Unread Promissory Notes: Clear Attorney’s-Fees Terms Remain Enforceable Without Prior Discussion

Case: Joan Falcao v. Mitchel Richardson
Citation: 2024 Vt. 78
Court: Supreme Court of Vermont
Decided: November 27, 2024
Opinion by: Justice Carroll

1. Introduction

In Joan Falcao v. Mitchel Richardson, the Vermont Supreme Court reaffirmed that signing an unambiguous agreement ordinarily binds the signer to its written terms, even when the signer does not read them and the parties never discussed a particular provision. Applying that principle, the Court enforced a promissory note containing a collection-related attorney’s-fees clause and rejected the trial court’s conclusion that the parties’ informal relationship justified disregarding the document.

Joan Falcao and her partner owned Health Hero Farm LLC, which owned a Vermont beef farm. The farm had originally been purchased with an experienced local farming family through the Vermont Land Trust. When that relationship deteriorated, Falcao and her partner arranged to buy out the family. Because the Land Trust retained a conservation easement and an agricultural-value purchase option, they considered the involvement of another experienced farmer important to obtaining approval of the buyout.

Mitchel Richardson, an auto-repair business owner who also raised cattle, became their friend and farming collaborator. Although no formal partnership agreement emerged, Falcao represented to others that Richardson was becoming a partner. The parties later agreed to acquire Galloway cattle, with Falcao advancing the purchase money.

The resulting dispute raised three connected questions: whether Richardson’s signature bound him to an unread attorney’s-fees provision; whether the circumstances made the note adhesive or unconscionable; and whether the trial court could substitute unjust-enrichment relief for enforcement of the written agreement.

2. Facts, Proceedings, and Decision

The signed note

Falcao insisted on documenting the cattle transaction. Richardson rejected an initial proposal involving purchase, boarding, reimbursement, and shared farming resources. He also rejected a proposed “simple promissory note,” whose terms were not in the record, expressing a preference for a handshake agreement.

Falcao subsequently wired $16,000 to the Canadian breeder. On his way to collect the cattle, Richardson stopped at the farm and signed paperwork that included another promissory note. Falcao asked whether he intended to read the papers. Richardson declined, invoking his trust in her, and signed without reading. The note required reimbursement of the purchase price and payment of collection-related attorney’s fees upon default.

The trial court’s approach

After the relationship deteriorated and Richardson moved the cattle to his property, Falcao sued to enforce the note. Following a three-day bench trial, the superior court declined to enforce it. The court emphasized that the parties had not discussed attorney’s fees and concluded that the note did not accurately reflect their agreement. It also characterized the document as a contract of adhesion presented among other papers by someone in a stronger negotiating position.

Instead, the court awarded Falcao $16,000 plus prejudgment interest for unjust enrichment. Its reasoning was that Richardson should not retain the cattle without compensating her, even though the written agreement would not be enforced.

The Supreme Court’s ruling

The Supreme Court reversed the ruling concerning the promissory note. It held that the note was unambiguous, Richardson’s signature manifested agreement to its terms, and the circumstances did not establish adhesion or unconscionability. Because an enforceable agreement governed the transaction, resort to unjust enrichment was erroneous.

The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with enforcement of the note. The Court did not determine an attorney’s-fees amount. It also left undisturbed matters not contested on appeal, including counterclaims and the rejection of both parties’ Prompt Pay Act claims.

3. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

A. Standards of review and interpretation

Theberge v. Theberge, 2020 VT 13, ¶ 7

This decision supplies the deferential standard for factual findings concerning the existence of a contract: such findings are reviewed for clear error, viewed favorably to the prevailing party below. Its significance lies in distinguishing factual questions from the legal consequences of the signed note. The Supreme Court could resolve the appeal without overturning the disputed factual findings.

Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Allstates Air Cargo, Inc., 2003 VT 8, ¶ 7

This case establishes that contract interpretation, including ambiguity and unconscionability, presents questions of law reviewed de novo. It authorized the Court to make its own assessment of the note’s legal effect while using the trial court’s valid factual findings.

Dep't of Corr. v. Matrix Health Sys., P.C., 2008 VT 32, ¶ 12

The Court relied on this precedent for the principle that interpretation seeks to implement the parties’ intent, but clear contractual language ordinarily embodies that intent. This approach prevented informal expectations from displacing the unambiguous written undertaking.

Beldock v. VWSD, LLC, 2023 VT 35, ¶¶ 27, 78

Beldock served two related purposes. Paragraph 27 supports enforcement of unambiguous language as a matter of law. Paragraph 78 explains that unjust enrichment supplies relief when no enforceable contract exists but fairness requires compensation. Once the note was held enforceable, the premise for substituting unjust-enrichment relief disappeared.

Isbrandtsen v. N. Branch Corp., 150 Vt. 575, 577 (1988)

This case defines ambiguity by asking whether reasonable people could differ about a provision’s interpretation. Neither party disputed what the note’s terms meant. Richardson’s lack of awareness of those terms was therefore not a question of ambiguity.

