Asylum Support Appeals and Withdrawal Decisions: The First‑tier Tribunal’s Jurisdiction Clarified

1. Introduction

The Court of Appeal’s decision in Secretary of State for the Home Department v First‑tier Tribunal (Asylum Support) [2025] EWCA Civ 1654 is a major clarification of the powers of the First‑tier Tribunal (Asylum Support) (“AST”) in appeals concerning asylum support under Part VI of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (“IAA 1999”).

The central question was whether, on an appeal under section 103 of the IAA 1999, the AST may examine the factual and legal correctness of a Home Office decision treating an asylum claim as withdrawn (explicitly or implicitly under Immigration Rules paragraph 333C) when that withdrawal is the foundation for refusing or stopping section 95 asylum support. Closely linked was a second question: when asylum support is stopped following such a withdrawal decision, does the asylum seeker have a right of appeal under section 103(2) on the footing that support was stopped “before that support would otherwise have come to an end”?

Lord Justice Stuart‑Smith (with whom Peter Jackson LJ and Bean LJ agreed) dismissed the Secretary of State’s appeal, upholding both Principal Judge Storey’s decision in the AST and Chamberlain J’s judicial review judgment ([2025] EWHC 694 (Admin)). The Court of Appeal confirms two key propositions:

The AST has jurisdiction in section 103(1) and section 103(2) appeals to decide whether an asylum claim has been validly treated as withdrawn, including examining factual disputes and legal errors in the withdrawal decision.
Where section 95 support is stopped following such a withdrawal decision, a section 103(2) stoppage appeal is available if, on the appellant’s case, support was stopped earlier than it otherwise would have ended under the scheme.

The judgment significantly strengthens the role of the AST as a specialist, accessible forum for destitute asylum seekers by confirming that it can “look behind” the Secretary of State’s decision to treat an asylum claim as withdrawn where that decision is the basis for refusing or withdrawing support.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 The individual appellants: MAH, LKL and GK

MAH (Sudan)

Claimed asylum on 18 September 2021 and was granted section 95 support on 26 October 2021, subject to conditions, including an obligation to attend interviews unless he had good reason not to.
Instructed solicitors (MLP) in November 2022 and later tried unsuccessfully to obtain updates from them.
Home Office sent an interview invitation on 2 October 2023 to MLP only, not to MAH personally. MLP never passed it on.
After MAH failed to attend the interview, the Home Office wrote on 16 October 2023 (this time to MAH at his hotel and to MLP) threatening to treat the claim as withdrawn unless he provided an acceptable explanation within 5 days.
On 23 October 2023, the Home Office wrote to MLP stating that, due to failure to respond, his claim had been treated as withdrawn under rule 333C and “consideration of your asylum claim will be discontinued”.
On 19 December 2023, the Home Office wrote directly to MAH saying that, as his asylum claim had been withdrawn, he no longer qualified for section 95 support and his support and accommodation would end on 3 January 2024, expressly stating that there was “no right to appeal”.
Notwithstanding this, MAH appealed to the AST under section 103(2); support continued pending the outcome.

LKL (Hong Kong/China)

Claimed asylum on 18 February 2022 and received section 98 temporary support until 14 February 2024.
Was intermittently absent from his hotel around the birth of his son on 5 October 2023; on return in November 2023 he discovered his belongings removed and two letters: one inviting him to interview; another (14 November 2023) stating that his claim had been treated as withdrawn under rule 333C for failure to attend.
He emailed the Home Office on 22 November 2023 explaining his non-attendance and seeking a review; this was rejected on 13 December 2023. He did not further challenge that decision.
On 8 February 2024 he applied for section 95 support for himself, his fiancée and his son. The Secretary of State refused on 14 February 2024 on the basis that his asylum claim had been withdrawn and he therefore did not meet the statutory definition of “asylum-seeker”.
He appealed under section 103(1); the Secretary of State accepted that the AST had jurisdiction to hear this appeal.

