Mahmood: Whole‑Course Culpability Governs Causing Death by Dangerous Driving; Category A Starting Points Apply Even to Pre‑2022 Offences, and Disqualification Must Be Recalibrated on Appeal

Case: R v Mahmood [2025] EWCA Crim 1267 (EWCA Crim, 18 September 2025)

Court: England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)

Introduction

This Attorney General’s Reference under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 arose from the tragic death of Carol Andrew, who was struck and killed by a Seat Leon driven dangerously by the respondent over a sustained seven-minute period on 21 July 2021. The respondent, then 29, drove persistently and egregiously: repeated red-light running, multiple overtakes and undertakes, and grossly excessive speed, culminating in a collision at over 60 mph in a 30 mph residential zone. He later attempted to conceal the dash cam. He pleaded guilty on re‑arraignment in January 2025 and was sentenced in April 2025 by HHJ Mairs to four years’ imprisonment and seven years’ disqualification (five years plus a two‑year statutory extension).

His Majesty’s Solicitor General referred the sentence as unduly lenient. The Court of Appeal quashed the sentence and imposed six years and four months’ imprisonment and recalibrated the disqualification to eight years and two months.

The case squarely addresses how courts should assess culpability under the Sentencing Council’s definitive guideline for causing death by dangerous driving (effective 1 July 2023) when the offence pre‑dates the increase of the statutory maximum to life imprisonment by section 86 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022; the proper focus of the culpability assessment (the whole course of dangerous driving, not just the instant of collision); the unduly lenient sentence (ULS) test; and the correct approach to recalculating disqualification when custody is varied on appeal.

Summary of the Judgment

• Guideline applicability: The 2023 Sentencing Council guideline applies to offenders sentenced on or after 1 July 2023, regardless of offence date, subject only to the pre‑existing statutory maximum (here 14 years) not being exceeded (following R v Freeth and R v Ahmed).
• Culpability assessment: The court endorsed that culpability is assessed by the entire course of dangerous driving, not just the moment of collision. The respondent’s driving plainly exhibited multiple Category A features: deliberate decision to ignore road rules, prolonged and persistent course of dangerous driving, grossly excessive speed, and repeated disregard for others’ safety.
• Unduly lenient: Given Category A, the proper starting point after trial is 12 years’ custody (range: 8–18). Even if Category B (starting point 6, range 4–9) were arguable, a notional after-trial sentence of 5 years was outside a reasonable range. The original sentence was unduly lenient.
• Sentence recalibrated: Minimum after-trial sentence identified as 8 years. Applying the accepted 20% plea discount yielded six years and four months’ imprisonment.
• Disqualification recalculated: Disqualification until an extended test is obligatory, and a discretionary period is also obligatory for at least two years. Following R v Needham, the court retained the five-year base period and added an extension equal to half of the revised custodial term (38 months), totalling eight years and two months.
• Other points: Attempted concealment of evidence (dash cam) and a relevant prior dangerous driving conviction were aggravating factors; significant bereavement and health problems were mitigating but could not justify a reduction to the level imposed below.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• R v Freeth [2023] EWCA Crim 1754:
  • Confirmed the 2023 definitive guideline applies to offenders sentenced after its commencement date, even for offences committed before the statutory maximum increased to life imprisonment.
  • Sentencers must apply the guideline’s structure and starting points “subject to not exceeding the relevant statutory maximum.” Mahmood follows and applies Freeth unequivocally.
• R v Ahmed [2023] EWCA Crim 1537:
  • Reinforced that an offender’s legitimate expectation is to be sentenced in accordance with the guideline in force at the date of sentence. There is no “freeze” of the applicable guideline at the offence date.
  • In Mahmood, the defence suggestion that the judge could discount because the offence pre‑dated the maximum’s increase was implicitly rejected by the Court’s re‑anchoring to the guideline starting points, constrained only by the pre‑existing statutory maximum (14 years).
• Brown [2018] EWCA Crim 1774 (as cited in Freeth):
  • Explains that top culpability categories are not reserved solely for the very “worst of the worst.” Where Category A features are present, Category A applies; it is not a rarity threshold.
  • Mahmood uses Brown’s principle to rebut defence submissions that Category A should be confined to only the most egregious cases.
• Attorney General’s Reference (Egan) [2022] EWCA Crim 1751; AG’s Ref (No 4 of 1989) [1990] 90 Cr App R 366; AG’s Ref No 132 of 2001 (Bryn Dorian Johnson) [2002] EWCA Crim 1418:
  • These authorities set the framework for unduly lenient sentence references: appellate restraint; intervention only where the sentence falls outside the range reasonably open to the judge; leave in exceptional cases; focus on “gross error.”
  • The Court in Mahmood applied this framework, concluding the 5‑year after‑trial notional term was outside any reasonable range given the Category A profile and aggravations.
• R v Needham [2016] EWCA Crim 455:
  • Establishes the methodology for combining discretionary disqualification with the statutory extension where immediate custody is imposed: add an extension equal to half of the custodial term to the base disqualification period.
  • Mahmood applies Needham by recalculating the extension to align with the increased custodial sentence.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning operates at three interlocking levels: (1) guideline fidelity and culpability anchoring; (2) the ULS intervention threshold; and (3) the consequent recalibrations of custodial and ancillary orders.

