“Planning–Licensing Harmony” and the Limits of Class B: A Definitive Clarification of ‘Purely Planning Considerations’ in Caravan Site Licensing

Introduction

This Court of Appeal judgment addresses a long-contested interface between two statutory regimes: (1) development control under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (TCPA 1990), and (2) caravan site licensing under the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960 (the 1960 Act). While overlap was always acknowledged, the doctrinal question was what it means to disregard “purely planning considerations” when determining site licence conditions, especially where the licence may trigger Class B permitted development rights under the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015 (GPDO 2015), Sch.2 Pt.5 Class B.

The appellant, Haytop Country Park Ltd (site operator), sought to use the 1960 Act licensing route to authorise a layout necessitating hardstandings following earlier unlawful engineering works and extensive tree felling on a highly sensitive site in the Derwent Valley (World Heritage Site buffer zone, Conservation Area, Special Landscape Area, adjacent to SSSI). This strategy hinged on a contention that the licensing authority must ignore the concluded planning position (“planning baseline”)—namely, an upheld enforcement notice requiring removal of hardstandings and restoration—and that Class B GPDO rights would then permit reinstatement of materially similar works required by the site licence.

Amber Valley Borough Council, as both local planning authority and licensing authority, refused to authorise plots inconsistent with the enforcement notice and a tree replacement notice. The First-tier Tribunal (FTT) increased the number of plots to 18 while purporting to disregard the enforcement notice as a “planning matter,” though it did give effect to the tree replacement notice. The Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) (UT) allowed the Council’s appeal, holding that licensing must conform to the established planning baseline. The Court of Appeal (Holgate LJ; Nugee and Moylan LJJ agreeing) was asked to resolve the legal conflict between the FTT and UT: can a 1960 Act site licence authorise (and thereby trigger Class B rights for) development inconsistent with the operative planning permissions or with a planning enforcement determination?

Summary of the Judgment

• The appeal was dismissed; the UT’s decision was upheld. The Court affirms a “harmony” principle: caravan site licensing must operate consistently with the planning regime, including binding determinations under the TCPA 1990 such as enforcement outcomes and the conditions of extant planning permissions ([83], [87], [89]–[99], [114]–[118]).
• “Purely planning considerations” are not a licence for ignoring the planning baseline. They refer to a limited line of authority where licensing unlawfully curtailed existing, unrestricted planning use rights without compensation (e.g., Esdell; Babbage). They do not justify licensing decisions that undermine or enlarge the planning permission actually relied upon under s.3(3) of the 1960 Act ([100]–[107]).
• Class B GPDO rights cannot be used to sidestep extant enforcement. The Class B right arises only where licence conditions lawfully require development, and must be read in the context of statutory harmony. It cannot be used to “bootstrap” new planning outcomes that contradict the operative planning position ([110]–[114]).
• Enforcement notices have a continuing, prospective effect (s.181 TCPA 1990). Only a grant of planning permission for development already carried out (not merely PD) can displace an enforcement notice insofar as inconsistent (s.180 TCPA 1990) ([79]–[81], [115]).
• Accordingly, the FTT erred in law by disregarding the enforcement position and permitting plots inconsistent with it. The UT’s approach—anchored to the established planning baseline—was correct and rational ([115], [117]–[118]).

Background

• Two historic permissions (1952 and 1966) permit use of the land for up to 60 caravans, subject to layout and other conditions; the 1968 site licence paralleled those permissions and required hardstandings within defined areas (A–H) ([7]–[8], [37]–[41]).
• In 2017, the operator unlawfully felled 121 protected trees and executed major engineering operations: terracing, retaining walls, bases for 27 units, internal roads ([9], [48]).
• 2019 enforcement: two notices were issued; the “change of use” notice was quashed but the “operational development” notice (hardstandings, re-profiling etc.) was upheld; the High Court dismissed a further legal challenge ([10], [56]–[61]).
• 2022 site licence: Council granted a licence limited to three plots to avoid conflict with the enforcement notice and tree replacement notice; FTT increased to 18 plots while discounting the enforcement constraints but giving effect to the tree replacement notice ([12]–[13], [62]–[71]).
• UT (2024) allowed the Council’s appeal, holding the FTT was wrong to disregard the planning baseline; licensing must not be inconsistent with the concluded planning position and enforcement outcomes ([15], [73]).

