Limited-Remand Compliance and Enforceable Personal Oral Guarantees as Separate Contracts

Introduction

In Paul J. Sorum v. Mike Sikorski and Big Sky Limited of Wyoming, a Wyoming Corporation, 2026 WY 91 (Wyo. Aug. 11, 2026), the Wyoming Supreme Court addressed two recurring appellate problems: (1) what a district court may (and must) do on a limited remand, and (2) whether an alleged personal oral guarantee—treated as a separate oral contract—was proven by the evidence. The parties had litigated for years over unpaid tank-lease obligations incurred by Clean Crude (an LLC owned 50/50 by Paul Sorum and Jeff Martinson) to Mike Sikorski/Big Sky. The district court found Clean Crude breached the written leases but did not pierce the corporate veil; it nevertheless held Sorum personally liable based on an oral promise to pay with personal funds if Clean Crude could not.

In the first appeal, Sorum v. Sikorski, 2024 WY 124, 559 P.3d 153 (Wyo. 2024) (Sorum I), the Supreme Court held the district court abused its discretion by not allowing Sorum to testify about the alleged oral guarantee and remanded for the limited purpose of allowing testimony and evidence on that issue. After the limited remand hearing, the district court again found an enforceable oral guarantee and reaffirmed the same damages and prejudgment interest award ($114,537.56). Sorum appealed again, contending primarily that the district court wrongly restricted evidence and that the oral guarantee was not supported by evidence.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed in full. It held:

  1. Limited remand scope: The district court correctly applied the mandate rule/law-of-the-case doctrine by limiting testimony and evidence to the remanded issue (the personal oral guarantee) and by excluding matters already decided or beyond the remand’s purpose.
  2. Oral guarantee finding: The district court did not clearly err in finding Sorum made an enforceable personal oral guarantee. Sikorski’s testimony, credited by the trial court, supported offer, acceptance, and consideration; the terms were sufficiently definite because they referenced known lease obligations and known services/equipment.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

A. Remand authority, the mandate rule, and law of the case

The opinion’s first issue is driven by Wyoming’s remand jurisprudence and persuasive federal authority describing how mandates operate.

  • Matter of Adoption of BBC, 849 P.2d 769 (Wyo. 1993) and Potter v. Gilkey, 570 P.2d 449 (Wyo. 1977) supply the core Wyoming rule: on remand the district court has jurisdiction only to the extent conferred by the appellate mandate. This anchors the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the remand hearing properly focused only on the oral guarantee.
  • Int. of JN, 2024 WY 105, 556 P.3d 748 (Wyo. 2024) (quoting Matter of Adoption of BBC) is cited for the requirement that a lower court must “substantially comply” with the combined directions, purpose, and intent of the mandate. The Court uses this to frame its inquiry as one of faithful compliance, not reopening the whole case.
  • Sanders v. Gregory, 652 P.2d 25 (Wyo. 1982) (quoted in Matter of Adoption of BBC) provides the consequence: if remand is for a specified purpose, proceedings inconsistent with that purpose are error. This supports the district court’s decision to restrict off-topic matters.
  • The Court expressly labels this framework the “mandate rule” and ties it to the law-of-the-case doctrine, citing secondary authority and federal cases: 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 684, Bay v. Anadarko E&P Onshore LLC, 73 F.4th 1207 (10th Cir. 2023), and SOLIDFX, LLC v. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc., 823 F. App'x 559 (10th Cir. 2020). These citations reinforce that the doctrine bars relitigation of both express and implied determinations.
  • For “greatest force on remand,” the Court cites Stevens v. Governing Body of Town of Saratoga, 2025 WY 35, 566 P.3d 166 (Wyo. 2025) and Anesthesiology Consultants of Cheyenne, LLC v. Stevens, 2020 WY 67, 464 P.3d 584 (Wyo. 2020), confirming that prior legal determinations bind successive stages and constrain district-court action.
  • On the breadth of what is barred, the Court relies on Anesthesiology Consultants of Cheyenne, LLC (citing Entek GRB, LLC v. Stull Ranches, LLC, 840 F.3d 1239 (10th Cir. 2016)) to make explicit that even “impliedly resolved” issues cannot be revived on remand.
  • The “no second bite at the apple” theme is supported by Harris v. City Cycle Sales, Inc., 112 F.4th 1272 (10th Cir. 2024) and Decker v. State ex rel. Wyo. Med. Comm'n, 2008 WY 100, 191 P.3d 105 (Wyo. 2008). This undercuts Sorum’s attempt to use the remand as a vehicle for re-arguing broader defenses and unrelated claims.
  • The method of identifying the “mandate” is supported by Trentadue v. United States, 244 F. App'x 874 (10th Cir. 2007) and Procter & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 317 F.3d 1121 (10th Cir. 2003): the mandate includes the concluding instructions and the opinion that precedes them. The Wyoming Supreme Court uses this to interpret Sorum I as authorizing evidence only “on that issue” (the guarantee).

