R v Blachford [2025] EWCA Crim 1542: Cross‑Category Sentencing for Rape, Severe Psychological Harm and the Limits of Unduly Lenient Sentence References

1. Introduction

R v Blachford [2025] EWCA Crim 1542 is a Solicitor General’s reference to the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) concerning the sentence imposed for a single count of rape. The case raises important issues about:

How sentencing judges should categorise harm under the Rape Definitive Guideline where the psychological impact is very serious but arguably not at the most extreme level.
When a sexual offence occurring in a “friends with benefits” or quasi‑relationship properly attracts the aggravating features associated with domestic abuse.
The degree to which exemplary good character, remorse and judicial mercy can legitimately reduce the sentence in a serious sexual offence.
The scope of the Court of Appeal’s power on an “unduly lenient sentence” reference and the deference owed to the sentencing judge’s evaluative judgment.

The offender (a 28‑year‑old assistant restaurant manager) raped a 26‑year‑old co‑worker (“V”) with whom he had previously had a casual sexual relationship. He pleaded guilty at the Plea and Trial Preparation Hearing (PTPH) and was sentenced to 3 years 9 months’ imprisonment after a 25% guilty plea discount from a nominal 5‑year term.

His Majesty’s Solicitor General considered that sentence unduly lenient, contending that the case should have been placed squarely into category 2B of the Rape Guideline (harm category 2, culpability B) with an 8‑year starting point, and that the aggravating features and level of harm demanded a substantially higher sentence.

The Court of Appeal granted leave but ultimately dismissed the reference, holding that while the sentence was plainly lenient and at the outer edge of what could reasonably be imposed, it was not so low as to require appellate intervention.

The decision is significant because the Court:

Expressly endorses a “cross‑category” approach to sentencing rape cases where the harm is assessed as lying between guideline categories.
Clarifies the limited additional aggravating weight to be given to the Domestic Abuse Guideline where the prior relationship was a casual, non‑committed one.
Explains the outer limits of reductions for personal mitigation (good character, remorse, youth) in serious sexual offending.
Re‑articulates the “lowest sentence that could reasonably have been imposed” test in unduly lenient sentence references and the proper role of mercy in that analysis.

The judgment is anonymised in accordance with the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992; the complainant is referred to as “V”. The Court expressly declined to lift the statutory reporting restriction (para 1).

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) held:

The sentencing judge was entitled to assess the case as falling “between categories 2 and 3B” under the Rape Guideline (para 19, 24), rather than as an unambiguously category 2B case as urged by the Solicitor General.
There is no gap between the two relevant guideline ranges: category 3B extends up to 7 years, which is also the bottom of the category 2B range (para 24). In such borderline cases, a judge may, in effect, adopt a notional intermediate starting point.
Before allowing for personal mitigation, the least sentence that could reasonably have been imposed on the facts was about 7 years (para 26).
A reduction from 7 years to 5 years to reflect the offender’s personal mitigation (exemplary good character, immediate and continuing remorse, youth, absence of further offending) was at the outer limits of what was properly open to the judge but still within the range of reasonable sentencing decisions (para 27).
After applying the standard 25% guilty plea discount, the final sentence of 45 months (3 years 9 months) was lenient and arguably verging on unduly lenient, but not so low as to compel intervention on a Reference (para 28–29).
The Domestic Abuse Guideline was technically engaged because of the pre‑existing intimate relationship, but in the particular circumstances it was not a strongly aggravating factor (para 25).

Accordingly, while grant of leave reflected the arguability of the case, the Court ultimately dismissed the Solicitor General’s Reference and left the original sentence in place (para 29).

3. Factual and Procedural Background

3.1 The Relationship and the Offence

The offender and V were colleagues at a restaurant in Hampshire. The offender, as assistant manager, organised the work rota; V worked mainly on Tuesdays and Saturdays (para 3).

