Date: Mar 11, 2026

Single-Subject Rule: A TABOR Fee-Vote Initiative Cannot Also Redefine “Fee” Statewide

I. Introduction

In Proposed Initiative 2025-2026 #158, 2026 CO 13, the Colorado Supreme Court reviewed—through an original proceeding under § 1-40-107(2), C.R.S. (2025)—the Title Board’s decision to set a title and submission clause for a proposed constitutional initiative amending Colorado’s Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights (“TABOR”), Colo. Const. art. X, § 20.

The Petitioner, Joshua Mantell, challenged the Title Board’s actions, arguing the initiative violated Colorado’s single subject requirement by combining (1) a new statewide voter-approval requirement for certain high-revenue “fees” imposed by state law with (2) a sweeping redefinition of “fee” applicable to any existing or new fee “as used in Colorado law.”

The Proponents, Michael Fields and Suzanne Taheri, defended the measure as having one subject—requiring voter approval of certain fees—and asserted the definitional change was necessary to make the voter-approval regime workable.

The court’s central issue was not the policy merits of the proposal, but whether the initiative’s components were “necessarily and properly connected” or whether the definitional rewrite constituted an impermissible second subject that risked log rolling and voter surprise.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the Title Board. It held that Initiative #158 violated the single subject requirement in Colo. Const. art. V, § 1(5.5) and § 1-40-106.5, C.R.S. (2025) because it combined two distinct purposes:

Creating a new statewide voter-approval requirement (beginning January 1, 2027) for certain state-law fees projected or actually generating more than $100 million in combined revenue over the first five fiscal years (with aggregation rules and a higher-education exclusion); and
Redefining “fee” across Colorado law (applicable to “any existing or new ‘fee’”) as a “voluntarily incurred” charge for a “specific benefit” that “reasonably approximate[s] the payer’s fair share of the costs.”

The court concluded the definitional rewrite was not necessary to implement the voter-approval provisions because the existing judicially developed fee framework would still permit enforcement. The definitional component was therefore a separate subject “coiled up in the folds” of the proposal. The court directed the Title Board to strike the title, ballot title, and submission clause and return the initiative to the proponents.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. TABOR background and the tax/fee distinction

The opinion situates the dispute in TABOR’s architecture and the practical stakes of labeling a government charge a “tax” versus a “fee,” emphasizing that TABOR generally requires voter approval for new taxes, tax rate increases, extensions of expiring taxes, and tax policy changes producing net revenue gains. To describe TABOR’s limits, the court cited Havens v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 924 P.2d 517 (Colo. 1996), for the baseline proposition that TABOR constrains state and local spending and taxing powers.

Because TABOR does not define “tax,” “fee,” or related terms, Colorado appellate decisions have supplied operative tests. The court cited:

Barber v. Ritter, 196 P.3d 238 (Colo. 2008): the leading framework distinguishing taxes (primary purpose to defray general governmental expenses) from fees (primary purpose to defray costs of services provided to those charged). The court relied on Barber to illustrate how the current legal regime already provides a workable definition of “fee” without constitutional rewriting.
Colo. Union of Taxpayers Found. v. City of Aspen, 2018 CO 36, 418 P.3d 506: elaborating that a charge imposed within a comprehensive regulatory scheme, aimed at defraying reasonable direct and indirect regulatory/service costs, is a fee, and that a fee must bear a reasonable relationship to the service costs.
Griswold v. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 2019 CO 79, 449 P.3d 373: reaffirming the regulatory-scheme and cost-defrayment understanding for fees.
Bloom v. City of Fort Collins, 784 P.2d 304 (Colo. 1989): cited as an earlier articulation of the reasonable-relationship requirement between fees and service costs.
Tabor Found. v. Colo. Bridge Enter., 2014 COA 106, 353 P.3d 896: relied upon for the proposition that a fee can be valid if reasonably related to overall service cost and imposed on those reasonably likely to benefit, even without individualized usage measures.

These tax/fee cases mattered in the single-subject analysis because they undercut the proponents’ claim that redefining “fee” was required to make a fee-vote requirement “enforceable and meaningless” without it. The court’s point: enforcement can proceed under existing doctrine.

