Grant v Metloc Systems Ltd [2025] NICA 60: Clarifying the “Just and Equitable” Extension of Time Test in Northern Ireland Discrimination Claims

1. Introduction

This Court of Appeal decision in Grant v Metloc Systems Ltd [2025] NICA 60 is now a leading Northern Ireland authority on when industrial tribunals may extend statutory time limits for discrimination claims on “just and equitable” grounds.

The case arose from an age discrimination complaint brought by the appellant, Patrick Grant, against his former employer, Metloc Systems Ltd. His claim was lodged four days outside the primary statutory time limit under Regulation 48(1) of the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations (NI) 2006. The Industrial Tribunal held, at a preliminary hearing, that the claim was out of time and that it was not “just and equitable” to extend time. The appellant successfully appealed that ruling.

The decision is significant because it:

• Formally adopts in Northern Ireland the approach of the English Court of Appeal in Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Local Health Board v Morgan [2018] EWCA Civ 640 to extensions of time in discrimination cases;
• Clarifies that there is no statutory requirement for a claimant to provide a “good” or “satisfactory” explanation for delay before time can be extended;
• Re‑emphasises that alleged prejudice to respondents must be evidenced, not merely asserted, and must not be speculative;
• Demonstrates when a miscalculation of the period of delay becomes a material error of law in the exercise of a tribunal’s discretion;
• Shows the Court of Appeal’s willingness to substitute its own decision and itself grant an extension of time under section 38 of the Judicature (NI) Act 1978.

The ruling will shape how industrial tribunals in Northern Ireland approach late discrimination claims, and it provides important guidance to practitioners on arguing “just and equitable” extensions.

2. Case Overview

2.1 Parties and Procedural Posture

• Appellant: Patrick Grant, a former employee of Metloc Systems Ltd.
• Respondent: Metloc Systems Ltd, the former employer.
• Forum of first instance: Industrial Tribunal (preliminary hearing on time bar).
• Appeal court: Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland (McCloskey LJ delivering the judgment; Colton J and Kinney J concurring).

The Industrial Tribunal was asked, as a preliminary issue, to determine:

“Whether the claim was lodged within the requisite time limit and if not whether time should be extended on just and equitable grounds and/or if appropriate because it was not reasonable to lodge the claim within the time limit.” [1]

The Tribunal decided in favour of the respondent: the claim was out of time and an extension of time was refused. The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal on five grounds of alleged error of law, all aimed at the Tribunal’s reasoning on the extension of time.

2.2 Factual Background Relevant to the Time Issue

The essential, undisputed chronology was as follows [4]:

• Employment commenced in 2017; terminated on 15 January 2024.
• The appellant contacted the Labour Relations Agency (LRA) on 21 March 2024 to initiate early conciliation.
• The LRA issued an Early Conciliation certificate on 19 April 2024.
• Taking account of the “paused” period, the backstop date for lodging a tribunal complaint in time was 19 May 2024.
• The complaint was in fact lodged on 23 May 2024 – four days late.

It was common case that the complaint was late, albeit by a small margin. The appellant thus relied on Regulation 48(4) of the 2006 Regulations, which allows tribunals to consider an out‑of‑time complaint if, “in all the circumstances of the case, it considers that it is just and equitable to do so” [2]–[3].

3. Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and held that the Tribunal’s refusal to extend time was vitiated by several material errors of law. In particular, the Tribunal:

• Miscalculated the length of the delay (stating six days instead of four) and thereby proceeded on an erroneous factual premise [8];
• Incorrectly found that the appellant had provided “no explanation” for his belief that he had more time and “no explanation” for his delay, despite its own recorded findings to the contrary [14]–[15];
• Applied an unlawful test by requiring a “satisfactory” (or “good”) reason for delay, contrary to the correct legal approach outlined in Abertawe [16]–[17];
• Accepted bare assertions of prejudice by the respondent and speculated about “inherent prejudice” and matters “going back many years” without evidential foundation [18]–[20];
• Failed properly to apply the broad, open‑textured “just and equitable” discretion mandated by the statutory wording and the case law, including the persuasive authority of Abertawe [10]–[12].

