Abuse of Trust Beyond Workplace Hierarchy: Sentencing Framework for Manager–Employee Sexual Assault in R v Mackenzie [2025] EWCA Crim 1526

1. Introduction

This commentary considers the decision of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in R v Mackenzie [2025] EWCA Crim 1526, a sentencing appeal arising from two offences of sexual assault contrary to section 3 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.

The case is significant for two main reasons:

It clarifies the proper scope of the “abuse of trust” aggravating factor in sexual assault sentencing, particularly in the context of manager–employee relationships.
It illustrates how appellate courts should re-evaluate the question of suspending a custodial sentence once they have corrected an error in culpability categorisation and reduced the length of the sentence.

The appellant, a 38-year-old store manager of a Co-op in Bath, sexually assaulted a much younger shop assistant (student) in the early hours of the morning after entering her bedroom uninvited, climbing into her bed and persisting in sexual touching despite repeated verbal resistance and physical attempts to make him stop. He pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual assault and was sentenced at first instance to 20 months’ immediate imprisonment.

On appeal, the central issues were:

Whether the sentencing judge was wrong to classify the case as involving an “abuse of trust” and therefore as high culpability under the Sentencing Council’s Sexual Offences guideline.
Whether, once the sentence was recalibrated, it should have been suspended rather than imposed immediately.

The Court of Appeal (Pepperall J giving the judgment) concluded that the sentencing judge had misapplied the “abuse of trust” factor and thereby placed the case in too high a culpability category, resulting in a manifestly excessive sentence. The court substituted a sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment on each count, concurrent, but declined to suspend it.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Essential Facts

The appellant was the victim’s manager at a Co-op store in Bath; he was 38, she was a university student working as a junior shop assistant.
After a work social event that the victim did not attend, the appellant sent sexually suggestive messages, including that she would make a “great hooker” and that she would be “an expert on positions,” acknowledging that he risked an HR complaint.
Later that night, he messaged her housemate stating he was on his way to the house and would be “sleeping with” the victim.
Around 2 am he arrived, was let in by the housemate, entered the victim’s bedroom, climbed into her bed, and sexually assaulted her by touching her breasts and bottom, both over and under clothing, despite her repeated objections and her biting his arm to try to make him stop.
The victim subsequently suffered serious psychological harm: loss of confidence and trust, anxiety attacks, disruption of her university studies, medication for mental health, and being effectively driven out of her home, with consequent financial and accommodation consequences.
The appellant had no previous convictions and expressed remorse; he attributed his conduct to excessive drinking and workplace “banter”.

2.2 Sentence at First Instance

The Crown Court judge categorised the offending as:
- Medium harm – touching of naked breasts and a sustained incident.
- Higher culpability – on the basis of “abuse of trust” (manager–subordinate) and the offending occurring in the victim’s home.
That led to classification as Category 2A under the Sexual Offences guideline, with a starting point of 2 years’ custody and a range of 1–4 years.
Taking into account aggravating features (location, timing, compulsion to leave her home, significant psychological harm) and mitigation (good character, remorse, steps to reduce alcohol use, family responsibilities), the judge assessed:
- After trial: 3 years’ imprisonment.
- After full credit for guilty pleas: 2 years.
- Additional reduction for delay and prison conditions: final sentence 20 months’ immediate custody.
The judge considered suspension but concluded that only an immediate custodial sentence would provide appropriate punishment, emphasising “breach of trust,” persistence, impact on the victim and her having to leave her home.

2.3 Decision on Appeal

The Court of Appeal held:

The sentencing judge was wrong to find that the case involved an “abuse of trust” (paras 21–22), given the proper legal meaning of that concept.
Accordingly, culpability was not “higher” but should be treated as lower within Category 2: the correct classification was Category 2B, not 2A.
The correct starting point should have been 12 months’ imprisonment with a range up to 2 years (para 22).
When properly assessed (with the serious aggravating features and the mitigation), the appropriate sentence:
- After trial: about 18 months’ imprisonment.
- After full credit for early guilty pleas: 12 months’ imprisonment (para 25).
The original sentence was therefore manifestly excessive.
The Court re-examined the question of suspension—because:
- The initial decision had been taken against the (now incorrect) 20-month sentence; and
- The judge’s suspension analysis partly relied on the erroneous “breach of trust” finding (para 27).
Despite the reduction to 12 months and the removal of the “abuse of trust” label, the nature and seriousness of the offending still required immediate imprisonment (para 31).

