Gaiziunas v R – When a Quashed Conviction Used as Bad-Character Evidence Does NOT Undermine Subsequent Verdicts

Introduction

In Gaiziunas, R. v ([2025] EWCA Crim 541) the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) addressed a novel problem: what should happen when a conviction that was adduced at trial as bad-character evidence is itself quashed years later? The appellant, Romualdas Gaiziunas, had been found guilty in 2019 of four separate breaches of protective orders against his former partner. During that trial the prosecution relied—under s.101(1)(f) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003—on his earlier conviction for possessing a bladed article, contending that he had created a “false impression” of good character. Five years on, that bladed-article conviction was overturned following revelations of police misconduct.

Mr Gaiziunas argued that because the jury had heard the later-quashed conviction, his breach convictions were no longer safe. The Court of Appeal rejected that submission, holding that the mere quashing of a conviction previously admitted as bad-character evidence does not automatically vitiate the subsequent verdicts; courts must conduct a fact-sensitive, case-by-case assessment of whether the fresh development makes the jury’s verdict unsafe. The decision clarifies an area on which there was no direct authority and sets a pragmatic precedent for future “after-acquired innocence” scenarios.

Summary of the Judgment

• The appeal focused exclusively on whether the later quashing of the bladed-article conviction rendered the 2019 breach convictions unsafe.
• The Court (Holroyde LJ, giving the single judgment) held:
  • The trial judge properly admitted the bladed-article conviction in 2019 under s.101(1)(f) CJA 2003; there was no error at that time.
  • The subsequent quashing of that conviction counted as “fresh evidence”, but did not, on the facts, undermine the safety of the breach convictions.
  • The strength of the complainant’s testimony, corroborative circumstances, and the limited forensic use of the bad-character evidence meant the verdicts remained safe.
  • There is no general rule that overturning a prior conviction automatically taints any later conviction in which it featured; each case turns on its own merits.
• Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

Analysis

1 – Precedents Cited or Considered

Although the judgment itself cites few authorities, it implicitly relies on well-established principles regarding:

• Bad Character Evidence – Criminal Justice Act 2003 ss.101–106, in particular s.101(1)(f) (“false impression”) and s.105 (safeguards).
• Fresh Evidence Appeals – Criminal Appeal Act 1968 s.23; authorities such as R v Pendleton [2001] UKHL 66 and R v Hakala [2009] EWCA Crim 2913 emphasising that the ultimate test is whether the conviction is unsafe.
• Bad Character Guidelines – R v Hunter & Others [2015] EWCA Crim 631, summarising the approach to false-impression cases.

The Court applied these strands without requiring extensive citation because the core issue—effect of a later quashing—had no direct precedent. By deciding that no automatic consequence flows from the overturning of a prior conviction, the Court created fresh authority filling this gap.

2 – The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Step 1 – Correctness of the Original Admission
   Holroyde LJ confirmed that, in 2019, the bladed-article conviction was valid and that the appellant had put his character in issue by suggesting he was a conscientious medical professional devoted to others. Therefore the trial judge’s decision to admit the conviction under s.101(1)(f) was sound and accompanied by a balanced judicial direction.
2. Step 2 – Characterising the New Development
   The quashing of the bladed-article conviction amounted to “fresh evidence” not available at the original trial. Thus the Court treated the appeal through the lens of s.23 of the 1968 Act: would the fresh evidence render the breach convictions “unsafe”? The appellant’s argument therefore morphed from a “misdirection” ground into a “fresh evidence” ground.
3. Step 3 – Safety of the Convictions
   Key factors supporting safety:
   • The prosecution case fundamentally rested on the complainant’s credibility; the bad-character evidence played only a peripheral, “rebuttal” role.
   • The jury received an orthodox limiting direction: they were not to convict “only or mainly” because of the prior conviction.
   • Even without the bladed-article conviction, the jury could have been told of the appellant’s earlier admitted breach of a non-molestation order, which would equally have blunted any claim to good character.
   • Given the implausibility of the appellant’s explanations (hacked LinkedIn account; coincidental garage visit; alleged assault by complainant), his credibility was already precarious.
   Weighing these elements, the Court concluded the jury would inevitably have convicted regardless of the contested piece of bad-character evidence.
4. Step 4 – No Automatic Rule
   The Court expressly rejected a bright-line rule. It accepted counsel’s concession that sometimes a quashed conviction may taint a later verdict, but emphasised the need for a fact-specific analysis—the essence of the Court of Appeal’s “unsafe” jurisdiction.

3 – Likely Impact of the Decision

The ruling has several important ramifications:

• Clarification of Principle – Establishes that the mere quashing of an earlier conviction used at trial does not automatically undermine subsequent verdicts. Practitioners must instead show how and why the later development renders the jury’s conclusion unsafe.
• Case-Management Guidance – Defence teams contemplating late appeals must frame them as “fresh evidence” applications under s.23, not as traditional misdirection appeals, unless the trial judge’s ruling was itself defective.
• Evidential Caution – Prosecutors will be acutely aware that relying on recent or contestable convictions as bad-character carries downstream risk if those convictions are later disturbed. Thorough disclosure and validation of such convictions becomes even more critical.
• Judicial Directions – The judgment implicitly endorses robust, limiting directions to the jury when admitting bad-character evidence—directions that can withstand future scrutiny even if the underlying conviction evaporates.
• Police Misconduct Implications – Although not central to the ratio, the case reflects growing judicial sensitivity to improper police behaviour (here, the officer’s perverting-justice conviction) and its ripple effects across multiple prosecutions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Bad-Character Evidence (CJA 2003) – Refers to information about a defendant’s past misconduct. Usually inadmissible, but seven statutory gateways allow it in. Gateway (f) lets it in when the defendant creates a “false impression” of himself.
• False Impression – When the defendant, through evidence or statements, portrays himself in an unduly favourable light, opening the door for the prosecution to correct that picture with contrary evidence.
• Unsafe Conviction – The Court of Appeal must quash a conviction if, in light of all the evidence (including any fresh evidence), it thinks the conviction is not safe. This is a broad, merits-based test that looks at the impact on the jury’s decision.
• Fresh Evidence (s.23 CAA 1968) – New material not available at trial which could have affected the verdict. The Court decides whether to admit it and, if admitted, whether it renders the conviction unsafe.

Conclusion

Gaiziunas v R establishes an important limitation on the fallout from quashed convictions: they do not automatically contaminate later convictions where they featured as bad-character evidence. The Court’s analysis underscores that the central question remains the statutory one—is the conviction safe?—which demands a holistic review of the trial, the newly-emerged facts, the judge’s directions, and the overall strength of the prosecution case.

For criminal practitioners, the case is a reminder to:

• Challenge questionable prior convictions aggressively at first instance to avoid later complications;
• Frame “post-quashing” appeals as fresh-evidence cases, focusing on materiality and impact;
• Recognise that judges retain a wide discretion to admit earlier convictions under the false-impression gateway, but also that carefully crafted limiting directions can immunise the verdict against subsequent legal shocks.

In the broader legal landscape, the judgment reinforces a pragmatic, evidence-based approach to appeal litigation, ensuring that the integrity of jury verdicts is preserved unless fresh developments genuinely erode their foundation.