GK (India)

Arrived in the UK in 2015, claimed asylum on 7 December 2019, and was granted section 95 support for herself and two minor children.
In November 2022 she instructed solicitors, who properly notified the Home Office.
Home Office sent an interview invitation on 17 October 2023 to GK but not to her solicitors. The letter was returned “addressee gone away”.
On 1 November 2023 the Home Office telephoned GK when she failed to attend. She said she had not known about the interview and still lived at the same address.
Subsequent letters (including a request for explanation and the eventual withdrawal decision of 15 November 2023) were all sent only to GK and were returned “gone away”; her solicitors were not copied in.
On 22 February 2024, the Home Office wrote to GK (again not to her solicitors) saying that, as her claim had been withdrawn, she no longer qualified for section 95 or section 98 support, which would end immediately. Again the letter wrongly asserted there was no section 103 appeal.
GK appealed under section 103(2); support continued pending the AST’s decision.

2.2 Issues before the AST

The parties agreed four issues for determination by the AST:

Whether the AST has jurisdiction to hear section 103(1) appeals where section 95 support is refused because the Secretary of State considers the claimant no longer an asylum seeker, owing to a “deemed withdrawal” decision.
Whether the AST has jurisdiction to hear section 103(2) “stoppage” appeals where section 95 support is discontinued following a decision that the asylum claim has been withdrawn.
Whether the AST has jurisdiction to consider the lawfulness and/or merits of the Secretary of State’s decision to treat an asylum claim as withdrawn.
What the correct disposal of the three appeals should be, given the answers to (1)–(3).

The Secretary of State accepted jurisdiction under section 103(1) in principle (Issue 1), but denied any section 103(2) jurisdiction in MAH and GK’s cases and any power in the AST to “look behind” the withdrawal decisions (Issue 3).

2.3 The AST’s decision

Principal Judge Storey decided, in essence:

Issue 1: Following R (SSHD) v CASA and Malaj [2006] EWHC 3059 (Admin), the AST has jurisdiction to consider both the factual and legal conditions for section 95 support, including whether the person meets the definition of “asylum seeker”.
Issue 2: Although there is no stand‑alone right of appeal against a decision to treat an asylum claim as withdrawn, a decision to terminate support because of that withdrawal is appealable under section 103(2).
Issue 3: Applying R (DN (Rwanda)) v SSHD [2020] UKSC 7, when considering a stoppage appeal the AST may “look behind” the decision to stop support to examine how and on what basis the Secretary of State reached the underlying withdrawal decision.

On the facts, the AST held that each case involved material defects in the withdrawal decision (including failures to comply with the Secretary of State’s own Withdrawal Policy and to consider child welfare duties), and remitted the matters to the Secretary of State for reconsideration.

2.4 Judicial review in the Administrative Court

The Secretary of State sought judicial review of the AST’s jurisdictional findings and its approach to the withdrawal decisions. Chamberlain J dismissed the claim in a detailed judgment, holding that:

The AST has jurisdiction to determine whether a person is an “asylum-seeker” for section 94 purposes, including whether a claim has been validly treated as withdrawn.
There is no general bar, in this statutory context, on collateral challenges to the lawfulness of the withdrawal decision.
Section 103(2) stoppage appeals are available where, on the appellant’s case, support was stopped before it would otherwise have come to an end, including where the stopping is premised on a contested withdrawal decision.

The Secretary of State appealed to the Court of Appeal with permission from Lewis LJ.

3. Statutory and Regulatory Framework

3.1 Asylum support under the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999

Part VI of the IAA 1999 governs support for asylum seekers. Key provisions include:

Section 94 – Definitions

“Asylum-seeker” means a person over 18 who “has made a claim for asylum which has been recorded by the Secretary of State but which has not been determined”.
“Supported person” means an asylum-seeker (or their dependant) who has applied for and is provided with support under section 95.
Section 94(3) defines when a claim is “determined”—at the end of a prescribed period following notification of the Secretary of State’s decision, or following disposal of an appeal.

Section 95 – Persons for whom support may be provided

Section 95(1): the Secretary of State may provide support for asylum seekers and their dependants who “appear to the Secretary of State to be destitute or to be likely to become destitute” within a prescribed period.
Section 95(9)–(11): support may be provided subject to written conditions, of which a copy must be given to the supported person.

