Introduction

Moore & Anor v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions ([2021] EWCA Civ 970) is a pivotal case adjudicated by the England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) on June 23, 2021. The appellants, Ms. Taylor Moore and her daughter SG, challenged the treatment of two maternity benefits—Maternity Allowance (MA) and Statutory Maternity Pay (SMP)—in the calculation of Universal Credit (UC). Specifically, they contended that MA is unjustly classified as "unearned income" and fully deducted from UC, whereas SMP is deemed "earned income" and only partially deducted through a tapered approach.

The core issues revolve around alleged unlawful discrimination under Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in conjunction with Article 8 or Article 1 of the First Protocol (A1P1), the rationality of the differential treatment, and procedural compliance with the Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED) under the Equality Act 2010.

This commentary delves into the nuances of the judgment, dissecting the legal reasoning, precedents cited, and the broader implications for welfare law and anti-discrimination jurisprudence.

Summary of the Judgment

The appellants sought permission to appeal the High Court decision where Swift J had dismissed their claims primarily on grounds of insufficient legal error and procedural timeliness concerning the PSED claim. The Court of Appeal meticulously examined the substantive grounds of the appellants, namely:

• The differential treatment of MA and SMP as unearned and earned income respectively in UC calculations, allegedly constituting unlawful discrimination.
• The argument that such differential treatment is irrational and unlawfully discriminatory without objective justification.
• The procedural claim that the initial hearing did not adequately consider the PSED under the Equality Act 2010.

After a comprehensive review, Lord Justice Singh upheld the High Court's decision, rejecting the permission to appeal. The court held that the differential treatment was justified under the "manifestly without reasonable foundation" standard and that the PSED claim was indeed made out of time.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment references several key cases that shaped its legal reasoning:

• R (on the application of DA) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2019] UKSC 21: Established the "manifestly without reasonable foundation" standard for assessing discrimination claims in welfare benefits.
• AL (Serbia) [2008] UKHL 42: Highlighted that the core issue in discrimination cases is whether the differential treatment is justified, rather than whether some exercise of that kind could ever be justified.
• R (TP and Ors) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2020] EWCA Civ 37: Emphasized that the focus should be on whether the differential treatment is justified and proportionate to the aims pursued, particularly when "other status" is involved.
• Brewster, Re Application for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland) [2017] UKSC 8: Affirmed the necessity for timely filings of judicial review claims, reinforcing strict adherence to procedural timeliness.
• R (Drexler) v Leicestershire County Council [2020] EWCA Civ 502: Clarified the application of proportionality and justification in cases where finite resources and policy priorities are at stake.

These precedents were instrumental in framing the court’s approach to evaluating the appellants’ claims, particularly in assessing the justification for differential treatment under the ECHR framework and the importance of procedural correctness in PSED claims.

Legal Reasoning

The court's legal reasoning can be encapsulated in several core areas:

• Distinction Between MA and SMP: The court examined the statutory definitions and administrative handling of MA and SMP. While MA is a non-taxable state payment with broad qualifying criteria, SMP is a taxable employer-payable benefit with stricter entitlement conditions tied to continuous employment. This structural difference underpinned the classification of MA as unearned income and SMP as earned income within UC calculations.
• Justification Under Article 14 ECHR: The court applied the "manifestly without reasonable foundation" test, requiring that any differential treatment be justified by a legitimate aim and be proportionate. The government's rationale emphasized administrative efficiency, alignment with employment incentives, and consistency with broader social policy objectives.
• Status Analysis: The appellants argued that both MA and SMP relate to maternity status and thus should receive equivalent treatment. However, the court differentiated that the protected status pertains to sub-groups within the maternity cohort, focusing on the differential impact on UC calculations rather than on general sex or pregnancy discrimination.
• Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED): The court held that the PSED claim was procedurally time-barred, aligning with established principles that judicial review claims must be filed within three months of the alleged breach.

The judges meticulously deconstructed the appellants' arguments, determining that the differential treatment was substantiated by legitimate policy objectives and administrative considerations, thus meeting the required legal standards.

Impact

The judgment reinforces the discretion of public authorities in structuring welfare benefits, particularly in distinguishing between different types of income in UC calculations. It underscores the deference courts afford to legislative and executive judgments in defining policy parameters, provided there is a rational basis. Additionally, it reaffirms the stringent procedural requirements for bringing forward PSED claims, emphasizing the importance of timely judicial scrutiny.

For future cases, this judgment serves as a precedent that justified differential treatment in welfare benefits, based on structural and administrative distinctions, is likely to be upheld unless it is manifestly unreasonable. It also delineates the boundaries of discrimination claims within sub-groups of a protected class, limiting their scope when the differential treatment is adequately justified by overarching policy objectives.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Manifestly Without Reasonable Foundation

This legal standard requires that a policy or decision be so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have made it. In discrimination cases, if a difference in treatment cannot be justified by a legitimate aim, it fails this test.

Earned vs. Unearned Income

Earned Income refers to income derived from employment or self-employment, such as wages or salaries. It often has different treatment in benefits calculations to incentivize work.

Unearned Income includes benefits or allowances that are not directly tied to employment, such as state pensions or certain welfare benefits. These are typically treated differently in benefit calculations.

Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED)

Under the Equality Act 2010, the PSED requires public bodies to consider how their decisions affect people with different protected characteristics. Claims under PSED must be made within three months of the alleged breach.

Article 14 ECHR

Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment of rights and freedoms set forth in the ECHR. It requires that any differential treatment must have a legitimate aim and must be proportionate.

Conclusion

The Moore & Anor v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions case is a landmark judgment that clarifies the permissible boundaries of differential treatment in welfare benefits under human rights and equality law. By upholding the differential treatment of MA and SMP in UC calculations, the Court of Appeal confirmed the state's discretion in designing welfare schemes that align with broader social and economic policy objectives.

The judgment emphasizes that as long as differential treatment is justified by legitimate aims and does not lack reasonable foundation, it will generally be upheld. It also serves as a reminder of the critical importance of procedural adherence, particularly regarding the timeliness of equality claims under the PSED.

Moving forward, policymakers and legal practitioners must consider these principles when structuring welfare benefits and contesting or defending similar differential treatments. The case reinforces the delicate balance courts maintain between protecting individual rights and respecting the legislative and executive's policy-driven decisions.