1) Guideline fidelity and culpability anchoring

• Guideline applicability: Citing Freeth and Ahmed, the Court reaffirmed that the definitive guideline effective from 1 July 2023 governs sentencing for all offenders sentenced thereafter, irrespective of the offence date. The only constraint is the statutory maximum applicable at the time of the offence (here 14 years). This forecloses any downward “normalisation” of starting points simply because the offence pre‑dated the increase to life imprisonment.
• Whole‑course assessment: The defence submission that culpability should be assessed only at the point of collision was rejected as “simply wrong.” The Court endorsed the judge’s consideration of the preceding seven-minute course of dangerous driving. This is consistent with the guideline’s focus on the overall nature of the driving and with common-sense causation: sustained, grossly dangerous conduct made a fatality “overwhelmingly likely.”
• Category A features present: The Court agreed that several Category A indicators applied:
  • deliberate decision to ignore the rules of the road;
  • prolonged and persistent course of dangerous driving over some seven to eight minutes;
  • grossly excessive speeds (84 mph in a 50 mph zone; 67 mph and then 60+ mph in a 30 mph zone);
  • repeated disregard for the safety of others, including running red lights and dangerous overtaking/undertaking manoeuvres.
  With these, the appropriate guideline starting point after trial is 12 years (range 8–18).
• Aggravation versus mitigation: The Court accepted substantial personal mitigation (acute bereavements including the brother’s death; health issues; remorse; family responsibilities), but emphasised that these could not credibly drag an after‑trial sentence to as low as five years, especially in the face of aggravating features: a prior conviction for dangerous driving (albeit old) and attempted concealment of critical evidence (the dash cam). The guideline’s structure requires a disciplined balancing exercise within the category range, not an unmoored downward drift.
• Category B “cusp” argument rejected: The Court noted that even if one placed the case at the cusp of Category B (starting point six years; range four to nine), a five‑year after‑trial notional sentence would be inconsistent with both the seriousness of the features present and the guidance. Hence, the original notional sentence could not stand.

2) The ULS threshold and appellate restraint

• Applying Egan and the classic Authorities (AG’s Ref No 4 of 1989; Bryn Dorian Johnson), the Court reminded itself that it should intervene only in cases of “gross error,” not in close or borderline cases.
• On the facts, the failure to anchor the sentence to a Category A starting point, and the effective placement of the case below even a Category B starting point, constituted a sentence outside the range reasonably open to the judge. The sentence was therefore unduly lenient.
• The Court also observed the importance, for transparency and appellate review, of the sentencing judge articulating the chosen starting point, uplifts for aggravation, and reductions for mitigation and plea. The absence of a clear pathway compounded the leniency error.

3) Consequent recalibration: imprisonment and disqualification

• Custodial term: The Court set a minimum after‑trial sentence of eight years in this case, reflecting a tempered but still significant movement down from the Category A starting point in light of the mitigation. Applying the 20% plea credit (which the Court accepted as within the judge’s discretion given the plea 10 days before trial) produced six years and four months’ imprisonment.
• Disqualification and extended re‑test:
  • Orders disqualifying the offender until passing an extended driving test are obligatory under section 36 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 (RTOA 1988). A discretionary disqualification of not less than two years is also obligatory absent special reasons (section 34(4), RTOA 1988).
  • Following R v Needham, where a custodial sentence is imposed, the disqualification should comprise: a base discretionary period plus a statutory extension under section 35A RTOA 1988 equal to half the custodial term.
  • Because the custodial term was increased to 76 months, the extension had to be increased to 38 months. Retaining the five‑year base period, the total became eight years and two months.

