Causation-Limited “Other Resultant Losses” under the 2001 Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme

Stephenson v First-Tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2025] EWCA Civ 1160

Introduction

This Court of Appeal decision resolves an important question of construction under the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 2001 (the “2001 Scheme”), namely the scope of “other resultant losses” in paragraph 42(b) where a child claimant has lost a parent to a qualifying criminal act.

The court confirms that paragraph 42(b) is causation-limited: “other resultant losses” are losses that result from the victim’s death and the consequent loss of parental services, and not losses that arise merely from the child’s pre‑existing circumstances or their status as a qualifying claimant. On the facts, the claimant’s need for accommodation works and for Court of Protection arrangements stemmed from pre‑existing disability and were therefore not recoverable under paragraph 42(b). The court also cautions against a blanket exclusion of building works, indicating that modest extensions integral to necessary adaptations can, in principle, fall within the concept of adaptations (though the point arose under paragraph 35 and not decisively under 42(b) here).

Background and Parties

The appellant, Dominic Stephenson, born in April 1997, suffers from Kabuki syndrome and other medical conditions. In January 2005, when Dominic was seven, his father unlawfully killed his mother and was later convicted of manslaughter. After living with maternal grandparents, Dominic moved to live with his aunt, Mrs Victoria Treacey (his litigation friend), who undertook building works to accommodate Dominic’s needs (additional bedrooms, a downstairs toilet, and a downstairs lounge). Dominic also has a care package via direct payments and social work support.

Separate civil proceedings against an NHS Trust, concerning the father’s release into the community, settled for £38,710. A claim was then made under the 2001 Scheme. It was accepted that Dominic was entitled to a tariff award for loss of parental services, together with the standard fatal award and child payments. Disputes arose about accommodation costs and Court of Protection/trust administration costs.

Issues Before the Court

• How should “other resultant losses” in paragraph 42(b) of the 2001 Scheme be construed?
• Are accommodation costs (including an extension) recoverable under paragraph 42(b)?
• Are costs of appointing a deputy in the Court of Protection or related trust administration costs recoverable under paragraph 42(b)?
• Did the First‑tier Tribunal (FTT) and Upper Tribunal (UT) err in law in rejecting these heads of claim?

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It held that:

• “Other resultant losses” in paragraph 42(b) means losses caused by the unlawful killing (i.e., arising from the death) and the resulting loss of parental services, and not losses that flow from the claimant’s pre‑existing disability or merely from being a qualifying claimant.
• On the facts, the accommodation works and Court of Protection costs were driven by Dominic’s pre‑existing disabilities rather than by the loss of his mother’s parental services, and therefore fell outside paragraph 42(b).
• The FTT’s suggestion of a blanket exclusion for “extensions” was too broad: while not arising in this case due to lack of causation, modest building work that forms part of adaptations can, in principle, be compensable under the Scheme’s “adaptations” concept (discussed by analogy with paragraph 35 for injured applicants). This does not import the complex personal injury accommodation heads exemplified by Roberts v Johnstone and Swift v Carpenter.

Path of the Case

The FTT awarded £44,210 comprising:

• £5,500 fatal award (paragraphs 38–39);
• £22,000 for loss of parental services at Level 5 of the tariff (£2,000 per annum until age 18) under paragraph 42(a);
• £16,710 for the costs of appointing a deputy in the Court of Protection (which CICA had said was an error but did not seek to recover).

Because Dominic had already received £38,710 in civil damages and £11,000 in CICA interim payments, there was no further sum payable after set‑off.

The UT dismissed a judicial review challenge, agreeing with the FTT’s construction that “other resultant losses” must arise from the loss of parental services and rejecting the accommodation and Court of Protection/trust costs. The Court of Appeal has now affirmed the UT.

