R v Larkin [2025] EWCA Crim 1222: Reaffirming the “One Starting Point” Rule and Clarifying Category 1 Harm in Coercive Control Sentencing

Introduction

This commentary examines the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) decision in R v Larkin [2025] EWCA Crim 1222, delivered by Lord Justice Holroyde on 24 June 2025. The case arose from a reference by His Majesty’s Solicitor General under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, contending that the sentence imposed for controlling or coercive behaviour in a family relationship (contrary to section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015) was unduly lenient.

The offender, Jason Larkin, pleaded guilty on the day of trial to a single count capturing a pattern of conduct over more than two years, including tying the victim (his then wife) to a chair and suffocating her with fabric, choking her with liquid and a beanbag while brandishing a knife, and later terrifying her during an aggressive confrontation. The sentencing judge imposed 43 weeks’ imprisonment and a five-year restraining order. The Solicitor General argued that the sentencing judge failed to apply the Sentencing Council’s guideline structure properly, particularly in (a) identifying and applying the correct harm category, (b) articulating and using the correct “starting point”, (c) overvaluing mitigation in the context of domestic abuse, and (d) allowing more than the usual 10% credit for a day-of-trial guilty plea.

The Court of Appeal’s judgment delivers important guidance on the structured guideline approach under the Sentencing Code, reasserts the “one and only starting point” principle tied to the definitive guideline category, explains why the harm here was Category 1, re-centres the limited relevance of “public good character” in domestic abuse cases, and confirms the orthodox ceiling of 10% credit for a plea entered on the day of trial.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court granted leave to refer and held the original sentence was unduly lenient.
The offending was correctly categorised as higher culpability Category A due to persistent conduct over a prolonged period.
On harm, the case plainly fell into Category 1: very serious alarm or distress having a substantial adverse effect, supported by the victim’s PTSD diagnosis, extended work absence, daily fear, and wider life disruption.
The Court held that the judge erred by not expressly selecting a harm category and by deriving his own “starting point” rather than using the guideline’s starting point for the chosen category (2 years 6 months for Category 1A).
There was no proper basis for any initial downward adjustment from the Category 1A starting point, though modest mitigation justified a three-month reduction to 27 months before plea credit.
The offender’s day-of-trial guilty plea merited a maximum 10% reduction; discussions between counsel did not warrant a higher discount.
Substituted sentence: 2 years’ imprisonment (after 10% reduction from 27 months, rounded slightly in the offender’s favour).
The restraining order was unchallenged.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents, Statutes, and Guidelines Cited

Serious Crime Act 2015, section 76: Defines the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship.
Criminal Justice Act 1988, section 36: Enables the Solicitor General to refer unduly lenient sentences to the Court of Appeal.
Sentencing Code, sections 59(1), 60(4), and 60(5): Impose a duty on courts to select the guideline category that most closely resembles the case for the purpose of identifying the starting point; only in rare cases may none of the categories sufficiently resemble the case (section 60(5)).
Sentencing Council’s Definitive Guideline: Controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship. Provides culpability and harm categorisations with corresponding starting points and ranges.
Sentencing Council’s Overarching Domestic Abuse Guideline: Emphasises particular features of domestic abuse, including how “good character” outside the domestic context may carry little to no weight when there is a proven pattern of abuse, reflecting the phenomenon of abusers having a public and private face.
“Familiar case law” on guilty plea credit: The Court relied on well-established authority that a plea on the day of trial usually attracts at most 10% credit, especially where there was no earlier unequivocal indication of willingness to plead to the eventual terms.

The judgment’s most salient doctrinal reinforcement is the insistence that judges must identify the applicable guideline category and use its specified starting point, with any adjustments transparently reasoned. This is not optional; it flows from the statutory duty in sections 59 and 60 of the Sentencing Code.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a) The “one and only starting point” rule under the Sentencing Code

The Court underscored, in direct terms, that under sections 59(1) and 60(4) of the Sentencing Code, a sentencer must:

Identify the guideline category that most closely resembles the offender’s case (balancing culpability and harm factors).
Use the prescribed starting point for that category as the only starting point.
Consider whether an initial adjustment up or down is justified by specific features of culpability or harm.
Then address aggravating and mitigating factors, explaining any further adjustment.

