Motorola v Hytera [2025] EWCA Civ 1667: Total Bar on Enforcement of Foreign Multiple-Damages Judgments and CPR 40.8A as the Primary Route for Post‑Judgment Relief after Foreign Appeals

1. Introduction

This Court of Appeal decision in Motorola Solutions Inc & Anor v Hytera Communications Corporation Ltd & Ors clarifies two important and previously unsettled areas of English private international law and civil procedure:

1. Section 5 Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980 (PTIA) – the court holds that section 5 bars enforcement in England and Wales of the whole of a foreign “judgment for multiple damages”, including the compensatory element, and also bars ancillary sums (interest, attorneys’ fees and costs) which are payable “under” such a judgment. It expressly rejects the contrary obiter dicta of Mann J in Lucasfilm v Ainsworth.
2. Revocation and variation of English enforcement judgments – where an English judgment has been entered to enforce a foreign judgment which is later reversed or varied abroad, the primary and historically correct route for post‑judgment relief is CPR 40.8A (derived from the old writ of audita querela), not CPR 3.1(7). CPR 3.1(7) remains a narrow, largely case‑management power and should not ordinarily be used to revoke final orders where CPR 40.8A applies.

The case arises out of substantial US litigation between Motorola and its Chinese competitor Hytera over alleged theft of trade secrets and copyright infringement. Motorola obtained very large judgments in the US, including statutory multiple (punitive) damages under the US Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), and sought to enforce parts of those judgments in England.

Two appeals were before the Court of Appeal:

• The first appeal – by Motorola, challenging Calver J’s conclusion that section 5 PTIA prevented enforcement of: (a) the entire DTSA damages (both compensatory and punitive), and (b) the associated interest, attorneys’ fees and costs.
• The second appeal – by Motorola, challenging a deputy High Court judge’s decision to revoke an English judgment enforcing US copyright damages after the Seventh Circuit in the US had overturned those damages and remanded for reassessment.

The Court of Appeal (Sir Geoffrey Vos MR giving the leading judgment) dismissed the first appeal and allowed the second. The result is a significant restatement of the English approach to foreign multiple‑damages judgments and to the procedural mechanisms for responding when foreign judgments change after they have been enforced here.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 The parties and the US litigation

Motorola, headquartered in Chicago, develops two‑way radio equipment. Hytera, headquartered in China, competes in the same market. In 2017, Motorola sued Hytera in the US District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging theft of trade secrets and copyright infringement under:

• the US Copyright Act; and
• the Defend Trade Secrets Act 2016 (DTSA).

The DTSA allows courts to award up to double compensatory damages as punitive damages for wilful and malicious misappropriation.

After a jury trial, the Illinois court awarded:

• c. US$136.3m in “compensatory” copyright damages (actually disgorgement of Hytera’s profits);
• US$135.8m in compensatory damages under the DTSA;
• US$271.6m in DTSA punitive damages (double the DTSA compensatory damages);
• US$51.1m pre‑judgment interest;
• US$34.2m attorneys’ fees; and
• US$2.67m costs (disbursements).

Together, these formed the “Illinois Judgments”.

2.2 The English enforcement proceedings

In April 2022, Motorola began proceedings in the Commercial Court to enforce the Illinois Judgments in England. Its initial position was to:

• enforce the Copyright Act compensatory damages, interest, fees and costs; but
• not enforce the DTSA compensatory and punitive damages.

Motorola’s claim form thus sought all components of the Illinois Judgments except the DTSA punitive damages, though its pleading later attempted to characterise DTSA compensatory sums as if they were copyright damages for the purpose of enforcement.

In November 2023, Cockerill J entered an English judgment (the “English Judgment”) for the US$136.3m copyright damages plus interest by consent, with a stay of execution pending the outcome of Hytera’s appeal to the Seventh Circuit (USCA), conditional on Hytera paying US$25m into court. Jacobs J subsequently continued the stay on that condition.

2.3 The US appeal and remand

In July 2024, the USCA allowed part of Hytera’s appeal. It held that the Illinois court had wrongly:

• included profits from Hytera’s foreign (non‑US) sales in the copyright damages; and
• denied Hytera the opportunity to prove apportionment of profits attributable to its own contributions.

The USCA therefore reversed the US$136.3m copyright damages award and remanded to the district court for a fresh assessment (the “Assessment”). It indicated that the reassessed damages were likely to be “substantially” lower, perhaps by an order of magnitude. The DTSA awards, including punitive damages, were otherwise largely upheld.

