“Inside Claims” and the Charterer’s Shield: Supreme Court Confirms Charterers May Limit Liability to Owners for Owners’ Own Losses (MSC Flaminia [2025] UKSC 14)

“Inside Claims” and the Charterer’s Shield:
Supreme Court Confirms Charterers May Limit Liability to Owners for Owners’ Own Losses
(MSC Mediterranean Shipping Co SA v Conti 11 Container Schiffahrts-GmbH & Co KG MS “MSC Flaminia” [2025] UKSC 14)

1. Introduction

The United Kingdom Supreme Court has delivered a landmark judgment resolving two long-standing controversies under the 1976 Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims as amended by the 1996 Protocol (“LLMC 1976”). The dispute arose from the catastrophic explosion and fire on board the container ship MSC Flaminia in July 2012. The owner (Conti) recovered some US $200 million in London arbitration from the time-charterer (MSC) for costs flowing from the casualty—ranging from firefighting water disposal to removal of contaminated cargo. MSC then sought to invoke the statutory right of tonnage limitation.

The central questions were:

  1. Whether a charterer can ever limit its liability vis-à-vis the shipowner for the owner’s own original losses (“inside claims”), as opposed merely to recourse claims by third parties.
  2. If so, whether the specific heads of loss claimed by Conti fell within the limitable categories in Article 2.1 LLMC 1976, bearing in mind the earlier authority that loss of or damage to the ship itself is not limitable.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Delivering the unanimous opinion, Lord Hamblen (with Lords Hodge, Briggs, Leggatt and Burrows concurring) allowed MSC’s appeal in part:

  • New Precedent: A charterer can rely on LLMC 1976 to limit liability towards the owner, even where the owner’s claim is for losses originally suffered by the owner itself. The Court rejected the Court of Appeal’s so-called “owner’s original loss qualification”.
  • However, the long-standing rule that there is no limitation for damage to, or consequential loss resulting from, the limiting vessel itself (stemming from CMA Djakarta and approved obiter in The Ocean Victory) remains intact.
  • Applying those principles, only one head of Conti’s four claims—the €9.2 million incurred discharging, decontaminating and disposing of cargo at Wilhelmshaven—fell within Article 2.1(e) (“removal … of the cargo of the ship”) and was therefore limitable. The other three heads (payments to national authorities, removal of firefighting water, removal of mixed waste) were characterised as costs of repairing the ship and not limitable.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  1. Aegean Sea [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 39
    Thomas J first suggested that a charterer could limit only for liabilities incurred “qua owner”. The Supreme Court has now disapproved that restriction.
  2. CMA Djakarta [2004] EWCA Civ 114
    Established that loss of or damage to the limiting vessel is outside Article 2.1(a). The Court reaffirmed this core holding.
  3. The Ocean Victory [2017] UKSC 35
    Supreme Court obiter endorsed CMA Djakarta. That endorsement is now express, not merely obiter.
  4. The Tojo Maru [1972] AC 242
    Quoted for Lord Reid’s guidance that limitation statutes should not be construed unduly narrowly.
  5. International materials: Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Arts 31-32 guided Lord Hamblen’s textual-object-purpose matrix; travaux of the 1957 and 1924 Conventions; comparative jurisprudence (e.g., Australian Goliath [2024] FCA).

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

(a) Ordinary Meaning of “Claims”

LLMC 1976 Art 1.1 and Art 2 define “claims” without differentiating between insider and outsider parties. Reading a hidden “owner’s original loss” exception would contradict the ordinary language and create asymmetry: e.g., cargo owned by a charterer would be limitable, but identical cargo owned by the owner would not.

(b) Context, Object and Purpose

Though the historical rationale of limitation was to protect shipowners, successive conventions (1924, 1957, 1976) deliberately extended the benefit to charterers, managers, operators, salvors and insurers in order to promote maritime adventure generally. Interpreting “claims” to exclude owners’ inside claims would frustrate that broader purpose and re-introduce uncertainty.

(c) Articles 9-11 and the “Single Fund” Argument

Conti’s strongest policy objection was that an owner might end up “paying itself” out of a limitation fund, diluting other claimants’ share. Lord Hamblen held that:

  • The fund mechanism is optional (Art 10). Invocation of limitation does not always entail a constituted fund.
  • Owners’ largest heads of claim are usually ship-damage claims, which remain non-limitable, so depletion concerns are overstated.
  • The Convention already contemplates situations where the fund provider must claim against the fund (e.g., cargo claims under a charterer’s bills).

(d) Construction of Article 2.1 Sub-paragraphs

  • Art 2.1(a): confined to loss of or damage to other property; does not cover damage to the limiting vessel nor consequential losses from such damage.
  • Art 2.1(e): embraces costs of removing, destroying or rendering harmless cargo, even if the owner incurred them primarily to permit hull repairs.
  • Art 2.1(f): covers mitigation costs only where the measure is directed to avert or minimise a loss that itself would be limitable; here the firefighting-water removal failed that test.

3.3 Anticipated Impact

The decision has considerable ramifications:

  • Contractual Risk Allocation: Owners and charterers will reassess indemnity and insurance provisions, knowing that charterers may limit “inside claims”.
  • P&I Clubs: Clubs underwriting charterers’ entries must now assume that limitation may cap exposure vis-à-vis owners, affecting reserve calculations.
  • Litigation Strategy: Shipowners suing charterers must plead carefully: ship-damage components remain unlimited, but mixed items (e.g., cargo removal) may be sliced out and forced into the limitation pot.
  • International Uniformity: The ruling aligns UK law with trends in several civil-law jurisdictions and Australian authority, promoting convergence under LLMC 1976.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

LLMC 1976
An international treaty allowing specified maritime defendants to cap liability at a figure linked to ship tonnage. Incorporated into UK law by Merchant Shipping Act 1995 s 185.
Limiting Vessel
The ship by whose gross tonnage the monetary limitation is calculated. Claims for damage to that very vessel are not limitable.
Inside vs Outside Claim
“Inside” = claim brought by one of the persons defined as “shipowner” in Art 1.2 (owner, charterer, manager, operator, or their servants). “Outside” = claim by any other person (e.g., cargo owner, harbour authority).
Limitation Fund
A pool of money (or guarantee) constituted under Art 11 into which all claimants prove; it can be set up by any person entitled to limit, and is treated as constituted for all.
Article 2.1(e)
Makes limitable the costs of removing, destroying or rendering harmless cargo; the Supreme Court confirms this applies even when the shipowner itself incurs the cost.

5. Conclusion

MSC Flaminia establishes that the LLMC 1976 confers on charterers a robust right to limit liability even against the shipowner’s own, originally suffered losses. The only entrenched carve-out remains damage to the limiting vessel and consequential losses flowing from that damage. By refusing to read unstated qualifications into the term “claims”, the Supreme Court has enhanced certainty and reinforced the Convention’s policy of predictable, near-unbreakable limits—while simultaneously preserving the doctrinal boundary around hull-damage claims. Maritime actors should audit their contracts, insurance covers, and casualty response plans in light of this clarified landscape.

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