United States v. Ragano: Victim State of Mind Is Not an Element of § 894 and “Entrapment-Like” FBI-Cooperation Evidence May Be Excluded Under Rule 403

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Date: April 9, 2026
Disposition: Conviction affirmed (Summary Order; nonprecedential under 2d Cir. Local Rule 32.1.1)

1. Introduction

United States v. Ragano arises from a prosecution for extortionate collection of credit under 18 U.S.C. § 894(a)(1). The government alleged that John Ragano, after making a $150,000 loan to Vincent Martino at 1.5% interest per week (with interest payments not reducing principal), used implicit and explicit threats—directly and through an intermediary—to collect the debt.

A critical procedural backdrop was Ragano’s earlier prosecution in United States v. Alimena, No. 21-cr-466 (E.D.N.Y.), where he pleaded guilty to a related extortionate-collection conspiracy and later self-surrendered. The indictment in this case charged that, despite the earlier case and conditions of pretrial supervision, Ragano continued to pursue collection through extortionate means.

On appeal, Ragano pressed three principal issues: (i) insufficiency of evidence of “extortionate intent,” (ii) erroneous exclusion of June 7, 2023 text messages between Martino and the FBI, and (iii) alleged prosecutorial exploitation of that exclusion during rebuttal summation.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit affirmed. It held that:

  • The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, was sufficient for a rational jury to find that Ragano used (or attempted to use) “extortionate means” and intended to instill fear of harm in Martino in connection with collecting the loan.
  • The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the June 7 FBI–Martino texts, principally under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, given low probative value absent an entrapment defense and the risk of jury confusion.
  • The government’s rebuttal summation did not amount to plain-error prosecutorial misconduct and did not deny due process.

The court also rejected an argument based on “inconsistent verdicts,” emphasizing that acquittals on other counts neither undermine the conviction nor show evidentiary insufficiency.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence Framework

  • United States v. Wilkerson, 361 F.3d 717 (2d Cir. 2004): Cited for the proposition that a sufficiency challenger “bears a heavy burden.” The Ragano panel used this framing to reinforce the appellate deference owed to jury verdicts.
  • United States v. Thiam, 934 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2019): Supplies the core standard—whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements” beyond a reasonable doubt. The panel also quoted Thiam’s emphasis (in original) to underscore that the standard is intentionally defendant-unfriendly on appeal.
  • United States v. Willis, 14 F.4th 170 (2d Cir. 2021): Reinforces two operational rules of sufficiency review: draw permissible inferences for the government, resolve credibility for the verdict, and consider evidence “in its totality.” This was crucial because Ragano sought to isolate a single recorded exchange and recharacterize it as unrelated to debt collection.
  • United States v. Anderson, 747 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2014): Used to reject the defense’s alternative explanation of the July 5 conversation. Anderson supplies the principle that the government need not disprove every hypothesis of innocence; when inferences compete, the jury chooses.
  • United States v. Huezo, 546 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2008): Cited to reiterate “totality, not isolation” review—an explicit antidote to cherry-picking a single exchange.

B. What § 894 Requires—and What It Does Not

  • United States v. Lombardozzi, 491 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2007): Central to the court’s treatment of “extortionate intent.” Lombardozzi is cited for the requirement that the government prove the defendant intended to instill fear of harm in the victim borrower, and also for the separate principle (invoked later) that proof of the victim’s state of mind is not an element of the offense.
  • United States v. Sears, 544 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1976): Quoted to stress statutory focus: “it is the conduct of the defendant, not the victim's individual state of mind, to which the thrust of the statute is directed.” This precedent directly supported affirmance of the evidentiary exclusion—texts about Martino’s mindset and FBI interaction were peripheral to § 894 liability.