After the USCA judgment, Hytera applied in England to:

• revoke the English Judgment; and
• secure the return of the US$25m paid into court.

A deputy High Court judge allowed that application under CPR 3.1(7), revoking the English Judgment and ordering the return of the money (subject to a reduced US$20m stay pending appeal).

2.4 The trial on the remaining English claims

Meanwhile, Calver J held a trial in November 2024 on the remainder of Motorola’s English claim, i.e. enforcement of:

• pre‑judgment interest;
• post‑judgment interest;
• attorneys’ fees; and
• costs (disbursements).

These had been awarded by the Illinois court without apportionment as between the Copyright Act and DTSA heads of claim. By this stage, Motorola did not seek to enforce the DTSA damages themselves, though at trial it tried to argue that the compensatory DTSA sums could notionally underpin the interest/fees/costs claims.

The main issue was the scope of section 5 PTIA and whether it barred enforcement of:

• the DTSA compensatory damages (as well as the DTSA punitive damages); and
• interest, fees and costs ancillary to the multiple‑damages award.

Calver J held that section 5 barred enforcement of both the compensatory and punitive DTSA damages, and that the interest, fees and costs (being indivisible and ancillary to the multiple‑damages judgment) were also unenforceable. Motorola appealed (the first appeal).

Separately, Motorola appealed the deputy judge’s revocation of the English Judgment (the second appeal).

3. Summary of the Judgment

3.1 First appeal – Section 5 PTIA

The Court of Appeal dismissed Motorola’s first appeal and held that:

1. Section 5 PTIA bars enforcement of the whole of a foreign “judgment for multiple damages” within section 5(3), namely a judgment:

   “for an amount arrived at by doubling, trebling or otherwise multiplying a sum assessed as compensation for the loss or damage sustained”.

   That “amount arrived at” includes both the compensatory and non‑compensatory (punitive) elements. No part of such a judgment – including the compensatory base – is enforceable in the UK.
2. Section 5(1) also precludes enforcement of ancillary interest, fees and costs which are “sums payable under” a multiple‑damages judgment. If those sums are not separably quantified by reference to non‑multiple causes of action, they are caught by the bar.
3. The court expressly declined to follow the obiter reasoning of Mann J in Lucasfilm v Ainsworth, and instead aligned with prior dicta in British Airways v Laker Airways, Lewis v Eliades, Service Temps, SAS Institute v WPL and leading textbooks.
4. Section 5 is interpreted consistently with section 6 PTIA: section 6 assumes that the whole multiple‑damages award (including the compensatory base) is a “judgment for multiple damages”, from which the compensatory portion is carved out only for limited clawback purposes.
5. Motorola’s attempt to argue that only the “penal” or “extra” element was barred was rejected as inconsistent with the statutory language, structure and purpose.
6. Motorola’s late attempt to amend to claim the DTSA compensatory damages directly was futile because such a claim would be barred by section 5 in any event.

3.2 Second appeal – Revocation of the English Judgment

On the second appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed Motorola’s appeal against the revocation of the English Judgment. It held that:

1. The deputy judge used the wrong power in revoking the English Judgment under CPR 3.1(7). The historically and textually appropriate jurisdiction is CPR 40.8A, which:
   • allows a party against whom a judgment has been given to seek a stay or “other relief” on the ground of matters arising after judgment; and
   • derives from the former writ of audita querela, traditionally used where events after judgment made its enforcement unjust (for example, reversal of the underlying liability abroad).
2. The deputy judge’s order could not be salvaged as if made under CPR 40.8A; CPR 3.1(7) and CPR 40.8A are not “interchangeable”. Section 3.1(7) is a general case‑management power, tightly constrained by finality jurisprudence; 40.8A is a specific post‑judgment relief power for supervening events.
3. The Court of Appeal therefore set aside the revocation of the English Judgment.
4. Exercising CPR 40.8A itself, the Court of Appeal held that it was premature to revoke the English Judgment while:
   • the US Assessment of copyright damages remained pending; and
   • the future course of the US litigation (including any further appeals) was unclear.
5. Instead, the Court:
   • continued the stay of the English Judgment; and
   • ordered that the US$20m security remain in court, as previously determined by the deputy judge, with liberty to apply after the Assessment or other material change of circumstances.
6. The Court recognised that, once the US process is complete, revocation and replacement of the English Judgment with a fresh judgment for whatever sum is then due will almost certainly be appropriate.

