Introduction

The case of Bonsu, R. v [2020] EWCA Crim 660 addresses critical issues related to the procedural aspects of criminal appeals in England and Wales. This case involves Rebecca Bonsu, the appellant, who sought an extension of time to appeal her conviction for conspiracy to supply a psychoactive substance, specifically nitrous oxide. The appeal brought forth by Bonsu raises questions about the admissibility of new arguments post the initial refusal by a single judge and the proper legal directions regarding adverse inferences drawn from silence during police interviews.

Summary of the Judgment

On February 13, 2019, Rebecca Bonsu was convicted in the Crown Court at Chester of conspiracy to supply nitrous oxide, a psychoactive substance, and subsequently sentenced to a 12-month community order with an electronically monitored curfew. The conviction stemmed from a police operation at the "Creamfields" music festival, where a Volkswagen Golf containing over a thousand nitrous oxide canisters and related equipment was seized. Bonsu appealed her conviction, arguing insufficient evidence of her involvement. The single judge refused the application for leave to appeal, a decision upheld by the Court of Appeal. The Court dismissed Bonsu's renewed application for an extension of time to appeal, primarily because her new arguments were introduced belatedly and lacked merit.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment references several key precedents, notably:

• R v Cowan, Gayle and Riccardi (1996) 1 Cr App R 1
• R v Condron and Condron [1997] 1 Cr App R 185
• Condron

These cases primarily deal with the legal standards and directions related to adverse inferences that juries may draw from a defendant's silence during different stages of legal proceedings. In Cowan, Lord Taylor CJ outlined essential components for instructing juries on adverse inferences, ensuring that silence does not solely determine guilt. Condron extended these principles, emphasizing that standard jury directions already sufficiently cover the necessary considerations when a defendant remains silent during a police interview.

Legal Reasoning

The Court of Appeal's reasoning centers on two main points:

1. Procedural Timeliness: The appellant introduced a new argument regarding the sufficiency of jury directions about adverse inferences from her "no comment" interview only after the initial refusal by the single judge. The Court deemed this timing inappropriate, aligning with established procedures that prevent parties from raising fresh contentions at later stages without prior consideration.
2. Merit of the New Argument: Even if the new argument were timely, the Court found it without merit. The Recorder had already provided comprehensive directions to the jury, both orally and in written form, ensuring that any adverse inferences from the appellant's silence were appropriately addressed in line with existing legal standards.

The Court emphasized that the proposed additional directions by Bonsu's counsel were unnecessary and not supported by the law or the circumstances of the case. The existing jury instructions were deemed sufficient to guide the jury in evaluating any inferences from her silence during the police interview.

Impact

This judgment reinforces the procedural rigidity of the appellate system in criminal cases. It underscores the importance of adhering to procedural timelines and discourages the introduction of new arguments at stages where they have been previously addressed or dismissed. Moreover, by upholding the adequacy of existing jury directions regarding adverse inferences from silence, the Court of Appeal reaffirms the sufficiency and comprehensiveness of standard legal instructions provided to juries in similar contexts.

Future appellants can take note of the Court's stance on procedural adherence and the limited scope for introducing new arguments post initial refusals. Additionally, the judgment serves as a confirmation that current legal directions adequately manage the complexities related to defendants' silence during police interviews.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Adverse Inferences and Defendant Silence

Adverse inferences refer to conclusions a jury might draw from a defendant's decision not to testify or comment during legal proceedings. According to Section 38(3) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, the jury must first be satisfied that the prosecution has presented a case to answer before considering any adverse inferences from silence. The Court of Appeal in this case reiterated that standard jury directions already sufficiently cover how to handle such inferences, negating the need for additional instructions.

Leave to Appeal and Procedural Timeliness

"Leave to appeal" is the permission required to proceed with an appeal in court. This process has strict time limits and procedural requirements. The Court of Appeal highlighted that introducing new arguments after an initial refusal violates these procedures, emphasizing the necessity to present all relevant contentions within the designated timelines.

Conclusion

The Court of Appeal in Bonsu, R. v [2020] EWCA Crim 660 decisively upheld the procedural standards governing criminal appeals, particularly emphasizing the importance of adhering to established timelines and procedures for raising arguments. By rejecting the appellant's late-submitted contention regarding jury directions on adverse inferences from silence, the Court reinforced the adequacy of existing legal frameworks and instructions provided to juries. This judgment serves as a pivotal reference point for future cases, delineating the boundaries within which appellants must operate and reaffirming the sufficiency of standard jury directions in managing complex legal concepts such as adverse inferences from defendant silence.