They developed a casual sexual relationship beginning in October 2023, correctly characterised (and ultimately accepted by both sides) as a “friends with benefits” arrangement (para 3, 10, 18). From the outset V made clear she did not want a committed relationship. The parties continued to have episodic consensual sexual intercourse, including up to about a week before the rape (para 3).

On 17 February 2024 they worked an evening shift together. V perceived the offender as being sarcastic, short and generally unpleasant towards her (para 4). After closing, they went to the staff room at the back to collect belongings. Once V entered, the offender:

Pushed her against a wall and attempted to kiss her twice; she said “no” twice and turned her head away (para 5).
Rubbed her vulva over her clothing; she tried to push his hand away (para 5).
Removed her jumpsuit, leaving her trapped with her arms restricted, and pulled it down to her ankles (para 5).
Turned her to face the wall, removed her underwear, and himself removed his trousers and pants (para 5).
Penetrated her vagina with his penis and continued until ejaculation (para 5).

The rape lasted a few minutes. The offender then left the room; V dressed and they proceeded to the car, as he was due to drive her home (para 6).

3.2 Immediate Aftermath and Messages

During the car journey, V was cold and withdrawn. When the offender asked what was wrong, she replied: “I’m really disappointed that just happened” (para 6). He told her not to feel disappointed; she replied that she did (para 6).

Later that night and in the following days, there were text exchanges in which:

The offender wished her “Goodnight” and apologised (para 7).
V said he should not have had sex with her; he agreed, said he knew that, and that he “hated himself” for doing so (para 7).
He acknowledged that what had happened was a “huge error” and repeatedly expressed regret and remorse (para 7).

These exchanges continued until 28 February 2024 when V asked him to stop contacting her (para 7). Both disclosed the incident to a mutual friend; the offender admitted having sexually assaulted V (para 8).

V reported to the police on 1 March 2024; the offender was arrested the same day (para 8).

3.3 Police Interview

Initially, the offender:

Denied rape, asserting a mutual “friends with benefits” relationship extending up to the date of the incident (para 8).
Claimed that on the night they hugged, kissed, mutually touched each other, he removed her bodysuit and they had consensual intercourse, during which she was highly sexually responsive (para 8).
Maintained that V voiced no objection and did not say “no” (para 8).

When confronted with the text messages, he attempted to reinterpret them as apologies for kissing her in the car or having sex at work, but eventually:

Admitted that V had said “no” to the first kiss (para 9).
Accepted that, looking at the messages and description, it appeared she was not consenting (para 9).

3.4 Proceedings and Plea

At his first appearance in the magistrates’ court, the offender gave no indication of plea and was sent to the Crown Court (para 10).

At the PTPH in the Crown Court on 16 June 2025 he pleaded guilty on a basis of plea which:

Accepted that he raped V at their place of employment after closing (para 10).
Described their preceding relationship as one of work colleagues who were also “in a relationship” involving flirting and occasional intercourse after work (para 10).
Admitted that on this occasion he “overstepped the mark” by not heeding her request to terminate sexual activity and that his continuation amounted to rape (para 10).
Accepted sending apologetic text messages and regretting his disregard of her objections (para 10).

The prosecution accepted this basis, save that it objected to the phrase “in a relationship”, preferring the characterisation “casual” or “friends with benefits” (para 10). That distinction later assumed importance in assessing the weight of “domestic” aggravation.