The Court of Appeal:

1. Formally adopted in Northern Ireland the approach of the English Court of Appeal in Abertawe on “just and equitable” extensions of time for discrimination claims [10]–[12], and the associated principle from Leggatt LJ that there is no requirement for a claimant to demonstrate a “good reason” for delay [16]–[17];
2. Held that the Industrial Tribunal’s exercise of discretion was “infected by several material errors of law” and was therefore unsustainable [22];
3. Varied the Tribunal’s decision so that time was extended in favour of the appellant under Regulation 48(4) [23(i)];
4. Remitted the case to a differently constituted Tribunal for determination of the substantive age discrimination complaint [23(ii)].

In exercising its own power to extend time, the Court relied on section 38(1)(a) of the Judicature (NI) Act 1978 and emphasised the virtues of “acceleration and expedition” [23].

4. Detailed Analysis

4.1 Statutory and Procedural Framework

4.1.1 Primary Time Limit

Regulation 48(1) of the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations (NI) 2006 provides:

“An industrial tribunal shall not consider a complaint under Regulation 41 (jurisdiction of industrial tribunals) unless it is presented to the tribunal before the end of the period of three months beginning when the act complained of was done.” [2]

This establishes the default three‑month limitation period for presenting an age discrimination complaint to the Industrial Tribunal.

4.1.2 Discretion to Extend Time – “Just and Equitable”

Regulation 48(4) qualifies the rigidity of the primary time limit:

“A court or tribunal may nevertheless consider any such complaint or claim which is out of time if, in all the circumstances of the case, it considers that it is just and equitable to do so.” [2]

The significance of this formulation lies in its breadth. It contains:

• No list of mandatory factors;
• No express requirement for a “good reason” for delay;
• No reference to extension being “exceptional”.

The Court of Appeal emphasised that Parliament “has chosen to give the employment tribunal the widest possible discretion” in equivalent wording in section 123(1) of the Equality Act 2010, and that this approach should be mirrored in Northern Ireland [10]–[12].

4.1.3 Overriding Objective of the Tribunal Rules

The Court also located this discretion within the context of the overriding objective in Rule 2 of the Industrial Tribunals and Fair Employment Tribunal (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations (NI) 2020 [2]:

“The overriding objective of these Rules is to enable tribunals to deal with cases fairly and justly.”

Fair and just disposal includes:

• Ensuring parties are on an equal footing;
• Dealing with cases proportionately to their complexity and importance;
• Avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility;
• Avoiding delay so far as is compatible with proper consideration;
• Saving expense.

Tribunals must interpret and exercise their powers to promote this objective, and parties must assist. This policy background reinforces a flexible, fairness‑oriented approach to late claims, rather than a mechanistic or unduly restrictive stance.

4.2 The Errors in the Tribunal’s Approach

4.2.1 Miscalculation of the Period of Delay

Both parties accepted that the Tribunal had repeatedly stated that the claim was six days late when, in fact, it was four days late [8]. The Court cited Harvey on Industrial Relations and Employment Law, para 281.02:

“As to the length of the delay, to state the obvious, it makes a difference whether the claim form was presented one minute late or one year late. A finding of fact must therefore be made by the Tribunal as to the length of the delay before it can properly exercise its discretion about an extension of time one way or the other.” [8]

The Court accepted this proposition and adopted it [8]. While acknowledging that not every such error will invalidate the decision, the Court stressed:

• Each tribunal decision must be assessed “as a whole” [9];
• The appellate court must assess the “magnitude of the error in its particular context” [9];
• However, an error of this kind will normally “tend to cast a cloud over the reasoning and the conclusions which follow it” [9].

In a case where the Tribunal also made other material errors, the miscalculation of delay contributed to the conclusion that the exercise of discretion was unsafe.

4.2.2 Mischaracterisation of the Claimant’s Explanation for Delay

The Tribunal’s own factual findings included that:

• The appellant received an LRA explanatory booklet and guidance [5(iv), (x)];
• He believed he had “a period of up to six months to lodge his claim” [5(xi)];
• He decided not to contact organisations offering advice because he believed he could not afford legal fees, and he did not explain why he did not seek free advice [5(vii)–(viii)].