Detailed Analysis

1) Statutory architecture and the “harmony” requirement

• TCPA 1990:
  • s.55, s.57: “development” requires planning permission.
  • ss.58–61: permissions include those conferred by development orders (e.g., GPDO 2015).
  • Art 3(1) GPDO 2015 grants PD rights; Art 3(4) prohibits development contrary to conditions of any planning permission “otherwise than by this Order” ([19]).
  • Enforcement: ss.171A, 172–174; appeals; s.181 (continuing effect of enforcement notices); s.180 (notice ceases insofar as inconsistent with a grant of planning permission for past development) ([20]–[25]).
  • Tree regime: TPO controls and replanting duties (ss.206–207), offences (s.210) ([26]–[28]).
• 1960 Act:
  • s.1: operating a caravan site requires a site licence.
  • s.3(3): a site licence may be granted only if, at the time of issue, the applicant is entitled to the benefit of a planning permission for the use of the land as a caravan site “otherwise than by a development order”—i.e., not PD ([31]).
  • s.5(1): wide power to impose licence conditions for interests of residents, others, and the public at large; must have regard to model standards (s.5(6)) ([34]–[35]).
  • Appeal: s.7 to FTT (and onward appeal on a point of law).

The Court treats s.3(3) as the keystone: because a licence depends on an express planning permission, the licence must be in harmony with that permission—including its conditions—rather than in conflict with it. Planning permissions are read as a whole; conditions are integral and “indispensable” (Barton Park Estates [2022] EWCA Civ 833; Trump International [2015] UKSC 74) ([60], [87]).

2) Authorities shaping the Court’s conclusion

• R v Kent Justices ex p Crittenden [1964] 1 QB 144:
  • A site licence cannot extend beyond the planning permission that is its prerequisite; licence conditions must respect planning limits, including conditions. Parliament intended planning authorities to determine the extent and limits of caravan site use, with licensing regulating the manner of use within those limits ([88]–[90]).
• Cartledge v Scottish Ministers (No.1) 2011 SC 587:
  • Number, density, and siting of caravans are planning matters; licensing serves a different purpose (health, hygiene, site conditions). A licence cannot enlarge a planning permission by allowing more units than the permission permits ([93]–[95]).
  • The Court of Appeal follows Cartledge absent compelling reasons to the contrary—which none were offered—and notes that Lord Denning MR’s contrary obiter in Esdell has not been followed ([92], [95]).
• Esdell Caravan Parks Ltd v Hemel Hempstead RDC [1966] 1 QB 895:
  • Applied to cases where planning rights existed without condition (e.g., under deeming provisions for existing use). A licensing authority may not, on purely planning grounds (e.g., Green Belt policy), restrict those rights via licence conditions when such restriction would require compensation if imposed through planning ([102]–[103]).
  • Lord Denning MR’s broader obiter—that planning should consider only “outline” and licensing “details”—is disapproved; it contradicts Crittenden and Cartledge ([92], [96]).
• Babbage v North Norfolk DC (1989) 59 P & CR 248:
  • Where there is an unconditional planning permission to use land as a caravan site, a licence condition requiring removal of all caravans in winter solely for visual amenity (a pure planning objective) is unlawful; it effectively prohibits the permitted use during that period and would have required compensation if imposed via planning ([104]–[106]).
• Hartnell v Minister of Housing [1965] AC 1134:
  • Explains “existing use” rights when caravan licensing commenced; planning authority cannot cut down those rights without compensation ([101]).
• Trump International [2015] UKSC 74; Barton Park Estates [2022] EWCA Civ 833:
  • Conditions are construed contextually; they are integral to the permission ([60], [87]).
• Hillside Parks v Snowdonia NPA [2022] UKSC 30; Pilkington principle:
  • The Court floats, but does not decide, a possible incompatibility if a site operator sought to rely on Class B PD to undertake works inconsistent with the operative permission on which the site licence depends ([111]).
• Duguid (2001) 82 P & CR 6; Mansi (1964) 15 P & CR 153:
  • Invoked by the operator to argue enforcement should not extinguish future PD reliance; the Court finds this misses the logically prior question—what does the licence lawfully authorise?—and does not displace the harmony requirement ([78], [81]).
• s.180 and s.181 TCPA 1990; Masefield v Taylor (1987) JPL 721 (obiter):
  • Enforcement has a continuing effect (s.181), and only a grant of planning permission for development already carried out causes the notice to cease to have effect so far as inconsistent (s.180) ([79]–[81]). The judgment notes obiter that a grant “in the form of PD” may not engage s.180 ([Note 1]; [25]), but the Court did not need to decide this point.