How these precedents influence the holding: Together, they justify the district court’s strict scoping of the remand hearing, validate the motion in limine aimed at excluding off-remand content, and support the Supreme Court’s conclusion that limiting evidence to the oral guarantee was not only permitted, but required.

B. Standards of review: discretion, clear error, and credibility

  • Strong Constr., Inc. v. City of Torrington, 2011 WY 82, 255 P.3d 903 (Wyo. 2011) (quoted in Sorum I) provides the “clearly erroneous” framework for bench findings: deference to credibility assessments, no reweighing, and reversal only with a firm conviction of mistake.
  • Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion under Sorum I and Lyman v. Childs, 2023 WY 16, 524 P.3d 744 (Wyo. 2023). The Court adds articulation of “judicial discretion” and “bounds of reason” from Williams v. Gage, 2026 WY 30, 585 P.3d 183 (Wyo. 2026) (quoting Hale v. City of Laramie, 2025 WY 133, 580 P.3d 516 (Wyo. 2025)), and the operative appellate question (“could reasonably conclude”) from Hutton v. Dykes, 2025 WY 94, 575 P.3d 334 (Wyo. 2025) (quoting Holloway v. Hidden Creek Outfitters, LLC, 2025 WY 59, 569 P.3d 756 (Wyo. 2025)).
  • The appellant’s burden to show abuse of discretion comes from Robinson v. Black, 2025 WY 25, 564 P.3d 1030 (Wyo. 2025) and Lackey v. Lackey, 2022 WY 22, 503 P.3d 92 (Wyo. 2022).
  • Deference to trial-court credibility determinations is reinforced by Dykes v. Hutton, 2026 WY 78 (citing McAdam v. McAdam, 2014 WY 123, 335 P.3d 466 (Wyo. 2014)), Van Vlack v. Van Vlack, 2024 WY 130, 560 P.3d 268 (Wyo. 2024), and the rationale from Hoy v. Miller, 2006 WY 147, 146 P.3d 488 (Wyo. 2006) (demeanor evidence).
  • The Court’s refusal to substitute its judgment on credibility draws from Meima v. Broemmel, 2005 WY 87, 117 P.3d 429 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting Wallop v. Wallop, 2004 WY 46, 88 P.3d 1022 (Wyo. 2004)), and its refusal to reweigh evidence is supported by Lyman v. Childs.

