R v Khan [2025] EWCA Crim 1518 – Harm Categorisation, Totality and Proportional Sexual Harm Prevention Orders

1. Introduction

The decision of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in R v Khan [2025] EWCA Crim 1518 is a sentencing appeal arising from a series of disturbing encounters in which the appellant drove around a residential area targeting schoolgirls on their way to school. The case primarily concerns:

the proper categorisation of harm and culpability under the Sentencing Council guideline for sexual communication with a child,
the application of the totality principle when sentencing for multiple related offences, and
the necessity and proportional duration of a Sexual Harm Prevention Order (SHPO).

Although the judgment is relatively short, it provides helpful clarification in three areas:

How courts may legitimately find Category 1 harm based on long-term psychological and behavioural impact, even where the conduct is limited in duration and involves no physical contact.
How the Court of Appeal will treat an arguable miscategorisation of culpability where the overall sentence is nevertheless not manifestly excessive.
That SHPOs, while appropriate in such cases, must have a proportionate duration; a 20-year order was held to be excessive on these facts.

The case also restates the effect of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 in providing lifelong anonymity to complainants in sexual offence cases, emphasising the obligations of those who report or comment on such proceedings.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 The Offending Conduct

The offending occurred on the morning of 9 March 2021 in Fenham, Newcastle, over approximately half an hour. It took place on the first day that pupils returned to secondary school after Covid-related closures.

Driving around the area, the appellant repeatedly approached groups of schoolgirls of various ages, often stopping his car alongside them, calling them over, and attempting to lure or intimidate them. For anonymity, the complainants are described as C1 to C10.

Incident involving C1 (age 18): The appellant pulled alongside her, asked her name, offered her a lift to school, and persisted even when she moved away; she was left “shaking”.
Incidents involving C2–C6 (ages 13–16): Similar behaviour followed – the appellant drove alongside groups of girls, called out to them (e.g. “Girl in the middle, come here, come here”), and repeatedly and aggressively shouted at them to get into his vehicle. They refused, hurried away, and contacted parents or reported the incidents on arrival at school.
Incident involving C7–C8 (both 16): The appellant engaged C8 under the guise of needing directions, then made a personal remark about her braces, followed them, and continued shouting even after being told three times that the police would be called.
Final incident involving C9 (14) and C10 (13): In the presence of male pupils, the appellant addressed the girls as “gorgeous” and “beautiful”. When a male pupil intervened, the appellant responded that he would “shag” the boys’ mothers, and then told C9 and C10 he would “shag” them and make them perform oral sex on the boys. He left only when told the police were being called.

One of the incidents was filmed, allowing the police to obtain the appellant’s registration number.

2.2 The Appellant’s Account

When interviewed by the police, the appellant:

blamed the children, claiming they had thrown a drink over his car and damaged it,
denied having invited any children into his vehicle or engaging in sexual conversation,
later accepted that he said he would “shag” the boys’ mothers, describing it as merely “a turn of phrase”, and
suggested that the complaints were racially motivated and false.

Two years later, when interviewed again, he maintained his denials and continued to blame one of the boys for damaging his car.

2.3 Charges and Convictions

The appellant pleaded guilty at the plea and trial preparation hearing to:

One count of harassment contrary to section 2 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997; and
Two counts of sexual communication with a child contrary to section 15A(1) and (3) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.

These guilty pleas attracted a 25% reduction from the otherwise appropriate custodial term.

2.4 First-Instance Sentence

The sentencing judge:

treated the sexual communication with a child counts as the lead offences,
sentenced the harassment count concurrently, and
imposed a Sexual Harm Prevention Order (SHPO) for a period of 20 years.

2.4.1 Sexual communication with a child

Against the joint position of prosecution and defence (who submitted that the offending was properly categorised as B2 under the relevant guideline), the judge:

categorised the offences as Category A1 (highest culpability and highest harm),
relied on victim impact statements to conclude that the complainants had been significantly and adversely impacted, and
identified a pre-plea sentence of 21 months’ imprisonment, within the guideline range for Category 1 harm (starting point 18 months; range 9 months–2 years).

