No “Wet Signature” Needed: R v Hayes [2025] EWCA Crim 1312 clarifies warrant validity, limits post‑plea challenges, and affirms consecutive sentencing for justice‑perverting conduct

Introduction

This commentary examines the decision of the England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in R v Hayes [2025] EWCA Crim 1312, delivered on 2 September 2025. The appellant, Lee Andrew Hayes, had pleaded guilty to three offences: conspiracy to pervert the course of public justice, possession of cocaine with intent to supply, and being concerned in the supply of cocaine. He received a total of six years’ imprisonment. He sought (i) an extension of time and leave to appeal against conviction, and (ii) leave to appeal against sentence.

The case presents several procedural and substantive issues of broader importance:

Whether a search warrant must bear a “wet signature” to be valid, in the context of modern processes including telephone applications and digitally recorded approvals.
Whether alleged defects in warrant issue or execution can be relied upon after a guilty plea.
How appellate courts treat a sentencing judge’s misstatement about concurrency where the total sentence imposed and the official record (Digital Case System) make the intended structure clear.
Sentencing issues: classification of “significant role” in drug supply, consecutive sentencing for perverting the course of justice, disparity with co-defendants, and the treatment of mental health mitigation.
Video-link sentencing practice, including the routine muting of defendants and the adequacy of representation.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court refused an extension of time (251 days) and refused leave to appeal against conviction. There was no arguable ground of appeal; in any event, no good reason for delay.
On the search warrant: the Court held there is no requirement for a “wet signature.” What is required is an indication that the warrant has been approved by the issuing court. The warrant here complied (Criminal Procedure Rules 2025, Part 47.27(3)).
Further, even if there had been a defect, that would not have formed a valid ground of appeal following the applicant’s guilty pleas.
Allegations of incompetent representation were unfounded; counsel’s contemporaneous notes and advice showed the applicant was properly advised and knew what he was pleading to.
Leave to appeal against sentence was also refused. The judge’s classification of a “significant role” in drug supply was plainly open on the evidence; the perverting-the-course-of-justice offence warranted consecutive punishment; totality was respected; and the overall sentence was not manifestly excessive.
The Court confirmed that it is routine for defendants to be muted on video link during sentencing; representation and opportunities to confer safeguard participation.
Any apparent inconsistency in how elements of the sentence were pronounced (concurrent vs consecutive) was resolved by the total term imposed and the Digital Case System record; the intention to make the justice‑perverting sentence consecutive was clear.

Analysis

Authorities and Materials Cited

Criminal Procedure Rules 2025, Part 47.27(3): establishes that a search warrant must include an indication of approval by the issuing court; a traditional handwritten “wet” signature is not required. The Court applied this directly to reject the “wet signature” ground.
Substantive offences:
- Section 1(1), Criminal Law Act 1977: conspiracy to pervert the course of public justice.
- Sections 5(3) and 4(3), Misuse of Drugs Act 1971: possession of a controlled drug of Class A with intent to supply; being concerned in the supply of a controlled drug.
Sentencing Council guidelines (implicitly applied by the judge and accepted by the Court of Appeal) on:
- Supply of Class A drugs (categorisation by harm and role: “Category 3, significant role,” with a 4.5-year starting point).
- Perverting the course of justice (culpability/harm matrices, with high culpability where conduct is planned and sustained; harm Category 2 at the top end; aggravation where there is a similar previous conviction).
- Totality: considering whether the distinct criminality of separate offences warrants concurrent or consecutive terms.

Notably, the Court did not rely on case-law citations. Its reasoning instead pivoted on the applicable procedural rule, the undisputed record, and well-established sentencing practice.