4. Analysis of the First Appeal: Section 5 PTIA and Multiple Damages

4.1 The statutory framework and policy of the PTIA

The Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980 was enacted against a backdrop of concern about US “long‑arm” economic regulation (especially antitrust treble‑damages actions) affecting UK trading interests. Its long title states that it is:

“An Act to provide protection from requirements, prohibitions and judgments imposed or given under the laws of countries outside the United Kingdom and affecting the trading or other interest of persons in the United Kingdom”.

Two provisions are central:

• Section 5 (“Restriction on enforcement of certain overseas judgments”) – a shield. It prevents registration or common‑law enforcement of, among other things, a “judgment for multiple damages” given by a foreign court.
• Section 6 (“Recovery of awards of multiple damages”) – a limited sword. It allows certain “qualifying defendants” (essentially UK citizens and those carrying on business in the UK) who have paid under a multiple‑damages judgment to recover the non‑compensatory excess from the foreign judgment creditor.

The court emphasised that:

• Section 5 operates irrespective of the nationality or trading location of the judgment debtor; it expresses a general policy that UK courts will not lend assistance to the enforcement of foreign judgments of a penal character.
• Section 6 is narrower; it is concerned with the protection of UK defendants who have actually paid under such judgments and seeks to undo, in part, the effect of foreign multiple‑damages awards.

This structural divergence supports the view that section 5 is not merely about compensating UK defendants, but also about shielding the English system from being a forum for enforcement of foreign punitive regimes.

4.2 What is a “judgment for multiple damages”?

Section 5(3) defines:

“In subsection (2)(a) above a judgment for multiple damages means a judgment for an amount arrived at by doubling, trebling or otherwise multiplying a sum assessed as compensation...”

The court’s reasoning is arithmetical and textual:

• Consider a compensatory sum C (e.g. US$1,000). A treble‑damages judgment awards 3C (US$3,000). The “amount arrived at” by the multiplication is 3C, not only the “extra” 2C. Section 5(3) clearly defines the “judgment for multiple damages” as the whole product of the multiplication, including C.
• There is no basis in the words of the statute to treat the multiple‑damages judgment as only the surplus over the compensatory base (e.g. only the 2C).

Accordingly, when section 5(1) prohibits UK courts from entertaining proceedings “for the recovery of any sum payable under such a judgment”, it bars enforcement of any part of a judgment which qualifies as a “judgment for multiple damages” under section 5(3).

4.3 The interplay between section 5 and section 6

Section 6(2) is crucial to understanding the intended scope of section 5. It provides that, where a qualifying defendant has paid “an amount on account of the damages” under a multiple‑damages judgment, the defendant may recover:

“so much of the amount… as exceeds the part attributable to compensation”.

Section 6(2) then prescribes a formula to identify the “part attributable to compensation” by proportionally apportioning the amount paid between compensatory and non‑compensatory elements. This has two implications:

1. Section 6 expressly assumes that the “amount” referred to (i.e. the multiple‑damages judgment amount) comprises both:
   • a compensatory component; and
   • a non‑compensatory (punitive) excess.
   If “judgment for multiple damages” referred only to the punitive excess, this formula and “carve‑out” for the compensatory component would be unnecessary.
2. Section 6 contemplates situations where only part of a multiple‑damages judgment has been enforced (for example, by execution against one asset). It provides a proportional mechanism for determining how much of any amount actually paid relates to the punitive element and is recoverable.

By contrast, section 5 contains no apportionment mechanism at the enforcement stage, which strongly suggests it was not intended to permit partial enforcement of the compensatory base of a multiple‑damages judgment. Instead, section 5 simply denies enforcement of “any sum payable under” such a judgment.

4.4 Purpose: denial of assistance to foreign penal regimes

Motorola’s central policy argument was that section 5 should be read as targeting only the “penal” element of multiple damages (the excess over compensation). The court accepted that:

• the PTIA is indeed concerned with foreign penal or quasi‑penal regimes; and
• UK law has long refused to enforce foreign penal laws.

However, it held that a complete bar serves that purpose in two distinct ways:

1. Deterrence – denying enforcement of even the compensatory component discourages claimants from seeking multiple damages in the foreign proceedings if they wish to preserve the possibility of enforcement in England.
2. Preventing indirect enforcement of the penal element – if the compensatory base could be enforced here, a claimant could:
   • enforce the “punitive” portion abroad; and
   • then come to England to enforce the “compensatory” portion;
   resulting in the English court effectively assisting a claimant who has recovered the whole multiple sum worldwide. Section 5 is designed to prevent that.