3) The Court’s legal reasoning

• The “harmony” principle. Because s.3(3) requires an express planning permission as the prerequisite for a site licence (not PD), the site licence must be set in harmony with that permission’s parameters and conditions. It cannot enlarge or relax the planning permission; it is an additional layer of regulation directed to site operation (health, safety, amenity, layout within permitted framework) ([87]–[99], [114]–[116]).
• Planning baseline is not a “purely planning” irrelevance. Concluded planning determinations—including an enforcement notice upheld on appeal and the refusal of a deemed application for permission—form part of the baseline to which licensing must conform. It is no answer to call them “planning” and therefore to disregard them; the statutory scheme requires consistency with planning outcomes ([96]–[99], [114]–[118]).
• Class B GPDO cannot be used to defeat enforcement or expand planning rights.
  • Class B arises only “where” a licence condition lawfully requires development. It is secondary to the primary requirement that the licence conditions themselves be compatible with planning. On the appellant’s case, Class B would operate independently of and contrary to the planning baseline; the Court rejects this as contrary to legislative intention since 1960 ([83], [110]–[114]).
  • Art.3(4) GPDO 2015 prohibits PD that is contrary to a condition of a planning permission, reinforcing the incompatibility of using Class B to undermine condition-based layout permissions like the 1966 layout condition ([19], [57]–[60]).
• Enforcement is forward-looking as well as retrospective. Section 181 TCPA 1990 gives enforcement notices continuing, prospective effect; anyone wishing to reinstate removed works must first obtain planning permission. The appellant’s “PD is prospective, enforcement is retrospective” dichotomy is rejected ([79]–[81]).
• No “duplication” bar. The FTT’s reliance on a generic anti-duplication idea (i.e., planning issues should be left to planning) is misplaced. The question is one of statutory construction and purpose; Parliament requires coordination, not abdication. It is rational and lawful for licensing to reflect binding planning outcomes ([82]).
• The correct order of operations. Reflecting UT Judge Cooke’s 2020 decision, planning issues should be resolved before licensing decisions. The operator could have sought a new permission or a s.73 variation for its preferred layout; it did neither and cannot gain advantage from unlawful works through licensing ([73(1)]–[73(3)], [108]–[109]).

4) What “purely planning considerations” actually means after Haytop

Haytop reconciles Crittenden, Esdell, Babbage, and Cartledge:

• “Purely planning considerations” are irrelevant to licensing where the licensing decision would otherwise curtail an existing, unconditional planning right in a way that could only lawfully be achieved through planning with compensation (e.g., Green Belt policy invoked to reduce numbers; seasonal total removal for visual amenity alone) ([102]–[107]).
• By contrast, it is not “purely planning” (and thus not irrelevant) to require a licence to conform to the extant planning permission and to binding planning determinations (including enforcement). That is legally required harmony, not duplication. The licence cannot be used to enlarge, relax, or contradict the planning position on which s.3(3) depends ([96]–[99], [114]–[118]).

5) The tree replacement notice

While the appeal centred on enforcement and Class B, the FTT had accepted that the tree replacement notice (TRN) legitimately constrained the licensing decision; the UT and the Court’s outcome (upholding the UT) proceeds on a basis consistent with recognising such constraints. The judgment underscores that, beyond planning permission constraints, overlapping statutory obligations (e.g., TPO/TRN) can lawfully shape what is licensable on amenity, safety, and environmental grounds—so long as licensing does not cut down planning rights in a manner requiring compensation through the planning code ([71], [73(5)], [77]).

6) Practical consequences, and what the operator should have done

• If a site operator wants a different layout or works than those authorised by the historic permission (including its layout conditions), the lawful route is:
  • Apply for a fresh planning permission; or
  • Use s.73 TCPA 1990 to vary or remove conditions; or
  • Seek permission for retention under s.73A where appropriate.
• Only once the planning position authorises the desired scheme can licensing mirror those parameters and, if appropriate, trigger Class B rights for works “required by” lawful licence conditions ([108]–[110], [114]–[116]).