The Court criticised the sentencing judge for not expressly identifying the category (though it inferred the judge probably treated harm as Category 2) and for creating an alternative “starting point” of 15 months rather than beginning at the guideline’s Category 1A starting point (2 years 6 months) once the correct category was chosen. The Court re-emphasised that the defendant, the victim, the public, and an appellate court are all entitled to clear sentencing remarks: category selected, the guideline starting point, any initial adjustment and its rationale, and the impact of mitigation/aggravation thereafter.

b) Culpability and harm categorisation

Culpability: Both parties, and the judge, accepted higher culpability Category A due to persistent action over a prolonged period. The record showed repeated conduct across more than two years, involving physical restraint, threats, suffocation, and menacing behaviour.

Harm: The core dispute was whether the case belonged to Harm Category 1 or 2. The Court held it was “clearly” Category 1 based on:

Clinically significant psychological injury: diagnosis of PTSD and prescription of medication.
Substantial adverse impact on daily life: off work for two years, panic attacks, flashbacks, daily fear.
Severe and demeaning episodes: being tied to a chair, suffocated, threatened with a lamp and a knife, choked with liquid and a beanbag, and forced to adopt safety/avoidance behaviours (e.g., cutting hair short).
The enduring terror recorded, including in the third incident caught on CCTV.

The Court expressly rejected reliance on victim texts suggesting she might not pursue proceedings if divorce finances were resolved. Such communications were irrelevant: they may reflect a desire for a clean break from abuse, and the victim cannot veto prosecution.

c) Mitigation: limited weight in a proven domestic abuse pattern

Although the offender had behaved well in custody and suffered prior mental health difficulties, the Court endorsed modest weight only. It cautioned—consistent with the Domestic Abuse Guideline—against the idea that an offender’s “public face” or general good character outside the domestic context should count for much when there is a proven pattern of domestic abuse. The appellate court effectively endorsed the trial judge’s quantum of three months’ reduction for all mitigation combined, but rejected any larger mitigation-driven departure from the correct starting point and category.

d) Guilty plea credit: day-of-trial pleas and the 10% ceiling

The plea was entered on the day of trial; the victim had already attended court and confronted the prospect of giving evidence. While there had been discussions between counsel, the offender had not given an earlier unequivocal indication of a willingness to plead to the count eventually added. Therefore, none of the benefits associated with an early plea—saving court time, avoiding trial preparation, and, critically, sparing the victim pre-trial anxiety—had been achieved at the point when they would count for greater credit. The Court applied orthodox principles: the maximum discount available was 10%.

e) The substituted sentence

Category selected: 1A (higher culpability, Category A; harm Category 1).
Guideline starting point: 2 years 6 months (30 months).
Mitigation: modest downward adjustment of 3 months to 27 months.
Guilty plea credit: 10% (2.7 months), yielding 24.3 months.
Rounding slightly in the offender’s favour: 24 months (2 years).

The Court quashed the 43-week sentence and substituted a term of two years’ imprisonment, identifying this as the least sentence that could properly have been imposed on a correct application of the guidelines.

