Hudson v R – Re-affirming Strict Time-Limit Adherence in Criminal Appeals and Correcting Release Calculations for Historic Sexual Offences

Introduction

The judgment in Hudson, R. v ([2025] EWCA Crim 724) concerns an 81-year-old applicant convicted in 2022 of grave sexual offences dating back to 1984. After leave to appeal against a 15-year custodial sentence was refused at the single-judge stage, the applicant—through new legal representation—sought an extraordinary 741-day extension of time to renew his application.

The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), constituted by Mrs Justice Yip, was therefore asked to determine:

Whether such a substantial extension of time should be granted, and
Whether the proposed new grounds of appeal (relating to guideline usage, mitigation, and totality) had arguable merit.

Although the appeal ultimately failed, the judgment lays down two important points of principle:

The Court will not routinely disregard statutory or procedural time limits—R v G [2024] EWCA Crim 188 is not an authority for automatic merits review regardless of delay.
For historic sexual offences charged under the Sexual Offences Act 1956, the two-thirds release regime in s.244ZA Criminal Justice Act 2003 does not apply if the offence did not carry life imprisonment at the material time; prisoners instead become eligible for release after serving one-half of their sentence (s.264(6)(d) CJA 2003).

Summary of the Judgment

• Extension of Time: Refused. The applicant failed to demonstrate good reasons for a 741-day delay. The Court clarified that while merits can be considered first, lengthy delay without excuse will still generally defeat an application.
• Merits of Proposed Appeal: None of the three reformulated grounds—measured reference to modern guidelines, mitigation for advanced age, and totality—were arguable.
• Sentence Structure: The trial judge’s use of consecutive sentences (7y + 6y for the two most serious offences against V1 and 2y for V2) correctly reflected totality principles, incorporated discounts, and respected historic statutory maxima (10 years per count).
• Release Proportion Error: The sentencing judge erred in stating that the applicant must serve two-thirds of the term. The Court of Appeal corrected the record: the applicant is subject to the one-half release rule.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

R v G [2024] EWCA Crim 188 – Relied on by the defence for the proposition that “even where there is lengthy delay … the Court will always consider the merits of the proposed appeal.” Mrs Justice Yip held that judgment was delivered by a differently constituted, unrepresented court, lacked a ratio decidendi on time extensions, and is not authoritative.
Sentencing Council’s “Totality Guideline” – Not a case precedent but a judicially recognised framework the trial judge explicitly applied when structuring concurrent and consecutive terms.
Statutory references:
- Sexual Offences Act 1956, s.15(1) – creating the historic offence of indecent assault on a male (max 10 years).
- Criminal Justice Act 2003, ss.244ZA & 264(6)(d) – governing release proportions.
- Release of Prisoners (Alteration of Relevant Proportion of Sentence) Order 2020 – superseded by s.244ZA but mistakenly relied upon by the sentencing judge.

Legal Reasoning

Time-Limit Discipline
The Court noted the administrative importance of finality and timely progression of appeals. While merits may sometimes be examined before ruling on delay, there is no blanket rule requiring the Court to do so. By distancing itself from R v G, the Court restated that applicants must show (i) good reason for delay and (ii) arguable grounds. Where (i) is absent, only an exceptionally strong ground would justify an extension— and none was present here.
Measured Reference to Modern Guidelines
Addressing the first ground, the Court stressed that the sentencing judge unequivocally reminded himself of the historic statutory maxima (10y) and used contemporary guidelines only “with measured reference.” This accords with established authority (not named in the transcript but typically including R v H [2011] EWCA Crim 2753).
Personal Mitigation – Age & Health
The judge expressly acknowledged the applicant’s age, hearing loss and unblemished record since the 1980s, but the scale, aggravating features and life-long impact on victims outweighed mitigation. A discretionary downward adjustment already occurred within individual sentences.
Totality & Sentence Construction
The Court endorsed the selection of two index offences (counts 7 & 8) against V1 and a separate consecutive term for V2. With 10 counts (many encompassing multiple acts) a 15-year aggregate was neither excessive nor disproportionate.
Release Proportion Clarification
The Court seized an opportunity—sua sponte—to correct the sentencing order. Because indecent assault (s.15, 1956 Act) never attracted life imprisonment, it is not a “relevant sexual offence” for the two-thirds regime introduced by s.244ZA. Instead, the default half-way release (s.264(6)(d)) applies.

Impact

1. Time Extensions Post-R v G
Practitioners can no longer cite R v G as carte blanche to expect merits review irrespective of delay. Courts will enforce procedural discipline unless compelling grounds justify indulgence.

2. Historic Offences & Release Proportions
Sentencers, prison governors, and practitioners must double-check whether the two-thirds regime applies. The clarification prevents unlawful detention of prisoners convicted of pre-2003 offences that lacked a potential life sentence.

3. Modern Guidelines for Historic Crime
The Court implicitly approves the now-settled practice: use contemporary guidelines with “measured reference,” anchored by the historic statutory maximum. This judgment adds narrative authority to that approach.

4. Victim Impact in Historic Cases
The Court’s language underscores the enduring trauma experienced by victims, reinforcing that delay in reporting does not diminish seriousness—and sentences may remain lengthy despite an offender’s advanced age.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Extension of Time: After a single judge refuses leave to appeal, an appellant normally has 14 days to renew. “Extension of time” is a request to file out-of-time; it will only be granted if the delay is explained and the proposed appeal is arguable.
Totality Principle: Ensures the overall sentence for multiple offences is proportionate to the criminality, preventing a “sum of parts” approach that would otherwise create an unduly long sentence.
Consecutive vs. Concurrent Sentences: Consecutive sentences are served one after another; concurrent run at the same time. Courts choose the structure that best reflects distinct episodes or victims.
Measured Reference: Where offences are historic and the law has changed, judges may look at modern sentencing guidelines for parity, but must cap sentences by the historical maximum.
Release Regime (Half vs. Two-Thirds): Under s.244ZA CJA 2003, certain serious sexual offenders sentenced to 7+ years now serve two-thirds before release. However, if the offence could not legally attract a life sentence at the time, s.244ZA does not apply; the prisoner is released at the half-way point.

Conclusion

Hudson v R is less about the underlying sexual crimes— which were undeniably grave—than about procedural discipline and statutory fidelity. The Court of Appeal has:

Re-asserted that extensions of time in criminal appeals remain exceptional and must be justified by both good reason and arguable merit.
Signalled that R v G should not be read as authority for ignoring strict time limits.
Clarified that the two-thirds release regime is offence-specific and hinges on the availability of a life sentence for the index offence.
Endorsed a structured, guideline-informed yet historically capped approach to sentencing historic sexual offences.

The judgment therefore serves as practical guidance for appellate lawyers, trial judges, and prison authorities alike, ensuring that both procedural and substantive aspects of criminal justice are administered with precision and fairness.