Date: Apr 16, 2026

Unmarked Low-Speed Vehicle Ramming and Split-Second Shooting: Fact Disputes Bar Summary Judgment Under Graham

I. Introduction

In Jeffery Payne v. Joshua Moser (Fourth Circuit, Apr. 13, 2026), the court addressed whether a police supervisor’s decisions during a failed controlled-buy operation—(1) directing detectives in unmarked vehicles to stop a suspect car through coordinated vehicle-contact tactics and (2) moments later shooting the suspect through a tinted window—could be resolved on summary judgment as objectively reasonable force under the Fourth Amendment.

The parties are Jeffery Payne (plaintiff-appellant), the targeted suspect in a planned narcotics sting, and Sergeant Joshua Moser (defendant-appellee), who rode in one of the unmarked vehicles, radioed instructions to “effect [Payne’s] arrest,” exited, shined a flashlight into Payne’s car, and fired one shot. Payne was later determined to be unarmed.

The key issues were: (a) whether the vehicle “TVI”/“PIT” tactics used to stop Payne constituted excessive force (potentially deadly force) given the circumstances; (b) whether the shooting was justified by a reasonable perception of an imminent threat; and (c) whether factual disputes required a jury to decide these issues rather than the court at summary judgment.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded. It held that the record contained genuine disputes of material fact concerning both categories of force: (1) Moser’s direction to stop Payne’s car using tactical vehicle intercept and ramming tactics, and (2) the subsequent shooting.

Applying the summary-judgment standard requiring the court to view evidence in the light most favorable to Payne, the panel concluded that a jury could find the vehicle-contact stop objectively unreasonable—particularly where Payne was driving slowly, in unmarked conditions, without lights/sirens activated before the first maneuver, and without an apparent public-safety emergency. The panel also held that the shooting could not be resolved as reasonable as a matter of law because there was a material factual dispute about whether Payne made a “furtive or threatening movement” (reaching toward the console) that could justify deadly force.

The court did not decide qualified immunity, instructing that the district court must consider it on remand because it had not reached that issue after finding no constitutional violation.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Summary-judgment discipline: courts cannot weigh credibility

Estate of Jones by Jones v. City of Martinsburg (961 F.3d 661): supplied the framing rule that facts are recounted in the nonmovant’s favor at summary judgment.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. (477 U.S. 242): provided the definitions of “material fact” and “genuine dispute.”
Henry v. Purnell (652 F.3d 524) (en banc) and Hensley ex rel. North Carolina v. Price (876 F.3d 573): reinforced that courts may not credit the movant’s evidence or resolve factual disputes in the movant’s favor at summary judgment.
Knibbs v. Momphard (30 F.4th 200): emphasized that credibility determinations are for juries, and also illustrated how officer identification can matter in reasonableness analysis.
Alexander v. Connor (105 F.4th 174), relying on Harris v. Pittman (927 F.3d 266) and Scott v. Harris (550 U.S. 372): limited when a court may reject a plaintiff’s account as “blatantly and demonstrably false,” typically requiring objective evidence (like video) of undisputed authenticity.
Milla v. Brown (109 F.4th 222): restated the de novo standard of review for summary judgment on appeal.
Penson v. Ohio (488 U.S. 75): cited in a cautionary footnote about counsel’s obligation to provide usable record citations; while not substantive to the constitutional holding, it underscores procedural expectations at summary judgment.

2. Fourth Amendment excessive force framework

Tennessee v. Garner (471 U.S. 1): supplied the principle that how a seizure is carried out matters and that deadly force requires probable cause of a threat of serious physical harm.
Graham v. Connor (490 U.S. 386): provided the controlling “objective reasonableness” test and the three Graham factors; also cautioned against hindsight in split-second policing decisions.
Estate of Armstrong ex rel. Armstrong v. Vill. of Pinehurst (810 F.3d 892) and Smith v. Ray (781 F.3d 95): were used for the “careful balancing” formulation and to explain how crime severity can act as a proxy for dangerousness, including attention to nonviolent offenses.
Culosi v. Bullock (596 F.3d 195): anchored the time-slice rule—reasonableness is judged by the information the officer possessed “at the moment the force is employed.”
Lewis v. Caraballo (98 F.4th 521) and Benton v. Layton (139 F.4th 281): reiterated that probable cause to arrest does not authorize excessive force and highlighted that the “immediate threat” factor is typically the most important.
Armstrong. v. Hutcheson (80 F.4th 508): cited for the proposition that objective reasonableness is treated as a question of law at summary judgment—once facts are fixed in the nonmovant’s favor.

