City of London Corporation v Bussandra [2025] EWCA Civ 1580: Mental Illness, “Deliberate” Acts and Intentional Homelessness

1. Introduction

City of London Corporation v Bussandra [2025] EWCA Civ 1580 is a significant Court of Appeal decision on the meaning of “deliberately” in the statutory test for intentional homelessness under section 191 of the Housing Act 1996, where the applicant suffers from mental illness.

The case lies at the intersection of homelessness law, mental health, the status and use of the Homelessness Code of Guidance, and the public sector equality duty (PSED) under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010. It also addresses how reviewing officers should handle, reason about, and (where appropriate) depart from expert psychiatric and mental health evidence.

The appeal was brought by the City of London Corporation (“the City”) against a County Court decision (HHJ Richard Roberts) which had quashed the City’s review decision and held that the applicant, Mr John Bussandra, had not been shown to be intentionally homeless. The Court of Appeal (Newey, Zacaroli and Yip LJJ) allowed the City’s appeal, reinstating the review decision.

2. Factual Background

2.1 The applicant’s personal and medical history

Mr John Bussandra, aged 51 and gay, has a long history of serious mental ill health. As early as 2015, his GP, Dr Caroline Cattell, recorded a diagnosis of recurrent depression and anxiety with some obsessive compulsive traits, noting that this impacted “all aspects of his life” and rendered him a “vulnerable individual” [3], [5]. He had a past overdose (1998) and later was also diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) [12], [14].

2.2 The move to Brighton

In late 2015, he exchanged his London accommodation for a housing association tenancy in Brighton (Flat 3, 28 Brading Road) with the Guinness Partnership; the tenancy started on 16 November 2015 [4]. Very soon he regretted the move, reporting increased anxiety and depression, and a strong desire to return to London where his family and friends were [5].

2.3 The thefts and alleged harassment

In December 2015, he travelled extensively, including to London and a number of European cities [6]. Whilst abroad, he reported that bank cards posted to his Brighton address had been stolen and used fraudulently, and he told the landlord that he wanted an exchange and could not live there because he felt unsafe and “cannot live with thieves” [7].

He reported the theft to the police on 7 January 2016 and discussed a transfer back to London with the Guinness Partnership. He was told there were no vacancies and a transfer might take years [8]. Shortly thereafter he indicated that he would hand in his notice and end the tenancy [8], [9]. On 12 January 2016, he gave four weeks’ notice, stating he had had to leave due to “antisocial behaviour and stealing of all my post, bank cards, money, from other tenants within the block!” [9].

In later representations, he alleged homophobic abuse and harassment as well as the thefts [15], [17], but the review officer ultimately rejected the harassment allegations as unproven [23], [32].

2.4 Subsequent homelessness and deterioration

By 2017, he was homeless—rough sleeping, sofa surfing, or in hotels when funds allowed [13]. His mental health deteriorated, with increased depression, anxiety, PTSD symptoms and suicidal ideation, leading to urgent referrals to crisis services [11]–[12]. A psychiatrist, Dr Waheed, in 2022 diagnosed recurrent depression and PTSD, then of at least moderate severity [14].

2.5 The housing decision and review

The City, considering an application many years later, accepted that:

• Mr Bussandra was homeless;
• he was eligible for assistance; and
• he had a priority need;

but decided that he had become homeless “intentionally” within the meaning of section 191 of the Housing Act 1996 because he had deliberately surrendered his Brighton tenancy [16].

He requested a review under section 202, supported by detailed evidence from a consultant psychiatrist (Dr Waheed) and an advanced clinical mental health practitioner, Ms Laura Pisaneschi, who had been treating him weekly from April 2023 [17]–[19]. They opined, broadly, that at the material time in 2015–16 he was likely experiencing a major depressive episode and PTSD-related fear and vulnerability which meant he wanted to “escape”, could not rationalise or think clearly, and that it would have been unreasonable for him to remain in the Brighton property [17]–[19].

The review officer, Mr Minos Perdios, upheld the original decision in his review letter of 3 April 2024 (“the Review Decision”) [21], finding that:

• the act of surrendering the tenancy was “deliberate” within section 191(1);
• his mental health condition did not negate that deliberateness or amount to a temporary aberration of mind; and
• the Brighton flat was reasonable for him to continue to occupy [28].

The County Court (HHJ Roberts) quashed the review for three primary reasons [29]:

1. wrong legal test on “deliberate” conduct;
2. inadequate reasons for rejecting the evidence of Ms Pisaneschi; and
3. only “lip service” paid to the PSED.