C. Inconsistent Verdicts and Acquittal on Related Counts

  • United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2001): Cited to show that acquittal on a substantive count does not negate conspiracy (and vice versa) because elements differ. Here, it undercut Ragano’s claim that acquittal on other counts “demonstrated” insufficiency.
  • United States v. Martinez, 110 F.4th 160 (2d Cir. 2024): Provides the modern statement that inconsistent verdicts do not permit attack on the conviction and that appellate review looks to evidence, not to the jury’s other verdicts. Martinez allowed the panel to dispatch the “three acquittals imply no threats” argument as legally irrelevant.

D. Evidentiary Standards and Rule 403 Deference

  • United States v. Skelos, 988 F.3d 645 (2d Cir. 2021): Supports the abuse-of-discretion standard for exclusion of evidence.
  • United States v. Litvak, 889 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2018): Adds the “manifestly erroneous” gloss—evidentiary rulings are reversed only in extreme cases.
  • United States v. Awadallah, 436 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2006): The doctrinal centerpiece for Rule 403 appellate review: so long as the district court “conscientiously balanced” probative value against prejudice/confusion, the result stands unless “arbitrary or irrational.” The Ragano panel relied on this to uphold exclusion even assuming hearsay concerns could be avoided.

E. Summation Misconduct and Plain Error

  • United States v. Williams, 690 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2012): Provides the “heavy burden” and due-process framing for summation misconduct, and, because no objection was made, the panel applied Williams’s “flagrant abuse” plain-error formulation.
  • United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 1998): Supports the principle that prosecutors may respond in rebuttal to defense allegations against the government.
  • United States v. Perez, 144 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 1998): Cited for the government’s greater leeway on witness credibility when the defense attacks credibility.
  • United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141 (2d Cir. 1989): Supports “broad latitude” for reasonable inferences in summation.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Applying § 894 to Implicit Threats and Intermediary Collection

The court anchored the statutory elements in the text of § 894(a)(1) and the definition of “extortionate means” in § 891(7), which expressly includes “implicit” threats of violence or other criminal harm. It then focused on whether the evidence permitted a finding that Ragano: (i) knowingly participated in using extortionate means and (ii) intended to instill fear of harm (per United States v. Lombardozzi).

Critically, the panel did not treat the July 5, 2023 recording as a standalone “smoking gun.” Instead, it accepted the government’s theory of continuity: earlier reputation evidence, prior relayed threats (“slap the sh** out of him”), use of an intermediary, and recorded collection interactions culminating in direct threats tied to repayment. With United States v. Willis and United States v. Huezo, the court emphasized that the jury could synthesize the record.

The July 5 exchange (“You owe me my f***ing money”; “So if I f***ing slap the sh** out of you, you're gonna tell on me?”) was treated as evidence of a threatened violent collection method, not mere angry banter.

Ragano’s alternative inference—that his threats were provoked solely by being accused of cooperation—was rejected under United States v. Anderson: where competing inferences exist, the jury’s choice governs on sufficiency review.

B. Why the FBI Texts Could Be Kept Out (Even If Not Hearsay)

The excluded evidence consisted of June 7, 2023 texts between Martino and FBI agents discussing setting a meeting at which the intermediary might threaten Martino or reveal Ragano’s frustration. Ragano argued the texts were highly relevant to negate intent and support the defense narrative.

The Second Circuit affirmed exclusion chiefly on relevance/probative-value grounds (absent entrapment) and Rule 403 risk:

  • No entrapment defense: The district court viewed the proffer as “through the back door” introduction of an “entrapment-like” theory—i.e., that government-involved planning provoked threatening language. Ragano expressly disavowed entrapment, weakening the texts’ legitimate probative purpose.
  • § 894 focuses on defendant’s conduct: Citing United States v. Lombardozzi and United States v. Sears, the panel reiterated that the victim borrower’s state of mind is not an element of extortionate collection of credit. Thus, evidence about Martino’s coordination with the FBI and his pre-meeting mindset had limited (and potentially distracting) bearing on whether Ragano made threats to collect.
  • Rule 403 balancing upheld: Under United States v. Awadallah, appellate review is highly deferential where the court conscientiously balances probative value against unfair prejudice/confusion. The panel endorsed the trial court’s view that introducing FBI planning texts risked jury diversion into “government misconduct” narratives not actually at issue.
  • Alternative means to impeach credibility remained: The district court permitted cross-examination about Martino’s cooperation, incentives, and the recorded July 5 encounter. That diminished the necessity of the texts as impeachment material and further reduced probative value.

