Defining “Stepchild” for Secure Tenancy Succession: Court of Appeal Endorses Bright-Line Rule and Rejects Article 14 Challenge

Introduction

Abdelrahman v Mayor and Burgesses of the London Borough of Islington ([2025] EWCA Civ 1038) required the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) to decide whether Ms Abdelrahman, the biological daughter of the late tenant’s long-term partner, was entitled to succeed to his secure tenancy. The primary question turned on the meaning of the term “stepchild” in Islington LBC’s succession policy, and whether confining that term to the child of a spouse or civil partner constituted unlawful discrimination under Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) taken with Article 8 (right to respect for the home).

At first instance HHJ Bloom held that a “stepchild” meant only the child of a person married to (or in a civil partnership with) the tenant. Consequently, Ms Abdelrahman, whose mother had never married the deceased tenant Mr Seales, fell outside the policy. The judge also ruled that, even if there was differential treatment, it was objectively justified and proportionate; a possession order therefore followed. Permission to appeal was granted on both construction and discrimination grounds.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal (Lewison LJ giving the leading judgment, with Nugee LJ and Elisabeth Laing LJ concurring) dismissed the appeal in full.

Definition of “stepchild”. On a proper construction of Islington’s policy, read against the background and purpose of s.113 Housing Act 1985, “stepchild” is restricted to a child of the tenant’s spouse or civil partner by a previous relationship. The updated, broader online dictionary definition relied on by the tenant was rejected.
Procedural point. A new argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that a child of a partner “living as” a spouse/civil partner should also qualify was disallowed because it would have necessitated new fact-finding.
Article 14 ECHR. Even assuming Ms Abdelrahman had a relevant “other status”, any difference in treatment was justified. The policy pursued the legitimate aim of managing scarce social housing through bright-line, easily administrable criteria and was not “manifestly without reasonable foundation”.
Section 3 HRA. The Human Rights Act interpretative obligation could not be invoked where the Court had already found no breach of Convention rights, and in any event it applies to legislation, not to a local authority policy.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Wandsworth LBC v Michalak [2003] 1 WLR 617 – emphasised Parliament’s choice of a closed list in s.113 to secure certainty in social housing.
Sheffield CC v Wall [2011] 1 WLR 1342 – held that a foster child cannot be read into “child” under s.113; confirmed the importance of the statutory “vital piece of paper”. Used here to show that de facto relationships fall outside the closed categories.
Rent Act / Family Cases – Fitzpatrick v Sterling HA (broader “family” under Rent Acts) was contrasted to stress that Housing Act terminology is intentionally narrow.
Discrimination & Margin of Appreciation: Burden v UK, Yigit v Turkey, SC v SSWP, Turley, Simawi, Dudley MBC v Mailley – collectively demonstrate that social-housing schemes are judged by the “manifestly without reasonable foundation” standard and that states may treat married and unmarried couples differently.
Interpretation of Policies: Tesco v Dundee (planning); Re Rowland (Lord Denning’s caution on dictionary reliance) – relied on to justify a purposive approach to the policy’s wording.
Appellate procedure on new points: Singh v Dass [2019] EWCA Civ 360 – no new points on appeal if fresh evidence or a different trial would have been needed.

2. Legal Reasoning

a) Context & Purpose. Islington’s succession policy, though broader than the post-2012 statutory right in s.86A, was modelled on the pre-2012 regime and retains the closed-list philosophy of s.113. Its purpose is to identify potential successors quickly, using objective documentary evidence, and thereby free up scarce housing stock for those in need.

b) Construction of “stepchild”. Lewison LJ embarked on a textual, purposive and contextual exercise:

Examined contemporaneous (2006-2014) dictionary definitions, showing a consensus: stepchild = “child of one’s spouse by a previous marriage”.
Observed that the online 2023 OED entry was an outlier and, if adopted, would destroy administrative certainty.
Noted that, unlike “spouse or civil partner”, Parliament did not extend “stepchild” to situations of cohabitation, indicating an intention to maintain a clear, document-based criterion.
Applied the same rationale to the policy: the council officer must be able to decide succession without intrusive enquiries into relationship quality or permanence.

c) Dismissal of the new “cohabitee-child” argument. The Court refused to entertain a fresh interpretation (leveraging s.86A(5)’s treatment of cohabitees) because:

It would require findings on the couple’s living arrangements that were never litigated below.
Singh v Dass principles bar such late arguments on appeal.

d) Article 14 Analysis.

Status accepted arguendo: Ms Abdelrahman could claim a status derived from being the child of an unmarried couple.
Legitimate aim: balancing security of tenure with fair allocation of limited social housing.
Proportionality/Margin of Appreciation: • Bright-line, document-based rules minimise administrative burden. • Policy already exceeds statutory minimum by recognising a wider set of relatives. • Differentiation between married and unmarried couples (and their children) lies within the broad discretion sanctioned by Strasbourg authorities, particularly in socio-economic fields.
Test Applied: “Manifestly without reasonable foundation” – the policy comfortably passed.

e) Human Rights Act s.3. Section 3 can only be used where incompatible legislation would otherwise breach Convention rights; it does not apply to non-legislative local policies, and, in any event, no breach was found.

3. Likely Impact of the Decision

Local Housing Authorities. Authorities may confidently maintain or adopt “bright-line” succession policies pegged to documentary kinship, knowing that Article 14 challenges will face a high justificatory threshold.
Interpretation of Family Terminology. Reinforces the principle that family labels embedded in statutory or quasi-statutory schemes are to be read narrowly unless the legislature expressly widens them.
Litigation Strategy. Parties seeking to invoke broader, socially updated meanings (e.g., relying on “always speaking” doctrine) must plead and evidence the point from the outset; appellate ambush will not be permitted.
Human Rights Jurisprudence. Confirms post-SC position: where social housing or welfare provisions are at stake and no suspect ground like race or sex is involved, courts will generally grant a wide margin of appreciation.
Policy Drafting. Encourages councils to articulate expressly the evidential basis required (e.g., marriage/CP certificates) to forestall interpretative disputes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Secure Tenancy: A tenancy granted by a local authority which gives the tenant strong protection from eviction and (pre-2012) some rights of succession.
Succession: The legal mechanism by which another person (usually a close family member) automatically becomes the tenant upon the original tenant’s death.
Bright-Line Rule: A clear, simple rule that leaves little room for subjective judgment, designed to promote administrative certainty.
Article 14 ECHR: The Convention provision prohibiting discrimination in the enjoyment of other Convention rights.
Manifestly Without Reasonable Foundation: A deferential standard of review: a measure in socio-economic policy will be upheld unless it is plainly irrational.
Section 3 Human Rights Act 1998: Requires courts to interpret legislation, so far as possible, in a way that is compatible with Convention rights.

Conclusion

Abdelrahman decisively re-affirms that, for the purposes of local-authority succession to secure tenancies, the term “stepchild” retains its traditional, marriage-based meaning. By endorsing Islington’s bright-line, evidence-based policy and rejecting the Article 14 challenge, the Court of Appeal underlines the judiciary’s reluctance to dilute closed statutory categories or to second-guess policy judgments in the sensitive field of social housing allocation. The judgment provides valuable guidance: administrators may prioritise certainty and resource management over nuanced assessments of modern family dynamics, and prospective successors must ground their claims firmly within the established documentary framework. Going forward, any expansion of succession rights to children of unmarried partners will require legislative, not judicial, action.