2.4.2 Harassment

For the harassment offence, the judge:

assessed high culpability,
adopted Category A1 under the harassment guideline (starting point 12 weeks; range: high-level community order to 26 weeks), and
selected 20 weeks’ imprisonment, imposed concurrently, expressly taking into account the delay by making the sentence concurrent rather than consecutive.

2.4.3 Final sentence

Allowing 25% credit for the guilty pleas, the judge:

imposed a total custodial sentence of 15 months’ imprisonment,
and made a 20-year SHPO, partly justified (in the judge’s view) by the fact that the appellant had a child.

2.5 Grounds of Appeal

The appellant appealed with leave of the single judge. His counsel, Miss Hirst, advanced:

2.5.1 Grounds relating to the custodial sentence

The judge was wrong to treat the sexual communication with a child offences as the lead offences.
The judge was wrong to categorise the sexual communication offences as Category A1 under the relevant guideline.
The judge was wrong to treat the fact that the offences occurred on the first day back at school after Covid restrictions as an aggravating feature.

2.5.2 Grounds relating to the SHPO

It was unnecessary to impose any SHPO.
If an SHPO was justified, a 20-year duration was manifestly excessive.

3. Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal (Constable J delivering the judgment) reached the following conclusions:

It was not wrong in principle to treat the sexual communication with a child offences as the lead offences, provided that the overall sentence was not manifestly excessive.
The judge was entitled on the evidence to find that the harm was Category 1, in light of significant, ongoing psychological and behavioural impact on the complainants.
However, the Court accepted that:
- none of the culpability A factors were present, and
- it might have been more appropriate to categorise culpability as B, as jointly submitted below.
The Court also accepted that treating the lifting of lockdown restrictions as an aggravating factor was unwarranted and not explained in the sentencing remarks.
Nonetheless, taking account of totality, the Court held that a pre-plea total of 21 months was not manifestly excessive for:
- two counts of sexual communication with a child (each with a starting point of one year), and
- the harassment count (which alone would have warranted three to four months’ imprisonment).
Accordingly, the 15-month custodial sentence (after guilty plea credit) was upheld.
On the SHPO:
- The Court declined to interfere with the decision to impose an SHPO at all, holding that some period was justified.
- However, it held that a 20-year order was excessive and could not be justified merely because the appellant has a young child.
- The Court therefore reduced the SHPO duration to 10 years, and confirmed, in accordance with section 82 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, that the notification period was likewise 10 years.

Accordingly, the appeal was allowed in part only, limited to reducing the duration of the SHPO.

4. Detailed Analysis

4.1 Legal and Normative Framework

4.1.1 Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 – Anonymity

At the outset, the Court reminded readers that the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 applies to these offences. Under that Act:

Where a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person may be published during their lifetime if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the victim.
This prohibition is automatic and continues for the victim’s lifetime, unless:
- the victim waives anonymity in accordance with statutory requirements, or
- a court lifts the restriction under section 3 of the Act.

By expressly invoking this provision at paragraph 1, the Court underscores its continuing importance, particularly in cases involving non-contact sexual offences such as sexual communication with a child.

4.1.2 Offence of sexual communication with a child (Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 15A)

Section 15A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 criminalises sexual communication with a child. In broad terms, the prosecution must prove that:

the defendant intentionally communicated with a person under 16, and
the communication was sexual, or intended to encourage the child to make a sexual communication.

The offence is serious despite often involving no physical contact; it targets the grooming and sexualisation of children via speech or other communication. The Sentencing Council’s guideline structures sentencing according to:

Harm – typically Categories 1, 2, and 3, with Category 1 signifying the greatest harm or risk of harm.
Culpability – usually A, B, or C, with A reflecting features such as planning, targeting particular vulnerability, or persistent behaviour.