The City appealed. The Court of Appeal’s task was to decide whether the Review Decision itself was legally flawed, not whether the County Court had reasoned correctly [30].

3. Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal (Newey LJ giving the main judgment, with which Zacaroli and Yip LJJ agreed) allowed the City’s appeal and reinstated the Review Decision.

The Court held that:

1. On the meaning of “deliberately” in section 191:
   • “Deliberately” bears its ordinary meaning of acting on purpose, not accidentally [49]–[50];
   • mental illness can, in some circumstances, prevent an act being “deliberate” even where there is no lack of legal capacity [51]–[52];
   • however, it is not enough merely to show that mental illness played a “significant role” in the decision. That is too broad a test and not supported by the authorities or the Code [56];
   • the Code of Guidance, although not law, can legitimately guide review officers and is consistent with this understanding [52], [55];
   • on a proper reading, the review officer applied the Code-based test and did not misdirect himself [57]–[63].
2. On reasons for rejecting medical evidence:
   • The review officer was entitled to depart from the opinions of the treating practitioner, Ms Pisaneschi, provided he gave intelligible and adequate reasons [67]–[69];
   • here, he did so. He carefully set out his reasons, drawing on the bank statements, travel pattern, earlier medical evidence, and the nature of the alleged aberration. The reasons were sufficient when viewed in the benevolent, non‑technical way required for review decisions [70]–[72].
3. On the Public Sector Equality Duty:
   • The review officer recognised that Mr Bussandra was disabled, expressly referred to the PSED, and in substance gave focused and detailed consideration to his mental health conditions in both the intentionality and reasonableness assessments [79]–[80];
   • the statutory “sharp focus” requirement under Hotak and Lomax was satisfied; this was not a case of mere lip service [75], [80]–[81].

Accordingly, the City’s review decision was lawful. No ground of challenge to it was made out [82].

4. Statutory and Doctrinal Framework

4.1 Intentional homelessness under the Housing Act 1996

Section 193(1)–(2) of the Housing Act 1996 imposes the “main housing duty” on a local housing authority if an applicant is:

• homeless,
• eligible for assistance,
• in priority need, and
• not homeless intentionally [31].

Section 191(1)–(2) defines “intentionally homeless” [32]:

• A person becomes homeless intentionally if he deliberately does or fails to do something in consequence of which he ceases to occupy accommodation that:
  • was available for his occupation; and
  • it would have been reasonable for him to continue to occupy.
• An act or omission done in good faith by a person unaware of any relevant fact is not treated as deliberate.

Thus, the intentionality enquiry has three elements:

1. Was there an act/omission which caused the loss of accommodation?
2. Was that act/omission deliberate?
3. Was the accommodation both available and reasonable to continue to occupy at the time?

Only the second and third elements were contentious in Bussandra.

4.2 Homelessness Code of Guidance

Under section 182 of the 1996 Act, authorities must “have regard” to the statutory Homelessness Code of Guidance (“the Code”) [33]. Chapter 9 of the Code deals with intentional homelessness. Among other things it provides [42]:

• Para 9.16: the act must be “deliberate” and not “forced upon the applicant through no fault of their own”; acts done in good faith while genuinely ignorant of a relevant fact must not be treated as deliberate.
• Para 9.17: Generally, an act/omission should not be considered deliberate where:
  • (b) the applicant is incapable of managing their affairs by reason of age, mental illness or disability;
  • (c) it results from limited mental capacity or a temporary aberration caused by mental illness, frailty or substance misuse.
• Para 9.20(d): voluntarily surrendering adequate accommodation which it is reasonable to occupy is an example of deliberate conduct—unless 9.17 applies.

The judgment emphasises that the Code is not law but can provide important practical guidance consistent with the statute [52], [55].

4.3 Reviews and appeals under Part VII

Sections 202–204A provide for internal reviews and County Court appeals on points of law. As confirmed in Runa Begum v Tower Hamlets LBC [2003] 2 AC 430, a section 204 appeal is similar in substance to judicial review [34]. The Court of Appeal in Bussandra reiterates that the County Court’s role is supervisory; it must not substitute its own factual evaluation if the review decision is lawful and properly reasoned [30], [34].

4.4 Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED)

Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 imposes a duty on public authorities to have due regard, when exercising functions, to the need to:

• eliminate discrimination;
• advance equality of opportunity between those with and without protected characteristics (including disability); and
• foster good relations.

In Hotak v Southwark LBC [2016] AC 811, the Supreme Court held that the PSED applies to homelessness decisions, including intentionality and vulnerability assessments. Review officers must give a “sharp focus” to:

1. whether the applicant has a disability;
2. the extent of the disability;
3. its likely effect, especially in the context of homelessness; and
4. its implications for the statutory test in issue [75].