Section 103 – Right of appeal

s.103(1): If, on an application for section 95 support, the Secretary of State decides that the applicant does not qualify for support, the applicant may appeal to the AST.
s.103(2): If the Secretary of State decides “to stop providing” section 95 support “before that support would otherwise have come to an end”, the person may appeal to the AST.
s.103(2A): Similar appeal rights exist for refusal / discontinuance of section 4 support.
s.103(3): On an appeal, the AST may (a) require the Secretary of State to reconsider; (b) substitute its own decision; or (c) dismiss the appeal.

Originally, section 103(7) contemplated regulations allowing appeals about where section 95 support is provided, but such regulations were never made—a point which played a role in the earlier Court of Appeal decision in Dogan.

3.2 Asylum Support Regulations 2000

The Asylum Support Regulations 2000 (“the 2000 Regulations”) supplement section 95 and implement aspects of the EU Reception Directive (Council Directive 2003/9/EC). The key provision here is Regulation 20:

Regulation 19(1) (as amended in 2005) allows the Secretary of State, when deciding whether to provide or continue asylum support, to consider compliance with “relevant conditions” relating to residence at a specified location.
Regulation 20(1) sets out grounds on which support “may be suspended or discontinued”, including:
- (e) failure to respond within a reasonable time to information requests about eligibility or support;
- (f) failure, without reasonable excuse, to attend an interview relating to eligibility for or receipt of support;
- (g) failure to respond to information requests about the asylum claim itself.
Regulation 20(3) requires any decision to discontinue support to be taken “individually, objectively and impartially” with reasons, and with “particular regard” to vulnerability (e.g. families, victims of violence).
Regulation 20(4) prohibits discontinuance before a decision is made under Regulation 20(1).

These provisions show that non‑attendance at interviews and non‑compliance with information requests can justify stopping support—but only following an individualised, reasoned assessment, particularly where vulnerable persons are involved.

3.3 Immigration Rules: Paragraph 333C and withdrawal decisions

Paragraph 333C of the Immigration Rules sets out when an asylum application is treated as withdrawn:

An application may be explicitly withdrawn if the applicant signs the relevant form or explicitly states a desire to withdraw the claim.
It may be implicitly withdrawn if, among other things, the applicant “fails to attend a personal interview” required under paragraph 339NA, unless they demonstrate within a reasonable time that the failure was due to circumstances beyond their control.
The applicant’s asylum record is then updated to show the application as withdrawn.

Crucially, a withdrawal decision under paragraph 333C is procedural: it does not assess the merits of the asylum claim but instead rests on conduct (such as non‑attendance at interview) and the adequacy of any explanation for that conduct.

4. Issues Before the Court of Appeal

The Secretary of State’s appeal raised two grounds:

Ground 1 – Scope of AST’s jurisdiction: Whether the AST can, in section 103 appeals, consider the merits or legality of a decision to treat an asylum claim as withdrawn.
Ground 2 – Availability of section 103(2) appeals: Whether a right of appeal arises under section 103(2) where support is discontinued following an asylum‑withdrawal decision.

The Secretary of State argued that:

The “decision under appeal” is only the support decision (refusal or stoppage), not the “prior decision” that the claim has been withdrawn.
By the “principle of regularity”, the withdrawal decision must be treated as valid unless set aside on judicial review, and cannot be collaterally challenged before the AST.
On proper construction of section 103(2), where support ends because the asylum claim has been withdrawn, support has not been stopped “before it would otherwise have come to an end” and so no stoppage appeal lies.

MAH (supported by the intervenor ASAP) argued that:

The AST’s subject‑matter jurisdiction includes deciding whether the person is an asylum-seeker and whether the preconditions for section 95 support are met; it therefore necessarily includes examining the correctness of a purported withdrawal decision that removes that status.
The supposed separation between the support decision and the withdrawal decision is artificial when the latter is the sole basis for the former.
Denying the AST access to the underlying withdrawal decision would force destitute asylum seekers to mount parallel proceedings: an AST appeal about support and a judicial review about the withdrawal, an unrealistic and burdensome outcome.
The language and purpose of section 103, together with authorities such as Malaj and DN (Rwanda), support a broad, merits‑based appellate jurisdiction.