4. Sentencing at First Instance

4.1 Victim Personal Statement and Psychological Harm

V’s victim personal statement (VPS) was lengthy and detailed (para 11). Key aspects include:

A fundamental change in personality and self: from confident, outgoing and ambitious to feeling like “a stranger” to herself; feeling unsafe in the world and in her own body (para 11(i)).
A diagnosis of Post‑Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) with symptoms of depression and anxiety, chronic flashbacks, panic attacks and debilitating nightmares (para 11(ii)).
Marked cognitive impacts: impaired memory and concentration, feeling that her cognitive abilities “were taken from her” (para 11(iii)).
Repeated suicidal ideation where suicide felt like “the only way through” (para 11(iv)).
Engagement in trauma‑focused therapy, described as an “exhausting life‑long process” (para 11(v)).
Severe functional impairment: months unable to leave the house, ongoing inability to go out alone, and eligibility for a blue badge due to anxiety and PTSD (para 11(vi)).
Major disruption to education and employment: missing half her university year, ongoing study difficulties, inability to return to work, resulting in loss of purpose and independence (para 11(vii)).
Profound impact on sexuality and life choices: now terrified of men, redefining herself as lesbian, decision never to have children because she cannot contemplate needing a man in her life (para 11(viii)).
Deterioration in body image and self‑presentation, hiding in baggy clothes to avoid male attention (para 11(ix)).
Her sense that the person she was “will never return” and that she will be suffering for a long time (para 11(x)).

This VPS formed the evidential basis for the prosecution’s submission that the case involved “severe psychological harm” and thus belonged in harm category 2 under the Rape Guideline (para 14–15).

4.2 Personal Mitigation and Pre‑Sentence Report

The offender, 28 at the time of the offence, had no previous convictions and enjoyed what the judge later called “exemplary character” (para 12, 20). Seven character references, from family, friends and a co‑worker, presented him as:

Kind, loving, caring, respectful, selfless and supportive (para 12(i), (ii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii)).
Someone who puts others first, is not aggressive or coercive, and whose behaviour on this occasion was totally out of character (para 12(i), (v)).
Deeply remorseful, often in tears when discussing the offence (para 12(ii)).

A pre‑sentence report suggested:

Possible explanations for his conduct, including the possibility that he misinterpreted events as consensual sexual interaction (para 13).
That the report writer “encountered nothing disingenuous” in the interview, supporting the sincerity of his remorse (para 13).

4.3 Guideline Categorisation and the Judge’s Approach

Initially, before the VPS, the prosecution classified the case as category 3B: harm category 3 (no additional harm features) and culpability B (medium culpability), with ejaculation as an aggravating factor (para 14). After reading the VPS, the Crown revised its position to category 2B, arguing that the evidence showed “severe psychological harm” (para 14).

The prosecution:

Relied on Rook & Ward, Sexual Offences (6th ed), stressing that “severe” means more than “significant” and that the guideline already assumes an intrinsic level of psychological harm in rape cases (para 15).
Invoked the Domestic Abuse Guideline, arguing the offence occurred in a domestic context because of the on‑off intimate relationship and the entitlement of V to trust the offender (para 14).

The defence maintained that the case fell within category 3B, even with the VPS, and should have a 5‑year starting point (para 16, 22).

There was broad agreement on key aggravating and mitigating factors (para 17):

Aggravating:
- Commission of the offence in the context of a quasi‑relationship (engaging the Domestic Abuse Guideline).
- Ejaculation during the rape.
Mitigating:
- No previous convictions.
- Exemplary good character and positive references.
- Genuine remorse.
- No further offending since the incident.
- Guilty plea at the PTPH (standard 25% discount).
- Reliance on prison conditions authority (Ali) as a modest additional factor.

The judge explicitly had regard to the Rape Definitive Guideline and the Domestic Abuse Guideline (para 18). He accepted the relationship as “friends with benefits” – that is, occasional and casual intimacy without commitment – rather than a formal partnership (para 18).

Drawing on Rook & Ward and the Court of Appeal authority R v Ul Nazir [2015] EWCA Crim 1604, he concluded that the case lay “between 2 and 3B” (para 19). He recognised the harm as serious, but not such as to compel straightforward categorisation as 2B.