Legal Reasoning

1) Conviction appeal: no arguable ground

The Court endorsed the single judge’s comprehensive refusal. The evidential picture was strong: cocaine, cash, drug paraphernalia (digital scales, snap bags, a press-type device), and mobile phone evidence tying supply communications, bank details, and identity (“Lee”) to the applicant. The Court addressed the applicant’s points as follows:

Disclosure and mental health: All defence disclosure requests were properly addressed pre-trial. No psychiatric evidence was served by the defence. A detailed psychologist’s report was available and considered at sentence; it did not undermine fitness to plead or stand trial, nor did it bear on guilt.
Alleged incompetent counsel/pressure to plead: After waiver of privilege, counsel provided detailed written responses (including contemporaneous advice). The Court was satisfied the applicant was adequately advised and knowingly pleaded guilty.
Perverting-the-course-of-justice and alleged coercion: The prosecution did not allege coercion as part of its case on guilt; in any event, the line of argument the applicant advanced would not have affected guilt/innocence.
“Hydraulic press” and cash: Whether or not a particular press device was present, there was a press-type item on the Digital Case System, and the role assessment rested on the totality of drug evidence and phone data. Return of some cash did not negate the wider supply evidence.
“Ownership” vs possession: The Court properly reiterated that possession concerns knowledge and control, not ownership. The “drugs belong to a third party” argument did not assist.
Participation at sentencing: It is standard video-link practice to mute defendants. Representation by counsel, pre/post-hearing conferences, and the opportunity to confer protect participation rights. No unfairness arose.

2) The search warrant and “wet signature”

A key point—pressed more forcefully in renewed grounds—was that the warrant was invalid because it lacked a “wet signature.” The Court rejected this absolutely:

There is no requirement for a wet-ink signature. Under CrimPR 2025, Part 47.27(3), what matters is that the warrant “include an indication that it has been approved by the court that issued it.”
Here, the warrant showed it was issued by Merseyside Magistrates’ Court, by a Justice of the Peace on a telephone application, and was “signed on the direction of” the JP—satisfying the procedural requirement.
Moreover, practical modern processes (telephone applications; digital records; signatures “on direction”) are compatible with the Rules. The Court thus squarely rebuffed the notion that a physical handwritten signature is mandatory.
Crucially, the Court added that, even if there had been a defect, this would not have formed a valid ground of appeal where the applicant had pleaded guilty.

3) Effect of a guilty plea on warrant-based challenges

The Court emphasised a further principle with practical bite: after a valid guilty plea, alleged defects in a warrant’s issue or execution are not a viable basis to impugn the conviction. Unless the plea is infirm (for example, equivocal or uninformed), procedural objections that could have been litigated pre-plea are foreclosed. The appellant’s contentions fell well short of that threshold, especially in light of counsel’s clear advice, the strength of the evidence, and the clarity of the pleas tendered.

4) Sentencing appeal: role, concurrency, disparity, and mental health

Significant role in drug supply: The judge’s categorisation (Category 3, significant role; 4.5-year starting point) was plainly justified on the evidence: quantity of Class A drug, supply paraphernalia, and phone communications linking the appellant to supply activity and payment channels. The Court held that the absence of a recovered “hydraulic press” or the return of some cash did not undermine this assessment.
Perverting the course of justice: The offending was planned, sustained, and aimed at derailing the administration of justice by staging an exculpatory video. High culpability with Category 2 harm (top end), aggravated by a similar prior conviction, was entirely justified.
Consecutive sentence and totality: The perverting-the-course-of-justice offence rightly attracted a consecutive term to reflect distinct criminality and harm to the justice system. Although an element of the pronouncement reportedly referred to concurrency, the total sentence and the Digital Case System record made the judicial intention for consecutivity clear. The resulting six-year total observed the totality principle.
Disparity with co-defendants: There was no arguable disparity. The co-defendants (of good character, with mitigation including youth and caring responsibilities) were sentenced only for the justice‑perverting conduct and were subordinate to Hayes’ role. They did not face the same Class A drug supply counts. Suspended terms for them did not render Hayes’ sentence disproportionate.
Mental health mitigation: The judge read and expressly took into account the psychological report (diagnoses included bipolar disorder, ADHD, EUPD, PTSD). The sentencing remarks show careful reduction to reflect this context. The Court held the approach was measured and appropriate.
Participation at sentencing via video link: The routine muting of defendants on the link does not, without more, vitiate the hearing. Representation, conferences, and opportunities to input were available and used; no unfairness was shown.
Outcome: The overall six-year term was just and proportionate and within the range counsel had advised prior to sentence.

5) Extension of time

A 251-day delay in seeking leave to appeal conviction was not justified. More importantly, the Court found no arguable ground of appeal. Both factors independently supported refusal of an extension and leave.