5. Summary of the Court of Appeal’s Judgment

Lord Justice Stuart‑Smith, endorsing Chamberlain J’s analysis, held:

The AST has jurisdiction in section 103(1) appeals to decide whether a person is an “asylum-seeker” within section 94(1), which necessarily includes deciding whether their claim has been validly treated as withdrawn.
The definition of “asylum-seeker” in section 94(1) must be read as containing an implied requirement that the claim has not been withdrawn (expressly or implicitly) – a claim that has been validly withdrawn cannot be one that “has not been determined” for these purposes.
There is no statutory indication that Parliament intended to preclude the AST from examining the correctness of withdrawal decisions when they are the foundation for a refusal or stoppage of support. The “prior decision” label is artificial in this context.
The principle of regularity does not bar the AST from evaluating the legality and factual basis of the withdrawal decision. To treat the withdrawal decision as unchallengeable would sever it artificially from the support decision it underpins.
Section 103(2) appeals are available whenever support has been stopped at a time which, on the appellant’s case, is earlier than it would otherwise have ended. That includes cases where the stopping is premised on a withdrawal decision whose correctness is contested.
Dogan [2003] EWCA Civ 1673 does not dictate a different result: it concerned very different facts and statutory context, in particular conditions about location of support and the untouched power in section 103(7); its reasoning does not extend to disputed questions about whether an asylum claim has been validly treated as withdrawn.

The Court therefore dismissed the Secretary of State’s appeal and confirmed that the AST was entitled to consider whether the withdrawal decisions in MAH, LKL and GK’s cases were lawful and factually sound, and to remit the cases for reconsideration.

6. Detailed Analysis

6.1 The definition of “asylum-seeker” and the implied non‑withdrawal requirement

A central plank of the Secretary of State’s argument was that once a claim is withdrawn (including implicitly under rule 333C), the person ceases to be an “asylum-seeker” under section 94(1). Chamberlain J agreed, but only after modifying the literal reading of section 94(1).

Section 94(1) defines an “asylum-seeker” as someone who has made an asylum claim which has been recorded and “has not been determined”. If read literally, a claim that is withdrawn might never be “determined” at all, apparently leaving the person forever within the definition. This is plainly not what Parliament intended. As Chamberlain J put it (and Stuart‑Smith LJ endorsed), the definition must be read as including an implied further element:

“[T]he definition of ‘asylum seeker’ in s. 94(1) must therefore be read as impliedly containing an additional element … The individual must not only have made a claim which has been recorded. He must also not have withdrawn his claim, whether expressly or by conduct treated by the IRs as inconsistent with an intention to continue to advance it.” ([90])

Thus, if a claim has in fact been withdrawn (lawfully and validly), the person is no longer an asylum-seeker and is outside the scope of section 95. But crucially, that simply raises a question – was the purported withdrawal lawful and valid? It does not itself answer the second, jurisdictional question: which body decides that? The AST or the Administrative Court alone?

6.2 AST’s jurisdiction under section 103(1)

The Court begins from a key proposition accepted at all stages and rooted in Malaj: when hearing a section 103(1) appeal, the AST can:

decide whether the statutory conditions for section 95 support are met (e.g. destitution); and
determine whether the appellant fits the statutory definition of “asylum-seeker” or “dependant”.

As Chamberlain J observed (approved by the Court of Appeal):

“The Tribunal's function is to provide an efficient, convenient and accessible forum in which disputes about eligibility for asylum support can be determined. Eligibility depends on satisfying the definition of ‘asylum seeker’ or ‘dependant’ and on being actually or imminently destitute. There is no obvious reason why Parliament should have conferred jurisdiction on the Tribunal to decide disputes about the latter but not the former.” ([83])

Once it is accepted that the AST may determine whether someone is an asylum-seeker, it must also be able to resolve disputes about whether a claim has been validly treated as withdrawn, because that is precisely what removes asylum-seeker status. Subject to any clear contrary indication in the statutory scheme, the AST’s merits jurisdiction over eligibility questions extends to that issue.

