Undue Influence and Inter Vivos Trusts: Confidential-Relationship Evidence Can Defeat Summary Judgment; Trust Capacity Requires the Contractual Standard

1. Introduction

This Second Department decision arises from two related Surrogate’s Court proceedings in Orange County involving the estate plan of William P. Baird, who died in 2020 at age 101. The decedent had four children: three sons (W. Robert Baird, Allen Baird, and Charles Baird—collectively, the “Bairds”) and a daughter (Mary Louise Baird Cardelli). Mary’s daughter, Elizabeth Cardelli, joined Mary in contesting the estate plan (together, the “Cardellis”).

The dispute centers on a late-in-life change: a June 2019 will that treated all four children equally was followed by (i) an October 31, 2019 will that gave Mary a fixed sum while leaving the residue to the sons and naming only them as fiduciaries, and (ii) a November 29, 2019 revocable trust funded with the decedent’s personal property that mirrored the new dispositive scheme.

The key issues on appeal were whether summary judgment was properly granted to the proponents on: (a) due execution of the will; (b) testamentary capacity; (c) undue influence affecting the will; (d) contractual capacity to create the trust; and (e) undue influence affecting the trust. A procedural appellate issue also arose regarding reviewability of an intermediate order after entry of a decree.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Appellate Division largely agreed that the will’s execution and the decedent’s testamentary capacity were established as a matter of law, and that the trust-capacity claim failed even under the correct (contractual) standard. However, it held that the Cardellis raised triable issues of fact on undue influence with respect to both the will and the trust—particularly based on evidence that Allen exercised control over the decedent’s communications, finances, and care, and evidence suggesting isolation of the Cardellis and an unexplained departure from prior testamentary intent.

Procedurally, the court dismissed the direct appeal from portions of the Surrogate’s Court order because the decree admitting the will to probate terminated the right of direct appeal from that order, while still reviewing the issues via the appeal from the decree.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Result)

A. Appellate procedure: intermediate orders and decrees

• Matter of Aho, 39 NY2d 241, 248: The court applied the familiar rule that entry of a final decree terminates the right to a direct appeal from a prior order. Here, because the decree admitting the will to probate was entered, the Cardellis’ direct appeal from parts of the October 3, 2024 order was dismissed, with review instead occurring on appeal from the decree (also citing CPLR 5501[a][1]).

B. Due execution: presumptions and proof on summary judgment

• Matter of Biondo, 215 AD3d 675 and EPTL 3-2.1[a]: Used for the baseline proposition that the will proponent bears the burden to prove due execution in conformity with statutory formalities.
• Matter of Fiorentino, 224 AD3d 685: Reinforced the proponent’s summary-judgment showing where execution proof is supported by deposition testimony and documentary formalities.
• Matter of Armato, 199 AD3d 999 and Matter of Sabatelli, 161 AD3d 872: Central to the “presumption of regularity” when an attorney drafts and supervises the will execution and when an attestation clause and self-proving affidavit exist.

Applying these authorities, the court held the Bairds established due execution through the drafting/supervising attorney’s deposition testimony and the presence of an attestation clause and self-proving affidavit, and that the Cardellis did not raise a triable issue to rebut those presumptions.

C. Testamentary capacity: minimal threshold, time-of-execution focus

• Matter of Baldino, 230 AD3d 681 (quoting Matter of Robbins, 206 AD3d 739): Provided the familiar three-factor test: understanding the act of making a will, knowledge of property, and recognition of natural objects of bounty.
• Matter of Austin, 242 AD3d 739, Matter of Armato, 199 AD3d 999, and Matter of Sabatelli, 161 AD3d 872: Supported reliance on attesting-witness proof (including self-proving affidavits and deposition testimony) to establish capacity at the moment of execution.
• Matter of Romano, 137 AD3d 922 and Matter of Hedges, 100 AD2d 586: Used to confirm that objectants must come forward with evidence creating a factual dispute once proponents make a prima facie showing.

On this record, the court found testamentary capacity established as a matter of law and rejected the capacity objection to the will at the summary-judgment stage.

D. Undue influence: circumstantial proof, confidential relationships, and “unnatural” dispositions

• Matter of Rozof, 219 AD3d 1428 and Fischer v Reed, 224 AD3d 886: Framed both (i) the movant’s prima facie burden on summary judgment and (ii) the multi-factor, fact-intensive nature of undue-influence analysis. They also supply the confidential-relationship inference rule requiring an explanation of circumstances once such a relationship is shown.
• Matter of Walther, 6 NY2d 49: The foundational Court of Appeals authority for assessing undue influence through surrounding circumstances, including whether the instrument is “unnatural” or represents an unexplained departure from expressed intentions.
• Matter of Gobes, 189 AD3d 1402: Supported treating the existence of undue influence and confidential relationships as fact-laden inquiries, often inappropriate for summary disposition.