Outcome: The appeal was allowed to the extent that the sentence was reduced. The Court imposed 12 months’ imprisonment on each count, concurrent (total 12 months), but declined to suspend the sentence (para 32).

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 The Legal and Factual Context

3.1.1 Statutory and Procedural Framework

Offences: Two counts of sexual assault under section 3 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, which criminalises intentional sexual touching without consent, where the defendant does not reasonably believe that the complainant consents.
Anonymity: The judgment begins by confirming that the complainant’s anonymity is protected under the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992, which prohibits publications likely to identify a complainant in sexual offence cases during their lifetime (para 1).
Guidelines: Sentencing was governed by:
- The Sentencing Council’s Sexual Offences: Definitive Guideline, which structures sentencing through harm and culpability categories.
- The Sentencing Council’s Imposition of Community and Custodial Sentences guideline (“imposition guideline”), which governs decisions to impose, suspend or avoid custody.

3.1.2 The Key Issues on Appeal

Abuse of Trust: Was the sentencing judge correct to find that the case involved an “abuse of trust” as an aggravating factor and therefore to treat the case as high culpability (Category 2A)?
Manifestly Excessive Sentence: Did that misclassification lead to a sentence outside the proper sentencing range for the offending?
Suspension: Once the error was corrected and the sentence reduced, should the remaining term of imprisonment have been suspended?

3.2 Precedents and Authorities Cited

The Court’s reasoning on “abuse of trust” is firmly rooted in existing Court of Appeal authorities and the Sentencing Council guideline itself. The judgment thereby consolidates and clarifies this area of law rather than creating an entirely new doctrine.

3.2.1 Sentencing Council Guideline on Abuse of Trust

At para 17, the Court set out the Sentencing Council’s expanded definition of “abuse of trust” within the Sexual Offences guideline. The guideline states:

“In order for an abuse of trust to make an offence more serious the relationship between the offender and victim(s) must be one that would give rise to the offender having a significant level of responsibility towards the victim(s) on which the victim(s) would be entitled to rely.”

It gives non-exhaustive examples—teacher/pupil, parent/child, employer/employee, professional adviser/client, carer/dependant, and ad hoc scenarios such as a late-night taxi driver with a lone passenger—and includes a critical caveat:

“These examples are not exhaustive and do not necessarily indicate that abuse of trust is present. … Where an offender has been given an inappropriate level of responsibility, abuse of trust is unlikely to apply.”

This framework emphasises:

Fact-specific analysis.
The need for significant responsibility and justifiable reliance, beyond mere status difference or hierarchy.
The impropriety of treating the mere label “employer/employee” as sufficient to constitute “abuse of trust”.

3.2.2 R v Forbes [2016] EWCA Crim 1388; [2016] 2 Cr App R (S) 44

The judgment identifies Forbes as the “modern leading authority” on abuse of trust in sexual offences (para 18). Forbes provides the overarching framework, emphasising:

The need for a careful, contextual assessment of the relationship between offender and victim.
That abuse of trust is a significant aggravating factor, not to be lightly found, and often associated with contexts where the offender has particular power or responsibility (e.g. carers, teachers, professionals).

While Forbes is not set out in detail in this judgment, its role is to anchor the Court’s approach: abuse of trust requires more than mere proximity or seniority; it demands a relationship in which the victim is entitled to rely upon the offender’s responsibility for their welfare, safety or interests.

3.2.3 R v Ashton [2015] EWCA Crim 1799; [2016] 1 Cr App R (S) 32

Ashton is key to understanding how the Court approaches managerial or quasi-employment relationships in sexual offending. There, the defendant:

Ran a bar with his partner.
Was significantly older than the victim.
Initially knew the victim as a customer then offered him bar work.
Later committed serious sexual offences against him.

The Court of Appeal in Ashton held:

There was no abuse of trust for the purposes of the sentencing exercise.
However, the inequality in age and circumstances between offender and victim was an aggravating factor and should be reflected in sentence.

This distinction—between a true “abuse of trust” and other aggravating features such as age and power imbalance—is central to Mackenzie. Pepperall J expressly notes that Ashton is “particularly useful guidance” in applying the abuse-of-trust concept to managers who assault junior workers (para 18).