The court rejected the suggestion that any unfairness could be cured ex post by section 6 clawback proceedings. Section 5 is intended to prevent the problem arising in the first place.

4.5 Authorities and textbooks

Although no previous binding authority had decided the point as a matter of ratio, most dicta and leading texts supported the Court’s interpretation:

• British Airways Board v Laker Airways [1985] AC 58 – Parker J (approved by Lord Diplock in the House of Lords) read section 5 as a broad shield preventing enforcement of US antitrust treble‑damages judgments here, even between US parties.
• Lewis v Eliades [2004] 1 WLR 692 – Potter LJ (with Carnwath and Jacob LJJ concurring) treated section 5 as rendering a multiple‑damages component unenforceable whilst allowing a separately quantified compensatory award under a different cause of action to be enforced. Nothing in Lewis suggested that the “multiplicand” within the multiple‑damages judgment itself was enforceable.
• Service Temps Inc v MacLeod [2013] CSOH 162 – Lord Hodge, in the Scottish Outer House, regarded section 5 as expressing a policy aligned with the non‑enforcement of foreign penal judgments.
• SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Ltd [2019] FSR 30 – Cockerill J held that section 5 barred enforcement of US treble‑damages judgments in full. The Court of Appeal endorsed her conclusion, though it nuanced her focus on “causes of action” and stressed that section 5 is concerned with judgments rather than underlying causes of action.
• Hangzhou Juidang Asset Management Co Ltd v Kei Kin Hung [2022] 2 CLC 919 – Christopher Hancock KC (sitting as a deputy High Court judge) adopted the same reading.
• Dicey, Morris & Collins, Cheshire, North & Fawcett and Briggs on Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments all treat section 5 as imposing a total bar on enforcement of multiple‑damages judgments.

The main contrary authority was:

• Lucasfilm Ltd v Ainsworth [2009] FSR 2 – Mann J suggested, obiter, that it would be wrong to deprive a claimant of genuinely compensatory damages merely because they had elected to seek multiplied damages. He regarded such an outcome as penalising the claimant and requiring clearer language.

The Court of Appeal in Motorola disagreed with Mann J for two reasons:

1. The language of section 5 is sufficiently clear once read with section 6 and the phrase “amount arrived at”.
2. The consequence is not a “penalty” on the claimant but a deliberate legislative choice to deny enforcement of such judgments entirely to further the PTIA’s twin aims.

4.6 Ancillary interest, fees and costs

Motorola argued in the alternative that, even if the DTSA compensatory damages were barred, the awards of interest, fees and costs should still be enforceable because:

• they were not themselves “arrived at by multiplying” compensation; and
• section 5(3) only defined “judgment for multiple damages”, not other monetary awards.

The court firmly rejected this. Section 5(1) prohibits proceedings:

“for the recovery of any sum payable under such a judgment”.

Interest, fees and costs awarded as a consequence of, and ancillary to, a multiple‑damages judgment are plainly “sums payable under” that judgment. To allow recovery of the costs of procuring an unenforceable multiple‑damages award would subvert the policy of the Act, even more so where those costs are inextricably linked with seeking the punitive element.

In Motorola, the Illinois court had not apportioned interest, attorneys’ fees or costs between the Copyright Act claim and the DTSA claim, nor between compensatory and punitive elements. No separate, purely copyright‑based portion was identified or readily identifiable. Calver J and the Court of Appeal therefore treated all those awards as indivisibly tied to the multiple‑damages judgment and hence unenforceable.

4.7 Use of Pepper v Hart materials

The court was taken to:

• Hansard debates when the PTIA Bill was introduced; and
• diplomatic correspondence between the UK and US governments about the Bill.

Applying Pepper v Hart, the court held that there was no ambiguity in the statutory language, so such materials were strictly unnecessary. Nonetheless, it observed that the extraneous materials reinforced its construction:

• they showed that both the UK and US governments understood section 5 as imposing a total bar, including the compensatory element; and
• the UK government had consciously rejected US objections to that approach.