Subsequent appellate authority (e.g. Haque, Lomax, McMahon) has stressed that compliance is a matter of substance, not form [76]–[77].

5. Precedents and Authorities Cited

5.1 Meaning of “deliberately” in intentional homelessness

(a) Early interpretation: Robinson and Devenport

The language of section 191 derives from section 17 of the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977. In Robinson v Torbay BC [1982] 1 All ER 726, Judge Goodall held that “deliberately” relates to the act or omission itself, not to a specific intention to become homeless [43].

The Court of Appeal endorsed this in Devenport v Salford CC (1983) 8 HLR 54. Fox LJ stated that there is “no requirement that the person deliberately became homeless. Only that he deliberately did, or omitted to do something in consequence of which he ceased to occupy” [44]. Waller LJ agreed, emphasising that “deliberately” is used in its ordinary sense and “is not to be narrowly construed” [44].

(b) Hawthorne: rejecting a pure “choice” test

In R v Wandsworth LBC ex p Hawthorne [1994] 1 WLR 1442, a mother had failed to pay rent but used her limited funds to maintain her children. The council argued that this was “deliberate” because she consciously chose between alternatives. The Court of Appeal rejected that approach [45].

Nourse LJ stressed that Part III of the 1985 Act was intended to house the homeless, and that the legislation does not aim to refuse assistance to those whose homelessness is brought about “without fault on their part”, for example through disability, sickness, poverty or inability to make ends meet [45]. Authorities must consider whether there is a sufficient causal nexus between such factors and the non‑payment, so as to mean the failure was not “deliberate”.

This marked a shift away from a simplistic “any conscious choice is deliberate” reading, and inserted a normative element of “fault” into the analysis.

(c) Ugiagbe: limited role of foresight and motive

In Ugiagbe v Southwark LBC [2009] EWCA Civ 31, Lloyd LJ confirmed that section 191(1) is “clear, simple and absolute” and, apart from the need for a deliberate act or omission, does not invite enquiries as to motive, or whether homelessness was foreseen [46]. Section 191(2) deals instead with ignorance of relevant facts, subject to good faith.

(d) Pieretti: mental impairment and “good faith” / deliberateness

In Pieretti v Enfield LBC [2011] PTSR 565, the applicant, suffering from a depressive illness, withheld rent for reasons connected to his mental state. The appeal was decided on PSED grounds, but Wilson LJ observed obiter that there was a “real possibility” that the applicant’s mental impairment was relevant to whether his acts were in good faith under section 191(2) or “for some other reason, not ‘deliberate’ within the meaning of section 191(1)” [47].

That dictum is central to Bussandra: it recognises that mental illness, short of incapacity, can sometimes mean that conduct is not ‘deliberate’ for homelessness purposes.

(e) Roman: “deliberate act” in allocation schemes

In R (Laines Roman) v Southwark LBC [2022] EWHC 1232 (Admin), Lang J interpreted “deliberate act” in a housing allocation scheme (not section 191). She held an act is deliberate if the applicant intended it, in the sense that they had a “real choice between two or more viable options and voluntarily elected to do the act” [48].

Newey LJ in Bussandra cites this to illustrate how courts have imported a “real choice between viable options” notion into related housing contexts. However, he does not treat Roman as displacing the statutory analysis of section 191; rather, it is part of the broader conceptual background [48]–[50].

5.2 Status and role of the Code of Guidance

The Court relies heavily on Supreme Court authority on statutory guidance. In Wathen‑Fayed v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government [2025] 1 WLR 3693, Lord Hamblen emphasised that statutory guidance:

• has “no particular legal status”;
• is not a source of law and cannot alter statutory meaning; and
• has persuasive authority, akin to textbooks, with weight depending on the quality of reasoning [53].

But, as Bennion, Bailey and Norbury note (and as Lord Hamblen approved), public authorities must consider guidance and may only depart from it where there are sufficient reasons. In some contexts, cogent reasons may be required [54]. The Supreme Court has also given real weight to the Homelessness Code in Nzolameso, Haile and Samuels [54].

Newey LJ reconciles these strands: the Code does not override section 191, but, insofar as it is consistent with the statute and case law, it provides important, authoritative guidance on how local authorities should approach intentionality [55].