3.2.4 R v Nilmoni Singh [2020] EWCA Crim 1366

In Singh, the defendant was a restaurant manager who sexually assaulted a waitress. The Court of Appeal (Holroyde LJ) held, at para 39, that:

The inquiry into abuse of trust is fact-specific.
The mere existence of an employer/employee relationship is not enough to constitute an abuse of trust.

Once again, the manager/subordinate structure, without more, did not automatically transform the case into a breach of trust. The Court in Mackenzie relies on this point as directly analogous: a manager’s misconduct towards a more junior employee is serious, but it does not necessarily meet the threshold of abuse of trust under the guideline.

3.2.5 R v Oprea [2021] EWCA Crim 1695

Pepperall J references Oprea as containing a “useful review of the authorities” on abuse of trust (para 18), delivered by Popplewell LJ. Although the details are not reproduced, Oprea reinforces:

The need for disciplined, principled use of “abuse of trust” as an aggravator.
The danger of expanding the category so widely that many routine hierarchical or service relationships are wrongly elevated into “trust” cases.

Together, Forbes, Ashton, Singh, and Oprea, read alongside the Sentencing Council guideline, form a coherent body of law which Mackenzie applies and further clarifies in the specific context of workplace manager–employee sexual assault occurring partly off work premises (the victim’s home).

3.3 Legal Reasoning of the Court

3.3.1 Rejection of “Abuse of Trust” in These Facts

The sentencing judge had justified a finding of abuse of trust by stating:

“You were her manager, and you abused her, and you did so in her own home.” (para 21)

The Court of Appeal accepted that:

The substantial age and status difference between the manager and the young student was an important aggravating factor.
The intrusion into her private bedroom, in the middle of the night, when she ought to have been safe, was particularly serious.

However, it held that these considerations did not justify a conclusion that the case involved an “abuse of trust” within the technical sense used in the guideline (para 22).

Key points in the Court’s reasoning:

The existence of a manager–employee relationship is not, by itself, sufficient (Ashton, Singh).
“Abuse of trust” requires a relationship where the offender has an enhanced degree of responsibility for the victim, in which the victim is entitled to place trust (as per the guideline and Forbes).
In this case, although the appellant was the victim’s store manager, there was no indication that:
- He had a specific, trust-based responsibility for her welfare or safety akin to, say, a teacher, carer, or professional adviser; or
- She was required to rely on him in a protective or safeguarding sense beyond normal workplace supervision.

The Court concluded that correctly understood, this was not an “abuse of trust” case, but a case where serious aggravating factors existed outside that label (para 22).

3.3.2 Correct Culpability Categorisation: From 2A to 2B

The misapplication of “abuse of trust” had a direct structural consequence: it moved the case into higher culpability (2A), which carries a starting point of 2 years’ custody and a range of 1–4 years (para 12).

Once abuse of trust was rejected, the Court re-categorised the case as:

Harm: Medium harm remained appropriate (touching of naked breasts, sustained incident).
Culpability: Lower culpability within Category 2 (i.e. 2B rather than 2A), because “abuse of trust” could not be properly relied upon (para 22).

The proper guideline starting point therefore became 12 months’ imprisonment with a guideline range up to 2 years (para 22). This re-set the entire sentencing exercise.

3.3.3 Treatment of Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

(1) Aggravating Factors

In para 23, the Court carefully distinguished between:

Factors relevant to categorisation (harm and culpability), and
Factors relevant at the second stage of the guidelines – movement up or down from the starting point.

Having removed “abuse of trust” from culpability assessment, the Court still identified several serious aggravators:

Location: The appellant entered the victim’s home and her bedroom “uninvited” and refused to leave. The bedroom is treated as a place where the victim was entitled to feel safe.
Timing: The offences were committed at about 2 am, when she was in bed. This heightens vulnerability and invasion of privacy.
Psychological Impact: The victim suffered serious, documented psychological damage, including anxiety, loss of trust, disruption to studies, and needing medication (see paras 8, 23).
Displacement from Home: She felt compelled to move out of the house where the offences occurred, incurring financial and practical consequences (paras 8, 23).
Intoxication: The appellant had been drinking since mid-afternoon (para 4) and committed the offences while intoxicated (para 23). Alcohol was treated as an aggravating, not mitigating, factor.
Age and Status Disparity: The Court stressed that, even though it did not amount to a formal “abuse of trust”, the significant difference between the 38-year-old manager and the much younger student shop assistant was a distinct aggravating factor that needed to be reflected in sentence (para 23).

