Introduction

This Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) decision, delivered by Lewis LJ, addresses two important sentencing questions:

• What limits apply when the Crown Court sentences for multiple summary-only offences, particularly as regards consecutive terms? and
• How should courts approach sentencing for failure to surrender to bail under the Sentencing Council’s Bail Offences guideline?

The appellant, Matthew Barker, engaged in a series of “test drive” vehicle takings from dealerships in 2022, including an aggravated vehicle taking during which he rammed a police car, causing significant damage. He was also convicted of driving whilst disqualified and later of failing to surrender to bail after pleading guilty and then missing the initial sentencing date. At first instance (Leicester Crown Court, 28 April 2025), he received an aggregate 52 months’ imprisonment and a 38‑month driving disqualification with an extended test requirement.

Barker appealed his sentence for the bail offence. In addition, the Registrar referred for review four sentences of five months’ imprisonment imposed for summary offences which had been ordered to run consecutively. The case thus squarely raised the limits of the Crown Court’s powers when dealing with summary matters and the proper application of the Bail Offences guideline.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, making three major corrections:

1. Summary offences and the six‑month aggregate cap:
   • The Crown Court is limited to the sentencing powers of a magistrates’ court for summary offences (per section 40(2) of the 1988 Act, as identified by the Court) and section 131 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 (MCA 1980).
   • Though the individual terms of five months for each summary count were within the single-count maxima, they could not lawfully be made consecutive to produce a 20‑month aggregate. The aggregate for consecutive summary sentences must not exceed six months.
   • The Court re‑structured the sentences: retaining 22 months for aggravated vehicle taking (count 2), substituting three months on each summary count, arranging concurrency so that the total for the four summary matters was six months, yielding 28 months in total for the driving offences.
2. Failure to surrender to bail:
   • Applying section 59 of the Sentencing Act 2020, the Court held that the sentencing judge should have followed the Sentencing Council’s Bail Offences guideline.
   • The offending was category 1A: culpability A (deliberate evasion/delay of justice) and harm 1 (serious interference with justice). With aggravating factors (extensive record; past non‑compliance), the Court substituted a sentence of four months, to run consecutively as a matter of principle.
3. Driving disqualification and ancillary orders:
   • The 38‑month disqualification was set aside and replaced with: 12 months’ discretionary disqualification under section 34 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 (RTOA 1988), extended by 11 months under section 35A and a further five months under section 35B, giving 28 months in total (12 + 16).
   • The requirement to pass an extended driving test was quashed as the appellant was already subject to such an order.
   • The victim surcharge was corrected to £190.

Final outcome: 32 months’ total immediate custody (28 months for the driving offences + 4 months consecutive for the bail offence), and a 28‑month driving disqualification comprising 12 months discretionary plus 16 months extension under RTOA 1988.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents and authorities cited

• Statutory framework:
  • Section 40(2) of “the 1988 Act” (as referred to by the Court): the Crown Court, when dealing with summary matters, is confined to the powers available to a magistrates’ court. The judgment applies this directly to cap the aggregate of consecutive sentences for summary offences.
  • Section 131, Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980: while magistrates can impose consecutive terms for multiple summary offences, “the aggregate term of such sentences shall not exceed 6 months.” The Court applied this six‑month ceiling to the Crown Court’s treatment of the four summary counts.
  • Section 59, Sentencing Act 2020: courts must follow relevant Sentencing Council guidelines unless contrary to the interests of justice. This underpinned the Court’s re‑calibration of the bail sentence in line with the Bail Offences guideline.
  • Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988:
    • Section 34: discretionary disqualification for certain offences (here, aggravated vehicle taking).
    • Sections 35A and 35B: mechanisms extending the disqualification period to avoid “time in custody” eroding the disqualification and to provide for structured extension. The Court used s.35A (11 months) and s.35B (5 months) to reach a total extension of 16 months beyond the 12‑month discretionary period.
  • Theft Act 1968: section 12 (taking a vehicle without consent – a summary offence) and section 12A (aggravated vehicle taking – the lead offence here).
• Appellate comparators for bail offences:
  • R v Stokes [2014] EWCA Crim 2772: eight months imposed after a ten‑year absence. Cited by the defence to argue that Barker’s ten‑month term was excessive by comparison. The Court’s response anchors on the binding nature of the guideline framework post‑Sentencing Act 2020.
  • R v Armasuel [2014] EWCA Crim 991: six months for failure to surrender; again used for comparative purposes.
  • R v Trabisohn [2005] EWCA 2282: six weeks ultimately imposed for a three‑month failure to surrender. Used to suggest proportionality constraints.