C. Oral contracts (including oral guarantees): elements, definiteness, and proof

  • The Court frames existence/terms/intent of oral contracts as factual questions using Positive Progressions, LLC v. Landerman, 2015 WY 138, 360 P.3d 1006 (Wyo. 2015) (quoting Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of Com., 868 P.2d 211 (Wyo. 1994)).
  • The fact/law boundary in oral-contract interpretation is drawn from Moncecchi v. McKellar, Tiedeken & Scoggin, LLC, 2026 WY 50, 588 P.3d 447 (Wyo. 2026).
  • The plaintiff’s burden to establish existence is supported by Davidson-Eaton v. Iverson, 2022 WY 135, 519 P.3d 626 (Wyo. 2022) (citing Belden v. Thorkildsen, 2008 WY 145, 197 P.3d 148 (Wyo. 2008)).
  • The Court treats an “oral guarantee” as simply an oral contract, applying ordinary contract law under Summit Constr. v. Koontz, 2024 WY 68, 550 P.3d 106 (Wyo. 2024) and Cross, 2026 WY 75.
  • For clear-error review of the district court’s finding that an oral contract existed, the Court cites Cross, 2026 WY 75 (quoting Hunter v. Reece, 2011 WY 97, 253 P.3d 497 (Wyo. 2011)).
  • The definiteness requirement is drawn from Davidson-Eaton v. Iverson (citing Fuger v. Wagoner, 2020 WY 154, 478 P.3d 176 (Wyo. 2020)) and Fowler v. Fowler, 933 P.2d 502 (Wyo. 1997), with the caution that courts cannot supply essential terms. The Court also relies on Cross, 2026 WY 75 for the principle that not every term must be in “minute detail,” and that law disfavors invalidating agreements for indefiniteness when intent is reasonably ascertainable.
  • The elements—offer, acceptance, consideration, and mutual assent—are supported by Cross, 2026 WY 75, Kappes v. Rhodes, 2022 WY 82, 512 P.3d 31 (Wyo. 2022), and Summit Constr. v. Koontz.
  • Consideration analysis is supported by Mantle v. N. Star Energy & Constr. LLC, 2019 WY 29, 437 P.3d 758 (Wyo. 2019) and Carroll v. Bergen, 2002 WY 166, 57 P.3d 1209 (Wyo. 2002).

D. Waiver and inadequate appellate briefing (contextual constraints)

While not dispositive of the two merits issues, the Court’s narrowing of what it would review is consistent with its prior warnings about waiver and insufficient argument:

  • McInerney v. Kramer, 2023 WY 108, 537 P.3d 1146 (Wyo. 2023) is invoked to decline issues lacking cogent argument/authority, even for pro se litigants.
  • The opinion’s footnote underscores waiver of personal-jurisdiction objections if not timely raised, citing Hopeful v. Etchepare, L.L.C., 2023 WY 33A, 528 P.3d 414 (Wyo. 2023) (citing Pilcher v. Elliott, 2020 WY 130, 473 P.3d 1251 (Wyo. 2020) and Cotton v. Brow, 903 P.2d 530 (Wyo. 1995)). This reinforces that limited remand is not a platform to resurrect waived defenses.

Legal Reasoning

1. The district court properly constrained the remand hearing to the mandate

The Court treated the remand question as one of mandate compliance: what did Sorum I actually authorize? It read the remand instruction holistically—introductory summary, substantive discussion, and conclusion—emphasizing the explicit limitation: “Remand is limited to reconsideration of the personal guarantee and providing the parties an opportunity to introduce evidence on that issue.” From that, the Court derived two operational rules:

  1. The district court must allow Sorum to testify about the guarantee (the error identified in Sorum I).
  2. The district court may admit additional evidence only if relevant to that issue; everything else (e.g., statute of frauds arguments, lease-party disputes, counterclaims) is outside remand scope or barred by law of the case.

Critically, the Court rejected Sorum’s framing that the district court “refused” his exhibits. The record showed the court repeatedly invited exhibit use (emails, documents) if tied to the existence/terms of the guarantee. At the hearing, the judge specifically asked whether Sorum wished to present anything further, including evidence; Sorum did not offer exhibits for admission. On that record, there was no exclusionary ruling to review. The Court added that even if relevant exhibits had been offered, admissibility would remain discretionary under evidentiary standards (citing Belden v. Thorkildsen, 2008 WY 145, 197 P.3d 148 (Wyo. 2008)).

2. The personal oral guarantee was an enforceable oral contract, proven by credited testimony

The Court’s second holding flows from orthodox contract analysis coupled with appellate deference to fact-finding. It reiterated (as it had in Sorum I) that the personal guarantee was “a separate, distinct oral contract” and not a modification of the written leases. This doctrinal separation matters: defenses that might defeat personal liability on the written leases (e.g., corporate veil/personal non-party status) do not necessarily defeat liability on a later personal promise supported by new consideration.

