A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence
Appellate jurisdiction and the pleading-stage framework
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Ellis v. Salt Lake City Corp., Mitchell v. Forsyth, and Ashcroft v. Iqbal supported immediate appellate review of the legal questions underlying the denial of qualified immunity. Mitchell v. Forsyth supplied the institutional rationale: immunity protects officials against the burdens of litigation, not merely an adverse judgment after trial. That protection would be substantially lost if review always awaited a final disposition.
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Luethje v. Kyle, drawing on Thomas v. Kaven, explained why qualified immunity can be harder to secure on a motion to dismiss than at summary judgment: the court considers the conduct as alleged, without weighing a developed evidentiary record. Peterson v. Jensen required acceptance of the complaint’s factual account, while Frey v. Town of Jackson required favorable reasonable inferences for the professors.
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Est. of Deweese v. Hancock stated the professors’ burden to allege a constitutional violation that was clearly established. Conn v. Gabbert likewise identified the two questions—whether a right was violated and whether it was clearly established—which made identification of the actual deprivation essential.
These authorities address review and litigation standards. Their citation does not mean that decisions issued after the challenged conduct supplied the officials’ contemporaneous notice of the underlying constitutional rule.
State-created property interests and conditional tenure
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Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth and Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill established the foundational distinction: state law or comparable independent sources create property interests, while federal constitutional law determines the process required before deprivation. The Constitution does not itself grant tenure.
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Schulz v. City of Longmont, quoting Kingsford v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., identified possible sources of employment property rights, including statutes, ordinances, and express or implied contracts. These cases supported looking beyond a narrowly worded statutory entitlement to the governing university and regents policies.
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Kosik v. Cloud Cnty. Cmty. Coll. and Brenna v. S. Colo. State Coll. supported recognition of tenure-based employment interests. Brenna v. S. Colo. State Coll. also featured in the substantive due process discussion, but its recognition of protection against arbitrary termination did not establish the particular substantive violation alleged here.
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West v. Grand County directly answered the defendants’ argument that employment is constitutionally protected only when termination is limited exclusively to “cause.” The employee there could be dismissed for cause, curtailment of work, or lack of funds, yet possessed a protected expectation of continued employment. Goudeau v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 37 similarly recognized protection when specified dismissal grounds included lack of work or funds.
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Krotkoff v. Goucher Coll. supplied persuasive support from the academic context. It treated bona fide financial exigency as compatible with the accepted meaning of tenure. Such an exception defines tenure’s limits rather than eliminating tenure altogether. Its relevance therefore depended on distinguishing genuine financial necessity from the alleged pretext in this case.
Meaningful notice and an opportunity to respond
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Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill was the majority’s central procedural authority. A tenured public employee ordinarily must receive notice of the charges, an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to respond. A preliminary hearing may be relatively informal if adequate further proceedings follow. The decision does not permit a government employer to define away federal safeguards simply by changing its own hearing rules.
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The majority relied on Arnett v. Kennedy, specifically Justice Powell’s concurrence as quoted in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, for the proposition that government may choose whether to confer a property interest, but cannot confer it and then authorize its deprivation without appropriate safeguards.
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Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., Davis v. Scherer, and Boddie v. Connecticut reinforced the established requirement of notice and an appropriate opportunity to be heard before significant deprivation. Morrissey v. Brewer contributed both the question “what process is due” and an illustration of meaningful procedural safeguards, including presentation of witnesses.
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Armstrong v. Manzo required a hearing in a meaningful manner. Powell v. Mikulecky supported the necessity of an adequate evidentiary opportunity within the overall process. Together, they undercut the suggestion that the existence of a proceeding, without attention to its substance, necessarily satisfies due process.
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Walker v. United States, quoting Willner v. Comm. on Character & Fitness, recognized that confrontation and cross-examination can be important when disputed assertions threaten a person’s livelihood. West v. Grand County qualified that principle: cross-examination is not mandatory in every case; its necessity depends on the significance and nature of the factual disputes.