6.3 Collateral challenge and the “prior decision” argument

The Secretary of State’s core conceptual move was to treat the withdrawal decision as a separate, antecedent decision that must be assumed valid unless quashed on judicial review. On this view:

The “decision under appeal” is only the section 95 refusal or stoppage.
The AST must accept the withdrawal decision as a given (by virtue of the principle of regularity) and cannot examine its lawfulness or factual basis.

The Court rejected this for several reasons.

(a) No statutory preclusion of collateral challenge

The starting point is the principle derived from Boddington v British Transport Police [1998] AC 143: whether a tribunal or court can entertain a collateral challenge to the legality of prior administrative action depends on the statutory context. Parliament may, but need not, preclude such challenges.

Chamberlain J (approved by the Court of Appeal) accepted that the “principle of regularity”—the assumption that administrative acts are valid until set aside—does not of itself answer the jurisdictional question. Rather, one asks whether the legislation, properly construed, excludes such challenges. Nothing in section 103 suggests such an exclusion.

Crucially, Stuart‑Smith LJ emphasised that the supposed separation between the withdrawal decision and the support decision is artificial in this context:

“…it does not follow that the decision to withdraw support can be seen in the pure isolation for which the Secretary of State contends. On the contrary, such a division seems wholly artificial and unreal: the decision against which the applicants appealed to the AST was a single reasoned decision that support should be refused or withdrawn because the applicant's asylum claim was withdrawn.” ([41])

Whether the withdrawal decision was made days before or at the same time as the support decision cannot sensibly alter the AST’s jurisdiction. The Court rejected the idea that timing could be used to insulate foundational reasoning from review:

“…the Secretary of State could not render a decision immune from challenge under section 103 by forming her view on the question of destitution or age before making the decision to refuse or withdraw asylum support. That seems to me to be particularly obvious where the question of destitution or age is the foundation for and an integral part of the decision to refuse or withdraw support.” ([39])

(b) Foundational reasoning as an “aspect” of the decision under appeal

The Court drew support from Michalak v GMC [2017] UKSC 71 on the nature of an “appeal”: unless limited, an appeal entails a full review “in all its aspects”, allowing the appellate body to assess the merits of the original decision and substitute its own.

Stuart‑Smith LJ applied this to section 103:

“I would hold that the foundational reasoning that underpins the decision to refuse or withhold support is one of the aspects of the decision; and there is no satisfactory distinction to be drawn between, on the one hand, foundational reasoning based on a view that the applicant's asylum claim should be treated as withdrawn or, on the other, foundational reasoning based on a view that the applicant is not destitute or is not aged 18.” ([43])

If the AST can re‑decide whether someone is destitute (a classic merits question) or over 18 (a fundamental status question), there is no principled reason why it cannot also re‑decide whether the conditions for implicit withdrawal under rule 333C are in fact met.

(c) DN (Rwanda) and the “tainting” of later decisions

The Court also applied the logic of R (DN (Rwanda)) v SSHD [2020] UKSC 7, where prior public law errors were held to “taint” later decisions.

Stuart‑Smith LJ adapted Lord Kerr’s reasoning:

“[W]ithout the existence of the decision to treat the appellants' asylum claims as withdrawn, the occasion for (much less the validity of) refusing or withdrawing asylum support would simply not arise. To divorce the withdrawal of asylum support from the treatment of the appellants' asylum claims would be, in my view, artificial and unwarranted. The decision to refuse or withdraw support is therefore inevitably tainted by any public law error in the decision to treat the asylum claims as withdrawn.” ([45])

In other words, if the withdrawal decision is legally or factually flawed, the support decision that rests upon it is likewise flawed. It would be incoherent to insist that the AST can review the latter but must treat the former as unassailable.

6.4 Section 103(2): “before that support would otherwise have come to an end”

The Secretary of State contended that where support ends automatically because the asylum claim has (validly) been withdrawn, it cannot be said that the Secretary of State has stopped support “before that support would otherwise have come to an end” under section 103(2). On that logic, stoppage appeals would be excluded in withdrawal cases.

