Upward departures in money-laundering sentencing where underlying drugs harm is identifiable: Court of Appeal affirms Ogden-calibrated approach in R v Masih & Singh [2025] EWCA Crim 1236

Citation: R v Masih & Anor (Singh) [2025] EWCA Crim 1236

Court: Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)

Judgment date: 10 September 2025

Introduction

This appeal concerns sentencing for money laundering arising out of an organised criminal gang’s wholesale cocaine operation of exceptional scale, including domestic distribution and export to Australia. The appellants, Masih (aged 44 at sentence) and Singh (aged 42), each pleaded guilty to conspiracy to conceal, convert, disguise or transfer criminal property (Criminal Law Act 1977, s 1(1)). Both were trusted handlers within a network led by Tarlochan Mahal, who directed from overseas and used encrypted communications (EncroChat). Masih acted as a principal money handler and allowed his home to be used for counting; Singh managed Mahal’s convenience store and used the EncroChat handle “Harryputter,” evidencing knowledge and active participation in cash movements closely tied to cocaine supply.

At first instance, HHJ Maylin assessed both as Culpability A, Harm Category 3 under the Sentencing Council’s Money Laundering Guideline (with a Category 3 starting point premised on £1 million). She then uplifted materially to reflect the underlying offence—wholesale Class A supply—drawing on the “Harm B” direction in the guideline and the drugs supply guideline (cocaine). Masih received 8 years’ imprisonment (15% plea credit); Singh 7 years and 2 months (10% credit). The central appellate issue was whether those uplifts outside the money-laundering guideline range were lawful and proportionate, or instead manifestly excessive and double-counted harm.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal dismissed both sentence appeals. It held that:

The judge properly treated each appellant as Culpability A within Harm Category 3 for money laundering; if anything, the overall criminality was on the cusp of Categories 1 and 2 given the scale (c. £10m and hundreds of kilograms of cocaine), but the Court proceeded on Category 3A for the appellants’ purposes.
The money-laundering guideline expressly requires consideration of the harm of the underlying offence (“Harm B”). Where the underlying offence is identifiable (here, wholesale Class A supply), it is legitimate to move upward within, and in appropriate cases outside, the money-laundering range by reference to the relevant underlying guideline.
Following R v Ogden and subsequent authorities (Campbell; Thompson), courts should not simply substitute the harsher guideline; rather, they should calibrate between the two, often landing “somewhere between” the money-laundering and drugs-supply starting points.
On that approach, uplifts of 4 years (Masih) and 3.5 years (Singh) were amply justified and not manifestly excessive, particularly given the judge’s generous mitigation reductions and plea credits.
Arguments on mis-categorisation (3A vs 3B) and parity failed; any differential between the two sentences was justified by role, duration, sums handled, and timing of plea.

Factual context

The gang, led by Mahal, operated on a commercial wholesale scale, moving hundreds of kilograms of cocaine and many millions of pounds in cash. EncroChat messages revealed direct managerial control from abroad and the appellants’ trusted roles. Over short windows evidenced by EncroChat data:

Masih (“Moralblazer”) discussed c. £1.345m over 66 days (3 April–8 June 2020), facilitated cash collection and counting, and had direct lines to Mahal.
Singh (“Harryputter”) discussed c. £732k over 26 days (4–30 April 2020), managed Mahal’s convenience store, and used it as a front to launder drugs proceeds.

Exemplar events in the wider conspiracy included a £1m cash seizure and a 161kg cocaine seizure. Both appellants declined to answer questions in interview.

The sentencing exercise at first instance

For Masih, the judge placed him in Culpability A, Category 3, arriving initially at the Category 3-A starting point (7–8 years’ territory), but then uplifted outside the money-laundering range to reflect the underlying wholesale drugs operation, fixing an “after trial” notional figure of 12 years before mitigation. After reductions for role, remorse, character, and plea (15%), the custodial term was 8 years.

For Singh, the judge took a 6.5-year starting point (slightly below the 7-year Category 3-A benchmark to reflect a sub-£1m amount), then adjusted to 10 years to reflect the underlying drugs harm. After mitigation to 8 years and 10% credit for a late plea, the final sentence was 7 years 2 months.

Grounds of appeal and responses

The appellants’ central theme was that the uplifts were excessive and double-counted the underlying harm. Singh further argued mis-categorisation (3B rather than 3A), and both pressed parity-based points. The respondent contended the uplift was mandated by the guideline’s “Harm B” instruction and justified by the scale: a global operation turning over c. £10m and 1,400kg over about three months, aiming at 2,000kg monthly, with the appellants knowingly enabling management from the safety of Dubai. The judge’s mitigation reductions were generous, and parity was respected given different roles, sums, durations, and plea timings.