Yet, in its conclusions, the Tribunal stated that:

• The appellant had provided “no explanation” for his belief that he had up to six months to lodge the claim [14];
• He had provided “no explanation” for his lack of promptness [15].

The Court found these conclusions unsustainable:

• The appellant’s belief arose from the wording of LRA materials suggesting a three or six month time limit [5(x), 14];
• He gave a reason for not seeking advice (believing he could not afford it), and there was also a further explanation that he was “busy working” [15];
• The Tribunal’s own factual findings contradicted its later conclusion that there was “no explanation” [14]–[15].

This amounted to a failure to take account of relevant evidence and to a plainly erroneous self‑direction in the conclusion [15].

4.2.3 Treating a “Satisfactory” Explanation as a Legal Requirement

Perhaps the most important legal error was the Tribunal’s insistence that the claimant’s explanation must be “satisfactory” before time could be extended [16]. The Tribunal also repeated that the appellant had failed to provide “any explanation” – which, as shown, was factually incorrect [14]–[15].

The Court, relying on Abertawe, endorsed Leggatt LJ’s formulation at para [25]:

“There is no justification for reading into the statutory language any requirement that the tribunal must be satisfied that there was a good reason for the delay, let alone that time cannot be extended in the absence of an explanation of the delay from the claimant. The most that can be said is that whether there is any explanation or apparent reason for the delay and the nature of any such reason are relevant matters to which the tribunal ought to have regard.” [16]

McCloskey LJ held this approach to be:

• Compatible with the Northern Ireland statutory provisions; and
• Not in conflict with existing NI appellate jurisprudence [16].

Accordingly, the Tribunal erred in law in imposing a requirement that:

• An explanation must exist; and
• That explanation must be “satisfactory” or “good” [16]–[17].

The Court summarised the correct position:

“There is no statutory requirement that a tardy claimant provide an explanation, much less a persuasive explanation, of their delay. To elevate this to the status of a legal requirement, as the Tribunal did, is erroneous in law. The Tribunal's discretion can be exercised in the claimant's favour in the absence of either type of explanation. However, in any case where a late claimant does provide an explanation considered persuasive by the tribunal, this will improve their prospects of a favourable exercise of discretion.” [17]

This holding is central to the new precedent: it removes any notion that a claimant must cross a threshold of “proper” explanation before the “just and equitable” discretion can operate.

4.2.4 Prejudice to the Respondent: Evidence vs Speculation

The Tribunal relied on two key points in refusing an extension:

• That granting an extension was likely to “open up issues going back many years” [6(b)]; and
• That there was “likely to be an inherent prejudice to the respondent should an extension of time be granted” [6(c)].

Crucially:

• The respondent adduced no evidence of prejudice [18];
• The only alleged discriminatory act on the ET1 was the dismissal on 15 January 2024 [19];
• The cross‑examination of the appellant did not raise issues “going back many years” [19].

The Court condemned the Tribunal’s approach in strong terms:

• The respondent relied on “bare, unsubstantiated assertion” of prejudice [18];
• The Tribunal “succumbed” to that mechanism and entered a “world of pure speculation” [18];
• The “going back many years” characterisation was unsupported by the pleadings, the evidence, or the respondent’s proof [19].

The Court drew expressly on Bryant v Nestle UK [2021] NICA 34, particularly para [26], and on Fire Brigades Union v Fraser [1998] IRLR 697 [20], to reiterate that:

• Tribunals must not adopt parties’ submissions on prejudice without “elaboration or specificity” and “supporting findings of fact”;
• Findings of prejudice based only on submissions and speculation are unlawful.

Thus, in addition to misapplying the “just and equitable” test, the Tribunal seriously erred in the way it evaluated prejudice, which is one of the “almost always relevant” factors per Abertawe [10].

