Clarifying Credit for Overlapping Remand: The “Saleh Rule” on Minimum-Term Deductions ([2025] EWCA Crim 720)

Clarifying Credit for Overlapping Remand: The “Saleh Rule” on Minimum-Term Deductions
Saleh v R ([2025] EWCA Crim 720)

1. Introduction

The Court of Appeal’s decision in Saleh v R addresses a narrow but recurrent problem in sentencing practice: should time spent on remand awaiting trial be credited against the minimum term of a life sentence when, during the whole of that remand period, the offender is already serving an earlier, unrelated term of imprisonment?

Mr Musa Saleh, already serving a 16-year extended sentence for attempted murder (committed in February 2021), was later convicted of the April 2021 murder of Abubakarr Jah. The trial judge imposed life imprisonment with a 36-year minimum term. Unlike his co-accused, Mr Saleh received no deduction for 1,118 days spent in custody between May 2021 and June 2024 because every one of those days overlapped with the earlier sentence. On appeal, counsel argued that this produced unfair disparity and a manifestly excessive term. The Court of Appeal disagreed, laying down what may now be labelled the “Saleh Rule”:

Where the defendant is continuously serving an existing sentence for unrelated offending, overlapping remand days for new allegations do not require any automatic deduction from the life-sentence minimum term; the sentencing judge must instead reflect overall culpability and totality in the usual way.

2. Summary of the Judgment

  • Extension of Time: Would have been granted had the appeal been arguable, but ultimately refused because the appeal lacked merit.
  • Main Ground: Failure to offset remand time against the 36-year minimum term.
  • Key Holding: The sentencing judge’s refusal to deduct overlapping remand days complied with s.240ZA Criminal Justice Act 2003 (CJA 2003) and relevant authority, especially R v Trendell [2022] EWCA Crim 1434.
  • Outcome: Leave to appeal refused; 36-year minimum term stands.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Statutory Framework

a) Statutes

  • Section 240ZA CJA 2003 – Governs credit for time on remand. Sub-ss.(4) & (10) deny automatic credit where the remand period “counts” towards another sentence already being served.
  • Schedule 21, Sentencing Act 2020 (SA 2020) – Provides starting points for life-sentence minimum terms (30 years for firearm murders).
  • Section 322 SA 2020 – Defines “associated offences” (not engaged here because the February and April offences were unrelated).

b) Case Law

  • R v Trendell [2022] EWCA Crim 1434 – Confirmed that overlapping remand while serving another sentence should not be double-counted.
  • General principles on totality (e.g., R v Manning [2021] EWCA Crim 718) implicitly inform the court’s approach.

3.2 Legal Reasoning of the Court

  1. Starting Point: Firearm murder (Sch.21 para 3) mandates a 30-year baseline.
  2. Aggravation Analysis: Premeditation, public setting, use of both gun and knife, concealment efforts, and ongoing criminality warranted a “significant” uplift.
  3. Totality Check: The judge factored in the remaining portion of the earlier 16-year sentence—over 7 years still to serve—when fixing a 36-year minimum.
  4. Section 240ZA Application: Because every remand day already counted towards the February sentence, automatic deduction was statutorily barred. The judge could still consider fairness, but need not deduct day-for-day.
  5. Parity with Co-Accused: Burton-Devine got 125 days’ credit only because that period preceded his other sentence. Accordingly, there was a principled distinction, negating any parity complaint.

3.3 Impact on Future Cases

The decision consolidates and crystallises existing but scattered authority by:

  • Confirming that overlapping remand does not create a presumption of credit against a life-sentence minimum term.
  • Demonstrating a structured two-stage approach: (1) statutory exclusion under s.240ZA; (2) discretionary adjustment via totality, but only where fairness demands.
  • Offering guidance on co-defendant disparity: factual, rather than purely temporal, differences will justify divergent credits.
  • Providing sentencing judges with a clear blueprint, likely reducing satellite litigation over remand deductions in complex multi-offence scenarios.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Minimum Term (a.k.a. Tariff): The fixed period an offender serving life must serve before parole eligibility.
  • Remand in Custody: Time spent in prison awaiting trial or sentence. Normally credited to eventual custodial terms to prevent “dead” time.
  • Overlapping Remand: Days on remand that coincide with an existing sentence. Under s.240ZA they are already “counted,” so double-crediting is barred.
  • Totality Principle: Ensures the aggregate of consecutive sentences is proportionate to overall criminality.
  • Slip Rule: A short window (usually 56 days) allowing the crown court to correct errors in sentence without appeal.

5. Conclusion

Saleh v R is now the leading authority on how to treat remand days that overlap with a previously imposed custodial sentence when fixing a life-sentence minimum term. The Court of Appeal affirms that:

  1. The statutory scheme (s.240ZA CJA 2003) itself negates automatic credit.
  2. The sentencing judge retains discretion to adjust for totality, but substantial, unrelated previous sentences normally preclude further reduction.
  3. Apparent disparity with co-accused must be tested against factual differences in custody chronology, not superficial symmetry.

The judgment delivers much-needed clarity, shielding future sentencing decisions from appeals premised on “double-counting” remand time, and underscores that lengthy minimum terms flow from serious sequential offending, not from bookkeeping anomalies.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)

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