5.3 Reasons challenges and the “benevolent” reading of review decisions

The Court draws on a now well‑established approach to homelessness review decisions:

• Holmes‑Moorhouse v Richmond upon Thames LBC [2009] 1 WLR 413: courts should adopt a “benevolent approach” to review letters, avoiding overly technical or nit‑picking scrutiny [35].
• Nzolameso v Westminster CC [2015] PTSR 549: nevertheless, review decisions must demonstrate that proper consideration has been given to the statutory requirements and the Code; key reasoning must be clear [35].
• South Bucks DC v Porter (No 2) [2004] 1 WLR 1953: reasons must be intelligible and adequate, enabling the reader to understand why the decision was made and how key controversies were resolved. Courts should only infer legal error where reasons genuinely give rise to substantial doubt [36]–[37].

These principles frame the analysis at Issues (ii) and (iii): whether the review officer adequately explained his rejection of expert evidence, and whether he properly engaged with the PSED.

5.4 PSED and mental health in homelessness law

The Court refers to:

• Hotak v Southwark LBC [2016] AC 811: sets out the need for a “sharp focus” on disability and its effects in homelessness decisions [75].
• Haque v Hackney LBC [2017] PTSR 769; Lomax v Gosport BC [2019] PTSR 167: PSED applies in suitability and reasonableness assessments [75].
• McMahon v Watford BC [2020] HLR 29: substance over form; what matters is whether the officer really understood and engaged with the applicant’s conditions, not whether he recited the PSED formulae [76].
• Kannan v Newham LBC [2019] HLR 22: “mere recitation” of the PSED is not compliance [77].

These cases underpin the conclusion that, although the review decision invoked the PSED fairly briefly, the officer’s substantive engagement with Mr Bussandra’s mental health sufficed.

5.5 Departure from expert evidence

The leading authority cited is Guiste v Lambeth LBC [2020] HLR 12, in which the Court of Appeal quashed a decision where a reviewing officer had effectively ignored or inadequately addressed a consultant psychiatrist’s direct evidence on the core legal issue [67].

Henderson LJ held that, when a review officer departs from cogent specialist medical evidence on a key issue, he must provide a clear and rational explanation. Bussandra reaffirms that principle but finds it satisfied on the facts.

6. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

6.1 Issue (i): Did the review officer apply the wrong test to “deliberately”?

(a) Competing positions

Ms Davies KC for Mr Bussandra argued that:

• The correct approach is to ask whether the applicant’s mental health problem caused the act or omission leading to homelessness.
• If the mental health condition played a significant role in the decision, then the act should not be characterised as “deliberate”.
• The Review Decision, despite echoing the Code’s language, in substance applied a stricter, more capacity‑based test, effectively requiring an inability to think rationally or clearly [39], [59]–[60].

Mr Hutchings KC for the City submitted that:

• “Deliberate” should be understood by analogy with contractual capacity, as set out in Chitty: if the person had sufficient capacity to understand the nature of their act, the act was deliberate [40].
• Alternatively, even if mental illness can negate deliberateness short of incapacity, the review officer followed the Code correctly and did not misdirect himself [41], [57]–[63].

(b) The Court’s construction of “deliberately”

Newey LJ starts by confirming the orthodox propositions [49]:

• “Deliberately” refers to the conduct (act/omission) that causes homelessness, not to wishing or intending to be homeless.
• The term has its ordinary meaning (“on purpose rather than by accident; intentionally” [50]).
• There is no requirement that the applicant foresees homelessness or desires it.
• “Deliberately” is not to be construed narrowly in favour of applicants [44], [49].

He then examines how mental illness interplays with deliberateness:

• There are clear cases where deliberateness is negatived:
  • accident; and
  • outright lack of mental capacity to understand the nature of the act (e.g. severe cognitive impairment) [50].
• However, mental health issues cannot be confined only to situations where legal capacity is absent. That would contradict Pieretti and Hawthorne [51].
• In Pieretti, depressive illness might render non‑payment of rent not “deliberate” even though capacity was not in issue [47], [51].
• In Hawthorne, factors like poverty or inability to make ends meet—well short of incapacity—could mean a failure to pay rent was not deliberate [45], [51].

He also considers the Code. Paragraphs 9.16–9.17 speak of:

• conduct “forced upon the applicant through no fault of their own”;
• incapacity to manage affairs “by reason of … mental illness”;
• “limited mental capacity”; and
• “temporary aberration … caused by mental illness” [52].

This clearly goes beyond pure incapacity. The Code assumes that mental health conditions shorter of a full lack of capacity may, in some circumstances, mean that the act is not properly described as deliberate.