4.2.5 Treatment of the Merits at a Preliminary Hearing

The Court noted that the Tribunal had not considered the substantive merits of the age discrimination claim when assessing prejudice [21]. The Tribunal had correctly self‑directed:

“In this preliminary hearing, in considering the issue of prejudice, no real determination can be made on the merits of the substantive case. However, there is a significant factual dispute between the parties which will have to be explored by a tribunal dealing with the substantive case.” [21]

The Court described this self‑direction as “impeccable” [21]. It accepted that, while in some contexts merits may be relevant to a just and equitable extension, here the Tribunal was entitled not to engage in a merits assessment at this preliminary stage, particularly given the significant factual disputes.

This confirms that tribunals should be cautious about turning an extension‑of‑time issue into a mini‑trial; however, they are not prohibited from taking broad merits considerations into account where properly evidenced and relevant.

4.3 Precedents and Authorities Shaping the Decision

4.3.1 Abertawe (etc) Board v Morgan [2018] EWCA Civ 640

Abertawe concerned section 123(1) of the Equality Act 2010, which is functionally equivalent to Regulation 48(4) in giving tribunals a “just and equitable” discretion to extend time. Underhill LJ (for a unanimous Court) cautioned against rigid, checklist‑based approaches, such as applying by analogy the section 33(3) Limitation Act 1980 factors as if they were compulsory [10].

Two key passages from Abertawe were reproduced and endorsed:

“First, it is plain from the language used ('such other period as the employment tribunal thinks just and equitable') that Parliament has chosen to give the employment tribunal the widest possible discretion. Unlike s 33 of the Limitation Act 1980, s 123(1) of the Equality Act does not specify any list of factors to which the tribunal is instructed to have regard, and it would be wrong in these circumstances to put a gloss on the words of the provision or to interpret it as if it contains such a list. Thus, although it has been suggested that it may be useful for a tribunal in exercising its discretion to consider the list of factors specified in s 33(3) of the Limitation Act 1980 (see British Coal Corporation v Keeble [1997] IRLR 336), the Court of Appeal has made it clear that the tribunal is not required to go through such a list, the only requirement being that it does not leave a significant factor out of account: see Southwark London Borough Council v Afolabi [2003] EWCA Civ 15, [2003] IRLR 220, para [33]. The position is analogous to that where a court or tribunal is exercising the similarly worded discretion to extend the time for bringing proceedings under s 7(5) of the Human Rights Act 1998: see Dunn v Parole Board [2008] EWCA Civ 374, [2009] 1 WLR 728, paras [30]–[32], [43], [48]; and Rabone v Pennine Care NHS Trust [2012] UKSC 2, [2012] 2 All ER 381, para [75].

That said, factors which are almost always relevant to consider when exercising any discretion whether to extend time are: (a) the length of, and reasons for, the delay and (b) whether the delay has prejudiced the respondent (for example, by preventing or inhibiting it from investigating the claim while matters were fresh).” [10]

Additionally, Leggatt LJ’s para [25] (discussed above) was adopted on the question of whether a “good reason” for delay is required [16]–[17].

The key contributions of Abertawe, now expressly adopted in Northern Ireland, are:

• Wide discretion: the “just and equitable” wording confers very broad discretion on tribunals.
• No mandatory checklist: tribunals are not required to apply, or march through, any fixed list of factors (e.g. the section 33 Limitation Act checklist from Keeble).
• Core but non‑exhaustive factors: length and reasons for delay, and prejudice to the respondent, will almost always be relevant but are not exhaustive or rigidly prescriptive.
• No “good reason” requirement: absence of a “good” or even any explanation for delay does not legally bar an extension, though it may be relevant in the discretionary balance.

4.3.2 British Coal Corporation v Keeble [1997] IRLR 336 and Southwark LBC v Afolabi [2003] EWCA Civ 15

Keeble had encouraged tribunals to use the section 33(3) Limitation Act factors when deciding whether to extend discrimination time limits. Over time, this was sometimes treated as an obligatory checklist. Afolabi disapproved of any requirement to go through such a list, stressing instead that tribunals must not leave out significant factors.

In Grant, the Court of Appeal, by following Abertawe, implicitly rejects any mechanistic reliance on Keeble-style checklists and endorses the Afolabi position. This is an important clarification for Northern Ireland tribunals: structured lists may be helpful guides but must not be treated as statutory requirements.

