R v Dervan [2025] EWCA Crim 1525: Evidence‑Based Harm Categorisation in Breaches of Non‑Molestation Orders

1. Introduction

The decision in Dervan, R. v [2025] EWCA Crim 1525 is a sentencing appeal arising from a pattern of domestic abuse, stalking, racial hostility and repeated breaches of a non‑molestation order. The case sits at the intersection of criminal law, domestic abuse protection, and sentencing practice. It is particularly significant for:

• Clarifying how courts should distinguish between “serious harm” and “very serious harm” when categorising breaches of protective orders under the Sentencing Council guidelines;
• Reaffirming that, even in domestic abuse cases where harm should not be underestimated, the enhanced “very serious harm” category must still be proved to the criminal standard;
• Illustrating how the Court of Appeal recalibrates sentences where an error in guideline categorisation has led to a manifestly excessive overall sentence.

The judgment is structurally simple but doctrinally important: it is a short, tightly reasoned intervention on a specific point of sentencing principle that has wide ramifications for domestic abuse and protective‑order breach cases.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 The Parties and Relationship Context

The appellant, Mr Dervan, had been in a relationship with the complainant, Sarah Howarth, for around ten years. They had four children together. The relationship broke down in August 2022. In the wake of the breakdown and due to the appellant’s conduct, the Family Court made a non‑molestation order on 24 September 2024, prohibiting him from contacting Ms Howarth.

This family law background is crucial: the subsequent criminal offending largely consists of breaches of that non‑molestation order and related abusive conduct directed at Ms Howarth and her new partner, Arshad “Ash” Rigby.

2.2 The Offending

The offending occurred mainly on 18–20 October 2024, less than a month after the non‑molestation order was granted. It involved:

• Breach of the non‑molestation order by direct contact and threats;
• Assault by beating – the appellant spat in Ms Howarth’s face;
• Racially aggravated stalking involving fear of violence, directed at Mr Rigby but mediated through messages to him, his family, and Ms Howarth.

2.2.1 The initial confrontation (18 October 2024)

When Ms Howarth and Mr Rigby went to collect one of her daughters, the appellant appeared in his car. He:

• Pulled up alongside Ms Howarth’s vehicle and shouted abuse, calling her “a slag”;
• Made violent threats against Mr Rigby, including that he would “batter Paki Ash” and “get his hands on” him;
• Was reminded by Ms Howarth that a non‑molestation order was in force, yet persisted in the confrontation;
• Opened his car door and spat into Ms Howarth’s face, constituting the assault by beating.

Later that day, the appellant telephoned Ms Howarth purporting to apologise, but in the same call repeated his threats against Mr Rigby.

2.2.2 Escalating digital harassment (19–20 October 2024)

Over the following days, the harassment migrated online and continued via calls and messages:

• Messages to Mr Rigby via Facebook Messenger accusing Ms Howarth of disloyalty;
• Further calls to Ms Howarth;
• Messages to Mr Rigby’s brother‑in‑law making similar allegations;
• A series of highly abusive, threatening and racially charged text messages to Ms Howarth about Mr Rigby.

The texts included explicit threats to “catch him and seriously hurt him”, references to waiting for him at the gym and to “smash” his face, combined with racist slurs (“Paki boyfriend”, “Paki shagger”) and misogynistic insults directed at Ms Howarth. The appellant also:

• Threatened to set Ms Howarth’s house and her partner’s mother’s house on fire;
• Threatened to stab both Ms Howarth and Mr Rigby;
• On 20 October 2024, sent further messages calling Mr Rigby “a little Paki cunt”.

These communications plainly underpinned both the breach of the non‑molestation order (prohibited contact) and the racially aggravated stalking involving fear of violence.

2.3 The Appellant’s Criminal Record

The appellant’s antecedents were highly aggravating. He had:

• 24 previous convictions for 59 offences spanning 2003–2023;
• Offences including robbery, battery and public order matters;
• Six convictions for breaching an anti‑social behaviour order (ASBO);
• On at least nine other occasions, breaches of various other court orders.

This history established a clear pattern of chronic disobedience towards court orders and persistent anti‑social, violent or abusive conduct.