4.4 The Sentence Imposed

The judge acknowledged the agreed aggravating factors, then turned to mitigation, observing that the character references:

“show a wholly different side to you than that that was on display on that occasion when you acted in this serious fashion, not only a man of previous good character but exemplary character previously.” (para 20)

He noted, anecdotally, that it is unusual in cases of this type for a defendant to plead guilty, but nonetheless applied the standard 25% reduction for a plea entered at the PTPH (para 20).

Standing back and taking account of all factors, he concluded that the shortest sentence he could impose was 45 months (3 years 9 months) after plea, which equates to a notional term of 5 years before discount (para 2, 20).

5. Issues Before the Court of Appeal

The Solicitor General’s Reference raised the following key issues:

Harm categorisation: Whether the judge erred in treating the case as lying “between” categories 2B and 3B, rather than assigning it firmly to 2B in light of the VPS and diagnosis of PTSD.
Aggravating features: Whether the Domestic Abuse Guideline and ejaculation required a substantially higher sentence.
Mitigation and mercy: Whether the degree of reduction granted for good character, remorse and other personal mitigation exceeded what was permissible in a serious sexual offence.
Scope of appellate intervention: Whether the sentence of 45 months was “unduly lenient” so as to justify an increase on a Solicitor General’s Reference.

6. Precedents and Authorities Cited

6.1 Sentencing Guidelines and Rook & Ward

The Court and the parties proceeded within the framework of:

The Rape: Definitive Guideline issued by the Sentencing Council, which uses a matrix of harm (categories 1–3) and culpability (A–C) with indicative starting points and ranges.
The Domestic Abuse Guideline, which applies where the offence occurs within a domestic or intimate partner context, usually increasing seriousness.

The prosecution also relied on Rook & Ward on Sexual Offences (6th ed.), which explains that:

“Severe psychological harm” for harm category 2 means more than significant harm, i.e. more than is inherent in rape generally (para 15).
Judges must remember that the guideline already assumes psychological harm as a basic feature of rape; thus something qualitatively or quantitatively greater is required to cross into “severe” territory (para 15).

6.2 R v Ul Nazir [2015] EWCA Crim 1604

Although the judgment does not quote Ul Nazir in detail, it notes that the sentencing judge relied upon it (para 19). Ul Nazir is commonly cited for guidance on:

The proper approach to assessing psychological harm in sexual offences.
The need for care in categorising harm, often requiring medical or expert evidence to support a finding of severe and long‑lasting psychological consequences.
Reinforcing that not every distressing or traumatic reaction will justify elevating harm above the level inherent in the offence.

In Blachford, Ul Nazir is used to support the idea that even serious and clearly harmful consequences do not automatically compel a category 2 classification; the judge retains a margin of evaluation.

6.3 Ali and Prison Conditions

The defence referred to a case called Ali (para 17), likely one of the decisions in which the Court of Appeal recognised that particularly harsh prison conditions (e.g. during the COVID‑19 pandemic or other systemic factors) may justify some modest reduction in sentence. While not discussed in depth, this authority formed part of the mitigation package the judge took into account.

6.4 General Attorney / Solicitor General Reference Jurisprudence

Although not expressly cited in the extract, the Court’s test is rooted in the long‑established authorities on unduly lenient sentence references under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, such as:

Attorney-General’s Reference (No 4 of 1989) [1990] 1 WLR 41.

Those cases emphasise that:

The Court must consider whether the sentence is not merely lenient but unduly so – i.e. outside the range of sentences which the judge could reasonably impose.
The Court’s function is not to correct every arguable error or to substitute what it might have imposed, but to intervene only where there has been a clear departure from proper sentencing standards.

In Blachford, this principle is reflected in the Court’s repeated reference to the “least sentence that could reasonably have been imposed” and the idea of staying within the “outer limits” of permissible leniency (para 26–27).

7. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

7.1 Harm Categorisation and the “Between Categories 2 and 3B” Approach

A central feature of the judgment is the endorsement of the sentencing judge’s assessment that the case was “between 2 and 3B” (para 19, 24).