Nevertheless, Newey LJ rejects the very broad test suggested by Ms Davies:

• The mere fact that a mental health problem “played a significant role” in a decision does not, as a matter of language or law, prevent the decision being deliberate [56].
• Otherwise, any applicant with mild or moderate depression who chose not to pay rent could point to mental illness as a “significant” factor and thereby avoid a finding of intentional homelessness [56].
• That outcome would not align with the ordinary meaning of “deliberately”, the Code, or the “thrust of section 191” [56].

The Court thus charts a middle course:

• Rejecting a narrow, contract‑capacity‑based view under which only complete incapacity or something akin to it negatives deliberateness.
• Rejecting the applicant’s broad “significant role” test.
• Accepting that mental illness can, in some cases, mean conduct is not deliberate, but only where, in substance, the decision cannot fairly be characterised as a purposeful act of choice (for example, where it was effectively “forced upon” the person, or amounted to a true temporary aberration of mind) [50]–[52].

(c) Did the reviewer apply the wrong legal test?

The crucial question then becomes what test the review officer in fact applied. Did he:

• wrongly insist on an inability to rationalise or think clearly (a de facto capacity test); or
• use that language merely to respond to the way the medical evidence had been framed?

Ms Pisaneschi’s letters repeatedly stated that, at the relevant time, Mr Bussandra was likely experiencing a major depressive episode and “may not have been able to rationalise and think clearly” [17]–[19]. In answer, the reviewer:

• accepted that Mr Bussandra had longstanding depression, anxiety and PTSD, and that this affected his day‑to‑day functioning [23]–[24], [61];
• but said he did “not agree” that, in December 2015/January 2016, he was suffering a major depressive episode that rendered him unable to rationalise or think clearly, giving a series of reasons (pattern of travel, ability to manage finances and articulate his aims, absence of psychotic features, etc) [24]–[25].

Newey LJ acknowledges that if the reviewer had treated “unable to rationalise and think clearly” as the legal threshold for deliberateness, that would have been an error [60]. However, reading the letter as a whole, he concludes that:

• The reviewer was not substituting a capacity‑type test for the correct one.
• Rather, he was explicitly adopting the Code‑based framework (para 11 and para 26 of the Review Decision) and then addressing, in detail, whether the mental state described by Ms Pisaneschi actually existed and, if so, whether it amounted to a “temporary aberration” or similar [22]–[23], [58].
• His references to “unable to rationalise and think clearly” were responsive to the specific language of the medical opinions, not a statement of the legal test [59]–[60].

Crucially, the reviewer’s conclusion was that this was “a simple case in which [the applicant] merely regretted moving to Brighton and then sought to move back to London” [26], [62]. That conclusion is inconsistent with any finding that the decision was not deliberate. It indicates that, in his evaluation, the act of surrendering the tenancy was a purposeful choice driven by regret and preference for London, not an aberration of mind [62]–[63].

Accordingly, the Court holds that the reviewer:

• applied an approach consistent with section 191 and the Code; and
• did not apply the unduly narrow, capacity‑driven test criticised by the respondent.

The City’s appeal on issue (i) was therefore upheld [64].

6.2 Issue (ii): Were reasons for departing from Ms Pisaneschi’s evidence inadequate?

(a) The legal standard

The Court re‑states that:

• Review decisions must give intelligible, adequate reasons which allow the applicant (and a court) to understand why the main issues were decided as they were [36]–[37].
• Where a reviewing officer departs from serious specialist medical evidence on a key point (as in Guiste), he must explain why in rational terms [67].
• However, courts apply a “benevolent approach” to the drafting of review letters, and will not overturn them for minor omissions or stylistic imperfections [35], [72].

(b) Application to the facts

Ms Davies argued that:

• The reviewer did not appreciate or give sufficient weight to the fact that Ms Pisaneschi was a treating practitioner seeing the applicant weekly.
• He underplayed her qualifications and the depth of her assessment.
• He did not properly engage with her view that the theft and perceived homophobic abuse had made it unreasonable for the applicant to remain and had driven a major depressive episode [68].

The Court rejects this reasons challenge. Newey LJ notes:

• The reviewer correctly described Ms Pisaneschi as an advanced clinical practitioner and did not denigrate her expertise [70].
• He explicitly accepted the general proposition that the applicant suffered from serious and long‑standing mental health conditions [23]–[24], [61].
• He devoted considerable space to explaining why he did not accept that, at the time of surrendering the tenancy, the applicant was suffering a major depressive episode that prevented rational decision‑making:
  • He relied on the bank statements showing extensive travel and ordinary financial activity in December 2015–January 2016 [25], finding this inconsistent with a person unable to manage affairs or suffering a temporary aberration [25].
  • He noted the absence of psychotic symptoms (while correctly acknowledging they were not a necessary pre‑requisite, but relevant) [25].
  • He stressed that the applicant had already expressed a wish to return to London before the theft of the cards [23], making the theft less plausibly the trigger of a drastic aberrant decision.
  • He drew attention to the applicant’s ability to articulate complaints to the landlord, police and others [25].