  While defence counsel relied on these earlier authorities, the Court’s central point is that, under section 59 SA 2020, the guideline is the primary compass. Prior cases may assist in calibration, but the guideline controls unless injustice would result from following it.

2) The Court’s legal reasoning

a) Unlawful aggregation of summary sentences

The Crown Court imposed four consecutive sentences of five months for summary offences (taking without consent and driving whilst disqualified), producing a 20‑month total for those counts alone. The Court of Appeal held this was unlawful because:

• The Crown Court, when sentencing for summary-only offences, is limited to magistrates’ powers (per section 40(2) of the 1988 Act as cited by the Court).
• Under section 131 MCA 1980, the aggregate of consecutive terms for summary offences cannot exceed six months.

Recognising that each five‑month term was individually within the single‑count maximum, the vice lay in ordering them to be consecutive beyond the statutory aggregate cap. To rectify this, the Court:

• Left intact the 22‑month sentence for the either‑way aggravated vehicle taking (count 2).
• Substituted three months on each summary count.
• Structured concurrency and consecutivity so that the total for the summary matters equalled six months (count 3 consecutive; count 1 consecutive; counts 5 and 6 concurrent), yielding 28 months for the driving matters in total.

The approach models how judges should restructure to comply with the statutory cap while still reflecting overall criminality and totality across mixed-mode counts.

b) Bail offences: guideline compliance and categorisation

On the failure to surrender, the sentencing judge had referenced the 12‑month statutory maximum and imposed ten months without referring to the Bail Offences guideline. The Court of Appeal held that section 59 SA 2020 required the judge to follow the guideline.

The Court classified the offence as Category 1A:

• Culpability A: deliberate evasion/delay of justice by failing to attend the listed sentencing hearing.
• Harm 1: serious interference with the administration of justice—an entire sentencing hearing was aborted; police resources were diverted to execute a warrant; and the final sentencing had to be relisted later.

The Category 1A starting point is six weeks’ custody, with a 28 days to 26 weeks range. Taking account of aggravating features—very extensive antecedents and prior non‑compliance (including offending on bail and breach of community order)—the Court moved upward within the range to four months, making clear it should run consecutively to the substantive sentence “as a matter of principle.”

c) Driving disqualification: structure and duplication

The Court adjusted the disqualification framework to mirror statutory design under the RTOA 1988:

• 12 months’ discretionary disqualification under section 34 for the aggravated vehicle taking.
• Extension of 11 months under section 35A and a further five months under section 35B, for a 16‑month extension, producing a 28‑month overall disqualification.
• The extended test requirement was quashed because the appellant was already subject to such an order; duplication is inappropriate.

3) Impact and significance

a) Sentencing architecture for mixed-mode cases

Barker makes plain that when sentencing for summary offences in the Crown Court, judges must observe the magistrates’ six‑month aggregate cap on consecutive terms. Structuring sentences to reflect overall criminality is permissible, but:

• Aggregate consecutive custody for summary counts must not exceed six months.
• Judges can and should employ concurrency for some counts and judiciously select which summary terms, if any, run consecutive, to stay within the cap while respecting the totality principle across the case.

This is a practical, precedential reminder that the presence of an indictable or either‑way lead count does not expand the Crown Court’s powers for accompanying summary matters.

b) Bail offences: guideline-led sentencing and consecutive terms

The decision underscores the centrality of the Bail Offences guideline and the statutory duty to follow it. Key points for future cases:

• Identify culpability and harm with reference to the specific consequences for the administration of justice (e.g., wasted court time, police deployment, relisting).
• Use the guideline starting point and range, applying aggravation/mitigation rigorously.
• Ordinarily, a sentence for failure to surrender should run consecutively to the sentence for the underlying offences. The Court here treated consecutivity as a matter of principle.

d) Road traffic disqualifications: correct calculation and avoiding duplication

Barker offers a clean worked example of combining:

• a base discretionary disqualification (RTOA 1988, s.34), and
• statutory extensions (RTOA 1988, ss.35A–35B) to ensure the disqualification reflects time in custody and does not expire while the offender is imprisoned.

