R v Grizzle [2025] EWCA Crim 1298: Category 1 harm in ABH can be proved by substantial psychological impact without psychiatric diagnosis; consecutive sentences for in‑custody assaults on prison officers upheld despite delay

Introduction

This commentary examines the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) decision in Grizzle, R. v [2025] EWCA Crim 1298 (Cavanagh J giving the judgment), an appeal against sentence for an assault occasioning actual bodily harm (ABH) committed within a Young Offender Institution. The case squarely addresses three recurring sentencing issues:

How “harm category 1” under the ABH guideline can be established for psychological impact without a formal psychiatric diagnosis.
The correct interaction between the adult ABH guideline and the overarching guideline for sentencing children and young people when the offender was under 18 at the time of the offence but over 18 at sentence.
Whether delay in charging that results in non-contemporaneous sentencing compels concurrency under the totality principle, particularly where in-custody assaults on prison staff are concerned.

The appellant, a youth at the time of the offence (17 years, five months), attacked a custodial manager at HMYOI Werrington. He pleaded guilty and received ten months’ detention (after full one-third credit), ordered to run consecutively to an existing three-year sentence for later, unrelated in-custody offences. The appeal challenged the harm categorisation, the mitigation applied, and the application of totality. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentencing judge’s approach in full:

Harm categorisation: The placement of the ABH in harm category 1 was justified on the basis of “serious psychological harm and/or substantial impact upon the victim” established by the victim impact material and GP evidence. A formal psychiatric diagnosis (e.g., PTSD) is not a prerequisite for category 1 in this context.
Starting point and uplifts: With culpability B and harm 1 (B1), the 18-month starting point was correct; moving up to 24 months was warranted by aggravation: offending in custody; the victim was a prison officer performing public duties; and the appellant’s relevant antecedents (excluding later offences).
Mitigation and youth principles: Reducing from 24 to 15 months before plea credit was not manifestly excessive. The court reiterated that the youth guideline’s indication (broadly half to two-thirds of adult levels for 15–17-year-olds) is permissive (“may”) and not mechanistic.
Totality and concurrency: Ordering the sentence to run consecutively was proper. The offences were unrelated in time and circumstance (notwithstanding all were in custody). The need to protect and deter assaults on prison staff justified a consecutive term. The charging delay, though unfortunate and not the appellant’s fault, did not compel concurrency or a reduction.
Outcome: Appeal against sentence dismissed.

Case Background and Key Facts

Offence: ABH committed on 12 September 2022 at HMYOI Werrington. The appellant triggered an alarm specifically to attack a male officer, then assaulted the custodial manager (Mr Steven Leech) by punching him repeatedly, causing him to fall to his knees. The incident lasted around 10 seconds and was unprovoked.
Injury/impact: Physical bruising without long-term physical injury; however, significant psychological impact ensued. Mr Leech experienced serious anxiety, extended sickness absences, and ultimately lost his career in the Prison Service. There was GP evidence of low mood and anxiety; no formal diagnosis of PTSD.
Procedural chronology: Substantial charging delay (requisition issued August 2024; first appearance October 2024). In the interim, the appellant committed later, separate serious offences (including s.18 GBH and possession of knives) and was sentenced in October 2024 to three years’ detention by HHJ Lazarus.
Sentence appealed: On 29 January 2025, HHJ Meegan imposed 10 months’ detention (after one-third plea credit) for the ABH, consecutive to the three-year sentence for the later offences.
Appellate materials: The Court considered a recent prison report showing consistently poor custodial conduct, undermining assertions of improvement.

Issues on Appeal

Whether the judge erred in placing harm in category 1 and in adopting 24 months before mitigation and plea.
Whether the judge gave insufficient weight to mitigation, including youth, delay, and asserted recent progress.
Whether, under totality, the sentence ought to have been concurrent or otherwise adjusted, especially given the charging delay.