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Mathews v. Eldridge supplied the balancing framework incorporated into the employment analysis: the employee’s interest, the government’s administrative concerns, and the risk of erroneous deprivation. Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents reinforced the need for meaningful notice and response in university employment proceedings.
Legislative action versus individualized executive implementation
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Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization recognized that generally applicable legislative measures ordinarily do not require individualized hearings for everyone affected. Its reasoning concerned both practical burdens and political accountability. The fact that an administrative body adopts a measure does not prevent that measure from being legislative in character.
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Londoner v. City and Cnty. of Denver provided the counterpoint: when government acts on particularized grounds affecting a relatively small group, affected persons may require an opportunity to present argument and proof. Its multistep assessment process also furnished the majority’s analogy for distinguishing preliminary authorization from an actual deprivation.
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United States v. Locke explained how enactment, publication, and a reasonable opportunity to understand and comply with general requirements can supply constitutionally adequate legislative process. The case supported the legislative exception, not a conclusion that every workforce measure falls within it.
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Onyx Props. LLC v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs organized the majority’s classification analysis around the number of affected people, appointment or election of decision-makers, general policymaking versus specific application, and general conditions versus individualized facts. Its discussion of Ind. Land Co. v. City of Greenwood and Kaahumanu v. Cnty. of Maui informed the relationship between the size of the affected group, hearing feasibility, and political remedies.
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Scribner v. Bd. of Educ. of U.S.D. No. 492 upheld the legislative removal of Kansas schoolteachers’ tenure protections. The defendants invoked it to argue that tenure had already disappeared. The majority distinguished a legislative act directly withdrawing an entitlement from a policy that merely authorized later action subject to additional approval.
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Price ex rel. Price v. W. Res., Inc. likewise concerned legislative process where legislation itself extinguished an interest. It helped define the distinction rather than resolve whether the WMP amendment was legislative.
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West v. Grand County also recognized that a bona fide large-scale reduction in force may justify dispensing with an ordinary pretermination hearing. Its warning against sham reductions was decisive here: the professors alleged targeted dismissals disguised as financial restructuring.
Fair warning, regulatory reliance, and preservation of arguments
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Roska ex rel. Roska v. Peterson and Mimics, Inc. v. Vill. of Angel Fire rejected reliance on legal provisions that did not actually authorize the challenged conduct or whose procedural limits officials disregarded. The majority used them to explain why officials could not read the WMP’s broad termination language independently of its immediately accompanying framework-approval requirement.
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Robbins v. Wilkie supported the proposition that sufficiently clear statutory text can provide notice of protected rights. The opinion expressly acknowledged its reversal on other grounds in Wilkie v. Robbins; the citation should not be understood as ignoring that subsequent history.
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Plumhoff v. Rickard required attention to the particular circumstances facing officials. Here, the university officials themselves prepared the framework necessary to obtain termination authority. Hope v. Pelzer framed the ultimate question as whether a reasonable official would understand the conduct to violate the right.
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Lowe v. Raemisch supported application of established principles with “obvious clarity” despite the absence of an identical earlier case. This was the majority’s answer to the claim that no precedent combined all the facts present here.
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Coones v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs supported treating the argument that ESU’s framework approval was legislative as waived because it had not been adequately developed below. The majority nevertheless supplied an alternative merits analysis classifying the alleged action as executive.
Substantive due process and reputational liability
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Brown v. Montoya supported qualified immunity where a plaintiff failed to identify clearly established substantive due process law applicable to the challenged conduct. Although the professors invoked arbitrariness and conscience-shocking conduct, those descriptions did not satisfy their burden.
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Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis prevented use of generalized substantive due process to bypass a more specific constitutional provision. Allegations that the professors were dismissed for protected political or associational activity belonged under the First Amendment rather than a repackaged substantive due process theory.
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Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders treated the person with ultimate authority over a statement as its maker for securities Rule 10b-5 purposes. Because only Hush signed the letters, this authority introduced uncertainty about attributing their statements to the university attorneys. The court did not definitively extend that securities rule to constitutional litigation.