4.1.3 Harassment (Protection from Harassment Act 1997, s. 2)

Section 2 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 criminalises harassment causing another to suffer alarm or distress. It is typically a summary-only offence (subject to later legislative changes), with shorter custodial maxima, reflected in the guideline:

Category A1 harassment: starting point 12 weeks’ custody; range from a high-level community order to 26 weeks.

The judge’s choice of A1 for harassment was based on persistence over a prolonged period (albeit within a single morning) and the significant distress to numerous child victims.

4.1.4 Sexual Harm Prevention Orders (SHPOs)

SHPOs are civil orders under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (ss. 103A–103K), imposed by criminal courts to:

Prevent sexual harm to the public or to particular individuals, by imposing prohibitions tailored to the offender’s risk, and
operate alongside, but distinct from, the criminal sentence; breach of an SHPO is a criminal offence.

A court may impose an SHPO only where:

the offender has been convicted of a relevant sexual or violent offence, and
it is necessary to protect the public (or specific persons) from sexual harm.

Duration may be fixed or indefinite. However, proportionality – in both scope and duration – is key. R v Khan addresses this proportionality dimension.

4.1.5 Notification requirements (Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 82)

Under section 82, persons convicted of specified sexual offences and receiving certain sentences are subject to notification requirements (often referred to as “sex offenders’ registration”) for a period that depends on the sentence length. For custodial sentences of between 6 months and less than 30 months, the notification period is typically 10 years.

The Court here confirmed that, in light of the custodial term, the appellant was subject to a 10-year notification period. Unlike the SHPO, this is not a discretionary order but a statutory consequence; the Court was simply clarifying the position.

4.2 Precedents and Authorities Cited

This judgment is notable for the absence of explicit case citations. The Court’s reasoning rests primarily on:

the statutory framework (Protection from Harassment Act 1997; Sexual Offences Act 2003; Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992), and
the Sentencing Council guidelines for sexual communication with a child and harassment, including the overarching principles on totality and guilty plea reductions.

In that sense, this judgment functions more as a guideline-consistent clarification of practice rather than a case that pivots on conflicting prior authorities.

Nevertheless, it indirectly reflects established appellate principles:

The Court of Appeal does not interfere merely because it would itself have passed a different sentence, but only where the sentence is wrong in principle or manifestly excessive.
Even where a technical or analytical error can be identified (such as miscategorising culpability), the Court will not allow an appeal if the overall sentence remains within a proper range when viewed through the lens of totality.

The decision therefore sits comfortably within mainstream sentencing jurisprudence, while adding practical guidance on harm categorisation and SHPO duration in this specific factual context.

4.3 Legal Reasoning of the Court

4.3.1 Lead offence and the totality principle

The first challenge was to the judge’s decision to treat the sexual communication with a child as the lead offence, rather than the harassment.

The Court rejected this ground. It emphasised that:

In the context of these offences and the relevant guideline maxima, it was entirely proper to identify the sexual communication as the most serious element.
Harassment under section 2 of the 1997 Act carries a comparatively lower maximum sentence than the sexual communication offence, which justified its treatment as a concurrent, subsidiary count.
The crucial safeguard is that the overall sentence must not be manifestly excessive.

The Court’s approach is consistent with the totality principle:

A sentencing judge may select one count as the lead count, reflecting the main criminality, and structure other sentences concurrently or consecutively.
Appellate review then focuses less on the arithmetical breakdown and more on whether the global term properly reflects the total criminality.

Here, the combination of two sexual communication counts (each with a one-year starting point) and a harassment offence (warranting three to four months) comfortably supported a 21-month pre-plea total, which was then appropriately reduced to 15 months for the guilty pleas.

4.3.2 Harm categorisation: justification for Category 1

The second area of challenge concerned the judge’s classification of harm as Category 1. The Court endorsed this assessment.