2. Single-subject doctrine and Title Board review

The court applied established initiative-review principles, emphasizing deference to the Title Board absent a “clear case,” while also reaffirming that courts examine the initiative’s text to assess single-subject compliance.

In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause for 2015-2016 #132, 2016 CO 55, 374 P.3d 460: cited for the presumption favoring the Board, limits on merits review, and the single-subject standards; also used substantively as an example where an initiative violated single subject by adding a significant institutional change beyond the initiative’s central purpose (there, redistricting plus changes to the Supreme Court Nominating Commission).
In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause for 2011-2012 #3, 2012 CO 25, 274 P.3d 562: cited for standard-of-review language and for the “necessarily and properly connected” formulation.
In re Proposed Initiative "Pub. Rts. in Waters II,", 898 P.2d 1076 (Colo. 1995): cited for the function of single subject in ensuring each proposal passes on its own merits.
In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause for 2013-2014 #76, 2014 CO 52, 333 P.3d 76: cited for log-rolling concerns and the “different factions” problem.
In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause for Proposed Initiative 2001-2002 #43, 46 P.3d 438 (Colo. 2002): cited for the “coiled up in the folds” metaphor describing surreptitious provisions.
In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause for 2013-2014 #90, 2014 CO 63, 328 P.3d 155: cited for the formulation that multiple subjects exist when a measure has “at least two distinct and separate purposes.”

3. The court’s key comparative precedent: Initiative #129

The opinion’s decisive precedent was the court’s earlier review of a substantially similar definitional rewrite in: In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause for 2013-2014 #129 ("Initiative #129"), 2014 CO 53, 333 P.3d 101.

In Initiative #129, the court had upheld a title for a measure whose single objective was “changing the definition of ‘fee.’” It treated that definitional alteration as its own coherent subject.

In Initiative #158, the definitional language was essentially identical, and the court used Initiative #129 to demonstrate that the definitional change is not a minor implementing detail but a stand-alone objective. Because Initiative #158 added a separate voter-approval regime on top of that objective, the court characterized it as “Initiative #129 plus a new voter approval requirement,” creating a two-purpose measure with log-rolling potential.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The governing test: one general objective vs. two distinct purposes

The court reiterated that an initiative complies with the single subject requirement when it tends to effectuate “one general objective or purpose,” and may include minor provisions necessary to effectuate that purpose, so long as the parts are “necessarily and properly connected rather than disconnected or incongruous.” Conversely, a violation occurs when an initiative “relates to more than one subject and has at least two distinct and separate purposes.”

2. Why the “fee” redefinition was not “necessary and proper” to a fee-vote requirement

The proponents’ central defense was functional: a voter-approval regime would be “unenforceable and meaningless” without a new definition of “fee.” The court rejected that argument on the initiative’s text and existing law:

Enforceability without redefining “fee”: The court reasoned that if the definitional section were removed, courts and election administrators could still apply the voter-approval thresholds using the existing judicial fee doctrine (e.g., Barber v. Ritter and Colo. Union of Taxpayers Found. v. City of Aspen).
Magnitude and breadth of the definitional change: By redefining “fee” “as used in Colorado law,” the initiative would reshape the treatment of “countless existing fees,” potentially altering their TABOR status. The court treated this as a substantial legal shift distinct from the prospective $100 million voter-approval trigger.
Prospective vs. non-prospective structure: The voter-approval requirement was explicitly forward-looking (starting January 1, 2027), but the definitional change was not similarly limited and was described (including in the title as modified on rehearing) as applying to “any existing or new ‘fee.’” That asymmetry reinforced the conclusion that the definitional rewrite is not a mere implementing detail for the future election requirement.