Impact and Significance

• Licensing authorities:
  • Must align licence conditions (number, siting, hardstandings, internal roads) with the operative planning permission and any definitive planning determinations, including enforcement notices that have survived appeal.
  • May impose stricter conditions than the planning permission for licensing purposes (health, safety, site amenity, model standards), but cannot enlarge the planning permission or relax its conditions ([97]–[99]).
  • May treat concluded enforcement positions and TRNs as constraints; this is not an unlawful reliance on “purely planning considerations.” It is the statutory harmony required by s.3(3) and Crittenden/Cartledge ([96]–[99]).
• Site operators:
  • Cannot use the licence–Class B pathway to reinstate or justify works contrary to an extant enforcement notice or to the conditions of the operative planning permission.
  • “Bootstrapping” through licensing to generate PD rights is impermissible; seek planning permission or s.73 variation first.
  • Enforcement notices bite prospectively (s.181): reinstatement of removed works without planning permission risks criminal liability ([79]–[81]).
• Tribunals and courts:
  • The “planning baseline” concept is endorsed. FTTs should not “wash their hands” of planning by invoking “purely planning considerations” where the issue is statutory consistency. Where a planning dispute is ongoing, a stay of licensing proceedings may be appropriate (as UT Judge Cooke indicated in 2020) ([51], [73(2)]).
• Policy coherence:
  • The judgment restores coherence to a field long complicated by attempts to separate “planning” and “licensing” into rigid boxes. The Court confirms substantial, controlled overlap: licensing must reflect planning outcomes; planning sets the limits, licensing regulates within them.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• What is the “planning baseline”? The totality of settled planning determinations that govern a site at the time of the licensing decision: the content and conditions of extant planning permissions, and any binding decisions on enforcement or certificates. Licensing must align with this baseline.
• What are Class B GPDO rights? A form of permitted development (planning permission conferred by order) for development “required by” the conditions of a caravan site licence. They are consequential and arise only if, and to the extent that, the licence conditions lawfully require works.
• Why can’t Class B defeat enforcement? Because licence conditions must first be in harmony with planning. You can’t create licence conditions that contradict an enforcement outcome and then claim PD rights to implement them. Enforcement notices also have a continuing effect unless overtaken by a planning permission for the development already carried out (s.180) and remain alive prospectively (s.181).
• What are “purely planning considerations” in this context? A narrow category drawn from Esdell and Babbage: factors like Green Belt policy or external visual amenity used to curtail an existing, unconditional planning right through licensing—something that planning law would require to be done, if at all, via planning procedures and with compensation. It does not include the requirement to respect existing planning permissions and enforcement outcomes.
• Can licensing be stricter than planning? Yes, for legitimate licensing purposes (health, safety, fire precautions, internal site amenity, separation distances, sanitation) and with regard to model standards. But it cannot authorise more than planning allows, nor prohibit the permitted use as such without planning-law justification.
• How do TPOs and tree replacement notices fit in? They are separate statutory duties that can constrain what is licensable (e.g., to preserve amenity and safety). Licensing may lawfully have regard to these requirements without improperly “duplicating” planning.

Key Takeaways and Practical Guidance

• Licensing under the 1960 Act cannot be used to obtain, by the back door, planning permission that has been refused or to nullify an enforcement notice. The two regimes must operate in harmony, not in conflict.
• “Purely planning considerations” are not a talisman to exclude binding planning outcomes from licensing. They are limited to the Esdell/Babbage situation of cutting down unconditional rights without compensation.
• Class B PD rights are a consequence of lawful licence conditions; they cannot be the engine for overriding the planning baseline.
• When planning disputes are unresolved, licensing processes may properly be paused until the planning position is clarified.
• Operators seeking modernised layouts or platforms should pursue planning routes first (new permission, s.73, s.73A), then calibrate licence conditions accordingly.

Conclusion

Haytop Country Park is a leading authority cementing the “planning–licensing harmony” principle. The Court of Appeal clarifies that: (1) a site licence must be framed consistently with the operative planning permissions (including conditions) that enable the licence under s.3(3) of the 1960 Act; (2) licensing must also respect definitive planning outcomes, including enforcement notices that have survived appeal; and (3) Class B GPDO rights cannot be invoked to subvert that baseline.

In reasserting and synthesising the principles in Crittenden and Cartledge, and situationally distinguishing Esdell and Babbage, the Court removes a long-standing source of confusion about “purely planning considerations.” The decision promotes legal coherence, environmental protection in sensitive landscapes, and procedural discipline: planning first, licensing second; alignment throughout. For operators and authorities alike, the message is clear—seek planning permissions for changed layouts or platforms and do not expect site licensing to rewrite the planning map.

Selected Citations

• Town and Country Planning Act 1990: ss.55–61; s.171A; ss.172–174; s.180; s.181; Part VIII (TPOs).
• Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960: ss.1, 3, 4, 5, 7; s.29(4).
• GPDO 2015: Art.3(1) and (4); Sch.2 Pt.5 Class B.
• Cases: R v Kent Justices ex p Crittenden [1964] 1 QB 144; Esdell Caravan Parks [1966] 1 QB 895; Babbage (1989) 59 P & CR 248; Hartnell [1965] AC 1134; Trump International [2015] UKSC 74; Barton Park Estates [2022] EWCA Civ 833; Cartledge 2011 SC 587; Hillside [2022] UKSC 30; Duguid (2001) 82 P & CR 6; Mansi (1964) 15 P & CR 153.