Thus, in murder cases, especially within the paragraph 3 category, the scope for judges to further adjust minimum terms purely on the basis of chronological age is inherently constrained by the statutory framework.

5.2.2 Consequences for 18+ offenders

The Court then drew a critical inference:

“Parliament has decided that a judge sentencing a 17‑year‑old must take a starting point for the minimum term of 27 years for a murder which, if committed by someone aged 18 or over, would fall into paragraph 3 where the starting point is 30 years. Accordingly, Parliament must have intended that a particularly serious murder committed by an 18‑year‑old will engage the paragraph 3 starting point of 30 years or very near to it.”

Applied to Qasim, who was 22 at the time of the offence:

• He was several years beyond 18; the case could not be treated as one at the bare threshold of adulthood.
• His youth alone did not justify substantial departure from the 30‑year starting point.

5.2.3 “Particular immaturity” and R v Kamarra‑Jarra

The Court acknowledged that in exceptional cases, youth‑based mitigation may still justify movement below the statutory starting points:

“Where there is evidence of a particular immaturity in a child or young adult then a court may be justified in moving down from the starting point in Schedule 21 on the basis that a young person's chronological age may not always reflect their actual level of maturity (see R v Kamarra‑Jarra [2024] EWCA Crim 198).”

This passage is significant because it:

• Affirms Kamarra‑Jarra: chronological age is not always a complete or reliable proxy for maturity.
• Recognises that, even within the statutory framework, individualised assessment of maturity and functioning remains important.
• But also sets a threshold: only where there is evidence of particular immaturity (for instance, developmental delay, neuro‑disability, or substantially immature thinking) will movement below the starting point be justified.

Critically, the Court found that no such evidence of particular immaturity was present in Qasim’s case. His vulnerability and addiction were recognised, but there was nothing to show that his psychological or cognitive maturity was markedly below that expected for his chronological age.

5.2.4 Distinguishing R v ZA

The Court also addressed the defence reliance on R v ZA (details not given in the judgment but accepted to be a non‑murder case). Its key point was that:

• ZA did not involve a murder sentence.
• As such, it did not grapple directly with the statutory minimum term framework in Schedule 21, which applies only to murder.

The implication is that while ZA and similar authorities may inform sentencing of young people in other serious offences, murder sentencing is uniquely constrained by the statutory regime. General youth‑sentencing principles or guidelines cannot override or substantially re‑write Parliament’s deliberate calibration in Schedule 21.

5.3 Outcome

Having:

• Accepted the 30‑year starting point;
• Found no error in the judge’s treatment of aggravating and mitigating factors; and
• Rejected the argument that youth and vulnerability in this case justified a substantial downward adjustment;

the Court of Appeal held that the 30‑year minimum term (before remand credit) was within the proper range and not manifestly excessive.

The appeal was therefore dismissed.

6. Analysis of Legal Reasoning

6.1 The statutory framework: Schedule 21 Sentencing Act 2020

Understanding Qasimm requires a brief explanation of Schedule 21:

• Schedule 21 structures how judges set minimum terms for mandatory life sentences for murder.
• It provides several categories with different starting points:
  • Whole life orders in the most serious cases (para 2).
  • 30‑year starting point for particularly grave murders (para 3), including murders done in the course of robbery.
  • 25‑year starting point (e.g., for certain weapon‑related murders) and lower starting points for less serious murder types (e.g., para 5 with a 15‑year starting point for many other adult murders).
• Paragraph 5A then inserts a graduated structure for child offenders (14–17), reflecting a different set of starting points.

Within this framework:

• The judge first selects the applicable category and corresponding starting point, based on the facts.
• The judge then adjusts upwards or downwards from that starting point to reflect case‑specific aggravating and mitigating features.

In Qasimm’s case, the factual findings (planned robbery with a knife carried for the purpose of robbing, and a killing arising in the course of that robbery) made the choice of paragraph 3(2)(c) straightforward and uncontroversial.

6.2 Proper treatment of aggravating features

The sentencing judge’s approach to aggravation was sound and methodical. He:

• Acknowledged planning as an aggravating feature but limited its weight to avoid double‑counting, on the basis that most “murder for gain” will involve some planning.
• Declined to treat the use of a knife as separately aggravating because the paragraph 3 category (murder in course of robbery) will often assume the presence of serious violence or weapons; to add this as an aggravating feature would risk punishing the same element twice.
• Gave significant weight to post‑offence conduct:
  • Disposal of the knife and phone/SIM.
  • Flight to Pakistan and prolonged evasion of arrest.