B. Assent and responsibility for unread terms

Sweet v. St. Pierre, 2018 VT 122, ¶ 12

Sweet states that an enforceable contract requires a meeting of the minds through offer and acceptance. The Court recognized that requirement but rejected the implication that every written term must have been separately discussed or consciously considered before signing.

HETCHKOP v. WOODLAWN AT GRASSMERE, Inc., 116 F.3d 28, 34 (2d Cir. 1997)

The Court cited Hetchkop for a contracting party’s basic responsibility to review a document before signing it. That responsibility was particularly relevant because Falcao expressly invited Richardson to read the paperwork.

Lamoille Grain Co v. St. Johnsbury & Lamoille Ctny. R.R., 135 Vt. 5, 8–9 (1976)

This Vermont precedent supports several central propositions: signing without reading ordinarily means accepting the document’s terms; some bargaining disparity is common; and unfair surprise depends on whether a party had a reasonable opportunity to understand the agreement or whether important terms were obscured by fine print and deceptive practices. It connected the duty to read with the limits of unconscionability.

Johnson v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 108 Vt. 269, 281 (1936)

Johnson establishes that parties are charged with knowledge of their contracts and bound by clear, unambiguous terms. It reinforced the distinction between Richardson’s actual knowledge and the legal consequences of his signature.

Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U.S. 45, 50 (1875)

This longstanding authority rejects a signer’s attempt to avoid contractual obligations merely by asserting that the document was unread or its contents unknown. It directly supported rejection of Richardson’s failure-to-read defense.

Silva v. Encyc. Britannica Inc., 239 F.3d 385, 389 (1st Cir. 2001)

Silva supplies the proposition that parties need not bargain separately over every written term. It answered the trial court’s concern that the attorney’s-fees clause had not been discussed before signing: lack of individualized negotiation did not make the provision unenforceable.

C. Unconscionability, adhesion, and meaningful choice

MAGLIN v. TSCHANNERL, 174 Vt. 39, 45–46 (2002)

Maglin recognizes unconscionability as a possible basis for setting aside an otherwise binding agreement, but holds that unequal bargaining power alone is insufficient. The relevant concern is whether that disparity coerced agreement because no meaningful alternative existed. Its discussion of a person’s ability to decline or postpone signing supported the conclusion that Richardson retained a genuine choice.

IN RE PALMER, 171 Vt. 464, 474 (2000)

This decision identifies both substantive unfairness and formation-related circumstances as relevant to unconscionability. The Court consequently examined not only the fee clause itself but also Richardson’s opportunity to read, negotiate, or refuse the note.

VAL PREDA LEASING, INC. v. RODRIGUEZ, 149 Vt. 129, 135 (1987)

Cited through IN RE PALMER, this authority supports considering unequal bargaining power and lack of an opportunity to read when assessing unconscionability. Its role was doctrinal; the opinion did not undertake a separate factual comparison with that case.

KPC Corp. v. Book Press, Inc., 161 Vt. 145, 151–52 (1993)

KPC Corp. directs attention to business experience, education, opportunity to understand the contract, and concealment in fine print when evaluating unfair surprise. The Court used that framework to distinguish being unaware of a provision from being unfairly prevented from discovering it.

KLOS v. LOTNICZE, 133 F.3d 164, 168–69 (2d Cir. 1997)

This decision associates adhesion with gross bargaining inequality and high-pressure tactics or deceptive language. It also supports enforcing clear contractual language absent unfairness, undue oppression, or unconscionability. Those features were not established here.

Glassford v. Brickkicker, 2011 VT 118, ¶ 13

The Court cited Glassford as a contrast: an arbitration clause was unconscionable where binding-arbitration costs would exceed the liability limit. It illustrates substantive unfairness in the operation of a contractual remedy. No comparable defect was identified in this note.

Mongeon Bay Props. LLC v. Mallet's Bay Homeowner's Ass'n, 2016 VT 64, ¶ 43

This precedent rejects a categorical rule invalidating unilateral attorney fee-shifting clauses. Accordingly, the fact that the note required Richardson to pay Falcao’s collection-related fees did not, by itself, establish substantive unconscionability.

D. Issues unnecessary to decide

FERRIS v. FERRIS, 140 Vt. 12, 16 (1981)

Ferris supports declining to decide additional issues when other grounds adequately dispose of the case. The Court therefore did not determine whether the trial court clearly erred in finding that attorney’s fees had not been discussed. Even accepting that finding, the signed note remained enforceable.

E. Secondary authorities

The Court also cited Williston on Contracts for the general rule binding a signer despite ignorance of a document’s terms, and Black’s Law Dictionary for the definition of a contract of adhesion. These authorities supplemented the cases; the decision ultimately rested on the note’s clarity, the significance of Richardson’s signature, and the absence of coercive or substantively unfair circumstances.

4. Legal Reasoning

A. Clear language governed the parties’ obligations

The Court’s starting point was that no interpretive uncertainty existed. The parties did not advance competing reasonable readings of the note. The dispute instead concerned whether Richardson should be bound by an obligation he had not read and that had not been orally negotiated.

That distinction was decisive. Ambiguity concerns what contractual language means; unfamiliarity concerns whether a party knew what the language said. A signer’s unfamiliarity does not itself make the agreement ambiguous or permit a court to substitute an understanding drawn from the parties’ friendship.

