Pearce & The Practical Limits of Duress: Clarifying When “Driving Off” is NOT the Only Choice

Introduction

Pearce, R. v ([2024] EWCA Crim 1557) arrives from the England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) on 13 November 2024. The appellant (Pearce) sought leave to appeal his convictions for:

• Two counts of Assault Occasioning Actual Bodily Harm (ABH) – victims Robert Gray & Susan Hill.
• One count of Dangerous Driving.

He had already pleaded guilty to Aggravated Vehicle Taking. At trial the jury acquitted him of attempted GBH with intent. The intended appeal centred on:

1. Alleged judicial error in failing to direct the jury on the defence of duress.
2. Alleged witness perjury, disclosure failings, and deficient defence representation.
3. Applications to adduce fresh evidence post-trial.

Mrs Justice Jefford, sitting with the Court of Appeal, refused leave. The decision is important because it restates— with unusual clarity in a practical motoring context— the indispensable element of no reasonable avenue of escape within the defence of duress. It further reiterates the high bar for admitting fresh evidence on appeal and the deference owed to jury findings of fact.

Summary of the Judgment

• The Recorder at trial was correct: duress did not arise on the facts. Pearce could have locked the car door or taken other non-violent measures instead of accelerating with individuals clinging to the vehicle.
• The Court rejected every additional ground (perjury, late disclosure, inadequate representation): all were either unsubstantiated or irrelevant to the central verdict.
• Applications to call 11 new witnesses or introduce phone records/body-worn footage were refused as unnecessary and peripheral.
• Leave to appeal against conviction was therefore refused— the convictions stand.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited & Underlying Authorities

The judgment itself references duress principles without naming cases, but the Court’s reasoning relies on long-standing authorities:

1. R v Graham [1982] 1 WLR 294 – established the two-stage test for duress (subjective belief + objective firmness).
2. R v Hasan [2005] UKHL 22 – clarified that duress is unavailable where a sober person of reasonable firmness would have taken “reasonable evasive action”.
3. R v Conway (1989) 88 Cr App R 159 – relevant to dangerous driving under duress; stresses existence of “immediate peril”.
4. R v Cole (1994) 99 Cr App R 206 – illustrates the need for a direct nexus between the threat and the offence committed.

Jefford J.’s observation that “on the applicant’s own case there were alternative courses of action open to him” echoes the ratio in Hasan and Graham: a defendant who has a practical escape route cannot invoke duress.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Duress Analysis
   • Pearce claimed he was punched and, panicking, drove away. Duress requires: (a) reasonable belief in threat of serious injury, (b) no opportunity to escape, (c) causative link, and (d) objective test.
   • The Court held the no-escape limb failed: shutting/locking the door, reversing slowly, or simply remaining until Gray stepped back were all viable. Driving several hundred metres while swerving could never be viewed as the only choice.
2. Witness Credibility & Jury Primacy
   • Discrepancies, if any, were raised in cross-examination and assessed by the jury.
   • Assertions of perjury must be supported by fresh, cogent evidence (see R v Pope [2012] EWCA Crim 2241). None existed.
3. Fresh Evidence Test (s.23 Criminal Appeal Act 1968)
   • Evidence must be capable of belief, admissible, and afford a ground for appeal.
     
   • Pearce supplied no signed statements; alleged evidence was “entirely peripheral”.
   • Therefore not “necessary or expedient in the interests of justice”.
4. Alleged Late Disclosure – Even if some material (damage footage, body-worn video) was served late, it was irrelevant to liability issues, thus no unsafe conviction (R v Burke [2020] EWCA Crim 544).

C. Impact of the Judgment

• Criminal Practice: Reinforces that duress directions will be withheld unless strictly raised by evidence supporting each element. Defence teams must flag duress early— preferably in Defence Statements— or risk losing the argument.
• Dangerous Driving Cases: Provides a modern illustration that panicked flight, even after assault, rarely satisfies the no-escape test.
• Appeal Strategy: Highlights how broad “scatter-gun” allegations (perjury, disclosure, misconduct) will not substitute for concrete fresh evidence.
• Judicial Resources: The judgment implicitly discourages wasteful applications to summons judges, counsel, or unrelated parties as witnesses in appeals.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Duress

A defence where a defendant argues they committed an offence only because they were compelled by threats of serious harm. It fails if a reasonable person could have avoided the threat without committing the crime.

Aggravated Vehicle Taking

The theft or unauthorised taking of a vehicle followed by dangerous driving or causing damage/injury.

Assault Occasioning Actual Bodily Harm (ABH)

An assault that results in physical injury that is more than “transient or trifling”, e.g., cuts, bruises.

Leave to Appeal

Permission required from the Court of Appeal before a full appeal can be argued. Refused if grounds are not reasonably arguable.

Fresh Evidence (s.23 CAA 1968)

New evidence not presented at trial can only be admitted on appeal if it is credible, relevant, and would likely affect the safety of the conviction.

Conclusion

Pearce’s application collapses chiefly on the issue of duress: the Court of Appeal found that he chose to endanger two bystanders when safer alternatives plainly existed. The case crystallises a practical rule:

“Where realistic non-violent options are open, a defendant who elects a dangerous course of action cannot rely on duress.”

Beyond duress, the judgment re-asserts orthodox principles on witness credibility, disclosure, and fresh evidence— all serving to protect finality of jury verdicts. Practitioners should treat Pearce as a cautionary reminder: raise defences rigorously and supported by evidence at trial; appellate courts will not retrofit speculative arguments post-conviction.