A crucial methodological point emerges: the Court explicitly states that having set aside certain matters (age and status difference, etc.) in determining the correct category (2B), it was then “necessary to take account” of those same matters as aggravating features when adjusting from the 12-month starting point (para 23). This is a clear guard against “double counting” while still ensuring that relevant seriousness factors influence the final outcome.

(2) Mitigating Factors

The sentencing judge had identified:

Previous good character.
Remorse.
Efforts to reduce alcohol consumption.
Active role in his son’s life.
His being in a relationship and caring for young children (para 13).

On appeal, counsel for the appellant added:

The fact that the appellant’s job allegedly remained open to him (para 24).
Work and financial pressures at the time of the offence (para 24).

The Court’s approach:

It accepted the relevance of the job remaining open as a mitigating factor, as it bears upon rehabilitation and stability (para 24).
It firmly rejected the suggestion that work or financial pressures “even begin to explain this offending” (para 24). This serves as an explicit warning that ordinary life stresses are not mitigating factors in sexual offending.

3.3.4 Recalibrated Sentence

We can reconstruct the Court’s sentencing reasoning as follows:

Guideline starting point (2B): 12 months’ imprisonment (para 22).
Adjustment for aggravating factors: The Court concluded that, given the multiplicity and seriousness of the aggravators (location, timing, psychological harm, displacement from home, intoxication, age/status disparity), the sentence after trial should be “in the region of 18 months’ imprisonment” (para 25). In effect, the aggravation justified moving 6 months above the starting point.
Mitigation: The Court considered the mitigants identified by the judge and the additional factor that his job remained open to him (para 25). These mitigants appear to have prevented the sentence from going higher than 18 months but did not justify a greater reduction.
Credit for guilty pleas: The Court allowed “credit for the early guilty pleas”, reducing the notional 18-month sentence to 12 months (para 25). This is consistent with the usual one-third reduction for an early guilty plea (18 months → 12 months).

Unlike the sentencing judge, the Court of Appeal did not make a further explicit reduction for delay or prison conditions. Instead, it described 12 months as “the just and proportionate sentence” once all relevant factors were taken into account (para 25). In context, it appears that the earlier allowance for delay and prison conditions was effectively subsumed into the overall appellate reassessment.

The Court concluded that the original approach, based on the erroneous high-culpability categorisation, had yielded a sentence that was “manifestly excessive” (para 25), which is the threshold for appellate intervention in sentence.

3.3.5 Reconsideration of Suspension

A distinctive feature of Mackenzie is the Court’s careful treatment of whether the newly reduced 12-month sentence should be suspended.

Two reasons were given for revisiting this question afresh (para 27):

The judge had considered suspension in the context of a much longer custodial term (20 months), which now fell to be reduced.
The judge’s decision against suspension had partly relied on the now-discredited finding of “breach of trust”.

The Court therefore applied the Imposition of Community and Custodial Sentences guideline itself, which asks:

Has the “custody threshold” been passed? (Clearly yes here.)
Is it unavoidable to impose immediate custody, or can the purposes of sentencing be met by a suspended sentence with requirements?

The factors taken into account (paras 28–30) included:

No risk of danger to the public.
No history of non-compliance with court orders.
A realistic prospect of rehabilitation.
Impact on others (family, those who care for the appellant).

Defence counsel stressed that:

The appellant had been held in a prison many miles from home, making visits effectively impossible for a long period.
He had missed major life events.

The Court’s response was instructive (paras 29–30):

Much of what was described (distance from home, missing life events) was considered “inherent in a sentence of imprisonment”.
Placement of prisoners within the estate is a matter for the Prison Service, not the court, and thus could not influence the sentencing decision.

Reassessing the overall seriousness (para 31), the Court emphasised:

The appellant was a significantly older, drunken manager.
He entered the younger employee’s bedroom uninvited, in the middle of the night.
He persisted in sexual assault despite verbal and physical resistance.
The victim suffered serious psychological harm and was compelled to leave her home.

On these facts, the Court agreed with the sentencing judge’s ultimate conclusion: the offending was so serious that “appropriate punishment could only be achieved by imposing a sentence of immediate imprisonment” (para 31). In other words, even though a 12-month term is in principle “suspendable” (statutorily and under guidelines), the court considered an immediate custodial sentence indispensable for punishment and public confidence.