2.4 Sentencing at First Instance

On 13 January 2025, Recorder Andrew Vinson sentenced the appellant at Manchester Crown Court (Minshull Street) as follows:

• Assault by beating (spitting): 9 weeks’ imprisonment;
• Two breaches of a non‑molestation order: categorised as A1 (high culpability, category 1 harm – “very serious” harm), with a notional sentence of 3 years’ imprisonment on each breach after trial;
• Two racially aggravated stalking offences involving fear of violence: categorised as B2 (high culpability, category 2 harm), with a notional sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment on each after trial, uplifted from 12 months to reflect a medium level of racial aggravation.

The judge treated the guidelines of the Sentencing Council as the primary framework. For:

• Breach offences – the guideline starting point for A1 (high culpability, very serious harm) is 2 years’ custody, range 1–3 years;
• Stalking offences – the guideline starting point for B2 is 36 weeks’ custody, range up to 18 months.

Taking account of totality and giving full credit for guilty pleas, the judge arrived at a final total sentence of 4 years’ imprisonment. The judgment makes clear that this equated to a notional sentence after trial of 6 years.

A restraining order and the mandatory victim surcharge were also imposed.

2.5 The Appeal

The appellant appealed against sentence with the leave of Sir Nigel Davis. The appeal focused narrowly on:

1. The categorisation of the harm in the breach of non‑molestation order offences (arguing they should not have been treated as causing “very serious harm”); and
2. The overall sentence of 6 years after trial (and 4 years after plea) as manifestly excessive.

Counsel for the appellant, Mr Fireman, accepted that the breaches were serious and might warrant a finding of “serious harm”, but contended that the threshold for “very serious harm” was not met on the evidence.

3. Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), presided over by Pepperall J, allowed the appeal against sentence. The key findings were:

• The first instance judge was right to:
  • Treat the offending as extremely serious and heavily aggravated by the appellant’s record;
  • Impose sentences of 18 months (after trial) for each racially aggravated stalking offence; and
  • Impose a sentence of 9 weeks (after trial) for the assault by spitting.
• The judge was also entitled to find high culpability for the breaches of the non‑molestation order.
• However, the judge erred in finding that the breaches caused, or were intended to cause, very serious harm (category 1 harm). On the evidence:
  • “Serious harm” was proved;
  • “Very serious harm” was not proved to the criminal standard.
• Properly categorised, the breaches were A2 offences (high culpability, category 2 harm – serious harm) under the Sentencing Council guideline, with a starting point of 1 year and a range up to 2 years for a single offence.
• Given the aggravating factors, a sentence at the top of the A2 range for a single breach would have been justified; for both breaches collectively, a total of 3 years after trial was appropriate.
• Looking at the overall criminality (including stalking and assault), the just sentence after trial should have been “in the region of 4 years’ imprisonment”.
• Applying full credit for the guilty pleas (approximately one‑third), this equated to a sentence of 32 months’ imprisonment (2 years 8 months).
• Accordingly, the Court:
  • Quashed the 4‑year sentence on the principal breach count; and
  • Substituted a sentence of 32 months’ imprisonment, to run concurrently with the other sentences.

The result was that the total sentence to be served was reduced from 4 years to 2 years and 8 months.

4. Detailed Analysis

4.1 Legal Framework

4.1.1 Offences

The appellant was sentenced for:

• Assault by beating – contrary to s.39 Criminal Justice Act 1988 (a summary offence encompassing common assault and battery, here constituted by spitting in the victim’s face);
• Breach of a non‑molestation order – contrary to s.42A Family Law Act 1996 (criminalising intentional breach of a protective Family Court order);
• Racially aggravated stalking involving fear of violence – contrary to:
  • s.32 Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (providing for racially aggravated versions of specified offences); and
  • s.4A Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (stalking involving fear of violence or serious alarm/distress).

This statutory matrix reflects a continuum of abusive behaviour: from physical assault and threats, to stalking, to breaches of protective orders aimed at preventing further abuse.

4.1.2 Sentencing Council Guidelines

Although no previous case law is cited in the judgment, the Sentencing Council guidelines play a central normative role, particularly:

• The guideline on breach of a restraining order / non‑molestation order (described in the judgment as having categories A1, A2, etc. based on culpability and harm);
• The guideline on stalking and harassment, including how harm and culpability are categorised; and
• The general approach to racial aggravation, where:
  • A base sentence is identified;
  • An uplift is then applied to reflect the level of racial aggravation (here, a “medium” level).