Analysis

Precedents and materials cited

Money Laundering Guideline (Sentencing Council). Two-stage harm analysis is central:

Harm by value bands (Category 3: £500k–£2m, starting point premised on £1m; Category 2: £2m–£10m; Category 1: £10m+).
“Harm B” requires taking account of harm associated with the underlying offence and, where identifiable, having regard to the relevant underlying guideline; this may justify an upward adjustment within or outside the money-laundering range.

Drugs Supply Guideline (cocaine). Category 1 involves 5kg; the guideline recognises that where an operation is “on the most serious and commercial scale,” sentences of 20 years and above may be appropriate depending on role. For Category 1: leading role starting point 14 years (range 12–16); significant role starting point 10 years (range 9–12).

R v Khan [2014] 1 Cr App R (S) 10. Sentencing in conspiracies requires balancing individual culpability and the scale of the overall enterprise. Role informs culpability; the wider conspiracy is an aggravating factor, particularly where the offender appreciates the scale.

Shaun Smith & Ors [2020] EWCA Crim 994. Conspiracies should be categorised by reference to the overall harm; individual culpability is then assessed by role. Avoid speculative maths based on individual profits in isolation from the greater conspiracy.

R v Cavanagh [2021] EWCA Crim 1584. Harm assessment is not limited to product seized at the end of surveillance; a fair, realistic assessment of the conspiracy’s actual and intended operations is required.

R v Ogden [2017] 1 WLR 1224; R v Campbell [2017] EWCA Crim 213; R v Thompson [2017] EWCA Crim 734. Where two guidelines potentially apply (here, money laundering and drugs supply), courts should not simply pick the harsher. Instead, the sentence should be calibrated in light of both, often landing between the two starting points; Campbell emphasises it is an error to simply prefer the heavier regime; Thompson approved a midpoint approach consistent with Ogden.

Sentencing Act 2020, s 63. The court may have regard to harm intended or foreseeably caused had the criminality continued.

Sentencing Act 2020, s 33. Pre-sentence reports: the Court noted they were not obtained below but directed they were unnecessary; the absence did not invalidate the sentences.

Legal reasoning applied by the Court

Categorisation under the money-laundering guideline. The judge’s placement of both appellants in Category 3A was unobjectionable. The Court observed that, set against the conspiracy’s overall £10m, a higher harm category (cusp of Categories 1/2) was at least arguable, reinforcing the seriousness.
Operation of “Harm B” and reference to the drugs guideline. Because the underlying offence was known and extreme (wholesale cocaine), the guideline mandated consideration of the underlying harm. It was therefore legitimate to uplift outside the money-laundering range. The Court emphasised that sentencing should be informed by the drugs guideline but not dictated by it.
Ogden-calibrated approach. Drawing on Ogden, Campbell and Thompson, the Court reaffirmed that the correct methodology is to pitch the sentence between the money-laundering and drugs-supply benchmarks rather than to transplant the harsher regime. On that analytical framework, uplifts of 4 years (Masih) and 3.5 years (Singh) were well within reasonable bounds given the conspiracy’s scale, the appellants’ knowledge and proximity to management, and the sophisticated laundering methods enabling overseas leadership.
Individualisation and parity. Differences in amount, duration and plea timing justified the small (but real) gradation between the appellants. Masih handled more and for longer; he also pleaded earlier, earning more credit. Singh’s contention that he was Category 3B was rejected; the judge’s finding of a significant role at the upper end, combined with direct employment by Mahal and use of the shop as cover, supported 3A.
Double-counting rebuttal. The Court’s reliance on Ogden/Campbell/Thompson deliberately avoids double counting by forbidding wholesale substitution of the drugs guideline and instead endorsing cross-guideline calibration. The resultant uplift corrects for underlying harm without replicating it.
Intended continuation of harm. While s 63 SA 2020 permits considering intended or foreseeable harm had the conspiracy continued, the Court noted the judge did not disbelieve that each appellant had effectively withdrawn; this tempered reliance on continuation but did not alter the permissibility of the uplifts based on the demonstrated underlying harm and the conspiracy’s scope during participation.