3. Vehicle ramming as a seizure and potentially deadly force

Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo (489 U.S. 593): supported that intentional means of stopping a vehicle can constitute a seizure.
Scott v. Harris (550 U.S. 372): illustrated when vehicle ramming is reasonable—terminating a “dangerous high-speed car chase” threatening the public.
Abney v. Coe (493 F.3d 412): recognized that ramming can be “deadly force” in some instances and upheld ramming in the context of a dangerous pursuit.
Pasco ex rel. Pasco v. Knoblauch (566 F.3d 572) and Moore-Jones v. Quick (909 F.3d 983): were cited as examples where courts found ramming tactics reasonable when suspects were fleeing at high speeds/erratically after law enforcement signaling.
Sabbe v. Washington Cnty. Bd. of Commissioners (84 F.4th 807): used for the proposition that failure to warn or provide direction before potentially deadly force can weigh against officers under the Graham analysis.

4. Deadly force and “furtive movement” limits

Franklin v. City of Charlotte (64 F.4th 519): supported that an officer’s reasonable but mistaken belief about a threat can still justify force.
Cooper v. Doyle (163 F.4th 64) and Knibbs v. Momphard (30 F.4th 200): supplied the rule emphasized by the panel: “simply being armed” is not enough for deadly force absent a furtive or threatening movement indicating imminent use.
Aleman v. City of Charlotte (80 F.4th 264), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 1032 (2024): provided the direct analogue—summary judgment is inappropriate where there is a genuine dispute whether the person made a threatening/furtive movement before being shot.
Anderson v. Russell (247 F.3d 125): distinguished as a case involving “minor discrepancies” where evidence conclusively supported the officer’s reasonable perception; here, the dispute over reaching toward the console was deemed material, not minor.

5. Supervisor/causation liability under § 1983

Amisi v. Brooks (93 F.4th 659): supported the principle that § 1983 liability reaches one who “causes” a deprivation, not only the actor who physically applies force—critical to analyzing Moser’s direction to employ TVI/PIT tactics even though he was not driving.

6. Qualified immunity framework (reserved for remand)

Brown v. Elliott (876 F.3d 637), Case v. Beasley (167 F.4th 651), and Taylor v. Riojas (592 U.S. 7): supplied the “clearly established law” and “reasonable misapprehension” framing.
Gooden v. Howard Cnty. (954 F.2d 960) (en banc), Putman v. Harris (66 F.4th 181), and Barricks v. Wright (168 F.4th 210): reinforced the on-scene perspective and anti-hindsight principle within qualified immunity analysis.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The court treated the vehicle tactics and the shooting as distinct uses of force

The panel faulted the district court for not addressing the alleged excessive force stemming from the TVI/PIT vehicle-contact stop and for analyzing only the shooting. Consistent with Garner’s focus on “how [a seizure] is carried out,” the panel analyzed each application of force separately under Graham.

2. Vehicle ramming at low speed, in unmarked conditions, without prior signaling can be unreasonable on Payne’s version

The court accepted (for summary judgment purposes) Payne’s account that he did not know law enforcement was pursuing him until after his car was rammed, and that the vehicles were unmarked and did not activate lights/sirens before the initial vehicle stop maneuver. It then applied the Graham factors:

Severity of crime: suspected felony drug dealing weighed “slightly” toward the officer, but the nonviolent nature of the offense mitigated that weight.
Immediate threat (most important): on Payne’s evidence, he was driving slowly and posed no immediate danger to bystanders, distinguishing the case from Scott v. Harris and Abney v. Coe, which involved dangerous, high-speed pursuits.
Active resistance/flight: a jury could find Payne was not “evading arrest” because he lacked notice it was police. The panel treated police identification (lights, sirens, commands, recognizable presence) as relevant to reasonableness even if not formally required in every case.

On that view of the facts, the panel held the TVI/PIT use of force was not objectively reasonable as a matter of law, so summary judgment could not stand.