4.3.3 Dunn v Parole Board [2008] EWCA Civ 374 and Rabone v Pennine Care NHS Trust [2012] UKSC 2

These authorities address the similarly worded discretion to extend time under section 7(5) of the Human Rights Act 1998. By aligning the discrimination time‑limit discretion with HRA jurisprudence, Underhill LJ in Abertawe – and McCloskey LJ in Grant – reinforce the idea that such discretions must be interpreted in light of their broad, unqualified statutory wording, not narrowed by judge‑made glosses or rigid factors [10].

4.3.4 Re Staritt [2005] NICA 48

Re Staritt was cited as authority on the status of English Court of Appeal decisions in Northern Ireland: they are not binding, but are frequently persuasive, particularly where the statutory context or common law principles are shared [12].

The Court used this framework to justify adopting Abertawe in the absence of any contrary NI authority and where the statutory wording was materially similar [12].

4.3.5 Bryant v Nestle UK [2021] NICA 34 and Fire Brigades Union v Fraser [1998] IRLR 697

Bryant was deployed as a direct warning against speculative assessments of prejudice. In that case, as here, the tribunal had adopted unsubstantiated submissions about “substantial additional work” and “additional evidence” as though they were findings of fact [20]. McCloskey LJ quoted para [26] of Bryant and applied it almost verbatim to the present context [20].

Fire Brigades Union v Fraser reinforced the principle that conclusions or inferences must be grounded in evidence, not in advocacy or conjecture [20].

4.4 The Court’s Legal Reasoning and Principles Established

4.4.1 Adoption of the Abertawe Approach in Northern Ireland

The Court explicitly held that the Abertawe approach:

• Is “consonant with the terms of the equivalent Northern Ireland statutory provisions” [12];
• “Does not abrade with any relevant decision of this court” [12]; and
• Is “couched in persuasive terms” [12].

Accordingly, it would be followed as a matter of precedent in Northern Ireland [12]. The Court emphasised the broad, open‑textured and non‑prescriptive nature of the discretion [11]:

• The three Abertawe factors – (a) length of delay, (b) reasons for delay, and (c) prejudice – will “almost always” be relevant, but:
  • They do not form a rigid checklist or universal rule [11];
  • Other factors may be relevant depending on the facts [11].

This is the central doctrinal development: it anchors NI tribunals’ extension decisions firmly in a flexible, fairness‑centred, fact‑sensitive analysis.

4.4.2 No Statutory Duty to Offer a “Good” or Any Explanation

Building on Leggatt LJ’s para [25] in Abertawe, the Court held:

• There is no statutory requirement that a claimant must provide an explanation for delay [17];
• Still less is there a requirement that any explanation be “good”, “satisfactory” or persuasive [16]–[17];
• Such explanations, when given, are relevant factors, and a persuasive explanation will naturally assist a claimant’s prospects [17];
• But tribunals may lawfully extend time even where:
  • No explanation is offered; or
  • The explanation is weak or unpersuasive.

In other words, the absence of a “good reason” is a factor in the discretionary balance, not a legal bar. This is a key point practitioners must now emphasise: tribunals should not treat a lack of explanation as automatically fatal.

4.4.3 Proper Role of Prejudice

Consistent with Abertawe, prejudice to the respondent is “almost always” relevant [10]. But Grant clarifies:

• Prejudice must be supported by evidence, not by assertions in submissions [18]–[20];
• Speculative or “inherent” prejudice will not suffice [18];
• The nature of the pleaded claim and the actual evidential issues must drive the analysis – here, a single alleged discriminatory dismissal, not a pattern “going back many years” [19];
• Tribunals must make specific findings of fact to underpin any conclusion about prejudice [20].

In practice, this means respondents seeking to oppose an extension must be prepared to adduce real evidence (for example, about lost documents, faded memories, or changed personnel), rather than relying on generalised complaints about delay.

