Tenth Circuit Holds PLRA “Imminent Danger” Exception Requires Standing-Like Nexus: Traceability and Redressability

1. Introduction

Barnett v. Bridges (10th Cir. July 14, 2026) addresses when a “three-strikes” prisoner may proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) on appeal under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Christopher J. Barnett, an Oklahoma prisoner, appealed the dismissal of his civil suit against prison officials (including the warden and supervisory staff) and sought IFP status.

The key issues were:

  • Whether Barnett could avoid the PLRA’s three-strikes bar by invoking the statutory exception for “imminent danger of serious physical injury,” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
  • Whether the “imminent danger” exception requires a nexus between the alleged danger and the claims/relief in the complaint—and, if so, how to measure that nexus.

The court’s published order is significant because it adopts, as binding circuit law, a specific nexus framework: the imminent-danger allegation must be both fairly traceable to the alleged unlawful conduct and redressable by the requested judicial relief.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit denied Barnett’s motion to proceed IFP. Barnett did not dispute that he had at least three prior dismissals qualifying as “strikes” under § 1915(g). He argued instead that the dismissals were wrong, he lacked a chance to appeal them, and he faced imminent danger.

The court held:

  • It would not revisit prior strike dismissals. (Kinnell v. Graves)
  • Even assuming Barnett adequately alleged “imminent danger,” § 1915(g) requires a nexus between that danger and the complaint.
  • The nexus is evaluated using a standing-like test requiring both traceability and redressability (adopting the approach of Pettus v. Morgenthau).
  • Barnett failed redressability because (i) his complaint centered on access-to-courts/retaliation allegations while the asserted danger involved beatings/placement in a dangerous prison, and (ii) he had been transferred, so relief against officials at the former prison would not redress danger at the current prison.

The court ordered Barnett to pay the appellate filing fee within 30 days or risk dismissal for failure to prosecute.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. The three-strikes bar and limits on collateral attack

  • Kinnell v. Graves, 265 F.3d 1125, 1128 (10th Cir. 2001): The court relied on Kinnell to reject Barnett’s attempt to re-litigate whether his earlier cases were correctly dismissed. This reinforces a procedural boundary: once strikes exist, the IFP inquiry focuses on § 1915(g)’s exception, not on revisiting the merits of prior dismissals.
  • Barnett’s strikes were identified through district-court dismissals and a prior Tenth Circuit characterization: Barnett v. David L. Moss Crim. Just. Ctr.; Barnett v. Unnamed TCSO Det. Officer; Barnett v. Okmulgee Cnty. Crim. Just. Auth.; and the court noted Barnett v. FBI (10th Cir. Feb. 28, 2025) as characterizing those rulings as strikes.

B. Threshold showing of imminent danger

  • Smith v. Veterans Admin., 636 F.3d 1306, 1309 (10th Cir. 2011): The court reiterated that the imminent-danger exception requires “specific, credible allegations.” Although the panel assumed imminent danger for argument’s sake, Smith provides the baseline evidentiary pleading standard.

C. Whether a nexus is required (inter-circuit consensus and Tenth Circuit alignment)

The court emphasized that multiple circuits require a nexus between the alleged imminent danger and the complaint:

  • Owlfeather-Gorbey v. Avery, 119 F.4th 78, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2024)
  • Prescott v. UTMB Galveston Texas, 73 F.4th 315, 321 (5th Cir. 2023)
  • Hall v. United States, 44 F.4th 218, 231 (4th Cir. 2022)
  • Fourstar v. United States, 950 F.3d 856, 859-60 (Fed. Cir. 2020)
  • Ray v. Lara, 31 F.4th 692, 700 (9th Cir. 2022)
  • Pettus v. Morgenthau, 554 F.3d 293, 297 (2d Cir. 2009)

The opinion also cited the treatise: 1 Moore's Federal Practice - Civil § 4.40 at 38, n.58 (2026) (collecting cases).

Critically, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that it had previously “joined” this view only in unpublished decisions: Boles v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., No. 22-1086, 2023 WL 1463248, at *3 (10th Cir. Feb. 2, 2023) (unpublished); Boles v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., 794 F. App'x 767, 770 (10th Cir. 2019); and Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 754 F. App'x 756, 759 (10th Cir. 2018), aff'd on other grounds, 140 S. Ct. 1721 (2020). In Barnett v. Bridges, the panel made the nexus requirement explicit in a published disposition, converting what had been persuasive (unpublished) into binding circuit guidance.

D. What kind of nexus: “traceability” and “redressability”

The central doctrinal move is the court’s choice among competing nexus formulations:

  • The Second Circuit’s two-part, standing-derived test: (1) danger “fairly traceable” to unlawful conduct alleged in the complaint; and (2) a favorable outcome would “redress that injury.” (Pettus v. Morgenthau, 554 F.3d at 298-99 (emphasis in original))
  • The Fourth Circuit’s alternative: nexus required but not redressability. (Hall v. United States, 44 F.4th at 230)
  • The Ninth and Federal Circuits align with Pettus: (Ray v. Lara, 31 F.4th at 701; Fourstar v. United States, 950 F.3d at 859-60)

The Tenth Circuit adopted Pettus as “more persuasive,” reasoning that it is incoherent to require some “nexus” but discard redressability: if the purpose is to limit IFP access to cases where judicial relief can address an imminent physical threat, redressability is the component that ensures the litigation can realistically mitigate the danger.