The Court rejected this reading as both circular and unduly restrictive.

The Secretary of State’s argument assumed that the withdrawal decision was valid. But that is precisely the point in issue in many cases. Section 103(2) should be construed so that the availability of an appeal does not depend on assuming the very conclusion that the appellant seeks to contest.
On the Court’s reading, the question is whether, if the appellant’s case is correct, support was stopped early. If the AST eventually finds that the withdrawal was valid, it can dismiss the appeal. But jurisdiction to hear the appeal does not depend on the outcome.

Stuart‑Smith LJ explained:

“The relevant question of interpretation is whether the AST can look behind the administrative decision and notification that support is being withdrawn. On the AST's and the Judge's interpretation, it can. If, when it does so, it finds the decision that the recipient's application is withdrawn to be unjustifiable, it may intervene … If it does not make that finding, it may (and will) not. The jurisdiction … is not dependent upon the outcome; nor does the AST ‘only [have] jurisdiction to allow a section 103(2) appeal’ as submitted by the Secretary of State.” ([42])

This reading preserves meaningful content for section 103(2). If the Secretary of State’s restrictive account were right, stoppage appeals would be available only where the sole issue was an alleged change in destitution status, not where support was stopped because of withdrawal (even though errors in withdrawal decisions are common and often fact‑sensitive).

6.5 Application to the three appellants

Once the jurisdictional principles are accepted, the AST’s approach to the individual cases becomes straightforward and illustrative.

MAH

The AST found as fact that MAH never received the interview invitation because the Home Office sent it only to his solicitors, who did not forward it.
This was contrary to the Secretary of State’s own Withdrawal Policy, which required direct service on the claimant.
The decision to treat his claim as withdrawn therefore rested on erroneous facts and policy non‑compliance.
Since withdrawal was invalid, MAH remained an asylum-seeker; support had been stopped prematurely; the case was rightly remitted for reconsideration.

LKL

The AST found no evidence that LKL had been served with a decision refusing his original section 95 support claim.
More fundamentally, the caseworker had failed to apply the section 55 Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 duty to safeguard and promote the welfare of his child, or to follow the Withdrawal Policy’s requirements regarding children.
Again, the withdrawal decision was defective, and the refusal of section 95 support based upon it was flawed; remittal was appropriate.

The Secretary of State accepted that GK’s solicitors were not copied into key correspondence and that she did not receive the letters inviting her to interview.
Letter after letter was returned as “gone away”, yet no effective steps were taken to resolve this or to engage with her solicitors.
No consideration was given to the fact that GK is a lone parent of two young children, contrary again to the Withdrawal Policy and the section 55 duty.
The AST therefore found the withdrawal decision and consequent stoppage of support unsustainable.

In each case, the AST’s findings about defective withdrawal went directly to whether the appellant remained an asylum-seeker and whether support had been properly refused or stopped. The Court of Appeal’s ruling confirms that these were precisely the sorts of issues the AST was entitled (and expected) to decide.

6.6 Distinguishing Dogan and endorsing Malaj

The Secretary of State relied heavily on Dogan v SSHD [2003] EWCA Civ 1673, where the Court of Appeal held that the then adjudicator did not have jurisdiction under section 103(2) to hear an appeal said to challenge a decision to impose a condition that support would only be provided in Liverpool. The reasoning there rested on two main points:

The decision in question was not, in substance, a decision to “stop providing support” under section 95, because support on the disputed terms had never actually been provided.
Section 103(7) specifically contemplated regulations about appeals concerning where support was provided; those regulations had not been made, indicating that Parliament had chosen not to create such an appeal right.

Chamberlain J, and the Court of Appeal, found Dogan to be distinguishable:

In MAH and GK’s cases, section 95 support was already in place and the Secretary of State plainly did make a decision to stop providing support.
There is no unexercised parallel regulation‑making power here relating to withdrawal decisions; no equivalent to section 103(7) undermines the inference of AST jurisdiction.
In Dogan, it was common ground that the location condition had not been complied with; the only question was whether such a condition could be imposed. Here, by contrast, the core dispute is whether the conditions for implicit withdrawal were met at all (a highly fact‑sensitive issue).