Under the Rape Guideline, for culpability B:

Category 3B (base level harm) has a starting point of 5 years and a range of 4–7 years.
Category 2B (where there is “severe psychological harm” or other specified features) has a starting point of 8 years and a range of 7–9 years.

The Court notes that there is no gap between the ranges: “the category range for category 3B goes up to 7 years which is also the bottom point of the category range for category 2B” (para 24). That overlap is crucial. It means that:

A judge can reasonably conclude that the offence is more serious than a “typical” category 3B case but not so serious as to warrant the full weight of category 2B.
In such a borderline case, the judge can position the sentence within the overlapping zone, effectively recognising an intermediate level of harm without formally moving to category 2.

In Blachford, the Court accepts that, given the VPS and diagnosis of PTSD, the judge was “just” entitled to that evaluation (para 24). This is an important affirmation that:

Harm categorisation is an evaluative judgment, not a mechanistic box‑ticking exercise.
Even very serious psychological consequences do not invariably compel a categorical shift upwards.
The existence of long‑term therapy, suicidality and functional disability supports seriousness, but the sentencing judge retains a margin of appreciation in deciding whether that crosses the threshold to “severe harm” as a guideline term of art.

Having accepted the judge’s starting premise (“between 2 and 3B”), the Court reasons as follows:

“If one were to start with the starting point for category 3B [5 years], there would have to be some upward adjustment to reflect V’s evidence about the impact on her” (para 24).
“For the same reasons, if one were to start with the starting point for category 2B [8 years] there would have to be some downward adjustment” (para 24).
On that analysis, before personal mitigation, “a notional sentence of about 7 years would have been the least sentence that could reasonably have been imposed” (para 26).

Thus, 7 years is positioned at the borderline between the two categories, reflecting the Court’s acceptance of a cross‑category, harm‑sensitive starting point.

7.2 Aggravating Features: Domestic Context and Ejaculation

The prosecution advanced two principal aggravating elements:

Domestic context: the offence arising from an intimate relationship, engaging the Domestic Abuse Guideline.
Ejaculation during the rape.

The Court’s treatment of these is nuanced:

Domestic Abuse Guideline:
- The Guideline is indeed engaged (para 25), because there was an intimate sexual relationship, even if casual.
- However, the Court expressly finds it “not compelling as a significantly aggravating feature” given the nature of the relationship (para 25).
- The relationship is characterised as “friends with benefits”, defined as “occasional and casual intimacy but the absence of a relationship of commitment on either side” (para 18, 25).
- This contrasts with more traditional domestic abuse contexts (e.g. cohabitation, long‑term partnership, marriage) where breach of trust and control dynamics are greater and hence weightier as aggravating factors.
Ejaculation:
- Recognised as an aggravating feature; it was both taken into account at first instance and reaffirmed as such on appeal (para 17, 25).
- However, the Court emphasises that the prosecution’s push for category 2B was not based on ejaculation but on the severity of psychological harm (para 25).

In effect, the Court holds that although both factors increase seriousness, they do not independently demand a radical step‑up in sentence from the 7‑year notional figure determined by the harm assessment.

7.3 Mitigation, Good Character and the Role of Mercy

Once the Court identified 7 years as the pre‑mitigation floor, the crucial question became how far downward the judge could legitimately move for personal mitigation.

The Court acknowledges the powerful mitigation:

Complete absence of previous convictions.
Substantial, consistent evidence of exemplary good character in multiple domains (family, work, friendship) (para 12, 20).
Early acceptance of responsibility (by plea) and documented, emotionally evident remorse, including admissions to a mutual friend (para 7–8, 12(ii), 13, 22).
Relatively young age and anticipated severe impact of imprisonment on the offender’s future (para 12, 23).

