R v Al Maamoury [2025] EWCA Crim 1114: The “Culpability Cusp” and Significant Totality Uplifts in Multi‑Victim Dangerous‑Driving Sentencing

Court: England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)

Date: 24 July 2025

Citation: [2025] EWCA Crim 1114

Introduction

This appeal concerned a sentence of 13 years and 6 months’ imprisonment imposed at Wolverhampton Crown Court for two counts of causing death by dangerous driving and two counts of causing serious injury by dangerous driving. The tragedy occurred at a late-night “car meet” where the appellant, driving a modified, older Nissan Skyline, deliberately accelerated hard to “show off” as he exited a roundabout, significantly exceeded the 40 mph limit (travelling at 54–57 mph), lost control, mounted the pavement, and struck spectators—killing two young people (aged 16 and 19) and seriously injuring two others.

The appellant pleaded guilty on the day of trial (10% credit). He was of previous good character, had caring responsibilities, and had one prior speeding endorsement. The central issues on appeal were: (i) whether the sentencing judge wrongly categorised the culpability under the Sentencing Council guidelines (A, B, or C); (ii) whether the judge erred in selecting a notional 9-year starting point for a single death; (iii) whether the 6-year uplift to reflect two deaths and two serious injuries was excessive; and (iv) whether mitigation was undervalued. The appellant also queried any reliance on his supposed awareness of a police presence.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the sentence. It rejected an argument for category C culpability as “wholly untenable.” Although the court accepted that the factor “obviously highly dangerous manoeuvre” in culpability A sets a high threshold and might be open to debate, it held that the combination of features brought the case to the cusp between categories A and B. In that position, a notional starting point of 9 years for a single death was properly open to the judge, aligning with the top of category B (9 years) and just above the bottom of category A (8 years).

The court further held that a substantial uplift of 6 years to reflect the totality—two fatalities and two seriously injured victims—was warranted even though all harm arose from a single incident. Mitigation (good character and caring responsibilities) carried only limited weight in the circumstances. The appellant’s awareness of a police presence was not material. The final sentence—after 10% credit for the very late plea—was not manifestly excessive.

Analysis

1) Precedents and Framework Cited

The court’s reasoning rested on the Sentencing Council guidelines for:

Causing death by dangerous driving (maximum: life imprisonment under amended legislation), and
Causing serious injury by dangerous driving (maximum: 5 years).

The guidelines provide three culpability categories with illustrative factors:

Category A (highest culpability): includes “deliberate decision to ignore the rules of the road and disregard for the risk of danger to others,” “obviously highly dangerous manoeuvre,” “racing or competitive driving,” and “speed significantly in excess of the speed limit or highly inappropriate for the prevailing conditions.”
Category B: includes “driving at a speed that is inappropriate for the prevailing conditions (where not culpability A)” and where “culpability falls between A and C.”
Category C: “standard of driving just over the threshold for dangerous driving.”

Starting points and ranges relevant here:

Causing death by dangerous driving:
- Category A: 12 years (range 8–18).
- Category B: 6 years (range 4–9).
Causing serious injury by dangerous driving (highest harm level):
- Category A: 4 years (range 3–5).
- Category B: 3 years (range 2–4).

No specific earlier appellate authorities were cited; the Court of Appeal’s contribution here is the way it interprets and applies the guideline structure—particularly the “cusp” between categories A and B and the approach to “totality” when multiple victims are involved.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a) Culpability: Why category C was untenable

The defence’s attempt to label the case as category C was “wholly untenable.” The facts—deliberate heavy acceleration to show off, significant excess speed on a damp 40 mph dual carriageway, loss of control, and the presence of spectators—were far beyond a case “just over the threshold” of dangerous driving.

b) The “obviously highly dangerous manoeuvre” factor and the A/B cusp

The sentencing judge had classified the driving as involving an “obviously highly dangerous manoeuvre,” placing the case in category A (albeit at the lower end). On appeal, the court accepted that this particular factor is “heavily qualified” by the word “obviously,” thereby “rais[ing] the bar high,” and acknowledged that its application could be queried on the facts.

Crucially, however, the Court of Appeal held that this did not undermine the ultimate selection of a notional 9-year starting point. The combination of features placed the case “at the very least” on the cusp between categories A and B. Those features included:

Deliberate heavy acceleration to show off immediately after a roundabout exit;
Speed significantly over the limit (54–57 mph in a 40 mph zone) on a damp surface;
Knowledge of spectators/pedestrians nearby at a car meet;
Use of a heavily modified, older car not engineered like a modern high-performance vehicle, with known handling tendencies (witness observed the car’s rear “stepping out” earlier).