Impact and future significance

This decision consolidates and sharpens sentencing practice in money-laundering cases linked to serious underlying criminality, especially drugs conspiracies:

Clear endorsement of upward departures. Where the underlying offence is identifiable and serious, judges are not confined to the money-laundering range. Substantial uplifts outside the range can be justified.
Ogden calibration is the key control. Courts must use the drugs guideline as a reference point to gauge the uplift but must not automatically apply it. Expect reasoned sentences that sit “between” the guidelines, especially where operations are at the “most serious and commercial scale.”
Couriers and cash handlers are exposed. This case underscores that those who move or count the cash can attract sentences approaching those for drug movers if they knowingly enable the wider enterprise, particularly where trusted by leadership and using sophisticated methods to facilitate cross-border management.
Harm assessment can reflect the whole conspiracy. Consistent with Khan, Shaun Smith, and Cavanagh, courts may anchor harm in the overall conspiracy rather than what can be proved for an individual transaction-by-transaction, subject to fair individualisation for role and duration.
Mitigation still matters, but has limits. Personal mitigation and plea credit were described as generous here; they did not overcome the gravity of the underlying enterprise. Early pleas remain crucial to sentence reduction.
Procedural note on reports (s 33 SA 2020). The absence of pre-sentence reports did not invalidate sentences; appellate courts may direct they are unnecessary, but the safer course remains to obtain reports unless clearly redundant.

Complex concepts simplified

Culpability categories (A/B/C). A reflects higher blameworthiness (e.g., trusted, significant role in a group; sophistication; knowledge of wider offending). B is medium culpability; C is lesser.
Harm categories by amount (money laundering). Category 3 covers £500k–£2m (starting point premised on £1m). Category 2 is £2m–£10m. Category 1 is £10m+. The “starting point” is a benchmark for a typical case within that category before aggravation/mitigation.
“Harm B.” A special instruction in the money-laundering guideline requiring courts to consider the harm from the underlying crime and, if identifiable, to have regard to the relevant underlying guideline (e.g., drugs supply). This can justify moving beyond the standard range.
Uplift outside the range. After selecting a starting point under the money-laundering guideline, the judge may increase the sentence to reflect underlying harm. In appropriate cases, this uplift can take the sentence beyond the range ordinarily set for money laundering.
Ogden-calibrated approach. A cross-check using both applicable guidelines: the court should avoid simply substituting the harsher guideline and instead pitch the sentence somewhere between the two, ensuring proportionality and avoiding double counting.
Conspiracy vs substantive offences. In conspiracies, sentencing reflects the offender’s role and awareness in the broader plan, not just discrete acts. The wider scope and intended operations can aggravate, even if the individual’s participation spanned a shorter period.
Parity. Co-defendants’ sentences should be broadly proportionate to their comparative culpability. Differences in role, sums, duration, and timing of guilty plea justify different sentences.
Credit for guilty plea. Reductions typically range up to one-third for the earliest plea, decreasing as the case progresses. Here, Masih received 15% and Singh 10% due to the timing of their pleas.

Practice points for sentencing hearings

For the Crown: Evidence of the underlying offence’s harm, scale, sophistication, and linkage to the money laundering will support an uplift outside the money-laundering range under “Harm B,” anchored by the drugs guideline.
For the defence: To resist excessive uplifts, press for precise role delineation, shorter involvement windows, and any disengagement. Challenge any attempt to simply transplant the drugs guideline; invite an Ogden-style calibration expressly reasoned on the record.
For the judge: Make the cross-guideline reasoning explicit. Identify the money-laundering starting point, articulate the “Harm B” basis for uplift, reference the drugs guideline as a comparator, and explain why the final figure (after mitigation and plea) is proportionate.
Reports: While the absence of a pre-sentence report did not invalidate the sentences here (s 33 SA 2020), good practice is to obtain one unless the court is satisfied it is unnecessary.

Conclusion

Masih & Singh affirms a clear and pragmatic rule: when sentencing money laundering that is inextricably tied to an identifiable and grave underlying offence (here, wholesale Class A supply), the court may move outside the money-laundering guideline to reflect that underlying harm. The uplift must be principled—calibrated by reference to, but not dictated by, the underlying offence’s guideline—consistent with the Ogden line of authority. In consequence, those who knowingly enable large-scale drugs conspiracies by handling the proceeds should expect sentences that approach the gravity of the underlying supply, particularly where their proximity to leadership and the sophistication of the laundering are proven. The Court’s dismissal of the appeals underscores both the legitimacy of substantial uplifts and the importance of transparent, cross-guideline reasoning to achieve proportionality without double counting.

This commentary is for general information only and is not legal advice.

R v Masih & Singh [2025] EWCA Crim 1236: Upward departures in money laundering sentences when underlying drugs harm is identifiable (Ogden-calibrated approach affirmed)