Detailed Analysis

1) The Statutory and Scheme Context

The Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1995 mandates a scheme for compensating criminal injury victims from public funds. The 2001 Scheme (since replaced by the 2008 and then 2012 schemes) provides capped, tariff‑based compensation, distinct from tort damages. Relevant here:

• Paragraphs 37–44 govern compensation in fatal cases.
• Paragraph 42 applies where a qualifying claimant under 18 was dependent on the deceased’s parental services:
  • 42(a): a tariff award for loss of parental services at Level 5 (£2,000 p.a. in 2001 Scheme); and
  • 42(b): “such other payments as a claims officer considers reasonable to meet other resultant losses”, with both awards subject to a multiplier to age 18 (by analogy with paragraph 32).
• Paragraph 35 (for injured applicants) allows “special expenses” including “adaptations to the applicant’s accommodation” (35(d)(ii)).

2) Construction of “Other Resultant Losses” in Paragraph 42(b)

The court applied orthodox interpretive principles: start from the natural meaning in context and purpose (Woodling v Secretary of State for Social Services [1984] 1 WLR 348; R (Colefax) v FTT and CICA [2014] EWCA Civ 945; [2015] 1 WLR 35). Paragraph 42(b) sits within a dedicated provision for loss of parental services in fatal cases. Its language (“other resultant losses”) and context point to a causation requirement tied to the death and the consequent loss of parental services.

Key conclusions:

• “Resultant” is causal. The relevant event is the criminal act causing death and the loss of the deceased’s parental services.
• “Other” signifies losses different from and in addition to the tariff payment under 42(a). It does not open a free‑standing gateway to fund needs that the child had independently of the parent’s death.
• It is not enough that a cost is incurred by a qualifying child; the loss must be attributable to the deprivation of the specific services the deceased parent provided.

This approach matched both the CICA Guide to Applicants (which suggests examples like additional childcare costs or an adult carer’s loss of earnings) and specialist commentary (Begley, Criminal Injuries Compensation Claims), which both envisage 42(b) as a route to reflect extra parental care that had actually been provided and is now missing, especially in cases where a disabled child previously received unusually intensive parental services.

3) Application to the Disputed Heads of Loss

a) Accommodation Works (Adaptations/Extension)

The court held that Dominic’s need for an adapted environment was driven by his pre‑existing disabilities, not by the loss of his mother’s parental services. The unlawful killing did not cause the need for the building works. Accordingly, these costs were not recoverable under 42(b).

Importantly, the court rejected the FTT’s suggestion that the cost of an “extension” can never be recoverable because it would “significantly widen” the Scheme. Referring to paragraph 35 (special expenses for injured applicants), the court observed that:

• “Adaptations to the applicant’s accommodation” can encompass modest building works, and a minor “extension” integral to, for example, converting a downstairs lavatory into a wet room may fall within adaptations.
• This does not import the complexities of tort law accommodation claims such as Roberts v Johnstone [1989] QB 878 or Swift v Carpenter [2020] EWCA Civ 1295; [2021] QB 339; the Scheme remains capped and tariff‑driven.

While the discussion arose by analogy to paragraph 35, the Court of Appeal’s cautionary note has broader relevance: in principle, there is no categorical ban on modest, functionally necessary building works within the Scheme’s concept of “adaptations”. For paragraph 42(b), any such costs would still have to satisfy the causal test (i.e., be losses resulting from the death and the replaced parental services) and the “reasonableness” criterion.

b) Court of Protection and Trust Costs

The court agreed that these were not recoverable under 42(b) on the facts. The need for a deputy and associated Court of Protection/trust administration flows from Dominic’s pre‑existing lifelong incapacity. The costs would be incurred irrespective of the death and therefore are not “resultant” from the loss of parental services. The absence of an express head for trust costs in paragraph 35 further supported the conclusion that they were not intended to be recoverable under the Scheme unless falling within a relevant causal and textual provision.

4) The Role of the 2012 Scheme

The UT noted wording differences in the 2012 Scheme but considered that the outcome would be the same. The Court of Appeal reached its decision on the 2001 Scheme without relying on the 2012 text. The reasoning—anchored in causation and context—will nonetheless be influential under later iterations of the Scheme given the continuity of structure and purpose in fatal awards.