Impact and Significance

• Whole‑course culpability confirmed: Mahmood firmly rejects any attempt to silo culpability at the micro‑instant of collision. In road‑death cases, the “overall nature of driving” is the right lens. This matters particularly where pre‑collision driving is prolonged and egregious.
• Category A is not a rarity class: Echoing Brown and Freeth, the Court underscores that where Category A features are present, Category A applies. Practitioners should avoid arguments that it is reserved for outlier cases only.
• Guideline supremacy subject only to the offence‑date maximum: Sentencers must apply the 2023 guideline structure (including Category A starting points) even for pre‑June‑2022 offences, provided the statutory maximum at the offence date is not breached. This promotes consistency and coherence in sentencing post‑guideline.
• Mitigation’s limits in road‑death cases: Genuine personal tragedies (including urgent family emergencies) may explain why an offender drove as he did, but they rarely displace Category A starting points where the driving was prolonged, deliberate, and grossly dangerous. Attempted concealment of evidence, by contrast, will aggravate significantly.
• Appellate expectations of transparency: Sentencing judges should explicitly state their starting point, adjustments for aggravation and mitigation, and the final plea discount. Failure to do so risks ULS intervention if the outcome is outside the proper range.
• Ancillary orders must be recalibrated when custody changes: Needham’s arithmetic remains essential. On appeal, do not simply uplift the total term; recompute the section 35A extension to match the revised custodial sentence, keeping the base period intact unless there is a reason to alter it.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Unduly lenient sentence (ULS): The Court of Appeal can increase a sentence if it is so lenient that it falls outside the range reasonably open to the sentencing judge. It is a high bar: the Court intervenes only in “exceptional” cases where there has been gross error, not just because it would have passed a different sentence.
• Sentencing Council guideline structure:
  • Starting point: A benchmark sentence assuming a contested trial and typical aggravation/mitigation for the chosen culpability category.
  • Category range: The range within which the final sentence should ordinarily fall after considering case-specific features.
  • Plea discount: A reduction (up to 33% for very early pleas; sliding scale thereafter) applied after arriving at the appropriate after‑trial sentence.
• Category A vs Category B (causing death by dangerous driving):
  • Category A typically includes deliberate ignoring of road rules, prolonged bad driving, grossly excessive speed, or clear disregard for safety. Starting point: 12 years (range 8–18).
  • Category B reflects lower culpability. Starting point: 6 years (range 4–9).
  • Presence of multiple Category A features strongly points to Category A.
• Guideline timing vs statutory maximum:
  • The applicable guideline is the one in force at the date of sentence.
  • The applicable statutory maximum is the one in force at the date of offence. A court must not exceed that earlier maximum.
• Disqualification arithmetic (RTOA 1988):
  • Disqualification is mandatory for at least two years absent special reasons. An “extended test” order is obligatory for dangerous driving.
  • When immediate custody is imposed, add a statutory extension equal to half the custodial term to the base disqualification period (R v Needham; section 35A RTOA 1988). If custody changes on appeal, the extension must be recalculated.
• Attempted evidence concealment: Tampering with or attempting to conceal material evidence (such as removing a dash cam) is an aggravating feature that will move a sentence upward within the range.

Conclusion

Mahmood provides clear and practical guidance for sentencing in causing death by dangerous driving cases:

• Culpability is assessed across the entire course of dangerous driving, not merely the instant of impact.
• Where Category A features are present—deliberate, prolonged, high‑risk driving at grossly excessive speeds—the Category A starting point (12 years post‑trial) is the orthodox anchor, even for offences predating the increase of the statutory maximum to life. The pre‑existing statutory maximum caps the sentence, but does not dilute the starting point.
• Substantial personal mitigation, including genuine emergencies and serious health issues, will be weighed, but will rarely justify extreme departures from Category A outcomes in the presence of significant aggravation (e.g., prior dangerous driving; attempted evidence concealment).
• The ULS jurisdiction will be engaged where sentences drift below the reasonable range dictated by the guideline’s structure and the facts. Transparency in articulating the sentencing pathway is essential.
• Ancillary orders—especially driving disqualification—must be recalibrated to match any revised custodial term, preserving the Needham methodology.

In practical terms, Mahmood is a robust reaffirmation of guideline fidelity and principled calibration in road death sentencing. It will influence both prosecutorial decisions to refer unduly lenient sentences and trial judges’ structuring of sentences in cases featuring sustained, egregious driving. Most notably, it forecloses “moment‑of‑collision” arguments and sets an expectation that serious Category A conduct will attract substantial custodial terms, with appropriately adjusted ancillary disqualifications.

Key Citations

• R v Mahmood [2025] EWCA Crim 1267
• R v Freeth [2023] EWCA Crim 1754
• R v Ahmed [2023] EWCA Crim 1537
• Brown [2018] EWCA Crim 1774
• Attorney General’s Reference (Egan) [2022] EWCA Crim 1751; [2023] 2 Cr App R (S) 16
• Attorney General’s Reference (No 4 of 1989) [1990] 90 Cr App R 366
• Attorney General’s Reference No 132 of 2001 (Bryn Dorian Johnson) [2002] EWCA Crim 1418; [2003] 1 Cr App R 41
• R v Needham [2016] EWCA Crim 455; [2016] 2 Cr App R (S) 26
• Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, s 86
• Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, ss 34(4), 35A, 36