Conversely, the Court expressly endorsed HHJ Gilbart QC’s decision in Malaj, which had rejected as “artificial and undesirable” the idea that factual findings leading to a conclusion that a person was not an asylum‑seeker could only be challenged by judicial review, whilst the statutory appeal system remained closed:

“I would also endorse the decision of HHJ Gilbart QC in Malaj … HHJ Gilbart QC rejected as both artificial and undesirable the Secretary of State's submission that ‘where [she] had made factual findings which led to a finding that an applicant was not an asylum seeker or a dependent of one, then the only remedy for the applicant would be in judicial review, and no use could be made of the statutory appeals system.’ I agree.” ([44])

6.7 The influence of Boddington, DN (Rwanda) and Michalak

Three key higher‑court authorities underpin the Court of Appeal’s reasoning:

Boddington v BTP [1998] AC 143 – establishes that whether collateral challenges to the validity of administrative acts are permitted depends on statutory context; there is no general rule forbidding such challenges.
R (DN (Rwanda)) v SSHD [2020] UKSC 7 – confirms that a subsequent decision can be irredeemably tainted by an earlier public law error, such that the later decision’s legality depends on the earlier decision’s validity.
Michalak v GMC [2017] UKSC 71 – explains that, absent restriction, an “appeal” entails a full merits review of all aspects of the decision, including substitution of the appellate body’s own decision.

Together, these authorities support the Court’s conclusion that:

The AST’s appellate jurisdiction under section 103 is merits‑based and not limited to Wednesbury‑style review.
In exercising that jurisdiction, the AST may consider whether the foundational withdrawal decision is lawful and factually correct.
Parliament has not, in the IAA 1999, chosen to carve out withdrawal decisions from the AST’s scrutiny; to the contrary, the statutory purpose of providing an accessible remedy for disputes about asylum support favours inclusion.

7. Complex Concepts Explained

Some of the key legal ideas in this judgment can be briefly clarified.

7.1 “Asylum-seeker” and “withdrawal”

An asylum-seeker (for support purposes) is an adult who has made an asylum claim that has been recorded and has not been determined or withdrawn.
A claim is explicitly withdrawn when the claimant signs a form or clearly states they wish to withdraw.
A claim is implicitly withdrawn when, for example, the claimant fails to attend an asylum interview and then fails to provide a satisfactory explanation within a “reasonable time”.
Whether an implicit withdrawal is valid often turns on factual questions (Did the person receive the invitation? Were they away for good reason?) and on whether Home Office policy and child‑protection duties were complied with.

7.2 Section 95 support and its conditions

Section 95 support is the main form of housing and subsistence assistance for destitute asylum seekers while their claims are being processed.
Support can be subject to conditions, such as residence in a specified address or attendance at interviews.
Under the 2000 Regulations, failure to attend an interview about support (or to respond to information requests) can justify stopping support—but only after an individualised, reasoned and fair assessment.

7.3 Section 103 appeals: non‑qualification and stoppage

A section 103(1) “non‑qualification” appeal challenges a decision that the applicant does not qualify for section 95 support—this often raises issues about whether the person is an asylum-seeker or destitute.
A section 103(2) “stoppage” appeal challenges a decision to stop existing section 95 support “before that support would otherwise have come to an end”.
In both types of appeal, the AST can re‑examine the factual and legal basis of the Secretary of State’s decision, including whether an asylum claim has been validly treated as withdrawn.

7.4 Collateral challenge and the principle of regularity

A collateral challenge is when a party attacks the validity of a prior administrative act (such as a withdrawal decision) in the course of other proceedings (here, a support appeal), rather than by a direct judicial review claim.
The principle of regularity means that administrative decisions are treated as valid unless and until a court or tribunal with jurisdiction decides otherwise. It does not, by itself, prevent such decisions being challenged—what matters is whether the relevant statute allows the tribunal to consider the issue.

7.5 DN (Rwanda): “tainted” decisions

The idea of a decision being “tainted” is that if a later decision depends on an earlier one, and the earlier one is legally flawed, the later decision is also unlawful.
In this case, if treating an asylum claim as withdrawn was unlawful, then any decision to stop section 95 support because of that withdrawal is similarly unlawful.

