Extension of Prior Approval Deadlines under Article 7(c) GPDO 2015: Gluck v. Secretary of State for Housing, Communities And Local Government & Anor

Extension of Prior Approval Deadlines under Article 7(c) GPDO 2015: Gluck v. Secretary of State for Housing, Communities And Local Government & Anor

Introduction

The case of Gluck v. Secretary of State for Housing, Communities And Local Government & Anor ([2020] EWCA Civ 1756) addressed critical issues surrounding the extension of time periods for prior approval applications under the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) Order 2015 (GPDO). Mr. J.J. Gluck contested the refusal of his prior approval applications by Crawley Borough Council, arguing that the council's decision was made after the stipulated 56-day period had elapsed. This commentary delves into the nuances of the judgment, elucidating the legal principles established and their implications for future planning law cases.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the lower court, affirming that the 56-day period specified in paragraph W(11)(c) of part 3 of Schedule 2 to the GPDO can indeed be extended by mutual written agreement between the applicant and the local planning authority (LPA) under Article 7(c) of the GPDO. In this case, it was determined that such an extension was appropriately agreed upon, thereby rendering the council's refusal of Mr. Gluck's applications unlawful. The judgment clarified the interpretation of Article 7(c), emphasizing that written evidence of an agreement to extend the decision timeframe satisfies legal requirements.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment referenced several key precedents to contextualize the Court's reasoning:

  • Murrell v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2010] EWCA Civ 1367: Highlighted the limitations on extending decision timeframes in hybrid prior approval cases.
  • R (Warren Farm (Wokingham) Ltd) v Wokingham Borough Council [2019] EWHC 2007 (Admin): Supported the interpretation that Article 7(c) relates only to Article 7(b), though this was ultimately overruled in favor of a broader interpretation.
  • Golden Ocean Group Ltd v Salgaocar Mining Industries Pvt Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 265: Affirmed that emails can satisfy the writing requirement under Article 7(c).
  • St Modwen Developments Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2018] EWCA Civ 1643: Emphasized the need to avoid legalistic interpretations within the planning system.

Legal Reasoning

The core legal debate centered on the interpretation of Article 7(c) of the GPDO. Mr. Gluck argued that Article 7(c) should not apply to the 56-day period specified in Schedule 2, suggesting it only pertains to the default 8-week period outlined in Article 7(b). However, the Court, led by Lord Justice Newey, determined that Article 7(c) indeed extends to any specified period in Schedule 2, including the 56-day timeframe. The judges reasoned that the language of the GPDO does not confine Article 7(c) solely to the periods outlined in Article 7(b), thereby allowing flexibility to extend decision-making timeframes through mutual agreement.

Furthermore, the Court addressed the manner in which such agreements must be documented. It concluded that written evidence of an agreement, which can be in the form of emails, suffices to satisfy Article 7(c), even if the agreement was initially made orally as long as it is subsequently confirmed in writing by both parties.

Impact

This judgment has significant implications for planning law by:

  • Affirming Flexibility: Clarifies that specified decision periods in Schedule 2 of the GPDO are not rigid and can be adjusted through mutual written consent.
  • Encouraging Documentation: Reinforces the importance of maintaining clear written records of any extensions agreed upon between applicants and LPAs.
  • Guiding Future Applications: Provides a clear precedent that can be cited in future cases where applicants seek extensions beyond stipulated timeframes.
  • Balancing Interests: Ensures that both developers and planning authorities can collaboratively manage decision timelines without undermining legal protections.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Prior Approval

A prerequisite process where certain developments can proceed without full planning permission, subject to approval on specific matters such as noise, traffic, or environmental impact.

GPDO (General Permitted Development Order)

Legislation that grants automatic planning permissions for specific types of developments, streamlining the planning process while imposing certain conditions and restrictions.

Article 7(c) of the GPDO

A provision that allows the extension of decision-making timeframes for prior approval applications beyond the standard periods, provided there is a written agreement between the applicant and the local planning authority.

Conclusion

The Gluck v. Secretary of State for Housing, Communities And Local Government & Anor judgment serves as a pivotal reference in understanding the extensibility of decision-making timelines within the planning system under the GPDO 2015. By affirming that specified periods for prior approval decisions can be extended through written agreements under Article 7(c), the Court has provided clarity and flexibility to both applicants and local planning authorities. This ensures that while expedient decision-making remains a priority, there is also room to accommodate complex cases that may require additional time, thereby fostering a more balanced and effective planning system.

Case Details

Year: 2020
Court: England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division)

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