The core structure of these guidelines is:

• Culpability (A–C) – depending on the offender’s intent, persistence, premeditation, and disregard of orders;
• Harm (1–3) – depending on the nature, extent and impact of harm caused or intended, running from lesser to very serious harm;
• A starting point and category range for each A/B/C × 1/2/3 combination.

4.1.3 The Appellate Test: Manifestly Excessive

The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) will interfere with sentence only where:

• The judge erred in principle (e.g. misapplied guidelines, took into account irrelevant factors, or ignored relevant ones); or
• The sentence is manifestly excessive – i.e. outside the range of sentences which a reasonable judge, properly directing themselves, could impose.

Here, the appeal succeeded because the misclassification of harm (A1 instead of A2) resulted in a sentence that was, in the Court’s view, manifestly excessive.

4.2 Sentencing at First Instance: The Recorder’s Approach

The Recorder’s reasoning, as summarised at paragraphs 7–9 of the judgment, may be distilled as follows.

4.2.1 Breach of non‑molestation order – A1 categorisation

The judge:

• Assessed the breaches as high culpability:
  • Serious and persistent breaches;
  • Committed shortly after the order was made;
  • Committed in defiance of a reminder of the order;
  • Against a background of domestic abuse.
• Assessed harm as category 1 – “very serious harm or distress”.

Under that categorisation, the guideline starting point is 2 years’ custody, with a range of 1–3 years. The judge then:

• Elevated the sentence within that range to 3 years for each breach, due to:
  • The appellant’s poor record;
  • Repeated breaches of court orders historically;
  • The presence of a child in the car during the incident;
  • Absence of any mitigating factors.

4.2.2 Stalking offences – B2 categorisation

For the racially aggravated stalking involving fear of violence, the Recorder:

• Classed culpability as high (B): the appellant intended to maximise fear and distress;
• Placed harm at category 2 – “some distress and psychological harm”.

On that basis:

• The starting point was 36 weeks’ custody;
• The range ran up to 18 months.

Taking account of:

• The previous convictions;
• The domestic abuse background; and
• Medium‑level racial aggravation;

the Recorder concluded that 18 months (after trial) for each stalking offence was appropriate.

4.2.3 Overall sentence and totality

After identifying the individual after‑trial sentences (3 years per breach, 18 months per stalking offence, 9 weeks for the assault), the judge:

• Applied the principle of totality to avoid disproportionate aggregation of sentences; and
• Gave full credit for the guilty pleas.

This produced:

• A notional total after‑trial sentence of 6 years’ imprisonment; and
• A final sentence of 4 years’ imprisonment after plea.

4.3 Grounds of Appeal

On appeal, counsel for the appellant advanced two linked arguments:

1. The Recorder’s categorisation of the breach of the non‑molestation order as category 1 harm (very serious harm) was wrong on the evidence. At most, the case justified a finding of serious but not very serious harm.
2. Consequently, the aggregated sentence of 6 years after trial (4 years with plea credit) was manifestly excessive when measured against both the guidelines and comparable sentencing ranges.

The Crown did not suggest that the stalking or assault sentences were wrongly assessed in principle.

4.4 The Court of Appeal’s Legal Reasoning

4.4.1 Confirmation of serious aggravation and justification for severe punishment

Pepperall J emphasised at paragraph 11 that the offending was:

• “Seriously aggravated” by:
  • The appellant’s previous convictions;
  • His “appalling record of breaching court orders”;
  • The timing – committed shortly after the non‑molestation order was made;
  • The fact that he persisted even when reminded of that order;
  • The presence of a child during the spitting incident;
  • The “vile racism” directed at the complainant’s new partner.
• Devoid of mitigation.

The Court agreed that the case “called for severe punishment”. This is important: the appeal is not a softening of the stance against domestic abuse or racist harassment. Rather, it is about the technical correctness and proportionality of the harm categorisation.

Nevertheless, the Court also drew attention to the limited actual physical violence:

“That said, unpleasant and persistent though these offences were, the only actual violence was the disgusting incident when the appellant spat on Ms Howarth.”

This observation feeds directly into the harm analysis.

4.4.2 Endorsement of stalking and assault sentences

At paragraph 12, the Court held that the Recorder was “entitled to conclude” that:

• The racially aggravated stalking offences merited 18 months’ imprisonment each after trial; and
• The assault by spitting merited 9 weeks’ imprisonment after trial.