E. Standing doctrine analogies used to justify redressability

  • Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 124 (1998) (Stevens, J., concurring): Cited for the idea that redressability is not in the constitutional text but is a judicially required element of standing—supporting the move to read a redressability component into § 1915(g)’s exception despite statutory silence.
  • United States v. Ramos, 695 F.3d 1035, 1048 n.4 (10th Cir. 2012): Used to emphasize traceability and redressability are distinct, even if closely related.
  • Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992): Supplies the canonical definition of traceability (causal connection between injury and misconduct).
  • Diamond Alt. Energy, LLC v. Env't Prot. Agency, 606 U.S. 100, 112 (2025): Supplies the articulation of redressability (relationship between injury and requested judicial relief).

F. Transfers and lack of redress

  • Lomax v. Ortiz- Marquez, 754 F. App'x 756, 760 (10th Cir. 2018), aff'd on other grounds, 140 S. Ct. 1721 (2020): The court used Lomax to illustrate why relief aimed at officials at one institution does not redress threats allegedly occurring at a different institution.
  • Day v. Maynard, 200 F.3d 665, 667 (10th Cir. 1999) (per curiam): Reinforced the idea that imminent danger at the prisoner’s current facility is not addressed by litigation targeting defendants “lacking any control” over current confinement conditions.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

  1. Step 1: Three strikes established, collateral challenges barred. The court treated the existence of three strikes as effectively settled and declined to re-examine them under Kinnell v. Graves.
  2. Step 2: Assume “imminent danger” to reach the dispositive interpretive question. Without deciding whether Barnett met Smith v. Veterans Admin., the court assumed imminent danger and asked: what must that danger have to do with the complaint?
  3. Step 3: A nexus is required. The panel relied on the inter-circuit consensus (D.C., Second, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, Federal) and its own unpublished decisions to hold that the exception is not a free-floating safety valve; it is tied to the lawsuit’s subject matter.
  4. Step 4: The nexus includes both traceability and redressability. The court selected the Pettus v. Morgenthau test, explicitly importing the structure of Article III standing (traceability and redressability), supported by Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife and Diamond Alt. Energy, LLC v. Env't Prot. Agency. It rejected the Fourth Circuit’s approach in Hall v. United States as less persuasive.
  5. Step 5: Application—redressability fails on two independent grounds.
    • Mismatch between claims and danger: Barnett pleaded access-to-courts restrictions and retaliation via administrative penalties; the alleged imminent danger involved beatings and placement in a more dangerous prison. Even if he won on the pleaded claims, the remedy would not address the asserted physical threat.
    • Transfer breaks redressability: Barnett was transferred during district-court litigation. Relief against officials at the prior facility would not redress danger at the new facility, consistent with Lomax v. Ortiz- Marquez and Day v. Maynard.

3.3. Impact

Doctrinal clarification in the Tenth Circuit. The most important precedential effect is that the Tenth Circuit, in a published decision, formalizes a two-part nexus requirement for § 1915(g)’s imminent-danger exception: (1) traceability and (2) redressability. This narrows the exception compared to a mere showing of danger and aligns the circuit with Pettus v. Morgenthau, Ray v. Lara, and Fourstar v. United States.

Practical pleading consequences for three-strikes litigants. Prisoners with strikes must now ensure that:

  • The complaint’s factual allegations connect the dangerous condition to the defendants’ challenged conduct (traceability); and
  • The requested relief—especially injunctive relief—would meaningfully mitigate the imminent danger (redressability).

Transfer sensitivity. The decision underscores that transfers can defeat redressability when the complaint targets officials at a prior institution. Future litigants may respond by (where legally supportable) naming defendants with authority over current conditions, seeking relief that runs to current custodians, or filing in a posture that avoids stale, facility-specific defendant/relief mismatches.

System-level effect. By adopting a standing-like filter at the IFP gateway, the court strengthens § 1915(g)’s function as a screening mechanism: only suits capable of addressing an imminent physical threat can bypass the filing-fee bar for repeat frivolous litigants.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • In forma pauperis (IFP): Permission to proceed without prepaying filing fees due to indigence.
  • PLRA “three strikes” (28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)): After three qualifying dismissals for frivolousness, maliciousness, or failure to state a claim, a prisoner generally cannot proceed IFP.
  • Imminent danger exception: A narrow escape hatch allowing IFP despite strikes if the prisoner is in imminent danger of serious physical injury.
  • Nexus requirement: The imminent danger must relate to the lawsuit—courts will not allow IFP based on danger unrelated to what the complaint is about.
  • Traceability: The alleged danger must be caused by (or fairly connected to) the unlawful conduct alleged in the complaint. (Drawn from Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife.)
  • Redressability: Winning the lawsuit must be capable of alleviating the imminent danger through the relief requested. (Drawn from Diamond Alt. Energy, LLC v. Env't Prot. Agency.)
  • Transfer and redressability: If you sue officials at Prison A but are now housed at Prison B, relief against Prison A’s officials often can’t fix current threats at Prison B (as illustrated by Day v. Maynard and Lomax v. Ortiz- Marquez).

5. Conclusion

Barnett v. Bridges establishes a clear, published rule in the Tenth Circuit: the PLRA imminent-danger exception in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) requires a standing-like nexus—both traceability and redressability—between the alleged danger and the complaint’s claims and requested relief. Applying that rule, the court denied IFP because Barnett’s alleged danger (beatings/placement in a dangerous prison) was not redressable by success on his pleaded access-to-courts/retaliation claims, and his transfer further prevented meaningful redress against the named defendants.