The Court of Appeal implicitly endorsed this methodology. Importantly, this reaffirms for future cases that:

• Judges must be careful to avoid double counting factors already captured by the chosen Schedule 21 category.
• Flight and deliberate efforts to frustrate the investigation and trial can be rightly treated as serious aggravation, especially where the underlying offence is as grave as murder.

6.3 Mitigation: youth, vulnerability, addiction and good character

The more contentious issue was the weight to be given to Qasim’s mitigating factors:

• Age (22): The judge accepted that he was “a young man who had probably not attained full maturity”. But 22 is well into legal adulthood and, in the context of serious organised criminality, the courts generally treat defendants of this age as bearing substantial personal responsibility.
• Vulnerability and exploitation: The judge recognised some exploitation by Khan and that Qasim’s drug addiction and dependency made him vulnerable. However, Qasim’s central operational role – taking the lead in the car, using the knife, initiating the escape route, fleeing abroad – indicated a significant degree of agency and willingness, limiting the mitigation that vulnerability could provide.
• Drug addiction: Addiction can sometimes blunt culpability, but where a defendant willingly participates in a planned, profit‑driven violent robbery, addiction will often carry less weight as a mitigator than in impulsive or non‑profit‑driven offences.
• Previous good character: This was acknowledged but, in the context of a pre‑planned robbery and killing, its mitigating weight is inevitably limited.

The Court’s refusal to interfere with the judge’s assessment demonstrates a clear message: in very serious, planned violent offending, youth and vulnerability will rarely justify a large departure from the statutory starting point unless coupled with strong, objective evidence of unusual immaturity or impairment.

6.4 The role of intent to kill

One might ask whether the absence of a pre‑existing plan to kill should reduce the minimum term. The judge’s approach – endorsed by the Court – was nuanced:

• The robbery was planned, but the fatal stabbing was not pre‑agreed or pre‑intended at the outset.
• However, at the moment of the stabbing, Qasim clearly intended to kill Hopley (given the force and location of the blow).

In this scheme:

• The lack of a plan at the outset to commit murder is not a positive mitigating factor where the offender ultimately forms an intention to kill and then acts on it.
• Conversely, pre‑meditated intention to kill might have been an aggravating factor if found – but its absence merely removes that aggravation, rather than creating mitigation.

This is consistent with the principle that mitigation generally arises where the mental element falls short of full intent to kill or cause really serious harm – for instance, where the case could otherwise have been manslaughter or where intent is less clear-cut. Here, intent to kill was clear.

6.5 Appellate restraint in tariff appeals

The judgment also illustrates the Court of Appeal’s general stance of restraint in interfering with minimum terms for murder. Where:

• The correct Schedule 21 category is used;
• The judge has identified relevant aggravating and mitigating factors;
• There is no misdirection of law or principle; and
• The resulting term lies within the broad “band” a reasonable judge might select;

the Court is reluctant to recalibrate individual factors or reweigh them. Sentencing is recognised as a discretionary, evaluative exercise for the trial judge, not a mechanical calculation.

7. Impact and Future Significance

7.1 Youth and young adults in murder cases

The most significant doctrinal contribution of R v Qasimm is its clarification of how youth and immaturity operate under Schedule 21 for murder, particularly:

• Children (14–17): For these offenders, paragraph 5A sets bespoke starting points reflecting age and seriousness. Judges have limited scope to deviate from these unless compelling evidence of exceptional immaturity or other unusual factors is present.
• Young adults (18+): Once the offender is 18 or over, the case falls into the adult regime (e.g., 30‑year starting point under paragraph 3). The Court has now made clear that:
  • A serious murder committed by an 18‑year‑old that triggers paragraph 3 should normally attract a minimum term of 30 years or very close to it.
  • As the offender’s age rises above 18, it becomes progressively harder to justify deviation from the 30‑year starting point on age alone.
  • Only where there is evidence of particular immaturity (in line with Kamarra‑Jarra) is a substantial downward move justified.

This firmly limits the extent to which defence counsel can argue for large discounts in minimum terms for young adults based solely on youth, vulnerability, or addiction, without supportive expert evidence of developmental immaturity or impairment.

7.2 Strategy for defence practitioners

Qasimm has practical implications for defence lawyers seeking to mitigate in murder cases involving young adults:

• Arguments framed merely in terms of being “young”, “immature”, or “vulnerable” will likely have only modest traction if the offender is over 18.
• Where substantial reduction from a 30‑year starting point is sought, there will be a premium on obtaining:
  • Psychological or psychiatric reports, or
  • Neurodevelopmental assessments
  demonstrating particular immaturity in the Kamarra‑Jarra sense.
• Counsel should be realistic with clients: in very serious robberies and drug‑related killings that trigger paragraph 3, even 18‑ to 21‑year‑olds may face near‑30‑year tariffs absent clear evidence of exceptional immaturity.