The key evidence came from the victim impact statements:

One complainant (the first approached by the appellant) attended court four years after the offence and personally read out her statement – described by the Court as a “telling sign” of the depth of impact.
She described:
- being worried in public,
- becoming very wary about going to school,
- being prevented from seeing a best friend who lived in the area,
- being particularly anxious in the evenings and having stopped going out, and
- fretting about what might have happened had she or her friends got into the car.
She expressly described the impact as “long lasting”.
Another statement described:
- being unable to walk to school alone,
- missing school when her mother could not drive her, and
- feeling exceptionally worried about walking the same route.

On this evidence, the Court held that the judge was “clearly entitled” to conclude that the harm was significant and thus to place it into Category 1.

Importantly, this reinforces that Category 1 harm is not confined to:

cases involving physical contact or completed sexual acts, or
extended periods of grooming behaviour.

Instead, what matters is the actual impact on the victim, including:

long-term psychological distress,
substantial changes in lifestyle, education, or social functioning, and
persisting anxiety or fear, even years later.

The case thus stands as a clear illustration that verbal and situational harassment with sexualised content can produce Category 1 harm, particularly in child victims.

4.3.3 Culpability: A or B, and does it matter?

By contrast, the Court was sympathetic to the argument that culpability had been overstated.

Miss Hirst argued that:

none of the specific culpability A factors listed in the guideline were present, and
both prosecution and defence had properly submitted that the case fell into culpability B.

The Court accepted that:

“none of the culpability A factors were present”,
none were identified by the judge, and
“on the evidence before the judge it might have been more appropriate” to treat the case as culpability B.

If culpability were B and harm Category 1, the guideline would indicate:

a starting point of one year, within a range of a high-level community order to 18 months’ imprisonment.

Yet the Court held that, even on that basis, a 21-month total prior to plea credit was not manifestly excessive once totality and the harassment count were taken into account.

The Court’s approach demonstrates two things:

Guideline categorisation is important, but it is not a rigid formula. An arguable miscategorisation in one dimension does not automatically invalidate the sentence where the overall outcome sits within the permissible range.
The appellate focus remains on overall proportionality, rather than on correcting every arguable analytical misstep made by the sentencing judge.

4.3.4 Covid context as an aggravating factor

The appellant also challenged the judge’s view that the offending being committed on the first day back at school after lifting Covid restrictions was an aggravating feature.

The Court agreed with the criticism:

It was “not easy to discern” from the sentencing remarks why the judge regarded this as aggravating.
The Court accepted that this factor should not have been treated as aggravating.

This is a specific but important point. It indicates that:

The mere fact that an offence occurred at a time of Covid-related transition (such as school reopening) is not inherently aggravating.
Any such reliance would require a clear causal link demonstrating that the timing materially increased the seriousness – for example, by exploiting particular vulnerabilities created by the pandemic context.

The Court did not, however, find that this error rendered the sentence manifestly excessive, again because of the strength of the underlying criminality and the totality assessment.

4.3.5 Necessity of an SHPO

On the SHPO, the appellant contended that no such order was necessary.

The Court rejected this argument and “did not consider it appropriate to interfere” with the judge’s assessment that an SHPO was warranted “in light of the conviction”.

This implies that:

The pattern of behaviour – repeatedly approaching schoolgirls, attempting to draw them into his vehicle, and making explicit sexual remarks – was sufficient to justify preventive restrictions to protect children from future harm.
The risk profile indicated by the offending justified at least some period of SHPO, even in the absence of previous sexual convictions.

The Court thus sends a clear message that SHPOs are appropriate tools in cases of sexual communication with a child and sexually motivated harassment, where there is an identifiable risk of reoffending.

4.3.6 Proportionality and duration of the SHPO

The more substantial success for the appellant lay in challenging the duration of the SHPO.

The Court accepted Miss Hirst’s submission that:

a 20-year duration was excessive on the facts, and
it could not be justified by the mere fact that the appellant has a young child.