The Review Decision, read fairly, makes clear:

• what the reviewer accepted (long‑standing mental health problems, theft of bank cards, vulnerability); and
• what he rejected (harassment/homophobic abuse; existence of a major depressive episode at the time of surrender; a lack of rationality or temporary aberration sufficient to negate deliberateness) [23]–[26], [61]–[62].

Newey LJ emphasises that the question is not whether the reviewing officer was right on the facts, but whether he explained himself adequately [69]. He concludes that:

• the reasons “enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was” [71]; and
• this is not a Guiste‑type case where key medical evidence was effectively disregarded or left unexplained.

Accordingly, the reasons challenge fails [73].

6.3 Issue (iii): Did the reviewer comply with the PSED?

(a) The “sharp focus” requirement

Applying Hotak, Lomax, McMahon and related authorities, the Court accepts that the PSED applies to:

• the intentional homelessness decision; and
• the assessment of whether it was reasonable for the applicant to continue to occupy the Brighton flat [75].

A review officer must:

1. identify any protected characteristic (here, disability: long‑term mental illness) [74];
2. consider its nature and extent;
3. consider its impact on the applicant’s situation, including the effect of homelessness and of the property in question; and
4. factor those matters into the statutory decision in a real and practical way [75]–[76].

Mere formulaic recognition of the PSED is inadequate, but an officer who does not explicitly label what he is doing as PSED‑compliance may nonetheless comply in substance [76]–[77].

(b) The Court’s assessment

Here, the reviewer:

• expressly recognised that the applicant was disabled under the Equality Act, and that he had other protected characteristics including sexual orientation [27], [79];
• stated that he had had regard to sections 149(3) and 149(6) of the Equality Act [27], [79];
• acknowledged the diagnoses of recurrent depression, anxiety, OCD traits and PTSD [23], [79];
• analysed in detail how those conditions affected:
  • his functioning and decision‑making at the time of the tenancy surrender; and
  • the reasonableness of remaining in Brighton (comparative availability of treatment and support in Brighton and London, the nature of his sense of vulnerability, the impact of the theft, etc.) [80].

Under the heading “Medical Conditions”, over some two pages, he:

• rejected the suggestion that the applicant needed London specifically to access adequate mental health care, noting that similar services were available in Brighton [80];
• observed that the applicant’s pre‑existing mental health conditions could exacerbate the anxiety of moving areas, but that this did not make continued occupation unreasonable [80];
• concluded that while the theft had understandably caused distress, it did not mean that remaining in Brighton was significantly impacting his mental health to the extent that continuation was unreasonable [80];
• considered that a stable tenancy in Brighton would in fact have been beneficial in allowing structured engagement with support services [80].

The Court holds that this constitutes the required substantive focus on disability and its effects. The PSED ground of challenge therefore fails [81].

7. Key Legal Principles Emerging from Bussandra

7.1 Meaning of “deliberately” under section 191 where mental illness is involved

The central doctrinal contribution of Bussandra can be summarised as follows:

1. “Deliberately” retains its ordinary meaning. It focuses on the purposeful nature of the act/omission which leads to loss of accommodation, not on whether the applicant intended to be homeless or foresaw homelessness [49]–[50].
2. Mental illness can negate deliberateness without amounting to legal incapacity. Conditions such as depression or PTSD may, in some circumstances, mean the applicant’s conduct was not deliberate because it was effectively “forced upon” them or amounted to a real temporary aberration of mind [51]–[52].
3. But not every causal role for mental illness suffices. It is not enough that mental ill health played a “significant role” in the decision. That test is too broad and would effectively treat many ordinary, albeit unwise, choices by mentally ill applicants as non‑deliberate [56].
4. The Homelessness Code of Guidance is consistent with this approach. Paragraphs 9.16–9.17 properly highlight that:
   • acts “forced upon” applicants through no fault of their own are generally not deliberate; and
   • incapacity to manage affairs, limited mental capacity and temporary mental aberrations may mean the act is not deliberate [52].
   But the Code does not convert all decisions influenced by mental illness into non‑deliberate acts [52], [56].
   • Contractual capacity concepts are relevant but not determinative. The law of contractual incapacity (as summarised in Chitty) is too narrow if treated as the exclusive lens for “deliberateness” in homelessness law. Section 191 involves a broader concept of fault and voluntariness than contractual validity alone [40]–[51].