At the same time, the Court reiterates the orthodox caution that:

“the more serious the offending of this type, the less weight will generally be placed on good character as a mitigating feature.” (para 23)

Balancing those forces, the Court concludes:

A reduction from 7 years to 5 years for personal mitigation was at “the outer limits of what could reasonably be given” (para 27).
Nevertheless, it was still within the band of reasonableness and therefore not an error justifying interference on a Reference (para 27–28).

The Court describes the sentence as “merciful” (para 28). This is significant. It recognises:

That judges are permitted, in appropriate cases, to exercise judicial mercy – going to the lower edge of a permissible range, especially where there is exceptional mitigation.
That such mercy must still remain within the objective limits of reasonable sentencing; it cannot be arbitrary or detached from the guideline framework and the seriousness of the offence.

Blachford therefore illustrates how mercy can operate in practice: the judge took full advantage of the downward flexibility available, but did not cross the line into impermissible leniency.

7.4 The Test on a Solicitor General’s Reference: “Unduly Lenient” vs Merely Lenient

The Court’s core analytical tool is the standard “unduly lenient sentence” test. It frames the inquiry in two stages:

Identify the least sentence that could reasonably have been imposed at first instance, having regard to the guidelines, facts and all relevant circumstances (para 26).
Decide whether the sentence actually imposed falls below that least reasonable sentence, in which case it is unduly lenient, or remains within the reasonable range, in which case it should not be disturbed.

Applying that approach:

The Court fixes 7 years as the least reasonable pre‑mitigation sentence (para 26).
It then accepts that a 2‑year mitigation discount to 5 years is at the “outer limits” but still permissible (para 27).
With the standard 25% plea discount leading to 45 months, the final sentence is:
- “Lenient” and “too low” (para 28).
- “Arguably… properly to be described as unduly lenient” (para 28) – signalling that reasonable minds might differ.
- But, in the Court’s own assessment, not so low that intervention is required (para 28–29).

In other words, the sentence lies at (or just inside) the lowest boundary of the reasonable range. The Court of Appeal therefore exercises restraint and declines to interfere, even though it might well have imposed a higher sentence itself.

This underscores a crucial point of principle: the role of the Court on a Solicitor General’s Reference is not to achieve a perfect or ideal sentence, but to correct only those sentences that fall clearly outside the ambit of reasonable judicial discretion.

7.5 Guilty Plea Discount in Serious Sexual Offences

The offender received a 25% reduction for a plea at the PTPH (para 2, 20). The defence urged that:

Pleas of guilty in rape cases with a pre‑existing relationship are rare.
The offender’s plea was early (an indication was given before PTPH) and consistent with profound remorse (para 20, 22).

The judge, and implicitly the Court of Appeal, nonetheless applied the standard 25% discount, in line with the Sentencing Council’s Guideline on Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty Plea.

The implication is clear:

The rarity or tactical undesirability (from a defendant’s perspective) of a guilty plea in this type of case does not mean that the offender should receive more than the guideline discount.
Any additional consideration of remorse must generally be addressed as part of personal mitigation, rather than by inflating the plea discount itself.

8. Complex Concepts Simplified

Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 anonymity

This Act gives lifetime anonymity to complainants in sexual offence cases. No publication may include details likely to identify the victim, unless a court lifts the restriction or the victim waives it. In Blachford the Court confirmed that anonymity remains in place and refers to the victim only as “V” (para 1).

PTPH (Plea and Trial Preparation Hearing)

The first substantive hearing in the Crown Court where the defendant is expected either to plead guilty or not guilty and the case is managed for trial. A plea entered at or before the PTPH normally attracts the full one‑quarter (25%) guilty plea discount.

Rape Guideline “categories” (e.g., 2B, 3B)

The Sentencing Council’s Rape Guideline classifies cases by:

Harm: Categories 1, 2 and 3, based on factors such as severe psychological harm, vulnerability, violence or multiple incidents.
Culpability: A, B or C, depending on aggravating behaviour (e.g. planning, use of weapons, abuse of trust, exploitation of vulnerability).