The judge appears to have regarded the appellant’s parenting status as supporting a longer order – perhaps reasoning that the order could help protect that child or reflected an ongoing period of risk while the child grew up. The Court of Appeal firmly rejected that as a sufficient basis.

The Court held that a shorter period was appropriate and substituted a 10-year SHPO. Paragraph 25 of the judgment reads:

“We therefore substitute a period of 20 years for the period of 10 years and we also confirm that in accordance with section 82 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 the notification period is also to be one of 10 years.”

Read literally, this is internally inconsistent and plainly a typographical slip. It is clear from:

the immediately preceding paragraph (stating that 20 years was excessive), and
the final paragraph (describing the appeal as allowed only by reducing the SHPO),

that the Court intended to substitute 10 years for 20 years, not the reverse. The commentary, and any practice that follows, treats the order as reduced to 10 years.

The Court also confirmed the linked 10-year notification period under section 82.

The key principles emerging are:

SHPO duration must be proportionate to the risk and the seriousness of the offending, not used punitively or simply to “mirror” the offender’s family circumstances.
The fact that an offender has a young child does not, without more, justify extremely long orders. Protection of the public, not indirect regulation of parenting, is the touchstone.
For a single episode of offending over a brief period, even if involving multiple victims and serious sexualised content, a 10-year SHPO was considered sufficient.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

5.1 Sexual communication with a child – what does it mean?

In everyday terms, sexual communication with a child covers situations where an adult:

talks to a child (under 16) in a sexual way, or
tries to get the child to talk sexually (for example, asking for sexual photos or descriptions).

It can occur in person (as here), online, or by phone. The law does not require any physical contact or even a meeting; the idea is to criminalise the sexualisation and grooming of children at an early stage.

5.2 Harassment

Harassment occurs where someone engages in a course of conduct which causes another person alarm or distress. A course of conduct usually means behaviour occurring on at least two occasions. In this case, the harassment consisted of the appellant repeatedly driving around the same area and approaching multiple groups of schoolgirls, creating a climate of fear and anxiety.

5.3 Harm and culpability categories in sentencing

Sentencing guidelines typically assess:

Harm – the seriousness of the impact or risk to the victim(s), and
Culpability – how blameworthy the offender is, given planning, targeting, persistence, etc.

For example:

Category 1 harm usually means particularly serious harm, such as long-term psychological impact, major disruption to life or education, or very vulnerable victims.
Culpability A often means the offender showed high blameworthiness – for example, careful planning, persistence over a long period, or exploiting a particularly vulnerable victim.
Culpability B is “medium” culpability – wrongdoing which is still serious but without the highest-level aggravating features.

5.4 The “starting point” and “range”

When the guideline states, for example, “starting point 18 months, range 9 months to 2 years”:

The starting point is the sentence a court should usually consider for a case falling squarely within that harm/culpability category and with no major aggravating or mitigating factors.
The range is the band within which the sentence can move up or down depending on additional factors (e.g. previous convictions, remorse, delay).

5.5 Guilty plea reduction

Defendants who plead guilty receive a reduction in sentence, in part to recognise:

the saving of court time and resources, and
the avoidance of requiring victims and witnesses to give evidence at trial.

Here, the appellant pleaded guilty at the plea and trial preparation hearing and received a 25% reduction in sentence. So a sentence of about 20–21 months was reduced to 15 months.

5.6 The totality principle

Where an offender is sentenced for more than one offence, the court must avoid simply adding up sentences mechanically. Instead, it must consider the totality of the offending.

The principle means:

The overall sentence must be just and proportionate to the totality of criminal behaviour, not merely an arithmetical sum.
Sentences on different counts may be made consecutive (one after the other) or concurrent (running at the same time) to achieve an appropriate overall term.

In R v Khan, the harassment term was made concurrent with the sexual communication sentence, in part to take account of the delay in the proceedings.