3) Impact and Significance

The judgment has several practical and doctrinal implications:

Guideline fidelity: Sentencers must articulate the chosen category and adhere to the guideline starting point. Adjustments must be principled and explained. This enhances transparency, consistency, and appellate review.
Category 1 harm in coercive control: Where there is diagnosed PTSD, prolonged absence from work, daily fear, suicide risk or attempts, and significant lifestyle disruption, Harm Category 1 will typically be engaged. This clarifies the threshold for “very serious alarm or distress” in section 76 cases.
Domestic abuse mitigation: The “public/private face” dichotomy limits the relevance of an offender’s good character outside the domestic sphere in the presence of a proven pattern of abuse. Practitioners should calibrate mitigation accordingly.
Victim agency and communications: Attempts by victims to negotiate or express reluctance to pursue proceedings will generally carry little or no weight in sentencing, both because they may be driven by a desire to escape ongoing abuse and because charging decisions do not rest with victims.
Guilty plea credit discipline: Day-of-trial pleas, absent earlier unequivocal indications, will attract no more than 10% credit. Counsel’s private discussions are not a substitute for a clear, early plea or written indication.
Unduly lenient references: The case demonstrates the Court’s readiness to correct sentences that drift from the structured guideline method or under-assess harm in coercive control contexts. It will likely influence future references and appellate scrutiny in domestic abuse sentencing.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Controlling or coercive behaviour (Serious Crime Act 2015, s.76): A pattern of acts of assault, threats, humiliation and intimidation, or other abuse that is used to harm, punish, or frighten the victim within an intimate or family relationship, causing serious alarm or distress with a substantial adverse effect on the victim’s usual day-to-day activities, and where the offender knows or ought to know this impact would occur.
Sentencing “starting point”: In guideline sentencing, the “starting point” is the baseline sentence for the applicable category of culpability and harm. It is not created ad hoc; it must be taken from the definitive guideline for the selected category. Only then can adjustments be made.
Harm categories: Category 1 (very serious alarm or distress with a substantial adverse effect) is more serious than Category 2 (serious alarm or distress with a substantial adverse effect). Evidence such as medical diagnoses (e.g., PTSD), extended work absence, and pervasive fear strongly indicates Category 1.
Mitigation in domestic abuse: Positive behaviour outside the offending environment often carries little weight where there is a pattern of domestic abuse; the guidelines recognise abusers can maintain a “public face” that masks private harm.
Guilty plea credit: Credit reduces sentence length to reflect early acceptance of guilt, resource savings, and victim protection. Pleas on the day of trial typically cap at 10% unless a clear, earlier indication of willingness to plead was given.
Unduly lenient sentence reference (CJA 1988, s.36): Allows the Law Officers to refer sentences that fall outside the range reasonably open to the sentencing judge. The Court of Appeal substitutes the least sentence that could properly have been passed.

Key Practical Lessons for Practitioners and Judges

Always state the selected guideline category and the corresponding starting point in sentencing remarks. Explain any initial up/down adjustment and then the effect of aggravation/mitigation.
Ensure victim personal statements are updated shortly before sentencing, particularly in coercive control cases where ongoing impact is central to harm categorisation.
In domestic abuse cases, avoid over-reliance on general good character or institutional behaviour in custody; focus on whether mitigation truly bears on culpability or risk.
For plea credit beyond 10% close to trial, the defence must demonstrate a clear, unequivocal earlier indication of guilt to the count eventually accepted.
Communications from victims about not pursuing a case should be treated with care; they rarely carry weight in sentencing and do not affect prosecutorial decisions.

Conclusion

R v Larkin is a strong restatement of the structured sentencing methodology mandated by the Sentencing Code and the Sentencing Council’s definitive guidelines. The Court of Appeal made plain that there is only one permissible “starting point”: the one attached to the guideline category that most closely resembles the case. On the facts, the case was properly placed in Category 1A for controlling or coercive behaviour—reflecting very serious psychological harm and lasting life impact—with modest mitigation and a tight 10% cap for a day-of-trial plea.

Beyond its correction of sentence, the judgment offers clear guidance for future coercive control cases: serious, enduring psychological injury and functional disruption will generally justify Category 1 harm; “public face” mitigation is limited in domestic abuse; and day-of-trial pleas will not leverage discussions into enhanced credit. The decision should promote consistency, transparency, and victim-sensitive sentencing across the criminal courts in this evolving and critical area of domestic abuse jurisprudence.