Precedents and Guidelines Cited or Applied

The Court’s reasoning proceeded primarily by reference to Sentencing Council guidelines rather than case law citations:

Assault Occasioning ABH Guideline: The adult guideline’s culpability/harm matrix was used, with the offence assessed at culpability B and harm category 1. The court confirmed that “serious psychological harm and/or substantial impact” can be established through victim impact material supported by general medical evidence; a formal psychiatric diagnosis is not required.
Overarching Principles – Sentencing Children and Young People: The court quoted paragraph 6.46, emphasizing that when an offender was 15–17 at the time of the offence, an outcome “broadly within the region of half to two-thirds of the adult sentence” may be appropriate but must not be applied mechanistically. The judgment underscores the flexible, non-formulaic application of this guidance.
Totality principle: While not expressly naming the Totality guideline, the court’s analysis tracks its core tenets: assess whether sentences for separate and unrelated offences should be concurrent or consecutive, ensuring the overall sentence is just and proportionate. The court affirmed that unrelated in-custody assaults on different dates, and the imperative to deter violence against prison staff, can properly attract consecutive terms.

Notably, the Court declined to engage in hypotheticals about what the earlier sentencing judge (for the later offences) might have done had the ABH been sentenced at the same time, reaffirming the appellate focus on whether the actual sentence imposed was wrong in principle or manifestly excessive.

Legal Reasoning

1) Harm Category 1 without psychiatric diagnosis

The appellant argued that without a formal PTSD diagnosis the harm should not be placed in category 1. The Court rejected this, holding:

Category 1 can be established where there is “serious psychological harm and/or substantial impact upon the victim.”
Here, uncontested victim impact evidence, corroborated by GP evidence of anxiety and low mood, showed a substantial adverse impact, including sustained sickness and loss of career.
Formal psychiatric diagnosis is not a precondition for category 1; what matters is the evidence of actual, substantial impact attributable to the offence.

This is a clear affirmation that the evidential threshold for psychological harm under the ABH guideline can be satisfied by credible lay and general medical evidence demonstrating real-world consequences (e.g., inability to continue in role), even absent psychiatric formalities.

2) Uplift within the B1 range to reflect custodial context and public duty

Starting from the B1 18-month benchmark, the judge moved to 24 months. The Court endorsed this as “plainly entitled,” emphasising:

Offending in custody: In-prison violence carries particular gravity due to the risk of cascading disorder, especially within youth establishments.
Victim a prison officer on duty: Assaulting an officer performing an important public service in a hazardous environment is a recognised aggravating factor.
Relevant antecedents: Prior violent and weapons-related offending, excluding later offences to avoid unfair double counting, further justified the uplift.

The Court also recorded that the judge self-directed against double counting, addressing a common sentencing pitfall when multiple aggravators overlap.

3) Mitigation: youth guideline is permissive, not formulaic

The reduction from 24 to 15 months pre-plea reflected youth, short duration of the assault, some asserted improved behaviour, and delay in charging. The appellant argued that this unduly minimised mitigation, suggesting youth alone would warrant about one-third off (to 16 months) and thus little allowance for other factors.

The Court rejected this line of argument for two reasons:

Guidance flexibility: Paragraph 6.46 uses “may” and cautions against mechanistic application. The range (half to two-thirds of adult sentence) is indicative, not mandatory. Sentencing remains a holistic judgment.
Contextual seriousness: Against the backdrop of serious in-custody violence, prior violent history, and ongoing aggressive behaviour (per the recent prison report), the judge’s overall reduction to 15 months was not manifestly excessive or wrong in principle.

4) Totality, delay, and concurrency

The appellant contended that absent the charging delay, the ABH would have been sentenced alongside the later offences and likely made concurrent, or that earlier sentencing would have depressed the later total. The Court held:

Unrelated offences justify consecutive terms: The Werrington ABH and the later Cookham Wood/Stoke Heath offences were distinct, separated by months, and not part of a single episode or course of conduct.
Institutional safety and deterrence: The imperative to protect prison staff and deter in-custody violence supported a consecutive approach.
No speculative re-sentencing: It is “wrong to speculate” about what might have happened had the ABH been sentenced earlier or together with the later offences. The appellate task is to assess whether the actual decision to impose a consecutive term was wrong in principle or manifestly excessive—it was not.
Delay not exceptional: Though unfortunate and not the appellant’s fault, the delay did not compel concurrency or a downward adjustment under totality.