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Woodling v Secretary of State for Social Services [1984] 1 WLR 348: Confirmed the contextual, purposive approach to construing social security/statutory schemes, focusing on the ordinary meaning within the statutory framework and purpose.
• R (Colefax) v First-tier Tribunal and CICA [2014] EWCA Civ 945; [2015] 1 WLR 35: Reiterated principles of interpretation for the CICS—read provisions holistically, harmonising text with the Scheme’s policy objectives and constraints.
• Roberts v Johnstone [1989] QB 878 and Swift v Carpenter [2020] EWCA Civ 1295; [2021] QB 339: Personal injury cases on accommodation loss. The court referenced them to emphasise that such complex capital valuation questions have no direct analogue in CICS claims; the Scheme remains capped and utilitarian. The reference serves to mark a boundary, not to import those methodologies.
• CICA Guide to Applicants for Compensation in Fatal Cases (2001, updated 2005): Not binding, but persuasive context. It exemplifies 42(b) with additional childcare costs or an adult carer’s lost earnings—i.e., expenses that replace services the deceased parent would have provided.
• Begley, Criminal Injuries Compensation Claims (Law Society) (1st ed. 2005; 2nd ed. 2016): Commentary anticipating that 42(b) can address cases where a deceased parent had been providing unusually intensive care to a disabled child, and where replacement care exceeds the standard tariff. Also notes the broad continuity of the fatal provisions across the 1996, 2001, and 2008 schemes.

Legal Reasoning: Why the Court Reached This Result

• Textual alignment with context: Paragraph 42 addresses the loss of parental services in fatal cases. Reading 42(b) as a free‑standing pot for any need of a qualifying child would clash with the tight, capped, tariff‑based architecture of the Scheme. The words “other resultant losses” must be given content by their location and function within paragraph 42.
• “Other” means “in addition to” the tariff, not “anything else”: The tariff at 42(a) compensates for ordinary parental services. Paragraph 42(b) permits reasonable top‑ups for additional losses that also flow from the same causal event (the death and consequent loss of services)—for example, replacement of special parental care actually provided to the child that goes beyond the ordinary.
• Purpose and limits of a public fund scheme: The Scheme is intended to provide meaningful, but bounded, public compensation to victims. It is not a substitute for full tort damages, and it resists open‑ended heads of loss. Causation acts as a principled control mechanism.
• Fact‑sensitive causation analysis: The pivotal factual finding was that both the accommodation needs and the Court of Protection/trust needs pre‑dated the mother’s death and would have arisen in any event. They were not caused by the loss of the mother’s services—even if the mother had been providing considerable care, the specific financial losses claimed were not consequences of her death.
• Clarification (not expansion) on adaptations: The court corrected an overly broad FTT statement: modest extensions can be part of “adaptations” in paragraph 35 (injury cases) and, by analogy, there is no categorical rule against such works within the Scheme. The key remains causation and reasonableness, not labels like “extension”.

Impact and Practical Implications

For claimants and advisers

• Establish a causal bridge to the loss of parental services: To recover under 42(b), show that the expense is a direct, reasonable replacement for a service the deceased parent actually provided and which ceased because of the death.
• Evidence of incremental loss is critical: Where a child had pre‑existing needs, identify the additional costs that arise specifically because the parent died. For example, quantify the difference between care arrangements with and without the deceased’s input.
• Accommodation claims are not per se excluded: If building works are truly part of necessary adaptations reasonably required to replace the practical aspects of parental care (e.g., enabling safe hygiene routines previously performed by the parent), they may be arguable—subject to causation, reasonableness, and the Scheme’s limits. But sweeping “extension” claims untethered to causation will fail.
• Court of Protection/trust costs will rarely be recoverable under 42(b): Unless they arise because of the death and the loss of services (which will be unusual), such costs typically flow from the claimant’s incapacity and would be incurred regardless.
• Avoid double recovery and consider set‑off: Civil settlements, interim payments, and other awards will be deducted from CICA awards. Structuring claims and sequencing evidence matters.