4.8 Human rights and “doubtful penalisation” arguments

Motorola advanced two further arguments:

1. “Against doubtful penalisation” construction – invoking the interpretive principle that legislation should not be construed to penalise persons unless clearly intended. The Court held:
   • section 5’s wording is clear; the canon has no role in displacing an unambiguous statute; and
   • section 5 does not penalise Motorola; it simply withholds the assistance of English courts to enforce a foreign judgment of a particular character.
2. Article 1 of Protocol 1 ECHR (A1P1) – Motorola contended that denial of enforcement of the compensatory portion infringed its right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions. The Court rejected this:
   • any property right in a debt must arise under national law; PTIA section 5 means there is no recognisable enforceable debt in English law.
   • Even if there were an interference, it would pursue a legitimate aim (maintaining the integrity of the domestic legal order vis‑à‑vis foreign penal judgments) and would be proportionate, within the legislature’s wide margin of appreciation.

4.9 Consequences for Motorola’s amendment application

Motorola sought permission at appellate level to amend its English pleadings to assert a direct claim to enforce the DTSA compensatory damages, which it had not pursued before Calver J. Hytera argued this was abusive (under Henderson v Henderson) and too late.

The Court of Appeal found it unnecessary to decide those abuse and timing questions. Any claim to enforce the DTSA compensatory damages was in any event . Since the amendment would be futile, there was no basis to grant it.

4.10 Practical impact of the section 5 ruling

The ruling cements several key propositions:

1. Total non‑enforcement of multiple‑damages judgments: UK courts will not enforce any part of a foreign judgment where the amount is calculated by multiplying compensation (e.g. double, treble damages), including the compensatory base amount.
2. Ancillary awards are also barred: interest, attorneys’ fees and costs that are payable “under” such a multiple‑damages judgment are likewise unenforceable unless they can be clearly and separately attributed to non‑multiple causes of action or awards.
3. Separate compensatory awards remain enforceable: following Lewis v Eliades, a distinct, separately quantified compensatory award under a different cause of action (not involving multiplication) remains enforceable, even if made in the same foreign proceedings as a multiple‑damages award.
4. Case management for litigants: claimants who expect to seek enforcement in England should consider:
   • avoiding reliance on statutory multiple‑damages provisions; or
   • ensuring courts quantify purely compensatory awards distinctly, so they are not subsumed into a single multiple‑damages judgment.
5. Lucasfilm obiter disapproved: practitioners should no longer rely on Mann J’s suggestion that the compensatory base within a multiple‑damages judgment might remain enforceable in England. That approach has now been definitively rejected at appellate level.

5. Analysis of the Second Appeal: CPR 40.8A, Finality and Foreign Appeals

5.1 The problem: foreign judgment reversed after English enforcement

The second appeal concerned this practical question:

When an English court has entered a final money judgment enforcing a foreign judgment, and the foreign judgment is later reversed or varied on appeal abroad, by what power and on what principles can (or should) the English judgment be revoked, stayed or varied?

Historically, this issue is not new. In Nouvion v Freeman (1889), Lord Bramwell considered exactly the situation where an English enforcement judgment had been entered and the underlying foreign judgment was later reversed. He suggested that the defendant would historically have had recourse to the writ of audita querela, now abolished, and its replacement in the Rules of the Supreme Court.

5.2 Historical root: audita querela and its procedural successors

Audita querela was a common law writ by which a judgment debtor could obtain relief from a judgment where new facts arising after judgment made its enforcement unjust (e.g. payment, compromise, or reversal of the underlying liability). It was abolished in the 19th century but replaced by:

• Order XLII r.27 RSC 1883 (and its predecessor), expressly providing for applications for “stay of execution or other relief… upon the grounds of facts which have arisen too late to be pleaded”.
• In modern CPR, by CPR 40.8A, which is in substantially similar terms.

CPR 40.8A provides:

“a party against whom a judgment has been given or an order made may apply… for a stay of execution… or other relief, on the ground of matters which have occurred since the date of the judgment or order… and the court may… grant such relief… as it thinks just.”

The Court of Appeal in Motorola held that this provision is the direct modern successor to audita querela and is specifically designed for cases where post‑judgment events justify relief, including where a foreign judgment enforced in England is later reversed or varied.

5.3 CPR 3.1(7) vs CPR 40.8A vs CPR 83.7

Three provisions were in play:

1. CPR 3.1(7) – a general power providing that “a power of the court under these Rules to make an order includes a power to vary or revoke the order”. It sits within Part 3 (“The court’s case management powers”).
2. CPR 40.8A – a specific post‑judgment relief power already quoted, allowing a judgment debtor to seek a stay or “other relief” on the basis of events occurring after judgment.
3. CPR 83.7(4) – a power to stay execution of a money judgment where there are “special circumstances which render it inexpedient to enforce the judgment or order” or where the debtor cannot pay. This is focused on execution (writs/warrants), not on variation or revocation as such.