The court emphasised that short duration and the absence of racing or police pursuit did not preclude a near‑A level of culpability in the round. As the court put it:

“We consider that the combination of all the circumstances in this case at the very least took this case to the cusp of culpability between category A and category B.”

c) Selecting the notional starting point at the cusp

The notional starting point of 9 years (for a single death after trial) was justified because it fits comfortably at the A/B boundary: the bottom of A is 8 years, the top of B is 9 years. The selection of 9 years reflected the court’s assessment of the overall seriousness in context, including aggravating features, and was not an error even if no single category A indicator was “squarely or obviously” met.

d) Totality and multi‑victim harm: a substantial uplift

The appellant argued that because all the consequences arose from a single incident, the uplift should be modest. The Court of Appeal rejected that submission. Where two people are killed and two more sustain serious injuries, a “very significant uplift” is required. The sentencing judge’s 6-year increase from the 9-year notional was therefore properly open, producing 15 years pre-credit for plea.

e) Mitigation and other points

Mitigation: Previous good character and caring responsibilities were considered but carried limited weight in light of the gravity and the appellant’s conduct. The PSR recorded an absence of genuine remorse at the time. The 10% plea credit for a day‑of‑trial plea was correctly applied.
Police presence: Whether the appellant knew of a police presence was treated as immaterial. What mattered was that he knew he was at a meet with spectators and nevertheless chose to show off.
Appellate test: The question was not whether the sentence was severe but whether it was manifestly excessive. It was not.

3) Impact and Significance

This judgment provides practical guidance on four fronts:

The “cusp” approach: Sentencers may lawfully select a notional starting point at the top of category B (or near the bottom of A) where a combination of factors pushes the case to the A/B boundary—even if no single category A factor is incontrovertibly satisfied. This reduces pressure to force a case into category A simply to reach a higher notional starting point.
“Obviously highly dangerous manoeuvre” clarified: The court underscores that this is a “heavily qualified” and high-threshold factor. Yet the absence of a decisive category A factor does not prevent a robust notional starting point where the overall circumstances demand it.
Totality in multi‑victim incidents: A substantial uplift is warranted where multiple deaths and serious injuries occur, even from a single incident. The 6-year uplift here will be a reference point for future cases involving multiple fatalities/injuries.
Contextual aggravation matters: “Showing off” at a car meet, the presence of bystanders, and the use of a heavily modified older vehicle with known handling characteristics can collectively elevate seriousness. Short duration and absence of racing do not neutralise those factors.

More broadly, the judgment signals continued judicial readiness—post‑increase of the statutory maximum to life—for firm sentencing responses to dangerous driving that causes catastrophic harm, particularly in street‑meet contexts.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Dangerous driving: Driving that falls far below the standard expected of a competent and careful driver, and it would be obvious to a competent and careful driver that the manner of driving would be dangerous.
Culpability categories (A/B/C): A framework in the guidelines to gauge how blameworthy the driving was. Category A is the most blameworthy, C the least (but still dangerous), with B in between.
Starting point and range: The guideline provides a starting point sentence for a typical case at that level of culpability and a range within which the sentence can be adjusted for aggravating/mitigating features.
Notional sentence: The sentence the court would impose for a single count after a trial, before applying reductions/credit for a guilty plea and before addressing multiple counts.
Totality principle: When sentencing for multiple offences, the overall sentence must be proportionate to the overall offending. The court may run some sentences concurrently and apply a measured uplift to reflect additional harm.
Uplift: An increase from the notional starting point to account for additional counts, victims, or aggravating features, ensuring the sentence reflects total harm.
Credit for plea: Reduction in sentence for a guilty plea. Early pleas attract higher credit; a plea on the day of trial commonly attracts about 10%.
“Obviously highly dangerous manoeuvre”: A guideline factor in category A indicating manoeuvres that are not merely risky but plainly and immediately dangerous to any competent driver—a high bar.
Yaw/oversteer: Loss of rear‑end traction causing the car’s rear to swing outward; overcorrection can amplify loss of control, especially in high‑power or modified vehicles.

Key Passages

“You were exceeding the speed limit … But it is not speed that is the essence of this case, it is the heavy acceleration … aggravated by the fact that you were showing off.” (Sentencing judge)

“Under this factor … [‘obviously highly dangerous manoeuvre’] … is heavily qualified … raises the bar high.” (Court of Appeal)

“We consider that the combination of all the circumstances … took this case to the cusp of culpability between category A and category B.” (Court of Appeal)

“Not one young person was killed but two. Not one young person was gravely injured but two. That necessitated a very significant uplift … an increase of 6 years was one properly open.” (Court of Appeal)

Conclusion

R v Al Maamoury is significant for crystallising a practical sentencing approach in dangerous driving cases that cause catastrophic multi‑victim harm:

Courts may select a notional starting point at the A/B “cusp” where the overall circumstances justify it, without having to find an unambiguous category A indicator.
The “obviously highly dangerous manoeuvre” factor is a high bar; its doubtful application does not preclude a top‑of‑B starting point where the case’s gravity is clear.
Substantial totality uplifts are appropriate where there are multiple fatalities and serious injuries arising from a single incident.
Context matters—showing off to spectators, significant speed on damp roads, and using an older, heavily modified vehicle with known handling risks can combine to elevate culpability markedly, even over a short duration and absent racing or police evasion.

In upholding a robust 13½‑year sentence (after 10% plea credit), the Court of Appeal confirms that late guilty pleas and otherwise positive personal mitigation will carry limited weight where wilfully reckless driving produces irreversible and widespread harm. This judgment will guide sentencers in navigating the guideline categories, choosing notional starting points at the boundary between A and B, and calibrating serious totality uplifts in multi‑victim dangerous‑driving cases.