The case also cautions against layering an extended test requirement where one already exists; duplication was set aside.

e) Practical checklists for practitioners

• When summary counts feature in the Crown Court:
  • Confirm they are indeed summary-only (e.g., TWOC under Theft Act 1968 s.12; driving while disqualified under Road Traffic Act 1988 s.103).
  • Ensure any consecutive terms across summary counts do not exceed six months in aggregate (MCA 1980 s.131).
  • Use concurrency strategically to remain within the cap.
• On bail offences:
  • Apply the Bail Offences guideline; identify the correct category.
  • Record aggravating/mitigating features expressly; move within the range accordingly.
  • Order consecutivity unless exceptional circumstances justify departure.
• Driving disqualifications:
  • State the base discretionary period (s.34), then any extensions under ss.35A–35B with the arithmetic made explicit.
  • Check for existing extended test requirements to avoid duplication.

Complex concepts, simplified

• Summary offence:
  Less serious criminal offence that is tried in the magistrates’ court. The Crown Court’s sentencing powers for such offences are generally no greater than those of the magistrates’ court. Consecutive terms across multiple summary offences must not exceed six months in total (MCA 1980 s.131).
• Consecutive vs concurrent sentences:
  Consecutive sentences are served one after another; concurrent sentences are served at the same time. A judge may mix both to achieve an appropriate overall (totality) outcome, but statutory caps still apply.
• Aggravated vehicle taking (Theft Act 1968 s.12A):
  An aggravated form of taking a vehicle without consent, typically involving dangerous driving, injury, or damage (here, ramming a police car).
• Failure to surrender to bail:
  A distinct offence committed when an accused person, released on bail, fails to attend court as required. It interferes with the administration of justice and is sentenced separately and usually consecutively to the index offences.
• Sentencing Council guidelines and SA 2020 s.59:
  Courts must follow relevant guidelines unless it would be contrary to the interests of justice. This makes guideline-compliance a legal duty, not just good practice.
• Bail Offences—Category 1A:
  Culpability A: deliberate evasion/delay; Harm 1: serious interference with justice (e.g., aborted hearings, police time). Starting point six weeks’ custody; range 28 days to 26 weeks, adjusted for aggravation/mitigation.
• RTOA 1988 disqualification and extensions:
  Section 34 allows discretionary disqualification; sections 35A and 35B extend the period so it effectively covers time when the offender is in custody and beyond, ensuring the disqualification is meaningful.

Conclusion

R v Barker delivers two key messages of broad significance:

1. On jurisdictional limits: Even in the Crown Court, sentencing for summary offences is constrained by the magistrates’ six‑month aggregate limit for consecutive terms (MCA 1980 s.131). Sentencers must structure concurrency and consecutivity accordingly. This is a clear, authoritative reminder with immediate practical utility in mixed-mode indictments or when summary charges are committed to the Crown Court.
2. On bail offences: Courts must apply the Bail Offences guideline pursuant to SA 2020 s.59. Where a failure to surrender causes serious disruption, Category 1A is apt; with aggravation, a custodial term within the guideline range is warranted. Such sentences should ordinarily run consecutively to reflect distinct harm to the administration of justice.

The decision also offers a worked template for correctly structuring driving disqualification orders using RTOA 1988 ss.34, 35A and 35B, and cautions against duplicative extended test requirements. In all, Barker refines sentencing practice by enforcing statutory caps, re‑centering guideline compliance, and clarifying the architecture of disqualification orders—changes that will resonate widely in day‑to‑day criminal sentencing.

Case data (for reference)

• Case: Rex v Matthew Barker
• Citation: [2025] EWCA Crim 1293
• Court: England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)
• Date: 1 August 2025
• Judge: Lord Justice Lewis
• Disposition:
  • Driving offences: 28 months (22 months aggravated vehicle taking + 6 months across summary counts within the six‑month aggregate cap).
  • Failure to surrender to bail: 4 months, consecutive.
  • Total custody: 32 months.
  • Driving disqualification: 28 months (12 months s.34 + 16 months extensions under ss.35A–35B).
  • Extended driving test order: quashed (duplication).
  • Victim surcharge: £190.