The deputy judge in Motorola treated CPR 3.1(7) as his only jurisdictional basis and relied on the line of authorities (e.g. Roult, Tibbles, Terry, Vodafone) governing the narrow circumstances in which final orders can be revisited under that power.

The Court of Appeal held that:

• CPR 40.8A is the primary and appropriate power in a case such as this, where:
  • a final judgment has been entered; and
  • events after judgment (a foreign appeal result) are said to justify relief for the judgment debtor.
• CPR 3.1(7) remains available but is not generally appropriate where a specific rule like 40.8A applies. Rule 3.1(7) is heavily constrained by finality considerations and developed mainly in the context of case management decisions and certain continuing orders (e.g. injunctions).
• CPR 83.7 is relevant for stays of execution but does not provide a complete framework for revocation or variation of the judgment itself. It also requires “special circumstances”, a stricter test than 40.8A’s flexible “as it thinks just”.

5.4 Finality and CPR 3.1(7): the prior case law

The judgment canvasses a series of authorities on CPR 3.1(7), “finality”, and closely related powers:

• Roult v NW Strategic Health Authority – CPR 3.1(7) cannot be used to “appeal” a final order to the same judge; its use in relation to final orders is extremely limited.
• Tibbles v SIG plc – CPR 3.1(7) is normally confined to:
  • material changes of circumstance; or
  • misstatements of the factual basis for the order.
  Successful applications are “rare”.
• Terry v BCS Corporate Acceptances – setting aside a final judgment under CPR 3.1(7) is a “wholly exceptional course”. The existence of specific set‑aside procedures (e.g. CPR 13 for default judgments) further narrows CPR 3.1(7)’s role.
• Vodafone v IPCom – CPR 3.1(7) cannot be used to discharge or vary a sealed final costs order on the basis that the underlying patent was later revoked; the appropriate route was CPR 52.30 (reopening of final appeals). Again, the existence of a specific rule constrains use of CPR 3.1(7).
• AIC Ltd v Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria – the Supreme Court accepted that CPR 3.1(7) can be used to adjust orders even between handing down judgment and sealing the order, but stressed that the weight of the finality principle varies by context; courts should not start from “neutrality” when asked to reconsider final decisions.
• UniCredit Bank GmbH v RusChemAlliance – the Court of Appeal held that CPR 3.1(7) can be used to discharge a final anti‑suit injunction, particularly when the party who obtained it seeks discharge. However, anti‑suit injunctions are “continuing” orders and the usual finality concerns are attenuated; CPR 40.8A was not available because the applicant was not “a party against whom” the order had been made.

These authorities underscore that CPR 3.1(7) is not a general “safety valve” for revisiting any and all final orders; its scope over final money judgments is extremely narrow.

5.5 Why CPR 40.8A is the correct route in Motorola

The Court of Appeal concluded:

1. Text and history – CPR 40.8A is specifically drafted to address:
   • a party against whom a judgment is given; and
   • matters arising after judgment;
   and to empower the court to grant “stay… or other relief… as it thinks just”. Its lineage from audita querela confirms its role in precisely this context, including when a foreign judgment enforced here has subsequently been overturned abroad.
2. Specific over general – where a specific rule exists, it should generally displace reliance on a more general residual power like CPR 3.1(7), particularly given the latter’s tightly constrained use in relation to final orders.
3. Finality still matters – even under CPR 40.8A, the importance of finality remains a factor, but that factor is weighed within a rule expressly contemplating post‑judgment relief. It is not appropriate to import wholesale the “exceptionality” gloss developed around CPR 3.1(7) into 40.8A.
4. Reversal of a foreign judgment is a paradigm case for 40.8A relief – the court accepted that the reversal of a foreign judgment on which an English judgment is based is a clear example of where it may be just to grant relief (revocation, variation and/or stay). But this does not mean that relief must be granted immediately or in a particular form; timing and form remain discretionary.

The deputy judge’s error was not simply formal. To allow his decision to stand would effectively extend CPR 3.1(7) into territory now clearly occupied by CPR 40.8A, undermining the carefully developed limits on 3.1(7) in the case law.

5.6 Should the English Judgment have been revoked at this stage?

Having held that the deputy judge acted under the wrong power and that his order must be set aside, the Court of Appeal then considered, under CPR 40.8A, what relief was appropriate on the facts as they stood.