8. Practical and Doctrinal Impact

8.1 Consequences for asylum seekers and advisers

The decision has important protective effects for asylum seekers:

Accessible remedy: It confirms that asylum seekers whose support is refused or stopped because of a withdrawal decision can raise all relevant factual and legal arguments directly before the AST, without needing simultaneously to secure scarce public law representation for judicial review.
Real scrutiny of withdrawal decisions: The AST can now, with full authority, examine whether interview notices were properly served, whether interpreters were available, whether vulnerable claimants understood correspondence, and whether the Withdrawal Policy and child‑welfare duties were respected.
Systemic impact: Evidence from ASAP showed a rising proportion of appeals involving withdrawal decisions (12% in 2022; 18% in 2023). This judgment ensures that such appeals will be decided by a specialist, experienced tribunal capable of fact‑finding, rather than by expensive and inaccessible High Court proceedings.

8.2 Implications for Home Office decision‑making

For the Secretary of State, the decision sharpens the legal consequences of procedural failings in withdrawal decisions:

Policy compliance becomes legally critical. Failures to follow the Withdrawal Policy—such as not sending letters directly to claimants, not copying representatives, or not factoring in vulnerability and child welfare—are now squarely within the AST’s purview and can lead to support decisions being overturned.
Better record‑keeping and communication. The Home Office can expect AST judges to require cogent evidence of service of letters, telephone contacts, and any reasons given by claimants for non‑attendance at interviews.
Reduced reliance on “no appeal” assertions. Several letters in these cases wrongly told recipients that there was no right of appeal. This judgment underlines that such statements are not determinative: if the statutory conditions of section 103 are met, a right of appeal exists regardless of what the letter says.

8.3 Development of administrative law and tribunal design

Doctrinally, the judgment:

Reinforces the model of specialist tribunals with full merits jurisdiction over discrete but critical areas (here, asylum support). It resists attempts to fragment decision‑making so that only the High Court can consider certain aspects of the underlying controversy.
Applies Boddington and DN (Rwanda) in a way that is sensitive to the statutory purpose: tribunals can be allowed, and sometimes expected, to engage with the validity of prior administrative acts where those acts form the necessary foundation of the decisions under appeal.
Clarifies the interpretation of section 103(2), preventing its hollowing out. Stoppage appeals remain available in a wide range of practical and important scenarios, including where the stoppage is triggered by contested withdrawal decisions.

The judgment also pays tribute to the institutional experience of the AST and its Principal Judge, emphasising how long practical experience in a specialist tribunal can shape and illuminate the proper construction of its jurisdiction.

9. Conclusion

Secretary of State for the Home Department v First‑tier Tribunal (Asylum Support) establishes and confirms a significant legal principle: the AST has full merits jurisdiction in section 103 appeals to examine and, if appropriate, reject decisions by the Secretary of State to treat an asylum claim as withdrawn, where those decisions underpin the refusal or discontinuance of section 95 support.

Key takeaways include:

The definition of “asylum-seeker” in section 94(1) must be read as including an implied requirement that the claim has not been withdrawn, but whether that requirement is met is for the AST to decide in section 103 appeals.
The withdrawal decision and the support decision are not hermetically separate; the former is foundational to the latter and can be examined as part of an appeal.
Section 103(2) stoppage appeals are available whenever, on the appellant’s case, support has been stopped earlier than it should have been, including where the early termination rests on a disputed withdrawal decision.
Earlier authorities such as Dogan are limited to their own context and do not prevent the AST from scrutinising the validity of withdrawal decisions; Malaj is fully endorsed.

In practical terms, the decision ensures that destitute and often vulnerable asylum seekers retain meaningful access to an effective remedy before a specialist tribunal when their support is refused or withdrawn on the basis of alleged procedural default in their asylum claims. In doctrinal terms, it is an important reaffirmation of the role of tribunals in conducting full merits review of administrative decisions within their sphere, including the foundational factual and legal assumptions on which those decisions rest.