Haque v Secretary of State for the Home Department: Establishing the “De-Minimis Error” Principle for Challenging Entry Clearance Decisions

1. Introduction

In Haque v Secretary of State for the Home Department ([2025] EWCA Civ 826) the Court of Appeal, Civil Division, has set a significant marker in immigration judicial review jurisprudence. Although the appeal concerned an apparently routine visitor-visa refusal, the Court took the opportunity to clarify the level of error that must be shown before a refusal will be quashed. Specifically, it held that immaterial factual or procedural errors—those which could not realistically have affected the outcome—will not suffice to overturn an entry clearance decision.

The case involved “A”, a Bangladeshi national, who made three successive visitor-visa applications for himself and his family. Each was refused by the Entry Clearance Officer (“ECO”) principally on credibility and financial-evidence grounds. After an unsuccessful judicial-review challenge in the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (“UT”), A sought permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal. The Court adjourned the permission application for oral argument, ultimately refusing permission and in so doing crystallising the “de-minimis error” principle.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court (single Lord/Lady Justice sitting) refused permission to appeal on the basis that:

• The only arguable errors identified—(i) a mistaken view of the hotel booking and (ii) an allegedly flawed proportionality assessment of trip cost to available funds—were immaterial. Even if corrected, the ECO would inevitably have reached the same decision.
• The Upper Tribunal was entitled to conclude that the ECO’s concerns about the applicant’s finances, intentions and lack of family ties were rational and within the range of reasonable responses (Wednesbury reasonableness).
• No issue of procedural unfairness was pleaded, and no compelling reason justified a full appeal.

The Court therefore reinforced that permission to appeal will not be granted where the alleged errors, individually or cumulatively, are not material to the lawfulness of the decision.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited or Implicitly Relied Upon

Whilst the judgment itself is sparing in explicit citations, its reasoning is anchored in well-established public-law authorities:

• R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. Caribbean Forces [1989]—for the proposition that materiality is key when evaluating factual mistakes.
• E v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 49—establishing that a mistake of fact can amount to an error of law only if (a) it is uncontentious and objectively verifiable, (b) the appellant was not responsible for it, and (c) the mistake played a material—i.e., decisive—part in the tribunal’s reasoning.
• Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223—underpinning the test for irrationality in administrative decisions.
• R (Balajigari) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 673—emphasising structured proportionality and fairness in immigration decision-making.
• R (Alvi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] UKSC 33—highlighting when reliance on unpublished criteria can render a decision unlawful (implicitly rejected here as guidance was publicly available).

Taken together, these authorities provide the doctrinal scaffold for the Court’s conclusion: error without materiality does not sound in judicial review.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

1. Composite Ground Dissection. The appellant’s sole ground of appeal was split into three sub-issues. The Court struck out the third sub-issue (irrational demand for further documents) at the paper stage, focusing only on (i) the hotel booking and (ii) the proportionality of costs.
2. Materiality Test. Applying E, the Court held that even if the ECO misunderstood the booking details, (a) the misapprehension was one of many concerns and (b) others—unverifiable income, sudden income inflation, lack of ties—were decisive. Hence, the mistake was not dispositive.
3. Financial Proportionality. Evidence showed that about 70–72 % of A’s only proven liquid resources would be spent on the trip. Contrary to counsel’s suggestion, there was no separate savings account. The marginal difference between using the balance at application date versus decision date could not have produced a different outcome. Therefore, any “arithmetic” error was also immaterial.
4. No Procedural Unfairness Alleged. The Court underscored that fairness arguments must be properly pleaded; they cannot be conjured at the permission stage.
5. High Threshold for Permission. Reiterating CPR 52 and Cart principles, the Court emphasised that appellate intervention requires a “real prospect” of success or a “compelling reason”; neither existed here.

3.3 Impact of the Judgment

The decision is likely to influence future visitor-visa judicial reviews and Court of Appeal permission applications in three ways:

• Clarified De-Minimis Error Rule. Claimants must demonstrate that any factual or procedural misstep was not merely present but material. Arguments anchored in trivial mistakes will be summarily rejected.
• Increased Evidential Burden on Applicants. Applicants from cash-based economies must still provide verifiable documentation (receipts, invoices, tax returns) or face “credibility” rejections immune from challenge.
• Procedural Discipline. Grounds must be tightly drafted; diffuse or unparticularised challenges risk being characterised as “confusing” and will not secure permission.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Material Error of Law: An error that, if absent, could realistically have led the decision-maker to reach a different conclusion.
• Wednesbury Irrationality: A decision is irrational if it is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it.
• Upper Tribunal Judicial Review: The specialist tribunal jurisdiction reviewing lawfulness—not merits—of immigration decisions where no statutory appeal lies.
• Permission to Appeal: A filter stage; the appellant must show a real (not fanciful) prospect of success or some other compelling reason.
• De-Minimis (Latin: “about minimal things”) Error: A mistake so slight that law will not concern itself with it.

5. Conclusion

Haque cements the proposition that only material errors are actionable in challenges to immigration decisions. The Court’s firm stance serves as a cautionary note to practitioners: scrutinise the causative potency of any alleged mistake before launching judicial-review proceedings or appeals. In doing so, the judgment streamlines immigration litigation, discourages marginal claims, and thereby promotes administrative finality without undermining genuine oversight of illegality, irrationality, or unfairness.

Beyond the immigration sphere, the case reinforces a broader public-law principle: courts will not intervene where the alleged unlawfulness is inconsequential to the outcome. As such, Haque is poised to be cited as authority whenever litigants rely on minor factual inaccuracies to attack substantively sound decisions.