Applying Cross, 2026 WY 75, Kappes v. Rhodes, and related cases, the Court located evidence of:

  • Offer: Sikorski testified that Sorum and Martinson said, in substance, if necessary “we’ll make sure you get paid” and would pay “personally.”
  • Acceptance: Sikorski accepted by agreeing to store their specialized equipment in his shop without charge and by continuing to provide tanks/services.
  • Consideration: The bargain included Sikorski’s uncompensated storage services and continued performance in exchange for a new personal payment commitment not previously owed by Sorum individually (supported by Mantle v. N. Star Energy & Constr. LLC and Carroll v. Bergen).
  • Definiteness: The promise was tethered to “known contract terms” (the leases) and ongoing, well-known charges; under Davidson-Eaton v. Iverson, Fuger v. Wagoner, and Fowler v. Fowler, the court could ascertain what performance was required without inventing essential terms.

Sorum’s primary appellate response—that Sikorski’s testimony lacked corroboration—failed because the Court treated sworn testimony as evidence and deferred to the trial judge’s credibility determinations. The district court explicitly found Sorum “not credible” and found Sikorski’s account “more credible and realistic.” Under Dykes v. Hutton, 2026 WY 78, Van Vlack v. Van Vlack, Hoy v. Miller, and Meima v. Broemmel, the Supreme Court refused to reweigh that conflict and held the finding was not clearly erroneous.

Impact

  • Sharper enforcement of limited remands: The decision reinforces that “limited” means limited in practice: parties cannot use remand to relitigate already decided issues, revive waived defenses, or expand the record on unrelated topics. District judges are encouraged to manage remand hearings with motions in limine and explicit relevance rulings to ensure “substantial compliance” with the mandate.
  • Practical burden for appellants alleging evidence exclusion: The opinion underscores a procedural reality: an appellant must show an actual offer of evidence and an actual adverse ruling. Complaints that documents “could have been admitted” are unlikely to succeed if the record shows the party did not move to admit them when invited.
  • Oral guarantees as independent contracts: By reiterating (from Sorum I) that a personal guarantee can be separate from underlying written contracts, the decision may be cited to support personal liability where new consideration is exchanged and terms are ascertainable by reference to known obligations.
  • Proof through testimony and credibility: The case signals that corroboration is not categorically required for an oral contract; the finder of fact may credit one witness over another. On appeal, that crediting is extremely hard to disturb under the clearly erroneous standard.
  • Pro se limits: The Court’s reliance on McInerney v. Kramer and waiver principles reinforces that self-representation does not relax briefing requirements, preservation rules, or the mandate’s constraints.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Limited remand
When an appellate court sends a case back for one specific task (here, to allow testimony/evidence about the oral guarantee), the district court may not reopen other issues. It has jurisdiction only for the remanded purpose.
Mandate rule
A district court must follow the appellate court’s instructions and the opinion’s purpose. It cannot do something inconsistent with what the appellate court directed.
Law of the case
Legal decisions already made in the same case—especially by an appellate court—are binding later in the same litigation. On remand, this prevents re-arguing settled points.
Motion in limine
A pre-hearing request to limit or exclude certain evidence or topics. Here it was used to keep the remand hearing focused on the oral guarantee.
Abuse of discretion
A deferential review standard for evidentiary/ruling choices. An appellate court asks whether the trial court could reasonably reach the decision, not whether the appellate court would have decided differently.
Clearly erroneous
A very deferential standard for factual findings after a bench trial. The appellate court will not reverse unless, after reviewing the entire record, it has a firm conviction a mistake was made.
Oral contract / oral guarantee
A binding agreement can be made verbally if there is an offer, acceptance, and consideration, and the essential terms are definite enough to enforce. The promise can be proven by credible testimony.
Consideration
The “exchange” that makes a promise enforceable—each side gives something of value (money, services, forbearance, or taking on a new obligation).

Conclusion

2026 WY 91 solidifies two practical rules. First, on a limited remand, the district court must hew closely to the appellate mandate and may properly exclude evidence and arguments outside the remanded issue, consistent with the mandate rule and law-of-the-case doctrine. Second, a personal oral guarantee may be enforced as a separate oral contract when its terms are definite by reference to known obligations and when the factfinder credits testimony establishing offer, acceptance, and consideration. The decision’s broader significance lies in its strict approach to remand discipline and its reaffirmation that credibility-based findings about oral agreements are rarely reversible on appeal.