“3B” means harm category 3 (no elevated harm feature) and culpability B (medium). “2B” means harm category 2 (including severe psychological harm) and culpability B. Each combination has an indicative starting point and a range.

“Severe psychological harm”

A legal term of art in the guideline. It requires harm that is more than the significant psychological harm inherent in rape. Evidence may include:

Diagnosis of a recognised psychiatric condition (e.g. PTSD).
Long‑term therapy needs.
Substantial functional impairment (work, education, relationships).
Serious self‑harm or persistent suicidal ideation.

In Blachford, V’s VPS and PTSD diagnosis clearly showed substantial harm, but the judge (and the Court) treated the case as borderline between categories 2 and 3, rather than automatically category 2.

Domestic Abuse Guideline

A Sentencing Council guideline that applies when an offence is committed in a domestic or intimate relationship context. Such context can aggravate seriousness because it often involves:

Breach of trust.
Power imbalance and control.
Victim’s particular vulnerability.

However, Blachford clarifies that while the guideline is technically engaged by a “friends with benefits” arrangement, it may not carry significant extra weight compared with more sustained or committed domestic relationships (para 25).

Basis of plea

A written document setting out the factual basis on which the defendant admits guilt. If accepted by the prosecution (and court), it determines the facts for sentencing. In Blachford, the offender’s basis of plea accepted the rape but described the relationship as an ongoing one; the prosecution insisted on it being characterised as “casual” or “friends with benefits”, which the judge ultimately accepted (para 10, 18).

Pre‑sentence report (PSR)

A report prepared, usually by a probation officer, to assist the judge with background information about the offender, risk assessment, and suitability for different sentences. It may offer insights into motivation, remorse and likelihood of reoffending. The PSR in Blachford supported the genuineness of remorse and considered possible (though not exculpatory) explanations for the conduct (para 13).

Unduly lenient sentence (Attorney/Solicitor General Reference)

Under s.36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, the Law Officers can refer a sentence to the Court of Appeal if they consider it “unduly lenient”. The Court asks whether the sentence is:

Not just lenient, but outside the range of sentences reasonably open to the sentencing judge.
Incompatible with proper application of the guidelines and relevant principles.

If so, the Court may increase it. Blachford confirms the Court must identify the lowest sentence that could reasonably have been imposed and only interfere if the sentence falls below that threshold (para 26–28).

Judicial mercy

The idea that, within the bounds of legality and reasonable proportionality, a judge may choose a sentence at the very bottom of the permissible range, particularly where there is powerful mitigation (e.g. exemplary character, extreme remorse, personal circumstances). Blachford endorses mercy in that sense, while stressing that it must still stay within the “outer limits” of reasonableness (para 27–28).

9. Impact and Significance

9.1 Sentencing in Rape and Domestic Abuse Cases

Blachford has several implications for future sexual offence sentencing:

Cross‑category sentencing is legitimate:
- Where harm lies between two categories, judges can position the sentence in the overlapping part of the ranges, rather than feeling compelled to force the case squarely into one box.
- This offers more nuanced calibration of sentences to the particular facts, especially in cases with complex or contested psychological harm.
Severe psychological harm remains a demanding threshold:
- Even compelling VPS evidence and psychiatric diagnosis may still produce a borderline assessment rather than an automatic category 2 classification.
- Defence practitioners can point to this decision when arguing that, although harm is serious, it does not necessarily mandate an 8‑year starting point under 2B.
- Conversely, prosecutors must be prepared to argue in detail why a specific case crosses the guideline boundary into “severe” harm, with evidence beyond what might be seen (sadly) as common in rape cases.
Domestic context is a spectrum:
- The Court’s distinction between a casual “friends with benefits” relationship and more committed domestic relationships signals that domestic aggravation is not binary.
- This will influence how courts treat acquaintance and casual partner rapes in terms of additional aggravating weight under the Domestic Abuse Guideline.