This confirms that:

• The Court saw no error in the B2 categorisation of the stalking offences;
• The uplift for medium‑level racial aggravation (from 12 months to 18 months) was proportionate; and
• The spitting assault, although a single act, justified a custodial sentence in the domestic abuse context.

4.4.3 High culpability for breach upheld

The Court upheld the finding of high culpability (A) for the breach offences. This is unsurprising given:

• The deliberate and knowing defiance of a recent court order;
• The reminder from the victim that the order was in force, and the appellant’s persistence;
• The pattern of harassment across multiple platforms and over multiple days;
• The appellant’s long history of ignoring court orders.

The appellate intervention focuses solely on the harm limb.

4.4.4 Harm analysis: “serious” vs “very serious” harm

The key reasoning comes at paragraph 13. The Court:

• Examined the victim personal statement (VPS), where Ms Howarth described:
  • The appellant as a “monster” when intoxicated;
  • That he “frightens her” and “causes chaos”;
  • His behaviour as “never ending” and impacting her wellbeing.
• Expressly reminded itself that in domestic abuse cases, courts must take care not to underestimate harm from breaches of protective orders.

Yet, despite this caution, the Court concluded:

“We accept, however, the submission that the evidence in this case was insufficient to prove to the criminal standard that these breach offences caused, or that the appellant intended to cause, very serious harm.”

Instead:

• The case was held properly to reflect “serious harm” – significant ongoing fear, chaos, and impact on wellbeing;
• But it did not reach the higher threshold of “very serious harm”, as envisaged by category 1 in the guideline.

This is the central legal point of the case: even in domestic abuse cases, “very serious harm” must be supported by evidence to the criminal standard. A victim’s significant fear and distress, without more, may suffice for “serious harm” but not necessarily “very serious harm”.

4.4.5 Re‑categorisation to A2 and recalibration of sentence

Having found that the breaches were miscategorised, the Court re‑assessed them as A2 offences:

• High culpability (A);
• Category 2 harm (serious harm).

Under the guideline, A2 attracts:

• A starting point of 1 year’s imprisonment for a single offence;
• A range of up to 2 years’ imprisonment.

Given the numerous aggravating features (timing, persistence, history of order breaches, domestic abuse context, presence of child), the Court held that:

• The Recorder would have been “entitled to go up to the very top of that sentencing range” (i.e. 2 years) for a single breach;
• For “both breach offences” together, “a total sentence of 3 years’ imprisonment after trial was justified”.

Notably, the Court does not say each breach should attract 3 years; rather, it treats 3 years as the aggregate appropriate sentence after trial for both breaches combined when assessed against the guideline and aggravating factors.

4.4.6 Totality and overall sentence

The Court then stepped back to consider the totality of the criminality across:

• Two breach offences (now totalling 3 years after trial);
• Two racially aggravated stalking offences (18 months each after trial);
• The spitting assault (9 weeks after trial).

Applying the principle of totality, it concluded at paragraph 14:

“In our judgment, the just sentence after trial for the appellant's total criminality in this case was in the region of 4 years' imprisonment.”

This is a classic totality exercise: if the individual sentences were simply stacked consecutively, they would produce a far higher figure. The Court instead identified a global figure that appropriately reflected the overall seriousness.

Having identified 4 years after trial as the just total, the Court then:

• Applied full credit for guilty pleas – normally around one‑third for early pleas; and
• Arrived at a final sentence of 32 months’ imprisonment (4 years reduced by approximately one‑third).

4.4.7 Substitution of sentence on the lead offence

In formal terms (paragraph 15), the Court:

• Allowed the appeal against sentence;
• Quashed the 4‑year sentence on the first breach count (which had effectively been the leading sentence determining the totality); and
• Substituted a sentence of 32 months’ imprisonment on that count, to run concurrently with the other sentences.

Because the other sentences were concurrent, reducing the principal breach sentence to 32 months meant that the total sentence became 2 years and 8 months.

4.5 Precedents and Authorities

The judgment as provided does not cite specific earlier cases. Instead, the reasoning is anchored in:

• The Sentencing Council guidelines (as the primary normative framework);
• The general appellate test of manifest excessiveness; and
• The principle of totality in sentencing.