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Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., quoted through Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, emphasized the narrow dimensions of the securities cause of action. That context reinforced the uncertainty about broader application; uncertainty favored qualified immunity rather than establishing a universal rule of attorney nonliability.
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Jensen v. Redevelopment Agency identified a name-clearing hearing as the remedy for a cognizable reputational injury. The court left for remand whether the OAH proceedings satisfied that requirement because the parties had not adequately addressed it.
Authorities shaping Judge Eid’s disagreement
Palacios v. Fortuna, quoting Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby, restated qualified immunity’s two requirements. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd required existing law to place the constitutional question beyond debate. Perry v. Durborow, drawing on White v. Pauly, warned against defining the asserted right at excessive generality.
Hennigh v. City of Shawnee supplied the dissent’s focus on a “legitimate expectation of continued employment.” Judge Eid reasoned that changing the legal conditions of employment might eliminate that expectation before any actual dismissal. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. supported her further premise that a valid legislative change can itself provide all the process constitutionally required.
These authorities exposed the central disagreement: the majority found clear notice through the combined operation of established principles and the WMP’s text; the dissent demanded closer factual guidance about when an employment entitlement disappears during a multistage policy change.
B. The Majority’s Legal Reasoning
1. Limited dismissal grounds created a genuine property interest
The defendants argued that the professors lacked protected employment interests because tenure allowed termination for reasons other than cause. That argument incorrectly treated conditional protection as no protection.
The relevant distinction was between employment terminable at will and employment terminable only upon specified conditions. Financial exigency and program discontinuance narrowed the entitlement but did not erase it. Because the complaint alleged that none of the authorized conditions existed, it plausibly alleged deprivation of an existing interest.
2. Authorization was not itself deprivation
The WMP amendment created an available route to suspension of tenure protections, but universities still needed individualized approval to use it. Without an approved framework, the professors retained their existing protections.
This made the timing of injury central. The majority treated ESU’s framework approval and subsequent termination decisions as a unified implementation process. The claim became actionable when that process actually operated against the professors, rather than upon adoption of an unused statewide authorization.
The court therefore did not conclusively decide whether adoption of the WMP amendment was legislative. It also did not decide whether failure to publish the amendment under Kansas law invalidated it or whether the personnel-measures exception applied. Those questions were unnecessary to its explanation of when the professors’ interests were affected.
3. The university-specific framework was plausibly executive
The majority first held that the defendants had not preserved their legislative-character argument concerning framework approval. Independently, it concluded that the allegations placed that approval on the executive side of the constitutional distinction.
The framework applied an existing policy to a particular institution; KBOR considered ESU-specific conditions; the affected group was comparatively limited; and the decision-makers were appointed. These features supported individualized procedures rather than reliance solely on political accountability.
The decision does not establish that appointed bodies cannot legislate. Appointment was one factor within a functional inquiry into what the government action actually did.
4. The alleged procedures did not permit a meaningful defense
Two deficiencies operated together. First, the professors allegedly received no notice or opportunity to be heard before adoption of the framework that weakened their existing protections. General campus consultation did not substitute for notice that this specific framework was being prepared.
Second, the later OAH hearings allegedly failed to disclose the actual reasons and evidence supporting each dismissal. An employee cannot meaningfully explain why a dismissal is mistaken when the employer supplies only a menu of possible explanations.
Restrictions on evidence, witnesses, and cross-examination reinforced the concern. The holding should not, however, be read as requiring full civil discovery or every trial procedure in every public employment hearing. The court assessed the alleged inadequacy of the proceedings as a whole, especially the absence of individualized reasons and supporting evidence.
5. Alleged pretext defeated reliance on a routine workforce reduction
A genuine financial reduction in force can present different procedural demands from an individualized dismissal. But the court had to accept allegations that ESU was financially secure and used restructuring as a device to remove disfavored professors.
The absence of financial justification thus mattered to the procedural claim: it undermined reliance on a bona fide reduction-in-force exception. It did not transform the surviving claim into the substantive due process claim that the court separately dismissed.
