Stagnation Can Be Found Despite Partial Case-Plan Compliance When Core Safety Conditions Remain Unresolved

Precedents Cited

• In re B.W., 162 Vt. 287, 291 (1994)
  The Court relied on In re B.W. for the governing two-step framework when termination is sought after initial disposition: (1) determine whether a “change in circumstances” warrants modification of the disposition order; and, if so, (2) determine whether termination is in the child’s best interests. This case sets the structure that controlled the Supreme Court’s review.
• In re H.A., 153 Vt. 504, 515 (1990)
  In re H.A. supplies the most common metric for “change in circumstances” in this setting: stagnation or deterioration “over the passage of time” in the parent’s ability to care properly for the child. The Opinion applies that concept directly, treating mother’s inability to achieve safe reunification conditions as stagnation.
• In re N.L., 2019 VT 10, ¶ 9, 209 Vt. 450
  The Court invoked In re N.L. for the appellate standard of review: findings stand unless “clearly erroneous,” and conclusions will be affirmed if supported by the findings. This deference is central in cases hinging on credibility, weight of testimony, and the practical significance of partial compliance.
• In re D.M., 2004 VT 41, ¶ 7, 176 Vt. 639 (mem.)
  The Opinion quotes In re D.M. (2004) for the key stagnation inquiry: whether the parent made progress in “ameliorating the conditions that led to state intervention.” This frames why the Supreme Court focused on safety and stability conditions—housing, mental-health stability, cooperative engagement—rather than isolated accomplishments.
• In re D.M., 162 Vt. 33, 38 (1994)
  The Court also relied on In re D.M. (1994) to clarify that stagnation may exist even where “parenting skills improve,” if improvement is “so insignificant” that resuming parental duties within a reasonable time is unlikely. That proposition supported affirmance despite mother’s completion of some services.
• In re A.F., 160 Vt. 175, 178 (1993)
  Cited for the trial court’s discretion to assess credibility and weigh evidence. This mattered because mother’s asserted milestones (employment, stable housing, consistent counseling) were either uncorroborated, recently initiated, or undercut by safety concerns and noncooperation—factual determinations the family court was entitled to resolve.
• In re A.F., 160 Vt. at 181
  Quoted for the principle that “some progress in some aspects” does not preclude a finding of changed circumstances warranting modification. The Opinion uses this to reconcile mother’s partial compliance with an overall stagnation conclusion.

Legal Reasoning

1. Step One—Change in circumstances (stagnation): The Supreme Court treated the family court’s stagnation finding as the decisive contested issue. Applying the quoted standards, it asked whether mother made meaningful progress on the conditions that triggered custody. The record supported a “no” answer because mother:
   • never obtained verified safe and stable housing suitable for the children;
   • never progressed beyond supervised visitation, with heightened safety measures (secure room; two staff present) due to volatile behavior;
   • was inconsistent in mental-health treatment and refused to provide information necessary for DCF to verify continued counseling after discharge;
   • did not successfully participate in Family Time Coaching (discharged due to dysregulation and resistance);
   • continued to struggle with substance use (including a positive cocaine test and admissions during a competency evaluation); and
   • remained unable to communicate and cooperate with DCF and providers in a manner compatible with safe reunification.
   The Court underscored that claimed improvements must be grounded in the evidence and connected to remediation of the original risks.
2. Mother’s “significant progress” argument failed on the record: The Opinion carefully parses the cited caseworker testimony, explaining that the “significant progress” characterization was hypothetical (i.e., if mother had achieved certain milestones), and the caseworker expressly lacked information confirming those achievements. Similarly, the Court rejected the claim of “twelve months” of counseling as inconsistent with testimony indicating a gap and a more recent re-engagement.
3. Deference to trial-court factfinding and safety judgments: The Court emphasized that the family court could discount weak or indirect evidence of employment and housing stability. It also treated unchallenged “predicate findings” (e.g., housing unsuitability; boyfriend’s property and associated safety concerns) as supporting the stagnation conclusion.
4. Caseworker knowledge and competence to testify: Mother argued that testifying workers lacked current knowledge because of staffing changes. The Supreme Court rejected this, pointing to evidence that the earlier worker continued to supervise visits and consult on the case, and that the later worker testified to recent meetings and dysregulation. The Court thus accepted that the family court had a sufficiently current evidentiary basis.
5. Step Two—Best interests: The family court made findings on bonding, adjustment to placement, and mother’s inability to resume parental duties within a reasonable time, and found termination in the children’s best interests. On appeal, mother did not challenge the best-interests analysis; after affirming stagnation, the Supreme Court had no reason to disturb termination.

Impact

While nonprecedential by the Opinion’s own notice, the decision reinforces several practical lessons likely to influence how termination cases are litigated and tried:

• “Progress” must be material and verifiable: Assertions of stable housing, employment, or treatment engagement carry limited weight where details are missing, verification is blocked (e.g., refusal to sign releases or provide provider information), or safety concerns remain tied to the living situation.
• Partial compliance does not defeat stagnation: Completion of classes or attendance at meetings may not matter if a parent cannot demonstrate safe parenting capacity in practice—particularly where dysregulation and conflict prevent advancement to unsupervised contact.
• Safety-driven supervision restrictions can be evidence of stagnation: Continued need for secure visitation settings and multiple staff supports a conclusion that core risks remain unmitigated.
• Appellate strategy matters: Failure to challenge best-interests findings can effectively narrow the appeal to the “change in circumstances” prong and, if that prong is affirmed, leave termination intact.
• Continuity of testimony can be established despite worker turnover: The Court’s acceptance of testimony from a former primary worker who remained involved suggests that “current knowledge” is functional, not purely positional.