7.3 Limited role of general youth‑sentencing authorities in murder

By distinguishing ZA, the Court reinforces that:

• General youth sentencing cases and guidelines (designed for discretionary maximum sentences in other offences) cannot be used to circumvent the statutory structure for murder in Schedule 21.
• Murder is a special case: Parliament has directly prescribed the minimum term architecture, and courts must work within that architecture.

7.4 Drug‑related robberies and serious minimum terms

Beyond youth, Qasimm underlines the sentencing seriousness of:

• Planned robberies of drug dealers involving weapons and ambush;
• Offences committed in crowded, public or residential areas (here, a busy shopping and residential area in Birmingham);
• Use of unsuspecting third parties (drivers) who may end up as the victims of fatal violence.

Such cases will routinely fall into paragraph 3 and attract very high minimum terms. The case signals to those involved in drug‑market violence that courts will not treat “criminal on criminal” offending as significantly less serious; the death of any human being, even within criminal milieus, carries the full weight of murder sentencing law.

8. Complex Concepts Explained

8.1 Life sentence vs minimum term

• A life sentence for murder means the defendant is subject to the sentence for the rest of their life.
• The court sets a minimum term – the period the defendant must serve in custody before being eligible to be considered for release by the Parole Board.
• After release (if granted), the individual remains on licence for life and may be recalled to prison if they breach licence conditions or commit further offences.

8.2 Starting points and adjustments

A starting point under Schedule 21 is not the final sentence; it is a benchmark. The judge;

• Identifies the appropriate starting point from Schedule 21 based on the nature of the murder.
• Then adjusts up or down, considering:
  • Aggravating factors (e.g., planning, attempts to conceal the crime, previous convictions, victim vulnerability, multiple victims, etc.).
  • Mitigating factors (e.g., genuine remorse, youth/immaturity, mental disorder, lack of intent to kill, previous good character, provocation falling short of a defence).

8.3 “Subsumed” offences

When the judge said the conspiracy to rob was “wholly subsumed” within the murder, he meant:

• Although conspiracy to rob is an offence in its own right, in this case the robbery and the murder were part of the same criminal transaction.
• Imposing a separate (and consecutive) sentence for the conspiracy could risk double punishment for essentially the same conduct.
• Accordingly, the conspiracy did not lead to a separate minimum term; it was taken into account as part of the murder tariff.

8.4 Pre‑sentence report (PSR)

A pre‑sentence report is a document prepared (usually by the Probation Service) to assist the court in sentencing by providing information about the offender’s background, risk, and needs. Under section 33 of the Sentencing Act 2020, courts must consider whether such a report is necessary before passing certain sentences.

In Qasimm, the Court of Appeal confirmed that a PSR was not necessary given:

• The gravity of the offence;
• The wealth of information already available from the trial and sentencing submissions; and
• The absence of any identified need for further specialist assessment directly bearing on sentencing.

8.5 Respondent’s Notice

A Respondent’s Notice is a document filed by the respondent (here, the prosecution) in an appeal, indicating the grounds on which it opposes the appeal and, sometimes, seeking to uphold the result on alternative grounds or invite the court to vary the order in some way. It structures the Crown’s arguments for the appellate hearing.

9. Conclusion

R v Qasimm is a significant sentencing authority that reinforces and refines the law in several respects:

• It confirms that murder committed in the course of a robbery attracts a 30‑year starting point under paragraph 3(2)(c) of Schedule 21, and that this starting point will often be applied without reduction in cases of serious, planned violent robbery.
• It emphasises the limited scope for reducing that 30‑year starting point for offenders aged 18+ on the basis of youth alone, given Parliament’s express structure in paragraph 5A for 14–17‑year‑olds.
• It clarifies that a judge may move down from the starting points only where there is evidence of particular immaturity, as recognised in R v Kamarra‑Jarra; simple assertions of youth, vulnerability or addiction will seldom suffice, especially where the offender has played a central, active role in planned violent crime.
• It underlines the appellate court’s reluctance to interfere with a sentencing judge’s balancing exercise absent clear error of principle or manifest excess.

In the broader legal context, Qasimm strengthens the message that Parliament’s statutory framework for murder sets tight parameters around judicial discretion, particularly in relation to youth and immaturity, and that those who participate in organised, armed robberies with fatal consequences can expect very long minimum terms, even at relatively young adult ages, unless exceptional mitigating factors can be demonstrated.