Important considerations included:

• The USCA had reversed the US$136.3m copyright damages award and remanded for a fresh Assessment, with an expectation that any new award might be around US$14.5m (plus interest and costs), or possibly lower.
• The Assessment hearing had concluded in the Illinois court, but the outcome was still pending; it remained possible that there would be further appeals or procedural twists in the US.
• An English judgment had been entered (by consent) to enforce the original US$136.3m award, but its enforcement was stayed, with US$20m standing in court as security.

The Court held that:

1. Immediate revocation was premature. It is undesirable, especially in complex cross‑border litigation, to be repeatedly granting and revoking final judgments in response to every development abroad. The better course is often to retain the judgment but stay its enforcement, adjusting the terms as necessary.
2. This situation is not exceptionally rare. It is a foreseeable consequence of the well‑established principle that final first‑instance foreign judgments are enforceable in England even while subject to appeal abroad, subject to stays. Foreign appeals may succeed or fail; English procedure must accommodate that reality without undermining the principle of finality.
3. Commercial reputational concerns are managed by transparency. The fact that Hytera has an outstanding English judgment against it (albeit stayed and subject to security) is a commercial reality, but any sophisticated observer can understand from the public record (including this judgment) that the underlying foreign award is under reassessment.
4. Revocation will almost certainly be appropriate later, once the foreign position is settled, so that the English court can:
   • revoke the existing English Judgment; and
   • substitute a new English judgment matching whatever final foreign sum (if any) is properly due under enforceable heads.

Accordingly, the Court refused to revoke the English Judgment at this stage, but continued the stay with liberty to apply after the Assessment or other material developments.

5.7 The US$20m security

The deputy judge had, when granting a temporary stay pending appeal, reduced the in‑court amount from US$25m (ordered by Jacobs J) to US$20m, reasoning that:

• US$14.67m represented the likely maximum reassessed copyright damages; and
• the remainder allowed for associated pre‑ and post‑judgment interest and costs.

He found that keeping US$20m in court caused Hytera inconvenience but not specific, irreparable harm, whereas Motorola would suffer real prejudice if the monies were released and the subsequent foreign Assessment proved substantial.

The Court of Appeal, having restored the English Judgment (subject to stay), saw no reason to disturb the deputy judge’s quantitative assessment. It:

• ordered the US$20m to remain in court as security; and
• granted the parties liberty to apply to the Commercial Court to vary the stay or the security once the Assessment and further events were known.

5.8 Procedural guidance for future cases

The judgment provides clear guidance for practitioners and judges:

1. Primary route: CPR 40.8A – where a defendant facing an English judgment seeks relief because of events after judgment (including foreign appeals, settlements, payments, etc.), the application should:
   • be made under CPR 40.8A; and
   • seek a stay and/or “other relief” (including variation or revocation).
2. CPR 3.1(7) is a narrow residual power – it should not ordinarily be used to revisit final money judgments where CPR 40.8A (or other specific procedures) are available. It remains mainly a case‑management tool, with a very restricted role as regards final orders.
3. Stays are usually preferable to immediate revocation – especially while foreign proceedings remain live. Where a foreign judgment has been set aside but is subject to remittal or further appeals, the English court will often:
   • continue or impose a stay of enforcement; and
   • require security or adjust existing security;
   rather than repeatedly granting and revoking judgments.
4. Security should reflect realistically foreseeable outcomes – the quantum of security should be based on realistic estimates of the foreign award that may ultimately be enforceable, including interest and costs, rather than the initial (now overturned) figure or a purely nominal amount.
5. Liberty to apply – orders under CPR 40.8A should normally include liberty to apply, reflecting the fluidity of foreign proceedings and allowing adjustment of stays and security as new events occur.

6. Complex Concepts Explained

6.1 “Judgment for multiple damages”

A “judgment for multiple damages” in section 5(3) PTIA is:

• a judgment where the court identifies a sum representing compensation (e.g. actual loss or unjustly obtained profits); and
• then multiplies that sum by two, three, or some other factor to award an enhanced amount intended to punish or deter, not merely compensate.

Common examples in US law include:

• treble damages in antitrust actions; and
• double damages in certain intellectual property or trade secrets statutes (like the DTSA for wilful and malicious conduct).

6.2 Penal laws and non‑enforcement

Under long‑standing conflict of laws principles, English courts will not enforce:

• foreign penal laws (criminal fines, penalties); or
• revenue (tax) laws; or
• certain public law sanctions.