9.2 The Weight of Good Character and Personal Mitigation

The case illustrates both the power and the limits of personal mitigation in serious sexual offences:

On one hand, exemplary character, genuine remorse and a clean record can justify a substantial reduction from the notional starting point (here, 7 down to 5 years pre‑plea).
On the other, the Court’s description of the 2‑year reduction as at the “outer limits” (para 27) signals that there is only so far such mitigation can reasonably go when the offence itself is grave.
The decision may be cited by both sides:
- Prosecutors to argue that exceptional personal mitigation cannot reduce rape sentences below certain thresholds.
- Defence lawyers to demonstrate that, in truly exceptional cases, substantial downward movement is still permissible and will be respected on appeal if kept within reason.

9.3 Attorney/Solicitor General References and Appellate Restraint

Blachford is also instructive for future Law Officer references:

It reinforces that the Court’s task is to identify the “lowest sentence that could reasonably have been imposed” and not to adopt its own ideal sentence as the benchmark (para 26–27).
The Court is explicit that a sentence may be lenient, even arguably unduly lenient in the abstract, yet still not be increased because it remains just within the range of reasonable judicial discretion (para 28–29).
This underlines that Solicitor General references should focus on sentences that represent a clear misapplication of the guideline framework, not borderline or mercy‑influenced decisions.

9.4 Practice Points for Advocates

For practitioners, the case highlights several strategic considerations:

VPS and medical evidence:
- Prosecutors should ensure that any claim of “severe psychological harm” is supported by sufficiently detailed and specific evidence (diagnoses, expert reports, long‑term impact), not merely by generalised descriptions of distress.
- Defence should scrutinise whether the harm described genuinely exceeds the level already inherent in rape and, where appropriate, argue for a cross‑category approach rather than a full step up.
Character and remorse evidence:
- High‑quality, specific character references and a well‑prepared PSR can materially influence the sentence, especially in first‑time offenders with demonstrable remorse.
- Advocates should, however, be realistic about the extent to which such mitigation can reduce sentences in rape cases, given the Court’s “outer limits” language.
Domestic context arguments:
- Both sides should be precise in describing the nature of any pre‑existing relationship and its implications for trust, power imbalance and victim vulnerability.
- Casual or non‑committed relationships may engage domestic guidelines but will not necessarily carry the same weight as more entrenched domestic arrangements.

10. Conclusion

R v Blachford [2025] EWCA Crim 1542 is a careful and nuanced judgment at the intersection of serious sexual offending, sentencing guidelines and the appellate review of allegedly unduly lenient sentences.

Its principal contributions can be summarised as follows:

It endorses a cross‑category approach under the Rape Guideline where harm lies between categories, making clear that judges may locate sentences in the overlap between 3B and 2B rather than feeling forced into one or the other.
It clarifies that “severe psychological harm” is a demanding threshold; even profound and life‑changing consequences, while clearly aggravating, do not automatically dictate a category 2 classification.
It recognises that the Domestic Abuse Guideline applies to casual intimate relationships but treats such cases as less aggravating than traditional domestic abuse in more committed relationships.
It delineates the outer limits of personal mitigation in rape cases, accepting a substantial downward adjustment (here 2 years) for truly exceptional good character and remorse while emphasising that such mercy must remain within the bounds of reason.
It re‑affirms the narrow scope of Attorney/Solicitor General References: the Court will not interfere merely because a sentence is lenient, or even arguably unduly lenient in some abstract sense, but only when it falls below the lowest reasonable sentence open to the judge.

In balancing V’s severe and ongoing suffering against the offender’s exceptional mitigation and guilty plea, the Court ultimately regarded the sentence as lenient but lawful. The decision will serve as an important reference point for future sentencing in acquaintance rape and domestic‑context sexual offences, and for understanding how mercy and guideline structure interact in serious crime.