Precedents Cited

The judgment references several key precedents that influenced the court's decision:

• Football Dataco Ltd v Smoot Enterprises Ltd [2011] 1 WLR 1978: This case was pivotal in interpreting CPR 12.11(1), establishing that the court does not need to second-guess the claimant's assertions but should ensure that the claim appears to be substantiated based on the statement of case.
• S v Beach [2015] 1 WLR 2701: Warby J highlighted the nature of default judgments under CPR Part 12, noting that such judgments are typically granted in the absence of evidence from the defendant and are based on the claimant's statement of case.
• Sube v News Group Newspapers [2018] EWHC 1234 (QB): This case provided guidance on the principles surrounding defamation and the assessment of serious harm, which the court applied in evaluating the defamatory statements made by Makar.
• Majrowski v Guy's and St Thomas NHS Trust [2007] 1 AC 224: While not directly cited, the judgment references the level of seriousness required for conduct to amount to harassment under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, as discussed in this case.

These precedents collectively informed the court's approach to default judgments, the assessment of claims in the absence of defendant's input, and the thresholds for harassment and defamation.

Legal Reasoning

The court's legal reasoning centered on several key areas:

• Default Judgment under CPR Part 12: The court meticulously followed CPR rules concerning default judgments. It verified the proper service of the claim documents to Makar, ensuring compliance with CPR 6.17 and CPR 12 PD 4.1. The absence of an acknowledgment or defense from the defendant, despite adequate notice, justified granting the default judgment.
• Enforcement of Settlement Agreement: The court examined the 2006 settlement agreement, confirming that Makar had received independent legal advice and was aware of her obligations not to make derogatory statements about the company. The court found repeated breaches of this agreement, substantiated by evidence of defamatory statements made by Makar.
• Harassment under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997: The court assessed whether Makar's conduct constituted harassment, considering the frequency, nature, and impact of her statements. It concluded that her persistent defamatory remarks, especially those intended to pressure the company, met the threshold for harassment.
• Balancing Freedom of Expression: Under Section 12(4) of the Human Rights Act 1998, the court acknowledged the importance of freedom of expression. However, it determined that the protective measures sought by the Claimants were justified to prevent harassment and defamation, maintaining the balance between individual rights and protection from harm.

The court's reasoning demonstrated a thorough application of existing laws and precedents to the facts at hand, ensuring that the relief granted was both appropriate and proportionate.

Impact

This judgment has several implications for future cases and the broader legal landscape:

• Reinforcement of Settlement Agreements: The case underscores the enforceability of settlement agreements, particularly clauses that restrict disparaging remarks. It serves as a deterrent for parties considering breaching such agreements.
• Application of Default Judgments: The detailed adherence to CPR Part 12 provides a clear framework for claimants seeking default judgments. It emphasizes the necessity of proper service and the conditions under which courts may proceed in the absence of the defendant.
• Harassment and Defamation Law: By affirming the thresholds for harassment under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and the standards for defamation, the judgment offers clarity on how these laws are applied in repetitive and malicious contexts.
• Balancing Rights: The judgment illustrates the courts' role in balancing freedom of expression with the need to protect individuals and entities from defamatory and harassing conduct, highlighting the nuanced application of the Human Rights Act 1998.

Practitioners can draw lessons on the importance of meticulous procedural compliance when seeking default judgments and the effective use of injunctive relief in cases of ongoing harassment and defamation.

Default Judgment

A default judgment is a judgment entered by the court in favor of the plaintiff when the defendant fails to respond to a lawsuit or appear in court. In this case, Makar did not acknowledge receipt of the lawsuit or defend against the claims, leading the court to grant judgment in the Claimants' favor without a full trial.

Injunctive Relief

Injunctive relief refers to a court order that requires a party to do or refrain from doing specific acts. Here, the Claimants sought an injunction to prevent Makar from making defamatory or harassing statements, effectively legally restraining her from continuing her harmful behavior.

Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (PHA)

The Protection from Harassment Act 1997 is UK legislation designed to protect individuals from harassment and stalking. Under this Act, harassment is defined as a course of conduct that causes alarm or distress. In this judgment, the court applied the PHA to determine that Makar's repeated defamatory statements amounted to harassment.

Civil Procedure Rules (CPR)

The Civil Procedure Rules are a set of rules governing civil litigation in England and Wales. They outline the processes for filing lawsuits, serving documents, and obtaining judgments, including default judgments. This case illustrates the application of CPR Part 12, which deals with default judgments, ensuring that procedures are correctly followed to protect the rights of all parties.

Human Rights Act 1998

The Human Rights Act 1998 incorporates the European Convention on Human Rights into UK law. Section 12(4) requires courts to take into account the right to freedom of expression when granting injunctions. In this judgment, the court balanced Makar's expressive rights against the Claimants' need to be protected from harassment and defamation.