In effect, the case operates as a guideline‑refining precedent: it clarifies how the existing guideline on breach of non‑molestation/restraining orders should be applied in domestic abuse contexts, particularly on the threshold between:

• Category 2 harm – serious harm; and
• Category 1 harm – very serious harm.

Although the Court does not explicitly reference other domestic abuse or breach‑of‑order cases, its language and emphasis align with modern jurisprudence that:

• Recognises the seriousness of non‑physical domestic abuse and the controlling nature of breaches; but
• Insists on evidence‑based classification of harm in line with guideline categories and the criminal standard of proof.

5. Simplifying Complex Legal Concepts

5.1 Non‑molestation orders and their breach

A non‑molestation order is a civil protective order made by the Family Court under the Family Law Act 1996. It typically prohibits an individual (often a former partner) from:

• Using or threatening violence against the applicant; and/or
• Harassing, pestering or contacting the applicant.

Once made, it is a criminal offence under s.42A FLA 1996 to breach the order intentionally. This mechanism bridges family law and criminal law, allowing robust enforcement of protective orders.

5.2 Culpability and harm categories (A1, A2, B2)

Under Sentencing Council guidelines, sentencing judges assess:

• Culpability (A = high, B = medium, C = low), reflecting how blameworthy the offender is (planning, persistence, deliberate breach, etc.);
• Harm (1 = very serious, 2 = serious, 3 = lesser), reflecting how bad the consequences were or were intended to be.

So:

• A1 = High culpability + very serious harm;
• A2 = High culpability + serious harm;
• B2 = Medium/high culpability + serious harm (depending on the particular guideline wording).

Each category combination corresponds to a starting point (e.g. 1 year, 2 years) and a range (e.g. 1–3 years) that guides the judge.

5.3 “Serious harm” vs “very serious harm”

Although the guideline language is not reproduced in the judgment, in practice:

• Serious harm can include:
  • Substantial psychological trauma;
  • Ongoing fear and distress;
  • Significant impact on daily life or wellbeing.
• Very serious harm is a step beyond, often involving:
  • Grave or long‑term psychological injury;
  • Serious physical harm or danger of such harm;
  • Particularly extreme or terrorising conduct.

In Dervan, the Court accepted that Ms Howarth experienced serious fear and impact on her wellbeing, but did not find sufficient evidence of harm at the very serious level envisaged by category 1.

5.4 “Criminal standard” of proof in sentencing findings

Even at sentencing, where some facts are in dispute, the judge must apply the criminal standard of proof (“beyond reasonable doubt”, or being sure) for any fact that would increase the seriousness of the offence and thus the sentence.

Here, categorising harm as “very serious” rather than “serious” materially increases the sentence range. The Court held that the evidence did not establish very serious harm to this standard.

5.5 Manifestly excessive sentence

A sentence is “manifestly excessive” if it is so high that no reasonable sentencing judge, properly applying the law and guidelines, could have imposed it. It is not enough that the appellate court might have imposed a slightly lower sentence; there must be a clear and substantial departure from reasonable bounds.

In Dervan, the miscategorisation of the breaches (A1 instead of A2) inflated the notional after‑trial sentence to 6 years, which the Court considered outside the proper range. Once corrected, the just sentence was around 4 years after trial, i.e. 32 months after plea.

5.6 Totality

The principle of totality requires the court to ensure that when an offender is sentenced for multiple offences, the overall sentence:

• Is just and proportionate to the total offending behaviour;
• Does not simply add all individual sentences mechanically where that would over‑punish; and
• Is usually structured by:
  • Making some sentences concurrent and some consecutive; or
  • Adjusting the length of the lead sentence to reflect the others.

In Dervan, the Court affirmed that 4 years after trial was the appropriate global sentence, from which 32 months after plea was derived.

6. Impact and Future Significance

6.1 Guidance on harm categorisation in domestic abuse breaches

The clearest doctrinal contribution of Dervan is that courts must:

• Recognise the seriousness of breaches of non‑molestation orders in domestic abuse contexts; but
• Exercise discipline in distinguishing “serious harm” from “very serious harm” when applying the breach guideline.