Section 5 PTIA extends this idea to foreign civil judgments that contain a punitive or penal character by multiplying compensatory damages. It does not invalidate such judgments abroad; it simply refuses to lend English enforcement machinery to them.

6.3 Stay vs revocation of a judgment

• A stay of execution suspends enforcement of a judgment (e.g. prevents execution against assets) while leaving the judgment itself intact.
• Revocation (or setting aside) removes the judgment from the record (or replaces it with a different one), as if it had not been entered in its current form.

In cross‑border enforcement, stays are often used while foreign appeals are pending or after foreign judgments are varied, to avoid premature or unjust enforcement while preserving finality until matters are clearer.

6.4 Audita querela and CPR 40.8A

Audita querela was a common law mechanism by which a judgment debtor could complain that, due to events arising after judgment, enforcement would be unjust (e.g. because the debt had been paid, or the underlying liability had been reversed abroad).

Although the writ no longer exists, its function is continued by CPR 40.8A, which allows a judgment debtor to seek a stay or other relief based on post‑judgment events. The Motorola decision confirms that CPR 40.8A must now be treated as the primary vehicle for such applications.

7. Broader Significance and Impact

7.1 For enforcement of US (and other foreign) judgments

The decision has immediate and practical consequences for cross‑border litigation, especially involving US law:

• US treble‑damages judgments are wholly unenforceable in England and Wales, including:
  • the compensatory base amount;
  • the multiplied punitive excess; and
  • ancillary interest, attorneys’ fees and costs to the extent they are payable “under” such judgments and are not separably attributable to non‑multiple claims.
• Strategic choices for claimants – claimants must choose between:
  • pursuing multiple‑damages remedies in foreign courts (with stronger leverage there, but no enforceability in England); or
  • framing claims to yield purely compensatory awards that can be enforced internationally.
• Judgment drafting – where foreign courts are sympathetic, parties may wish to ensure that:
  • any compensatory award is stated separately from multiple damages; and
  • interest, fees and costs are apportioned between causes of action.
  This may allow enforcement of the purely compensatory components even if a distinct multiple‑damages award is unenforceable.

7.2 For English civil procedure

The decision clarifies and rationalises the use of overlapping procedural powers:

• CPR 40.8A is confirmed as the central mechanism for judgment debtors seeking relief from final judgments following supervening events.
• CPR 3.1(7) is reaffirmed as a limited, mainly case‑management tool, with very restricted application to final orders. Courts and practitioners should hesitate before invoking it where a specific rule (40.8A, 83.7, 52.30, etc.) is available.
• Courts are encouraged to favour stays with security and liberty to apply over repeated revocation and re‑granting of final judgments in response to foreign procedural developments.

7.3 For the doctrine of finality

The judgment strikes a nuanced balance:

• On the one hand, it recognises the importance of finality, echoing Roult, Tibbles, Terry, Vodafone and AIC. Final orders should not be lightly reopened.
• On the other, it accepts that:
  • reversal of a foreign judgment on which an English enforcement judgment is based is a legitimate ground for relief; and
  • CPR 40.8A is designed precisely to accommodate such situations, without unduly stretching the concept of “exceptional” circumstances.

By leaving the English Judgment in place but staying enforcement and retaining security, the court maintains formal finality while ensuring practical justice pending the foreign Assessment.

8. Conclusion

Motorola v Hytera is a leading authority on two fronts.

First, it resolves longstanding uncertainty about section 5 PTIA. The Court of Appeal holds that:

• a foreign “judgment for multiple damages” is unenforceable in England and Wales in its entirety, including the compensatory base; and
• ancillary awards of interest, attorneys’ fees and costs that are indivisibly linked to such a judgment are also barred as “sums payable under” it.

This confirms and entrenches the UK’s refusal to assist in the enforcement of foreign multiple‑damages regimes and disapproves the contrary obiter in Lucasfilm.

Secondly, the judgment clarifies the procedural architecture for responding to foreign appeals after English enforcement:

• CPR 40.8A is the primary power to be used where a judgment debtor seeks relief based on post‑judgment events, including foreign reversals; and
• CPR 3.1(7) is a narrow, residual power not normally to be invoked in such contexts, particularly where a specific rule exists.

The court’s chosen solution – preserving the English enforcement judgment but staying it and maintaining calibrated security pending the US Assessment – provides a pragmatic template for future cases where foreign litigation continues to evolve after English enforcement. It safeguards both the finality of English judgments and the fairness due to parties whose foreign liabilities are still in flux.