R v Alsaadoun ([2025] EWCA Crim 800): “Showing-Off” Motive Held to be a Distinct Aggravating Factor in Category A Death-by-Dangerous-Driving Sentencing

1. Introduction

The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in R v Alsaadoun confronted a familiar yet legally nuanced scenario: the sentencing of a young driver whose reckless conduct caused the death of a passenger. The appellant, then 21, accelerated his BMW to almost 90 mph in a 30 mph zone at 3:17 a.m., colliding with a slow-moving HGV and killing his cousin, Yusif Salah. He pleaded guilty to causing death by dangerous driving, contrary to s 1 Road Traffic Act 1988, and received a total sentence of eight years four months’ imprisonment.

With leave of the Single Judge the appellant challenged the sentence on two grounds:

The judge adopted too high a starting point within Category A of the Sentencing Council Guideline.
The judge paid insufficient regard to mitigation and impermissibly double-counted the “showing-off” element already inherent in the excessive speed.

The appeal invited the Court of Appeal to clarify when, if at all, a driver’s motivation for excessive speed may be treated as an additional aggravating factor rather than an aspect subsumed by the speed itself.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court (Vice-President Fulford LJ, Swift LJ, and Judge Levine) dismissed the appeal, holding:

Excessive speed placed the offence in Category A, but the reason for that speed—namely “showing off” or “racing against oneself”—increased the risk to the public and was independently relevant. It was therefore not double-counting to treat the motive as an aggravating feature.
The sentencing judge’s modest upward adjustment from the 12-year starting point to 12 ½ years (before one-third plea discount) appropriately balanced aggravation and mitigation.
An erroneous indication to the appellant that he would serve half (rather than two-thirds) of his sentence, although unfortunate, did not render the overall term excessive or wrong in principle.

Consequently, the custodial term and ancillary driving disqualification remained intact.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Considered

Although the judgment’s text does not recite every authority, it addresses and is informed by several strands of prior case-law and guidance:

Sentencing Council Guideline: Causing Death by Dangerous Driving (effective 24 Oct 2017). • Defines Category A where (i) “Greatly excessive speed” or (ii) “Racing” is present. • Starting point 12 years, range 8–18 years (for offences pre-28 Jun 2022, max 14 years).
R v Cooksley [2003] EWCA Crim 996 – pre-Guideline authority that first articulated structured categories for death by dangerous driving and warned against double counting.
R v Kelly [2000] QB 198 – leading authority on the prohibition of double counting of aggravating factors already inherent in an offence.
R v Richardson [2006] EWCA Crim 3186; A-G’s Ref (No 54 of 2002) (Martin) – recognise “showing off” as aggravating, especially where vulnerable passengers are present.
R v Bewick [2012] EWCA Crim 2051 – confirmed that post-incident psychological harm suffered by a defendant does not automatically justify large reductions where very serious harm was caused to a victim.
R v Pursehouse [2022] EWCA Crim 1704 – recent discussion on interaction between guideline categories, today’s higher maximum sentence (life), and double counting.
Principle in R v Millberry [2002] EWCA Crim 2891 – court must balance aggravating and mitigating factors in the round rather than mathematically.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

Step 1 – Categorisation • Speeds of 90 mph in a 30 mph zone manifestly qualify as “greatly excessive speed” ⇒ Category A (starting point 12 yrs). • Maximum sentence limited to 14 yrs because offence preceded the statutory increase to life on 28 June 2022.
Step 2 – Aggravation beyond Speed The Court drew a distinction between how the vehicle was driven (speed, lane-weaving) and why it was driven that way (showing off). – Motive can elevate culpability because it shows a deliberate disregard for safety to impress others, thereby increasing risk. – That factor is analytically separate from the bare fact of speed and therefore may legitimately move the sentence upward inside the Category A range.
No Double Counting Double counting occurs only when an element considered at Step 1 is replicated at Step 2. • Here, Step 1 addressed “speed”. • Step 2 addressed “showing off” motive. Result: No duplication. The incremental 6-month uplift was modest and within judicial discretion.
Mitigation • Youth (21 at offence), genuine remorse, early guilty plea, PTSD and depression diagnosed post-accident, and delay in proceedings were all accepted. • The court confirmed that these factors were taken into account but were not so weighty as to justify a larger reduction, given the very high culpability and irreversible harm.
Operational Error on Release Provisions The sentencing judge mistakenly told the appellant he would be released at ½ time. Statute (Criminal Justice Act 2003, as amended by the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022) mandates two-thirds release for sentences ≥7 years for this offence. – The Court held the mis-statement created “disappointment” but did not render the sentence excessive; the legal release point is fixed by statute, not by judicial pronouncement.
Outcome – Appeal dismissed; custodial term and driving disqualification stand.

3.3 Impact of the Decision

a) Sentencing Practice
R v Alsaadoun sets a clarifying precedent that where a driver’s excessive speed is motivated by “showing off”, that motive can be treated as an additional aggravator even though speed already places the offence in Category A. Practically:

Prosecution advocates may now highlight evidence of bragging, social-media filming, or peer encouragement to justify uplifts.
Defence lawyers must prepare to address the motive distinctively rather than merely accepting a high speed categorisation.
Judges gain assurance that modest uplifts for motive do not contravene the double-counting prohibition, provided the reasoning is specifically articulated.

b) Double-Counting Doctrine
The decision refines the doctrine by recognising that motive is conceptually separate from an act already embedded in the guideline category. Future appeals alleging double counting will be scrutinised: the key question will be whether the second factor adds qualitatively different culpability or merely repackages a characteristic already captured at Step 1.

c) Youth and Post-Offence Trauma
The Court reaffirmed that psychological sequelae and the offender’s youth, while relevant, cannot disproportionately outweigh strong public-protection considerations in fatal road-traffic cases, especially under the heightened maximum sentence regime post-2022.

d) Practical Guidance on Release-Point Errors
Where a sentencing judge misstates the release fraction, the remedy is not to shorten the term; appellate courts will treat the statutory position as paramount, absent exceptional unfairness.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Category A, B, C (Guideline) – A structured ranking of culpability: A = greatest culpability (e.g., racing, very high speed, impaired driving); B = medium; C = lower culpability.
Double Counting – An appellate rule that a factor already inherent in the guideline level or statutory definition cannot be used again to increase sentence unless it adds something qualitatively different.
Starting Point vs. Range – Each Category has a starting point sentence; judges may move up or down within the range after weighing aggravation and mitigation.
Release on Licence (Two-Thirds Rule) – For certain violent/serious offences where the maximum is life imprisonment, offenders serving determinate sentences ≥7 years must serve ⅔ before release, under ss 244A–244B Criminal Justice Act 2003.
Extended Re-Test – A mandatory measure requiring the offender to re-take an extended driving test before licence reinstatement, aimed at public safety.

5. Conclusion

R v Alsaadoun may on the surface appear as a routine sentence appeal, but it cements an important refinement in fatal-driving jurisprudence: the motive of “showing off” is not absorbed by the bare fact of excessive speed and can therefore justify an upward movement within Category A without violating the rule against double counting. The decision also reinforces practical lessons: counsel should address motivation expressly; mental-health sequelae and judicial slips on release fractions seldom outweigh the gravity of causing death; and the Sentencing Council Guideline remains the lodestar but not a straitjacket. Going forward, the case will likely be cited wherever defendants argue that the rationale for their dangerous driving has been impermissibly double-counted.