6. Personal participation depended on the particular right asserted
The same defendants could plausibly participate in an unconstitutional process without participating in discriminatory selection. KBOR members allegedly approved the framework that enabled the deprivation, but the complaint did not allege that they selected the professors or knew who would be dismissed.
Similarly, Thomas’s alleged awareness of union organizing did not establish involvement in selection. The attorneys’ drafting of letters did not establish that they chose the affected professors. Accordingly, the procedural claims survived while the association, equal protection, and related conspiracy claims against those defendants failed.
This distinction illustrates a core limitation of § 1983: allegations must connect each defendant’s own conduct to the particular constitutional violation, rather than rely on institutional position or participation in the broader events.
7. Substantive due process failed at the clearly established stage
The court did not announce that tenure can never receive substantive due process protection. Instead, it held that the professors failed to demonstrate clearly established law covering the conduct alleged here.
Characterizing conduct as arbitrary, irrational, or conscience-shocking was insufficient. The political-retaliation allegations also could not avoid the requirements of the more specific First Amendment theory.
C. Judge Eid’s Partial Dissent
Judge Eid would have granted qualified immunity on the disputed property-interest claims because the law did not clearly resolve this sequence of policy changes and implementation.
Her first objection concerned the nature of employment property. Unlike tangible property, an entitlement to continued employment exists because legal restrictions limit termination. Removing those restrictions might therefore extinguish the entitlement immediately, even while further administrative steps remain before dismissal. In her view, the majority’s analogy to a multistage tax assessment did not make the answer sufficiently clear.
Her second objection concerned the framework’s classification. Although only particular professors were dismissed, the framework applied across ESU’s workforce. Moreover, gubernatorial appointment and Senate confirmation supplied an indirect form of political accountability. A reasonable official could therefore consider approval legislative.
Judge Eid also read the prior circuit authorities as discussing several possible legislative-executive tests without selecting a definitive framework. For her, that uncertainty precluded a finding that the officials had constitutionally sufficient warning.
The disagreement was therefore not simply over whether notice and hearings generally matter. It concerned the specificity of precedent required before officials can be denied immunity when government changes the underlying employment entitlement itself.
D. Potential Impact and Limits
Substance will matter more than administrative labels
Universities and other public employers cannot assume that calling a measure a policy amendment, emergency plan, or workforce reduction makes its implementation legislative. Courts may examine each stage separately and ask when existing protections were actually displaced.
Conditional tenure remains constitutionally meaningful
The opinion reinforces that financial and programmatic exceptions do not render tenure equivalent to at-will employment. Public employees outside higher education may invoke the same reasoning where employment is terminable only on enumerated grounds.
Individualized reasons are a practical compliance priority
Employers contemplating dismissal should identify the actual grounds and supporting evidence and provide a meaningful opportunity to respond. Generic lists of possible reasons create particular constitutional risk when the employee’s selection is contested.
Policy designers and individual selectors face different exposure
Participation in designing or approving a deficient process may support a procedural claim. Liability for political discrimination or retaliation requires allegations connecting the defendant to the discriminatory action. The decision therefore encourages claim-specific pleading rather than undifferentiated allegations against an entire administration.
Qualified immunity remains a substantial limitation
The professors prevailed only in part. The substantive due process and attorney-related reputational rulings show that even plausible constitutional concerns may not overcome uncertainty in clearly established law.
Important questions remain unresolved
- Whether the alleged financial and political explanations are supported by evidence.
- Whether the defendants can obtain qualified immunity on a developed factual record.
- Whether the OAH proceedings supplied an adequate name-clearing opportunity.
- Whether the original WMP amendment was legislative or complied with Kansas publication requirements.
- The merits and appropriate remedies for the surviving claims.
The opinion does not prohibit genuine financial restructuring, guarantee lifetime employment, or foreclose a direct legislative alteration of employment entitlements. Its principal force concerns the alleged deprivation of existing conditional rights through individualized implementation without adequate process.