Impact and Practical Implications

Search warrants and formalities:
- “Wet signatures” are not required. An indication of judicial approval, including approvals made by telephone and signed “on direction,” suffices under CrimPR 2025 Part 47.27(3).
- Police/prosecutors and courts can rely on modern, remote processes without fear that the absence of an ink signature will undermine the warrant on appeal.
Post-plea challenge boundaries:
- Defendants who plead guilty will not be able to re-litigate alleged warrant defects on appeal unless they can undermine the plea itself (e.g., show it was not informed or was equivocal).
- Defence teams must identify and pursue warrant challenges pre-plea; after a plea, such arguments will almost always be out of bounds.
Sentencing practice:
- Perverting the course of justice often warrants a consecutive term, especially where planned, sustained, and impactful on the administration of justice, and particularly where there is a relevant previous conviction.
- “Significant role” in drug supply can be established without every paraphernalia item being present; volume of drug, packaging/weighing equipment, and communications evidence can collectively prove significant operational function and financial motivation.
- Disparity arguments must account for different charges, roles, culpability, mitigation, and antecedents. Principals with prior similar offending can expect immediate custody even where co-actors receive suspended sentences.
Remote hearings:
- Muting a defendant on video link is routine and not inherently unfair. The focus is on whether the defendant had reasonable opportunities to confer with counsel and participate through representation.
Pronouncement vs record:
- If a judge’s oral words about concurrency/consecutivity are unclear or contain a slip, the total sentence and the official record (DCS) can clarify intention. Practitioners should check the recorded total against the stated structure.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Perverting the course of public justice: Conduct intended to interfere with the administration of justice, such as fabricating evidence or staging exculpatory material to mislead investigators/courts.
Possession with intent to supply: Requires knowledge and control over the drug, plus evidence of intent to distribute (quantity, packaging, scales, communications, money). Ownership of the drug is not determinative; control is.
Being concerned in the supply: Participation in the supply process (arranging, facilitating, communicating) even if not physically handing over drugs.
“Wet signature”: A signature made in ink by hand. The Court confirms such a signature is not required on a search warrant if the warrant otherwise indicates judicial approval in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Rules.
Concurrent vs consecutive sentences:
- Concurrent: terms run at the same time; the longest term effectively sets the total.
- Consecutive: terms are added together, reflecting distinct criminality or different incidents.
Totality principle: Ensures that when sentencing for multiple offences, the overall sentence is just and proportionate to the entirety of the criminality.
Role categorisation in drug cases: “Significant role” denotes an operational function within the supply chain with expectation of financial gain and some influence over others, but not necessarily leadership.
High culpability/Category 2 harm (perverting justice): Planning, persistence, and causing delay/impact on proceedings places offending high on culpability and can push harm within Category 2 towards its top end.
Video-link practice: Defendants are typically muted during remote hearings to maintain order; their participation occurs through counsel and arranged conferences, which must be available and effective.

Conclusion

R v Hayes [2025] EWCA Crim 1312 consolidates several practical points of criminal procedure and sentencing:

First, the Court unequivocally confirms that a search warrant does not require a “wet signature.” An indication of court approval, including where granted by telephone and signed “on direction,” complies with CrimPR 2025 Part 47.27(3).
Second, alleged defects in warrant issue/execution cannot generally be raised after a guilty plea; such pleas foreclose procedural challenges unless the plea itself is impugned.
Third, when oral pronouncement and structure do not neatly align, the total term and the Digital Case System record can be used to discern and give effect to the sentencing judge’s intention.
Fourth, the Court reaffirms orthodox sentencing approaches: significant role in Class A supply supported by multi-source evidence; consecutive punishment for justice‑perverting conduct reflecting distinct harm; disparity assessed in light of different charges, roles, and mitigation; and careful, explicit consideration of mental health.
Finally, the Court endorses standard video-link practice (muting defendants) where representation and opportunities to confer are available, underscoring that procedural regularity and effective advocacy safeguard participation rights.

The decision’s most enduring precedent is its clear statement on warrant formalities and the limits of post‑plea challenges. Together with its guidance on sentence structure and participation in remote hearings, Hayes offers practitioners a concise, modern roadmap for avoiding and contesting procedural objections in criminal proceedings.