In practice, this means:

• Victim personal statements are crucial, but must be assessed carefully to determine whether the harm is severe enough to justify category 1;
• The mere presence of multiple aggravating factors (e.g. timing, persistence, prior breaches) does not automatically elevate harm to category 1 – those factors may instead justify moving towards the top of the range within the correct harm category;
• Courts should explicitly ask:
  • Is there concrete evidence of harm (or intended harm) at the “very serious” level?;
  • Or is the case best described as involving “serious” harm, albeit with powerful aggravation?

This will help ensure more consistent and principled application of the guidelines across domestic abuse breach cases.

6.2 Reinforcement of severity for persistent order‑breaches

On the other hand, Dervan strongly reinforces that:

• Offenders with lengthy histories of breaching court orders can and should expect substantial custodial sentences for further breaches;
• Even where physical violence is limited (here, essentially to spitting), the totality of threats, harassment, and racist abuse can fully justify several years of imprisonment.

Sentencers may take comfort from the Court’s clear statement that “this case called for severe punishment”, provided the guideline categories are correctly applied.

6.3 Domestic abuse and the risk of underestimating harm

Paragraph 13 contains a nuanced warning: in domestic abuse cases, judges must take care not to underestimate harm from breaches of orders. The Court accepts that:

• Domestic abuse often involves patterns of coercive and controlling behaviour;
• Breaches of protective orders can be deeply traumatising even without serious physical injury;
• Victims like Ms Howarth, who describe the abuse as “never ending” and speak of a “monster” persona, may suffer profound psychological harm.

However, the Court balances this with the need to maintain:

• Evidential rigor – harm categories must be supported by evidence, not assumption;
• Proportionality – avoiding inflation of sentences beyond what is justified by the proven harm.

6.4 Racial aggravation in the domestic context

The case also underscores that:

• Racially abusive language (“Paki Ash”, “little Paki cunt”) used in the context of stalking and threats will lead to:
  • Conviction for racially aggravated offences (here, racially aggravated stalking); and
  • A sentence uplift to reflect the racist element (here, from 12 months to 18 months for each stalking count).
• Racial hostility towards a victim’s partner in a domestic abuse scenario will be treated as a serious aggravating factor, both for the stalking and for the overall sentencing picture.

This is consistent with broader sentencing trends giving significant weight to hate‑motivated elements.

6.5 Practical implications for practitioners

For defence practitioners:

• Dervan provides a useful authority to:
  • Challenge A1 categorisation where the evidence of harm does not clearly reach “very serious”;
  • Argue for A2 categorisation (and thus lower ranges) while still acknowledging seriousness;
  • Seek recalibration of sentence where guideline miscategorisation inflates the total.

For prosecutors and judges:

• The case emphasises the importance of:
  • Detailed, well‑evidenced victim personal statements;
  • Explicit reasoning when moving to category 1 harm;
  • Careful deployment of aggravating factors – raising the sentence within the correct harm category, rather than using them to justify an unjustified harm upgrade.

7. Conclusion and Key Takeaways

Dervan, R. v [2025] EWCA Crim 1525 is a focused yet important sentencing decision in the field of domestic abuse and breaches of protective orders. It delivers several key messages:

• Seriousness of breaches affirmed: Persistent, threatening and racist harassment in breach of a non‑molestation order, particularly with a history of non‑compliance, will rightly attract substantial custodial sentences.
• Harm categorisation must be evidence‑based: The distinction between “serious” and “very serious” harm is not rhetorical; it has concrete sentencing consequences and must be justified by evidence to the criminal standard, even in domestic abuse contexts.
• Domestic abuse harm must not be underestimated: Courts must take full account of the psychological and emotional impact of order‑breaches on victims of domestic abuse, but without over‑extending the top harm category absent clear proof.
• Guideline fidelity and proportionality: The Court of Appeal will intervene where an erroneous harm classification materially inflates the sentence, ensuring proportionality and consistent application of the Sentencing Council guidelines.
• Totality remains central: The identification of a global “just sentence after trial” (here, 4 years) followed by plea‑based reduction (to 32 months) exemplifies principled application of totality in multi‑count domestic abuse cases.

In sum, Dervan refines the law on sentencing breaches of non‑molestation orders by insisting on an evidence‑driven, category‑accurate approach to harm, while simultaneously affirming the gravity of domestic abuse, chronic order defiance, and racially aggravated harassment. It is likely to be frequently cited in future sentencing appeals involving protective‑order breaches in domestic settings.