4.4.4 Appellate Review of Discretionary Time‑Limit Decisions

The Court acknowledged that such appeals attract a restrained standard of review. It referenced Abertawe para [20] (not quoted in full in the judgment) as emphasising:

• The limited scope for appellate court intervention in the exercise of a first‑instance tribunal’s discretion [9];
• The need to consider the tribunal’s decision “as a whole” [9].

However, where the decision is affected by:

• Errors of law (e.g. imposing a non‑existent statutory requirement for a “satisfactory” explanation);
• Material misdirections (e.g. ignoring relevant evidence, mischaracterising delay); or
• Findings based on speculation rather than evidence (e.g. prejudice, “going back many years”),

the appellate court is entitled – indeed obliged – to intervene. That threshold was clearly crossed in Grant.

4.4.5 Use of Section 38 Judicature (NI) Act 1978

Having found the Tribunal’s decision unsustainable, the Court considered the appropriate remedy under section 38 of the Judicature (NI) Act 1978. It chose to:

• Vary the Tribunal’s decision to grant an extension of time itself [23(i)]; and
• Remit the substantive discrimination claim to a differently constituted Tribunal [23(ii)].

The Court explained that it was “fully equipped” to determine the extension issue and that doing so promoted “acceleration and expedition” [23]. This is a practical application of the overriding objective (fairness, avoiding delay, saving expense).

The decision signals that, where the extension point is purely discretionary and the record is complete, the Court of Appeal is prepared to substitute its own determination rather than prolong litigation with a remittal on the preliminary issue.

4.5 Impact and Future Significance

4.5.1 For Industrial Tribunals in Northern Ireland

Tribunals must now adjust their approach to late discrimination claims in several ways:

• No “exceptional” rule: Although the Tribunal below stated that an extension “should be the exception rather than the rule” [6(e)], the Court’s endorsement of Abertawe and its criticism of glosses on the statutory language make it clear that tribunals must not treat extensions as inherently exceptional as a matter of law. The statute simply asks what is “just and equitable”.
• Precise calculation of delay: Tribunals must make accurate findings on the length of delay. Misstating the delay, even by a couple of days, can be material, particularly in short‑delay cases [8]–[9].
• Correctly identify and evaluate explanations:
  • If a claimant gives reasons for delay, the tribunal must accurately record and assess them, not later assert that “no explanation” was given when its own findings say otherwise [14]–[15].
  • Tribunals must stop short of imposing any legal requirement that the explanation be “satisfactory” before time can be extended [16]–[17].
• Evidence-based prejudice analysis:
  • Prejudice arguments must be scrutinised carefully and grounded in evidence, not in counsel’s submissions [18]–[20].
  • Tribunals should avoid generalised references to “inherent prejudice” or speculative impacts “going back many years” unless supported by the pleadings and proof [19].
• Holistic, non‑formulaic balancing:
  • Tribunals should consider length of delay, reasons, prejudice and any other relevant factors in a flexible, fact‑sensitive manner [11].
  • There is no requirement to follow a checklist akin to section 33 Limitation Act [10]–[11].

4.5.2 For Practitioners Representing Claimants

Claimant representatives should note that:

• A short delay (here, four days) can be particularly amenable to a “just and equitable” extension, especially where the respondent has not shown prejudice;
• Mistaken reliance on official guidance (e.g. LRA wording mentioning “three or six months”) may form part of an explanation for delay [5(x), (xi), 14];
• Even where the explanation for delay is weak, tribunals remain empowered to extend time, and advocates should stress the broad statutory discretion;
• It is worth challenging speculative prejudice arguments and requiring respondents to prove specific, real prejudice.

4.5.3 For Respondent Employers and Their Advisers

From the respondent perspective:

• Opposing an extension will require more than asserting that the claim is late and that recollections have faded;
• Evidence may be needed about:
  • What investigations were undertaken and when;
  • Whether any documents or witnesses are no longer available;
  • How, concretely, the delay has affected fairness.
• Where delay is minimal, it will generally be harder to establish real prejudice.