3.4 Impact and Significance

3.4.1 Clarifying the Boundaries of “Abuse of Trust”

Mackenzie reinforces and slightly sharpens the message from Ashton and Singh:

Managerial status or workplace hierarchy alone is not enough to constitute an “abuse of trust” for sentencing purposes in sexual assault cases.
Even when combined with:
- a significant age and status disparity; and
- an assault taking place in the victim’s home;
these factors do not automatically
Instead, they must be treated as powerful aggravating factors at the adjustment stage, not as decisive of higher culpability.

Practically, this judgment:

Will discourage courts at first instance from routinely characterising manager–employee sexual assaults as “abuse of trust” unless there is some additional, specific basis for concluding that the offender had a recognised position of trust in the sense contemplated by the guideline.
Emphasises that judges should provide “a clear justification” (as the guideline itself states) before making a finding of abuse of trust.
Preserves the special weight of the abuse-of-trust factor for relationships that truly involve safeguarding or reliance (teacher/pupil, carer/dependant, etc.), rather than diluting it by over-extension.

3.4.2 Guidance on Handling Workplace Sexual Assaults

The case provides a practical roadmap for sentencing in similar workplace or quasi-workplace sexual assault scenarios:

Start by categorising harm and culpability strictly according to the guideline, without conflating aggravating factors (e.g. home intrusion, age disparity) with formal higher-culpability factors like abuse of trust.
Then, from the correct starting point, move up or down the range to reflect:
- Serious aggravation (e.g. intoxication, exploitation of age or status differences, invasion of the victim’s home and bedroom, psychological harm).
- Mitigation (first-time offender, remorse, genuine steps towards rehabilitation, family responsibilities).

For prosecutors and defence practitioners, this clarifies the proper structure of argument:

Prosecutors should be slow to assert abuse of trust in standard workplace hierarchies, but should strongly emphasise any exploitation of power, vulnerability or intrusion into the victim’s private sphere as aggravation.
Defence advocates have clear authority to resist overbroad “abuse of trust” submissions, directing the court instead to Ashton, Singh and now Mackenzie.

3.4.3 Approach to Suspension After Sentence Reduction

Mackenzie is also notable for its approach to suspension after the appellate court has reduced sentence:

It confirms that where a court of appeal substantially reduces a custodial term or removes a key aggravating label (like abuse of trust), it should ordinarily reconsider afresh whether immediate custody remains necessary.
However, it also illustrates that:
- Passing of the custody threshold and a sentence length capable of suspension do not create a presumption in favour of suspension.
- Serious sexual offending—especially involving intrusion into a victim’s home and resulting in substantial psychological harm—will often justify immediate custody despite strong personal mitigation and good prospects of rehabilitation.

The Court’s refusal to be swayed by logistical difficulties of prison placement or the inevitable personal/family hardship caused by imprisonment is a clear signal that such matters, being “inherent in a sentence of imprisonment”, will rarely justify suspension by themselves.

3.4.4 Confirmation of Methodology Under Sentencing Guidelines

The judgment is also significant for its disciplined use of the Sentencing Council framework:

It reiterates the two-stage guideline method:
1. Identify the category of harm and culpability and adopt the associated starting point.
2. Adjust within the range for aggravating and mitigating factors.
It shows the court taking care not to “double count” factors by using them both to determine category and again as aggravation.
It underscores the importance of a reasoned explanation when invoking serious aggravating concepts (e.g. abuse of trust).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

The following section explains key legal concepts used in the judgment in more accessible terms.

4.1 “Sexual Assault” under Section 3 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003

Section 3 covers situations where:

The defendant intentionally touches another person.
The touching is sexual (judged objectively by its nature and/or circumstances).
The other person does not consent.
The defendant does not reasonably believe that the other person consents.

In Mackenzie, the sexual nature of touching (breasts and bottom under clothing, in bed at 2 am) and absence of consent (repeated verbal and physical resistance) were uncontroversial by the time of sentence, as the appellant had pleaded guilty.

4.2 “Abuse of Trust” as an Aggravating Factor

“Abuse of trust” does not mean simply that someone in a position of seniority has acted badly. In the sentencing context, it is reserved for situations where:

The offender has a particular responsibility for the victim (e.g. teacher, carer, parent, professional adviser).
The victim is entitled to rely on the offender for protection, care or guidance.
The offender exploits that special position to commit the offence or conceal it.