7.2 Treatment of expert medical evidence in homelessness reviews

The case confirms:

• Review officers are not bound by psychiatric or clinical opinions, but may only depart from them if they give cogent, intelligible reasons.
• Evidence from treating practitioners with longitudinal knowledge requires careful and respectful engagement, but can be rejected where contradicted by contemporaneous records, behaviour (e.g. extensive travel), or other medical opinions, and where the reviewer’s reasoning is adequately articulated [67]–[72].

7.3 PSED in intentional homelessness and “reasonableness to continue to occupy”

Bussandra confirms and applies:

• The PSED applies to decisions on intentional homelessness and on whether it was reasonable to continue to occupy particular accommodation.
• Compliance is assessed in substance: what matters is whether the officer:
  • identified disability;
  • understood its nature and severity; and
  • genuinely considered how it affected the applicant’s experience of the property and of homelessness [75]–[80].
• Brief or formulaic references to the PSED are not sufficient, but equally, specific statutory citations are not required if the necessary evaluative work is clearly done [76]–[77], [79]–[81].

8. Complex Concepts Explained

8.1 What is “intentional homelessness”?

A person is intentionally homeless if:

1. They once had accommodation that:
   • was available to occupy; and
   • it would have been reasonable for them to continue to occupy; and
2. They did something (or failed to do something) on purpose which caused them to lose that accommodation.

Example: someone with a secure flat decides to surrender their tenancy and move out, with no other stable accommodation lined up, because they prefer another city. That is likely intentional homelessness, unless another factor (such as severe mental illness, duress, or misconceived good‑faith mistake about a crucial fact) means their action is not treated as “deliberate” under section 191(1)–(2).

8.2 “Deliberate” vs “fault”

“Deliberate” in this context does not mean “blameworthy in a moral sense”, nor does it require a wish to be homeless. It simply asks: was the act purposeful rather than accidental?

However, case law like Hawthorne introduces a notion of “fault” in a looser sense: where someone’s homelessness is brought about by disability, sickness, poverty, or inability to manage finances, their failure to, say, pay rent may not be characterised as deliberate. This is because, in substance, their circumstances may have left them with no real choice, or their mental/financial state made their conduct not properly voluntary.

8.3 Mental illness, “capacity” and “temporary aberration”

Three levels are worth distinguishing:

1. Full legal capacity: the person can understand the general nature and effect of what they are doing (e.g. surrendering a tenancy). Normally, acts done in this state are deliberate.
2. Impaired but not absent capacity / limited capacity: the person is mentally unwell; their judgement is impaired; their emotions and thinking are distorted; but they can still superficially function—pay bills, travel, communicate. The question becomes whether, in context, their decision is truly voluntary or has effectively been forced upon them by their mental state (a “forced” act or “temporary aberration”) [52].
3. Lack of capacity: the person cannot understand what they are doing in any relevant sense. Their acts are not “deliberate” at all.

The Code explicitly recognises the second category—limited capacity or temporary aberration due to mental illness—as potential reasons why an act should not be treated as deliberate [42], [52]. Bussandra confirms that while this category is real, it is narrower than “any significant influence” of mental illness.

8.4 “Reasonable to continue to occupy”

Even if the act is deliberate, the applicant is not intentionally homeless unless the lost accommodation was reasonable to continue to occupy.

Reasonableness is judged objectively but having regard to the applicant’s particular characteristics, including disability, mental health and other vulnerabilities. The question is not “was it ideal or comfortable?”, but “was it reasonable, all things considered, to expect the applicant to stay?”. Severe harassment, genuine threats, or overwhelming mental health impacts may make continued occupation unreasonable even where the property is physically adequate.

8.5 Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED) in practice

When a housing officer applies the PSED, they should:

• identify whether the applicant has a disability (physical or mental) and any other relevant protected characteristics (e.g. race, sexual orientation);
• understand the nature of that disability and how it affects ordinary life and the specific housing problem;
• actively consider:
  • whether the disability makes it harder to cope with homelessness;
  • whether certain types of accommodation or locations are unsuitable or particularly distressing;
  • whether additional support or more favourable treatment is required to achieve substantive equality [74]–[75].

What matters is genuine engagement, not ticking boxes. In Bussandra, the Court found the reviewer had genuinely grappled with the impact of depression and PTSD on both decision‑making and suitability, even if the PSED section of the letter was brief [79]–[81].