5.7 SHPO and notification – a simple explanation

Two different mechanisms applied to the appellant:

A Sexual Harm Prevention Order (SHPO) – an order made by the court, lasting for a specified period (here, 10 years after appeal), that can:
- place restrictions on what the offender can do (e.g. contact with children, internet use),
- aimed at preventing further sexual harm.
Notification requirements (often called “being on the sex offenders’ register”) – arising automatically by law for certain sexual offences and sentences. For a sentence of this length, the period is 10 years. During that time, the offender must regularly provide information to the police about their address and certain other details.

6. Impact and Significance

6.1 Sentencing for sexual communication with a child

The case has several practical implications for sentencing in similar cases:

Category 1 harm can be found where:
- victims experience ongoing fear, avoidance of certain routes or areas,
- there is disruption to education (missing school when not accompanied), and
- the psychological impact persists for years.
Courts may treat apparently limited “one morning” behaviour as seriously harmful if the evidence shows substantial, lasting impact on vulnerable child victims.
The Court warns against automatic elevation to culpability A in the absence of the guideline factors; this invites sentencing judges to be careful in their categorisation. However, appellate relief will depend on whether the overall sentence is excessive, not on the categorisation alone.

6.2 Clarification about Covid-related circumstances

By rejecting the lifting of lockdown as an aggravating feature, the Court:

curbs a potential trend of treating the pandemic context as a free-floating aggravator, and
insists on a specific connection between any contextual factor and the seriousness of the particular offence.

This provides a useful check on speculative or emotive reliance on Covid-era circumstances in sentencing.

6.3 SHPO practice and proportionality

The reduction of the SHPO from 20 years to 10 years has clear implications:

It signals that very lengthy SHPOs (20+ years) are to be reserved for cases of entrenched or particularly grave risk – for example, repeated serious offending or high-risk predatory behaviour.
In cases like this – serious but arising from a single short period of offending – a 10-year order may more commonly be seen as an appropriate upper range.
Personal circumstances, such as having a young child, are not an adequate basis for extending SHPOs beyond what risk and necessity genuinely demand.

6.4 Appellate approach: error versus manifest excess

The Court’s handling of the culpability issue illustrates a familiar but important appellate stance:

Even where the Court is prepared to say that the judge may have miscategorised culpability, it will not interfere if the overall sentence is within a reasonable band once all offences and the totality principle are considered.
Defendants seeking to challenge guideline categorisation must therefore show not only that the category is debatable, but that it materially affects the fairness of the final sentence.

7. Conclusion

R v Khan [2025] EWCA Crim 1518 is an instructive sentencing decision in the field of sexual communication with a child and related harassment. Its key contributions can be summarised as follows:

It confirms that Category 1 harm may properly be found in sexual communication cases where children suffer long-term psychological and behavioural consequences, even in the absence of physical contact.
It cautions against stretching culpability A beyond the factors listed in the guidelines, while emphasising that an arguable miscategorisation will not necessarily disturb a sentence that is not manifestly excessive.
It explicitly rejects the use of the mere lifting of Covid restrictions as an unwarranted aggravating factor.
It affirms that an SHPO was necessary on these facts but holds that a 20-year duration was disproportionate, reducing it to 10 years and thereby reinforcing that SHPOs must be carefully tailored to risk and necessity.
It restates the significance of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 in protecting victim anonymity in sexual offence cases, including non-contact offences.

In the broader legal context, the case sits as a practical guide on how to apply sentencing guidelines, the totality principle, and the law on SHPOs in cases involving sexually motivated approaches to children in public. It emphasises:

the real and often enduring harm caused by “mere words” directed at children,
the importance of evidence from victim impact statements, and
the need for proportional, risk-based preventive orders alongside punitive sanctions.

As such, R v Khan is likely to be frequently cited in practice whenever courts are asked to assess:

the seriousness of sexual communication with a child in non-contact, public settings, and
the appropriate duration of SHPOs following a first conviction of this type.