The mere fact that A is B’s boss, or older, or more powerful, does not automatically amount to a legally recognised “abuse of trust”, although it may still aggravate the sentence in other ways.

4.3 Sentencing Council Guideline Categories (Harm and Culpability)

The Sexual Offences guideline categorises offences based on:

Harm – how serious the impact was (physical injury, psychological harm, duration, level of violation).
Culpability – how blameworthy the offender was (planning, exploitation of vulnerability, abuse of trust, group offending, etc.).

For each combination (e.g. 2A, 2B), the guideline provides a:

Starting point – the sentence usually appropriate for a first-time offender convicted after trial.
Range – the band within which the sentence can move up or down depending on specific aggravating or mitigating features.

In this case:

2A (medium harm, higher culpability) → starting point 2 years’ custody; range 1–4 years.
2B (medium harm, lower culpability) → starting point 1 year; range up to 2 years (para 22).

4.4 “Manifestly Excessive” Sentence

The Court of Appeal will only interfere with a sentence if:

It is based on a wrong legal principle or guideline error; or
It is outside the range of sentences which a judge, properly directing themselves, could reasonably have passed—in other words, it is “manifestly excessive”.

In Mackenzie, the incorrect classification as an abuse-of-trust case placed the sentence at an artificially high level. Once corrected, the judge’s 20-month sentence was above what the Court considered the top of a reasonable range, so it was held to be manifestly excessive (para 25).

4.5 Immediate Custody vs Suspended Sentence

When a court decides that:

The offence is serious enough to cross the “custody threshold”; and
A custodial sentence of ≤ 2 years is appropriate;

it must then consider whether to:

Send the offender immediately to prison; or
Impose a suspended sentence of imprisonment (the term is fixed, but the offender stays in the community under conditions, and is only imprisoned if they breach those conditions or reoffend).

The decision turns on:

Whether the seriousness of the offence requires “immediate” punishment.
The risk the offender poses to the public.
Prospects of rehabilitation and whether these would be better served in the community.
The effect of immediate imprisonment on dependants or others.

In Mackenzie, although the appellant had good prospects and low risk, the seriousness of the sexual offending (home invasion, persistence, serious harm) meant that only immediate custody could meet the need for punishment and public confidence (para 31).

4.6 Credit for Guilty Pleas

Defendants who plead guilty receive a reduced sentence as recognition of:

Sparing the victim the ordeal of trial.
Saving court time and resources.
Demonstrating some limited acceptance of responsibility.

The usual maximum reduction is one-third off the sentence that would have followed a trial, if the plea is entered at the first reasonable opportunity. That is what appears to have happened here: 18 months after trial, reduced to 12 months after early guilty pleas (para 25).

5. Conclusion

R v Mackenzie is an important sentencing decision that refines the application of the “abuse of trust” aggravating factor in sexual assault cases and demonstrates rigorous adherence to the Sentencing Council framework.

The key takeaways are:

Abuse of trust is a distinct, high-gravity concept. It is not enough that an offender is a manager, older, or more powerful than the victim; there must be a relationship of recognised responsibility and reliance, such as those exemplified in the guideline. Otherwise, those features should be treated as aggravating factors at the adjustment stage, not as determinative of high culpability.
Fact-specific analysis is essential. The Court reaffirms the need for a “close examination of the facts” and a clear justification whenever abuse of trust is found, echoing Forbes, Ashton, Singh and Oprea.
Sentencing methodology must be disciplined. Harm and culpability categories set the starting point; aggravating and mitigating factors then justify movement within the range. Courts must avoid double-counting the same factor at both stages.
Workplace sexual assaults by managers are gravely serious. Even without a formal “abuse of trust” label, such offences—especially where they involve intoxication, intrusion into the victim’s home, persistence in the face of resistance, and lasting psychological harm—will ordinarily attract immediate custodial sentences.
Suspension is not automatic once sentence length is reduced. Although the Court reconsidered suspension afresh, it concluded that the seriousness of this offending demanded immediate custody, underscoring that the public interest in punishment and denunciation can outweigh strong personal mitigation and good rehabilitation prospects.

Within the broader legal landscape, Mackenzie consolidates and clarifies the law on abuse of trust in sexual offences; it will guide trial judges and advocates in properly calibrating sentences for workplace-related sexual assaults and in resisting the overextension of the abuse-of-trust concept while still treating such offences with the seriousness they deserve.