9. Practical Impact and Future Significance

9.1 For local housing authorities

Authorities and reviewing officers should take several lessons from this decision:

1. Continue to use the Code as the primary framework.
   • Section 191 must be applied according to its statutory meaning, but the Code’s intentionality chapter (particularly paras 9.16–9.17) remains authoritative guidance.
   • Officers should explicitly structure their analysis around the Code where mental health issues are raised.
2. Careful, evidence‑based engagement with mental health.
   • Authorities must not assume that every decision taken by a mentally ill applicant is “deliberate” in the statutory sense.
   • Equally, they are not bound to conclude that any presence of mental illness prevents an intentionality finding.
   • They must weigh contemporaneous evidence (bank statements, travel, behaviour, earlier medical records, landlord correspondence) against retrospective psychiatric opinions.
3. Reasons must be detailed where medical opinions are rejected.
   • If departing from a treating clinician’s view that conduct was a temporary aberration or irrational, officers must explain why, in a way that directly engages with that opinion.
   • Bussandra indicates that substantial reasoning (as here) will usually suffice; perfunctory or conclusory dismissal (as in Guiste) will not.
4. PSED must be integrated into the analysis, not bolted on.
   • Officers should ensure that disability and its effects are interwoven into both the intentionality and reasonableness assessments.
   • They should avoid formulaic “we have had regard to the Equality Act 2010” paragraphs unconnected to the substantive analysis.

9.2 For applicants and advisers

The decision has several implications for those representing homeless applicants:

• Evidence threshold: To avoid an intentionality finding on mental health grounds, it will generally be necessary to show:
  • that at the time of the act (e.g. giving notice) the applicant’s mental state was such that the choice was not truly voluntary—e.g. a severe crisis, an episode of overwhelming fear, or a major depressive episode with marked loss of rational control; and
  • that this is supported by contemporaneous evidence, not solely by retrospective accounts.
• Framing expert evidence: Clinicians should, where possible:
  • differentiate between general long‑term vulnerability and acute episodes;
  • explain how the mental state at the material time affected the applicant’s capacity for choice, judgement and risk‑appraisal; and
  • engage with any apparently inconsistent behaviours (such as organised travel, financial management, or effective self‑advocacy).
• Challenging review decisions:
  • Pure reasons challenges must show that the decision letter fails to explain why the main issues were decided as they were. The “benevolent approach” is a real hurdle [35], [72].
  • Arguments that the PSED has been breached must demonstrate a substantive failure to engage with disability, not just the absence of explicit labels [76]–[77].

9.3 Systemic impact on homelessness law

Bussandra is likely to become a leading authority on:

• How “deliberateness” is to be analysed where mental illness is in play.
• The status and correct use of the Code in intentional homelessness decisions.
• The level of reasoning required to depart from expert mental health evidence.
• The practical content of the PSED within intentionality and suitability assessments.

It tightens the doctrinal boundaries: mental illness is a serious and sometimes decisive factor, but not a catch‑all shield against findings of intentional homelessness. Equally, it prevents authorities treating all acts by mentally ill applicants as fully voluntary simply because they appear superficially organised.

10. Conclusion

City of London Corporation v Bussandra clarifies and refines the law on intentional homelessness where mental illness is alleged to underpin the critical act leading to homelessness.

The key points are:

• Meaning of “deliberately”: The term retains its ordinary meaning of acting on purpose, but mental illness can, in appropriate cases, render an act non‑deliberate—particularly where it is effectively “forced upon” the applicant or constitutes a genuine temporary aberration of mind. However, it is not enough that mental illness simply plays a “significant role” in the decision.
• Role of the Code: The Homelessness Code of Guidance does not change the statute but provides significant, court‑endorsed guidance. Paras 9.16–9.17 accurately reflect how mental illness, limited capacity and aberration should be treated within section 191.
• Expert evidence: Reviewing officers may depart from psychiatric/clinical opinions, but only with clear, rational and adequately explained reasons. Bussandra illustrates what adequate explanation looks like.
• PSED: The public sector equality duty is a substantive duty of inquiry and evaluation, not a recital. Where a review decision shows real engagement with the nature and impact of disability on intentionality and suitability, the PSED will usually be satisfied.

On the facts, the Court held that the reviewer lawfully concluded that Mr Bussandra’s surrender of his Brighton tenancy was a deliberate act of regretful relocation rather than a non‑voluntary aberration dictated by his mental ill health. While a hard outcome for a vulnerable applicant, the judgment provides a structured and balanced framework for future cases at the difficult boundary between personal responsibility, mental illness, and the statutory homelessness safety net.