B. Signature manifested assent without term-by-term discussion

The Court treated Richardson’s signature as an objective manifestation of acceptance. Requiring proof that he subjectively considered each provision would undermine the settled rule that parties must review documents before signing.

Richardson’s decision to rely on trust did not shift that responsibility to Falcao. Particularly significant was her invitation to read the papers. On these facts, his lack of knowledge resulted from choosing not to review an available document, rather than from being denied access to its terms.

The opinion thus rejects a requirement of separate oral approval for attorney’s-fees clauses. The written proposal itself could introduce that obligation, and signing could accept it.

C. The circumstances did not establish adhesion or coercion

The Court rejected the trial court’s reliance on superior bargaining power for several reasons:

  • Richardson had previously refused proposals. His rejection of two earlier arrangements demonstrated awareness that he could decline Falcao’s terms.
  • Leverage was not exclusively financial. Richardson’s farming experience was important to Health Hero Farm’s continued operation, giving him bargaining significance despite Falcao’s financing role.
  • No compulsion was shown. His desire to purchase the cattle did not establish that he lacked a meaningful alternative to signing.
  • Reading remained possible. The papers’ presentation together did not establish unfair surprise where he could inspect them and was encouraged to do so.

The Court did not hold that financial disparity is irrelevant. Rather, disparity must be connected to coercion, oppression, or a genuine absence of meaningful choice before it justifies refusing enforcement.

D. The fee provision was not substantively unconscionable

The attorney’s-fees term was not hidden in fine print, and the Court found it neither substantively unfair nor unreasonably favorable to Falcao. Its unilateral character did not automatically invalidate it under Vermont precedent.

This was a contextual conclusion, not a blanket endorsement of every collection-fee clause. The opinion establishes that this provision, in these circumstances, supplied no basis for refusing enforcement.

E. Context remained relevant to enforceability

An important limit is that the Court did not disregard all surrounding circumstances simply because the note was clear. It examined those circumstances extensively when assessing unconscionability. The distinction is between using informal expectations to override clear obligations and using formation evidence to evaluate a recognized defense to enforcement.

F. Equity could not replace the enforceable bargain

The trial court’s unjust-enrichment award prevented Richardson from receiving the cattle without repayment, but omitted the contractual collection remedy. Once the note was held enforceable, fairness-based restitution could not substitute for the parties’ governing agreement. The reversal therefore mattered even though Falcao had already received an award equal to the purchase price: the written bargain included an additional obligation concerning enforcement costs.

5. Potential Impact

Greater certainty for informal lending. The decision confirms that written repayment terms retain legal force even when a transaction originates in friendship or informal collaboration. Courts should not treat personal trust as a substitute for the signed agreement.

A more focused unconscionability inquiry. Future litigants will need evidence connecting bargaining disparities to actual unfairness, coercion, inadequate opportunity to review, or oppressive terms. A stronger financial position, standing alone, will not suffice.

Protection for written collection remedies. Creditors may rely on clear attorney’s-fees provisions without proving that each clause was separately negotiated. Nevertheless, this decision does not establish the amount recoverable under any particular provision or eliminate the need for further proceedings on a fee request.

Limits on equitable substitution. Trial courts must first determine whether an enforceable contract governs before replacing contractual relief with unjust enrichment. An equitable award that returns the principal may still fail to honor the parties’ enforceable allocation of collection costs.

The opinion principally reinforces and applies established Vermont doctrine rather than creating an entirely new duty to read. Its distinctive contribution is the application of that doctrine to an unread fee provision in a friendship-based farming transaction.

6. Complex Concepts Simplified

Promissory note
A written promise to repay money, potentially including additional obligations such as collection costs.
Objective assent
Agreement shown through outward conduct, such as signing, rather than a person’s undisclosed understanding.
Ambiguity
Language reasonably capable of different interpretations. Not reading a clear term does not make it ambiguous.
Contract of adhesion
A contract imposed by a stronger party in circumstances offering little meaningful choice. The Court found that description unsupported here.
Procedural unconscionability
Unfairness in how an agreement is obtained, such as coercion, deceptive presentation, or a meaningful inability to review its terms.
Substantive unconscionability
Unfairness in the obligations themselves. The opinion considers both formation and substantive fairness without announcing that both must always be proved.
Unjust enrichment
A fairness-based remedy for benefits retained without adequate compensation when no enforceable contract governs the claim.
De novo review
Independent appellate review of a legal question without deference to the trial court’s legal conclusion.
Remand
Returning the case to the trial court for further proceedings under the appellate court’s ruling.

7. Conclusion

Joan Falcao v. Mitchel Richardson confirms that an unread but unambiguous promissory note may bind its signer to an attorney’s-fees provision that was never separately discussed. Friendship, trust, and unequal financial resources did not overcome Richardson’s signature where he could read or reject the agreement and no unconscionability was established.

The broader lesson is a disciplined separation of interpretation, assent, and enforceability: clear text defines the obligation, signature ordinarily manifests acceptance, and a supported legal defense—not informal expectations alone—is needed to defeat enforcement.