3. The shooting could not be resolved without deciding a central factual dispute: did Payne reach toward the console?

The opinion acknowledged that Moser reasonably relied on the informant’s repeated statements that Payne was “often armed,” but treated that as only part of the calculus. Citing Cooper v. Doyle and Knibbs v. Momphard, the court emphasized a limiting principle: even if a suspect may be armed, deadly force generally requires some “furtive or other threatening movement” suggesting imminent use.

Because Payne denied reaching and claimed his left hand stayed on the wheel/then by his side, while Moser claimed he saw Payne reach toward the center console, the panel held the dispute was material under Aleman v. City of Charlotte. Without objective evidence (e.g., video) to “blatantly” disprove Payne under Alexander v. Connor/Scott v. Harris, the court refused to credit Moser’s account at summary judgment.

4. Qualified immunity was expressly left open

Because the district court ended the case at the “no constitutional violation” step, the Fourth Circuit remanded for the district court to address qualified immunity “in the first instance,” including whether clearly established law covered each alleged use of force given the facts a jury could find.

C. Impact

Expanded scrutiny of vehicle-contact tactics outside high-speed pursuits: The opinion signals that TVI/PIT (and ramming) may be treated as potentially deadly force and may be unreasonable where the suspect is moving slowly, the public-danger rationale is absent, and officers have not signaled or identified themselves before impact.
Identification/notice becomes practically central in reasonableness: While not creating a categorical “warning required” rule, the panel made clear that failure to activate lights/sirens or otherwise make police presence known can meaningfully affect the Graham “flight/resistance” and “threat” analysis.
“Furtive movement” disputes will frequently defeat summary judgment in shootings: Where deadly force is justified by a claimed reach or threatening movement, and there is no objective footage resolving the dispute, this decision reinforces that juries—not judges—must often decide what happened.
Supervisory direction can be actionable force “causation”: By relying on Amisi v. Brooks, the court underscores that a supervisor who orders the use of force may face § 1983 exposure even if not the physical actor (here, ordering vehicle-contact tactics).
Procedural reminder to litigants: The court’s footnote (citing Penson v. Ohio) highlights the expectation that parties cite specific record materials rather than dumping entire transcripts—an admonition likely to influence summary-judgment practice.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Summary judgment: A pretrial ruling where the judge can decide the case only if no real dispute exists over facts that matter to the outcome. If reasonable jurors could disagree about key facts, the case must proceed.
“Genuine dispute of material fact”: A fact dispute is “material” if it could change who wins under the governing law, and “genuine” if a reasonable jury could side with the nonmoving party on that point.
Seizure (Fourth Amendment): Police “seize” a person when they intentionally stop or restrain freedom of movement. Intentionally stopping a car by contact tactics can qualify.
TVI / PIT: Vehicle tactics designed to prevent escape or immobilize a car. Because they can cause crashes and serious injury, courts may treat them as serious (sometimes deadly) force depending on context.
Deadly force: Force likely to cause death or serious bodily injury. Firearms are classic deadly force; vehicle ramming can also qualify depending on risk and circumstances.
Objective reasonableness: The constitutional test from Graham v. Connor: whether a reasonable officer, with the information available at the moment, would think the level of force used was appropriate.
Qualified immunity: A doctrine shielding officials from damages unless they violated a constitutional right that was “clearly established” at the time. Even if a right is violated, an officer may be immune if the law was not sufficiently clear in the specific context.
Judicial notice: A court’s acceptance of certain facts as true without requiring evidence, typically because they are not reasonably disputable (here, the definition of TVI/PIT from department policy).

V. Conclusion

Payne v. Moser reinforces two practical rules in Fourth Amendment litigation: (1) vehicle-contact stops (TVI/PIT/ramming) are not automatically reasonable simply because officers had probable cause—context like speed, public danger, and police identification can make such force disproportionate; and (2) shootings premised on a suspect’s alleged “furtive movement” generally cannot be resolved on summary judgment when the suspect squarely denies the movement and no objective evidence conclusively settles the dispute.

By vacating summary judgment and remanding—including for qualified-immunity analysis—the Fourth Circuit positions juries to decide contested “what happened” questions before courts decide whether the Fourth Amendment (and clearly established law) was violated under the facts the jury could find.