3. Log rolling and voter surprise risk

The court’s single-subject analysis focused on the two classic evils the doctrine targets:

Log rolling: By bundling two distinct reforms—(i) statewide voter approval for certain fees and (ii) narrowing the definition of “fee” statewide—the measure could attract coalitions that would not support both policies independently. The court identified the realistic possibility of cross-cutting constituencies: voters who want stricter voting requirements might not want to reclassify existing charges; and voters focused on closing what some see as a “TABOR loophole” via redefinition might not favor a new statewide vote requirement.
Surprise (“coiled up in the folds”): The definitional change, with potentially sweeping and retroactive effects on the status of charges, was deemed a “surreptitious” second subject embedded in a measure framed around voter approval. The court emphasized that it was not deciding how the definition would apply to existing fees, but the risk of significant unadvertised legal consequences supported the single-subject violation.

4. Remedy

Upon finding a single-subject violation, the court reversed the Title Board’s actions and remanded with directions to strike the title, ballot title, and submission clause and return the initiative to the proponents—effectively requiring proponents to redesign and resubmit a compliant measure.

C. Impact

The opinion establishes a practical and doctrinal boundary for TABOR-related initiatives and, more broadly, for Colorado initiatives that combine a trigger mechanism (like an election-approval requirement) with a foundational definitional rewrite (altering the meaning of a key legal term across “Colorado law”).

Drafting discipline for initiative proponents: If proponents want (a) voter approval for certain fees and (b) a narrower constitutional definition of “fee,” they likely must pursue those as separate measures, unless they can show the definitional component is truly necessary and tightly limited to the voter-approval mechanism.
Heightened scrutiny of “global definitions”: A definition that purports to apply to “any existing or new” instance of a term “as used in Colorado law” will be treated as a major legal objective, not a minor implementation provision—especially when it may disrupt established case-law frameworks.
Title Board and litigation strategy: Even with deferential review, the court signaled it will severly police initiatives that appear to “bundle” a high-salience reform with a technically complex, systemwide change that could be overlooked by voters focusing on the headline promise.
TABOR disputes may shift to definition-only measures: The court expressly stated it “take[s] no issue” with an initiative that seeks only to change the definition of “fee” (citing In re 2013-2014 #129), implying definitional-only proposals remain viable but must stand alone.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

TABOR: A constitutional provision restricting government taxing/spending and, importantly here, often requiring voter approval for new or increased taxes. Whether a charge is classified as a “tax” can determine whether an election is required.
Fee vs. Tax (under current Colorado case law): A tax is primarily meant to pay for general government expenses. A fee is primarily meant to pay for a specific service or regulation connected to those who pay it, and it must be reasonably related to the costs of that service/regulation.
Single subject requirement: Colorado initiatives must have one subject. The rule prevents bundling unrelated or loosely related proposals that could pass only by trading votes among different interest groups.
Log rolling: Combining multiple proposals to create a “you vote for my idea and I’ll vote for yours” coalition—producing passage of a package that might fail if each part were voted on separately.
“Coiled up in the folds”: A court’s shorthand for a hidden or unexpected provision embedded in a complex initiative—raising the risk that voters approve something they did not understand they were approving.
Aggregation rule (in the initiative’s design): Initiative #158 proposed that when determining whether a fee exceeds the $100 million threshold, revenue would be combined with other fees funding “similar subjects or purposes” created or increased within the same year or the preceding five years. This is a mechanism to prevent splitting a large fee program into multiple smaller fees to avoid triggering a vote.
Retroactivity concern: The court did not decide how the redefinition would affect existing fees, but it treated the initiative’s text—defining “any existing or new ‘fee’”—as raising the possibility of widespread reclassification of existing charges, underscoring the separate and substantial nature of the definitional change.

V. Conclusion

2026 CO 13 clarifies and strengthens Colorado’s single-subject guardrails for ballot initiatives: a measure cannot, in one package, both impose a new statewide voter-approval requirement for certain fees and redefine “fee” across Colorado law where the definitional rewrite is not necessary to implement the voting requirement. By treating the statewide redefinition of “fee” as its own distinct objective—consistent with In re 2013-2014 #129 ("Initiative #129")—the court found Initiative #158 to be a two-purpose proposal that risks log rolling and voter surprise.

The practical takeaway is straightforward: proponents seeking major structural change to how Colorado classifies and regulates fees under TABOR must draft with single-subject discipline, separating broad definitional overhauls from distinct electoral-approval regimes unless they can demonstrate an unusually tight, necessary connection between the two.