C. Rebuttal Summation: Responsive Argument + Lack of Prejudice

The prosecutor argued that the notion Martino “concocted” the cooperation accusation to provoke Ragano was contradicted by evidence, and that Martino genuinely believed the accusation. Applying United States v. Williams plain-error review (no contemporaneous objection), the panel held:

  • The rebuttal was permissible response to defense attacks under United States v. Tocco, with credibility leeway under United States v. Perez and inference latitude under United States v. Casamento.
  • Even assuming tension with excluded texts, the remarks were not “flagrant abuse” and did not cause substantial prejudice—particularly because, as the prosecutor emphasized, Martino’s motivation “doesn’t matter” to the elements; Ragano’s actions do.

3.3. Impact

A. Practical Takeaways for § 894 Prosecutions

  • Totality-of-evidence narratives remain powerful: The decision reinforces that § 894 cases can be proved through a mosaic—reputation evidence, intermediaries, contextual statements, and culminating threats—rather than an isolated “classic” extortion demand.
  • Implicit threats are enough: The statutory definition of “extortionate means” and the court’s willingness to treat coded “street terminology” as threatening underscores that intimidation may be established without explicit “pay or else” language.

B. Evidentiary Strategy: Cooperation/Planning Materials Are Vulnerable Under Rule 403

  • When a defendant disclaims entrapment, materials that resemble entrapment proof (planning, “luring,” controlled meetings) may be deemed low-probative and high-confusion, and thus excluded.
  • The court’s reliance on United States v. Sears and United States v. Lombardozzi signals that attempts to litigate the victim’s subjective fear, motives, or FBI coordination will often be treated as collateral in § 894 trials.

C. Limits and Caution: Nonprecedential Form

Because this is a Second Circuit Summary Order, it “DO[ES] NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.” Nevertheless, it may influence litigation behavior: it reflects how the court is currently applying established standards (sufficiency deference, Rule 403 balancing, and plain-error review of summations) in § 894 contexts.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Extortionate collection of credit” (18 U.S.C. § 894): A federal crime targeting loan-sharking-type collection methods—using violence or threats (even implicit) to collect or attempt to collect a debt.
  • “Extortionate means” (18 U.S.C. § 891(7)): Not limited to explicit threats; it includes implied threats of violence or other criminal harm to person, property, or reputation.
  • “Extortionate intent”: The borrower need not actually be afraid; the government must show the defendant intended his conduct to instill fear of harm (per United States v. Lombardozzi).
  • Sufficiency-of-evidence review: Appellate courts do not re-try cases. They ask whether a rational jury could convict on the record, drawing inferences for the government and deferring to the jury on credibility (per United States v. Thiam and United States v. Willis).
  • Rule 403: Even relevant evidence may be excluded if its value is substantially outweighed by risks like unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.
  • Plain error (no objection at trial): A much harder standard for defendants; reversal typically requires an obvious, serious error that undermines the fairness and integrity of proceedings (as framed in United States v. Williams).

5. Conclusion

United States v. Ragano affirms a § 894 conviction by applying familiar Second Circuit principles with notable clarity: juries may infer extortionate intent from the full context of collection conduct, including intermediaries and implied violence; § 894 does not turn on the borrower’s subjective mindset; and cooperation-related communications with law enforcement can be excluded under Rule 403—especially where they risk importing an “entrapment-like” narrative that the defense disclaims.

The decision also underscores two appellate realities: inconsistent verdicts do not impeach a conviction, and unpreserved claims of summation misconduct almost never succeed absent truly egregious prejudice.