Although the Bairds met an initial prima facie burden negating undue influence, the court held the Cardellis’ evidence raised triable issues: alleged control by Allen over communications, finances, and care; alleged isolation of the Cardellis (including a claimed incident where Elizabeth was turned away and the home phone later disconnected); and the will’s apparent unexplained departure from the decedent’s prior equal-treatment plan. Under Matter of Rozof, Fischer v Reed, and Matter of Walther, these circumstances were sufficient to require a trial on undue influence. The same reasoning applied to the trust’s undue-influence claim.

E. Capacity to create a trust: contractual capacity standard controls

• Murphy v Hollins-Reid, 237 AD3d 839: Drove the court’s correction of the Surrogate’s Court error—trust validity is tested by contractual capacity, not testamentary capacity.
• Matter of Moore, 204 AD3d 1014: Supplied the operative formulation: competence is presumed; invalidation requires proof that the person did not understand the nature of the transaction at the time.
• Matter of Nurse, 160 AD3d 745: Cited by comparison (“cf.”), underscoring that the sufficiency of proof can turn on the quality of contemporaneous evidence about understanding.

Even after correcting the legal standard, the Second Department affirmed dismissal of the trust “lack of capacity” theory: the Bairds’ proof (trust document plus drafting attorney’s deposition testimony about execution) established contractual capacity prima facie, and the Cardellis did not raise a triable issue.

3.2 Legal Reasoning (What the Court Actually Did)

1. Separated the issues by doctrine and burden. Due execution and testamentary capacity were treated as relatively “formal proof” inquiries well-suited to summary judgment when supported by attorney-supervised execution, self-proving affidavits, and attesting-witness testimony.
2. Treated undue influence as circumstantial and fact-heavy. The court emphasized that undue influence depends on the full context—dependency, opportunity, isolation, and an “unnatural” or unexplained plan. Evidence suggesting a confidential relationship (inequality/control) can shift practical pressure to the beneficiary to explain the transaction’s circumstances.
3. Corrected the trust-capacity standard but affirmed the outcome. The court acknowledged the Surrogate’s Court applied the wrong standard (testamentary instead of contractual) for the trust, yet concluded dismissal was still warranted because the record supported capacity under the correct test.

3.3 Impact (Why This Opinion Matters)

• Undue influence in late-life plan changes will often survive summary judgment when coupled with control/isolation evidence. The decision signals that even where execution and capacity are cleanly proven, a credible narrative of dependency, restricted access to the decedent, and a sharp, unexplained departure from prior plans can require a trial—especially when the alleged influencer is a primary beneficiary and caregiver/manager.
• Parallel treatment of will and revocable trust undue influence. By reinstating undue-influence challenges to both the will and the trust on the same factual showing, the court reinforces that revocable trusts used as will-substitutes can be litigated through the same undue-influence lens when the circumstances overlap.
• Clarifies doctrinal boundaries: capacity standard depends on instrument type. The express correction—trust creation is governed by contractual capacity—matters for future Surrogate’s Court motion practice, jury instructions, and expert proof. Litigants must plead and prove the right capacity standard for each instrument (will vs. trust vs. transfer).
• Motion practice guidance. Proponents can still win summary judgment on due execution and capacity with robust attorney/attestation proof, but should expect heightened scrutiny (and potential denial) on undue influence where there is evidence of a confidential relationship, caregiver dominance, or family-member isolation.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Summary judgment: A pretrial ruling that ends a claim only if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
• Attestation clause: A clause in the will, signed by witnesses, stating that the statutory signing formalities were followed.
• Self-proving affidavit: A sworn statement (usually by the witnesses) that simplifies proof of due execution, often allowing probate without live witness testimony.
• Presumption of regularity: When an attorney drafts and supervises execution, courts presume the formalities were properly observed unless rebutted.
• Testamentary capacity: The mental ability to make a will—knowing you are making a will, what you own generally, and who your close family/expected beneficiaries are.
• Contractual capacity: The mental ability to understand the nature of a transaction at the time it is made (here, creating/signing a trust agreement).
• Undue influence: Improper pressure that overcomes a person’s free will so the document reflects the influencer’s desires, not the maker’s. It is often proved indirectly through circumstances (dependency, control, secrecy, isolation, and unexplained changes).
• Confidential relationship: A relationship marked by trust and dependence where one party may have dominance or control; if shown in this context, it can support an inference of undue influence requiring an explanation of the transaction.
• In terrorem clause: A “no-contest” clause that can penalize beneficiaries who challenge the will, subject to New York’s rules and exceptions.

5. Conclusion

Matter of Baird (Cardelli) draws a sharp line between issues that can be resolved on formal proof (due execution and capacity) and issues that typically require a fuller factual record (undue influence). While proponents prevailed on due execution, testamentary capacity, and contractual capacity for the trust, the Second Department reinstated both will- and trust-based undue influence claims because evidence of caregiver/beneficiary control, alleged isolation, and an unexplained deviation from prior estate plans created triable issues. The opinion also reinforces that revocable trust capacity is measured by contractual capacity, not testamentary capacity—an important doctrinal correction for future Surrogate’s Court litigation.