Impact and Significance

The decision clarifies and reinforces several important sentencing practices:

Proof of psychological harm for ABH: Practitioners should note that credible victim impact statements, supported by GP or equivalent medical evidence, can suffice for harm category 1. While formal psychiatric evidence may strengthen a case, its absence is not determinative.
Custodial assaults on staff: Expect meaningful uplifts within the guideline range and a strong presumption toward consecutive sentences for discrete in-custody assaults on officers, reflecting institutional safety and deterrence.
Youth sentencing flexibility: The “half to two-thirds” indicator for 15–17-year-olds is not a discount formula; courts retain latitude to calibrate sentences to the overall seriousness and personal mitigation.
Totality and delay: Administrative or investigative delay leading to non-contemporaneous sentencing does not, without more, require concurrency. The focus remains on whether the overall sentence is just and proportionate across distinct episodes.
Appellate restraint: Reinforces the high threshold for intervention—“wrong in principle” or “manifestly excessive”—and the inappropriateness of reconstructing hypothetical concurrent disposals across different sentencings.

Complex Concepts Simplified

ABH (Assault Occasioning Actual Bodily Harm): An offence where the assault causes actual harm, which can include psychological harm if sufficiently serious.
Harm categories and culpability: Sentencing Council guidelines grade offences by harm (impact on the victim) and culpability (blameworthiness). Here, culpability B (medium) and harm 1 (highest) applied, with a starting point of 18 months and a range up to 2 years 6 months for adults.
Category 1 psychological harm: Can be based on evidence of serious psychological effects or substantial life impact (e.g., long-term sickness, loss of employment) even without a formal psychiatric label like PTSD.
Guilty plea credit: Sentences are reduced for early guilty pleas, usually up to one-third where the plea is entered at the first stage of proceedings.
Youth sentencing “may” guidance (para 6.46): For offences committed at ages 15–17, the court may consider imposing a sentence broadly within half to two-thirds of the equivalent adult sentence—but this is not automatic or mathematical.
Totality principle: Ensures the overall sentence across multiple offences is proportionate. Concurrent sentences are typical where offences arise from the same incident or course of conduct; consecutive sentences are appropriate for distinct episodes, particularly to mark separate criminality.
Consecutive vs concurrent: Concurrent terms run at the same time; consecutive terms are added. Consecutive sentences tend to be used for different incidents, victims, or where deterrence/public protection is salient.
Manifestly excessive / wrong in principle: The appellate threshold for altering sentence is high; the Court will not interfere simply because it might have chosen a different number but requires clear error or a plainly excessive outcome.

Detailed Observations for Practitioners

Evidence for harm: Where the prosecution contends for category 1 harm on psychological grounds, robust, specific victim statements detailing functional impact (work incapacity, lifestyle change) plus GP notes can be sufficient. Defence challenges should focus on causation (alternative stressors), duration, functional recovery, and any inconsistencies, potentially supported by expert evidence if appropriate.
Aggravation in custodial settings: Courts will treat assaults in prison as qualitatively more serious due to systemic risks. When advising clients, anticipate uplifts within the guideline range and the likelihood of consecutive sentences, even for youths.
Youth mitigation: The presence of youth does not guarantee extensive reductions where there is entrenched violent conduct or ongoing institutional aggression. Concrete evidence of rehabilitation and improved behaviour will carry more weight than aspirational assertions; adverse prison conduct reports can be decisive.
Delay and sentence structure: Delay alone rarely dictates concurrency. To argue for concurrency under totality, demonstrate a close connection between offences (same incident or tight course of conduct) or show that the overall punitive effect would otherwise be disproportionate.
Double counting vigilance: When advancing aggravating features like “public-facing worker” and “offence in custody,” ensure analytical separation. Here, the sentencing judge expressly cautioned against double counting—a practice endorsed by the Court of Appeal.

Conclusion

R v Grizzle provides clear and practical guidance on three fronts. First, it confirms that harm category 1 in ABH can be grounded on substantial psychological impact established by victim impact statements and general medical evidence; psychiatric diagnosis is not a prerequisite. Second, it reaffirms that the “half to two-thirds” indicator in the youth guideline is permissive and not a rigid tariff—holistic evaluation remains the touchstone, even where the offender was a youth at the time of offending. Third, it underscores that assaults on prison officers within custody will commonly attract upward movement within the guideline range and consecutive sentences, with the totality principle not requiring concurrency merely because of charging delays.

The judgment thus strengthens the jurisprudential emphasis on safety and deterrence in custodial environments, clarifies evidential sufficiency for psychological harm in ABH, and preserves sentencing flexibility for youth offenders in serious cases. For practitioners, the case signals the evidential and policy thresholds that will shape future sentencing for in-custody violence against staff and the limits of delay-based arguments under totality.