For decision-makers (CICA, FTT, UT)

• Apply a tight causation test under 42(b): Ask: would this loss have been incurred if the parent had not died? Is it a reasonable replacement for services the parent provided?
• Do not exclude “extensions” categorically: Focus on function and necessity (is the work an adaptation integral to meeting needs?), not on nomenclature. Evaluate quantum proportionately within the Scheme’s cap.
• Maintain the Scheme–tort boundary: Resist importing personal injury accommodation valuation models. The Scheme’s tariff and cap are structural features that constrain awards.

Across Schemes (2001–2012)

Although the court decided this case on the 2001 Scheme, its causation‑centred reading is likely to be persuasive for analogous provisions in the 2008 and 2012 Schemes. The UT indicated the same result would follow under the 2012 Scheme’s wording.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Qualifying claimant: Someone entitled to claim because they meet the Scheme’s relationship/status criteria (e.g., a child of the deceased victim). Being a qualifying claimant confers eligibility; it does not itself cause compensable “loss”.
• Parental services (42(a)): The ordinary day‑to‑day care, supervision, guidance, and practical assistance a parent provides to a child. The 2001 tariff fixed this at Level 5 (£2,000 per year) to age 18, multiplied for the remaining years.
• Other resultant losses (42(b)): Additional, causally linked losses that arise because the parent has died and their services are no longer available—e.g., extra childcare costs, a relative’s lost earnings incurred to step into the deceased’s role. They are not a general fund for needs unrelated to the death.
• Adaptations vs. extensions: “Adaptations” are modifications to make a home suitable for a disabled person’s needs (e.g., ramps, wet rooms). Sometimes a modest increase in floor area is inseparable from the adaptation (e.g., enlarging a toilet to create a wheelchair‑accessible wet room). There is no absolute bar on such works in principle, but they must meet the Scheme’s causation and reasonableness tests.
• Court of Protection/trust costs: Legal and administrative costs for managing the property and affairs of someone lacking capacity. These typically arise from incapacity and are not caused by the parent’s death unless there is a specific, provable causal link.
• Scheme vs. tort damages: The CICS provides limited, tariff‑based awards from public funds, capped (here at £500,000), and does not mirror the fuller, head‑by‑head assessment of loss in civil litigation.

Key Takeaways

• Paragraph 42(b) of the 2001 Scheme is causation‑limited: the loss must result from the death and the loss of parental services.
• Pre‑existing needs (even if significant) do not become compensable under 42(b) merely because the child is a qualifying claimant.
• Accommodation works can be recoverable in principle when they are necessary adaptations; there is no categorical ban on modest “extensions” integral to such adaptations. But in fatal cases, causation to the loss of parental services must still be shown.
• Court of Protection/trust costs will generally be non‑recoverable under 42(b) unless unusually and distinctly caused by the death and displaced parental services.
• The decision reinforces the Scheme’s public, capped, tariff‑driven character and its distinction from tort damages.

Conclusion

Stephenson v FTT delivers a clear, principled construction of paragraph 42(b) of the 2001 Scheme. The phrase “other resultant losses” is tightly moored to causation: it covers only those reasonable losses that flow from the death and consequent loss of parental services, operating as a supplement to the tariff rather than a gateway to fund pre‑existing or collateral needs. While the court left open the possibility that modest building works integral to adaptations can, in principle, be recoverable within the Scheme’s architecture, claimants must show a direct causal link to the loss of parental services. On the facts, the appellant’s accommodation and Court of Protection/trust costs were not caused by the mother’s death and were therefore outside paragraph 42(b).

The decision preserves the Scheme’s balance between compassion and fiscal restraint, provides practical guidance for future fatal claims involving disabled children, and corrects an overbroad tribunal statement about extensions. It is likely to guide interpretation under later schemes with analogous wording and will be central to future assessments of what counts as a compensable, causally “resultant” loss in fatal cases.

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This commentary is for information only and does not constitute legal advice.