4.5.4 Wider Application Beyond Age Discrimination

Although this case concerned the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations, many discrimination regimes in Northern Ireland use the same or similar “just and equitable” language. The principles in Grant are therefore likely to influence:

• Claims under other equality statutes or regulations with identical wording;
• Approaches to analogous discretions (e.g. under human rights legislation) where courts are considering whether to extend time limits in the interests of justice.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

5.1 “Just and Equitable” Extension of Time

In simple terms:

• “Just” means fair or right in the circumstances.
• “Equitable” reflects fairness in a broader sense, taking account of all relevant factors and the balance between the parties.

When deciding whether it is “just and equitable” to extend time, a tribunal usually considers:

• How long the claim is late;
• Why it is late (if any reasons are given);
• Whether the delay has disadvantaged the respondent (for example, by making it harder to gather evidence);
• Any other circumstances that bear on fairness (such as the conduct of both parties).

Crucially, there is no legal rule that:

• An extension can only be granted in “exceptional” cases; or
• The claimant must show a “good” reason for being late.

5.2 “Prejudice”

“Prejudice” here means real disadvantage or harm to the respondent if the late claim is allowed to proceed. Examples might include:

• Key witnesses have left and cannot be located;
• Important documents have been destroyed in the ordinary course of business before the respondent knew a claim was coming;
• Memories of events have faded, making a fair trial more difficult.

What Grant insists upon is that such prejudice must be proven, or at least supported by facts. General statements like “we will suffer prejudice” or “this will mean a lot more work” are not enough.

5.3 Appellate Court’s Role vs Tribunal’s Discretion

Tribunals are the primary decision‑makers on matters of fact and discretion (like whether to extend time). The Court of Appeal does not simply re‑decide the question from scratch. Instead, it intervenes only if:

• The tribunal misinterpreted or misapplied the law (“error of law”);
• The tribunal took into account irrelevant factors, or ignored relevant ones;
• The decision is so unreasonable or illogical that no reasonable tribunal could have reached it; or
• The process was unfair.

In Grant, the Court identified clear legal errors and factual misdirections that went beyond a simple difference of opinion. It was therefore entitled to set aside the decision and substitute its own.

5.4 Early Conciliation and the “Clock”

In many employment disputes in Northern Ireland, a claimant must go through an early conciliation process with the Labour Relations Agency before issuing a tribunal claim. During this period:

• The limitation “clock” is paused (time does not run);
• When the LRA issues a certificate, the clock resumes, and the claimant must calculate the adjusted deadline.

In Grant, the appellant misunderstood LRA guidance suggesting a “three or six months” time limit and believed he might have up to six months to claim [5(x)–(xi)]. The Court accepted that this misunderstanding was part of his explanation, although it did not say that such a misunderstanding automatically justifies an extension.

6. Conclusion: Key Takeaways

Grant v Metloc Systems Ltd [2025] NICA 60 is now a leading authority on time‑limit extensions in discrimination cases in Northern Ireland. Its key contributions are:

• Formal adoption of the Abertawe approach: Tribunals have a wide, flexible discretion under “just and equitable” wording. They must avoid rigid checklists and judge‑made glosses that narrow this discretion.
• No “good reason” requirement: There is no legal requirement that a claimant provide a “good” or even any explanation for delay. Explanations, when given, are relevant but not a condition precedent to extension.
• Evidence-based prejudice: Respondents’ claims of prejudice must be supported by evidence. Bare assertions and speculation (especially about matters “going back many years”) are insufficient.
• Accuracy and coherence in fact‑finding: Tribunals must:
  • Accurately determine the length of any delay; and
  • Avoid internal contradictions (e.g. finding that explanations exist while simultaneously concluding that “no explanation” was provided).
• Respect for, but not deference to, tribunal discretion: While appellate intervention remains limited, clear errors of law, misdirections, or speculative findings will warrant setting aside a refusal to extend time.
• Practical, expeditious appellate remedies: The Court’s willingness to substitute its own decision and extend time underscores a commitment to efficiency and the overriding objective of dealing with cases fairly and justly.

Overall, this judgment re‑balances the law of limitation in Northern Ireland discrimination cases. It moves away from a culture in which extensions are treated as exceptional, and towards a principled, flexible, evidence‑based exercise of discretion rooted in the statutory phrase “just and equitable” and the overriding objective of the tribunal system.