Section 1983 Claims Require Specific Facts; Jurisdictional Dismissals Must Be Without Prejudice
Case: Jarvis Roberts v. State of Pennsylvania, No. 25-2051
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Opinion filed: October 20, 2026
Disposition: Affirmed as modified.
Precedential status: This per curiam disposition is expressly designated “NOT PRECEDENTIAL.” Under Third Circuit I.O.P. 5.7, it does not constitute binding precedent. Its significance lies in applying established pleading, immunity, and jurisdictional rules rather than announcing a new binding rule.
1. Introduction
Jarvis Roberts, representing himself, brought a federal civil action arising from criminal proceedings in Berks County, Pennsylvania. He sued the Commonwealth, Berks County, the City of Reading, prosecutors, defense attorneys, a state judge, a detective, and a witness. His claims sought damages for alleged constitutional violations, malicious prosecution, and a conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights.
Roberts alleged that prosecutors knowingly presented false testimony, withheld evidence exposing that testimony, and retaliated against him by filing false charges. He also alleged that defense counsel refused to challenge prosecutorial misconduct and conspired with the Commonwealth to violate his speedy-trial rights, with the state judge’s complicity. These were allegations, not factual findings adopted by the appellate court.
The appeal principally concerned whether Roberts adequately pleaded that a defense attorney acted under color of state law, whether prosecutorial immunity barred his claims, and whether his complaint sufficiently identified misconduct by Detective Michael Perkins. A separate question concerned the proper form of dismissal when a court lacks jurisdiction or declines to hear supplemental state-law claims.
2. Background and Summary of the Opinion
The underlying criminal proceedings
When Roberts filed his civil complaint, two consolidated criminal proceedings were pending: Commonwealth v. Roberts, CP-06-CR-00004876-2017, concerning alleged firearm possession, and Commonwealth v. Roberts, CP-06-CR-0000416-2019, involving witness-intimidation and harassment charges.
The Commonwealth later withdrew the unlawful-possession charge after determining that Roberts’s prior New York conviction did not supply the statutory disqualification required by 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6105(a)(1). A charge of carrying a firearm without a license, added after the civil complaint was filed, was also dismissed. A jury convicted Roberts of two witness-intimidation counts and acquitted him of two harassment counts. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, and further appellate review was denied.
The District Court’s rulings
The District Court dismissed the complaint through several rulings:
- The Commonwealth and the judge in his official capacity were protected by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.
- The judge was immune from the individual-capacity claims.
- Roberts’s former attorneys were not adequately alleged to be state actors under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court declined supplemental jurisdiction over associated state-law claims.
- The complaint lacked specific allegations against the City of Reading, the prosecutors, and Detective Perkins, and further amendment was considered futile.
- The claims against the criminal witness were dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.
The appellate disposition
The Third Circuit confined its substantive review to claims Roberts meaningfully challenged in his opening brief. It upheld dismissal of the challenged claims against a former defense attorney, the prosecutors, and Detective Perkins. It also agreed that further amendment of those claims would have been futile on the record presented.
The court nevertheless corrected the judgment’s treatment of certain dismissals. Claims against the Commonwealth and the judge in his official capacity, together with the state-law claims against the former attorneys, were to be dismissed without prejudice. The dismissal of the witness for lack of personal jurisdiction was necessarily without prejudice as well.
The court also denied Roberts’s motion for default judgment and granted the City of Reading leave to file a sur-reply, deemed filed as of August 6, 2026.
3. Analysis: Legal Reasoning
A. Liberal construction does not eliminate pleading requirements
The court recognized that self-represented litigants receive a liberal reading of their pleadings. That protection, however, does not require a court to invent factual allegations, construct claims from an undifferentiated record, or disregard appellate briefing rules.
Two standards of review governed the appeal. Ordinary dismissal for failure to state a claim received de novo review. To the extent dismissal rested on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8’s requirement of a short and plain statement, review was for abuse of discretion. The distinction matters: a complaint can fail because its allegations do not establish a legally sufficient claim, because its presentation does not reasonably explain the claim, or both.
B. A defense attorney is not automatically a state actor
Section 1983 requires conduct under color of state law. A defense attorney performing the traditional functions of criminal representation ordinarily does not meet that requirement, even when the attorney participates in a state criminal proceeding.
The court recognized an important qualification: a private person may act under color of state law by willfully participating in a conspiracy with state officials to violate constitutional rights. Roberts’s allegations did not plausibly establish such joint action. Calling counsel’s conduct a conspiracy did not supply facts showing an agreement or coordinated unconstitutional conduct.
The holding therefore does not categorically exempt defense attorneys from § 1983 liability. It distinguishes ordinary representation from sufficiently pleaded participation in unconstitutional state action. On the existing record, the court also found amendment futile.
C. Prosecutorial immunity turns on function
The claims against the Berks County prosecutors failed because the challenged conduct fell within their protected role as advocates for the Commonwealth. Absolute prosecutorial immunity protects that function even when the plaintiff alleges serious wrongdoing. Immunity does not establish that the conduct was proper; it prevents the particular damages action from proceeding against the protected official.
The court also acknowledged the boundary between advocacy and investigation. Work undertaken to generate evidence can differ from interviewing witnesses in preparation for trial. Roberts did not adequately explain how an amended complaint would allege conduct outside the protected advocacy function.
Accordingly, the opinion should not be read to immunize everything a prosecutor does. Its reasoning depends on the function performed and on the inadequacy of Roberts’s proposed basis for avoiding immunity.
D. Extensive exhibits cannot replace a coherent claim against a named defendant
Roberts named Detective Perkins but did not describe Perkins’s allegedly wrongful conduct in the body of the complaint. On appeal, he asserted that Perkins knowingly and intentionally lied in a police report and probable-cause affidavit. More than 200 pages of attached state-court documents contained references to accusations of fraud and perjury, but the complaint did not explain how those materials supported a federal claim.
The court declined to require the District Court to search those records and assemble a cause of action. This was not a categorical ruling that exhibits never matter. Rather, the complaint failed to connect the defendant, the alleged conduct, and the claimed violation in an intelligible way.
The court supplied an alternative ground as well: even assuming the District Court should have extracted allegations from the exhibits, the materials did not provide sufficient facts to make intentional or knowing falsification plausible. Both the presentation and the factual substance were deficient.
E. Amendment was assessed in relation to the actual defects
The court upheld denial of further amendment because it would have been futile on the record before it. The attorney claim lacked a plausible state-action theory; Roberts did not identify an amendment overcoming prosecutorial immunity; and the materials concerning Perkins did not support a plausible falsification claim.
This is a case-specific conclusion, not a rule that every deficient pro se complaint should be dismissed without an opportunity to amend.
F. The basis for dismissal determines whether prejudice is appropriate
The judgment required modification because a jurisdictional dismissal does not adjudicate the claim’s merits. Under the authorities applied here, Eleventh Amendment immunity deprived the court of subject-matter jurisdiction over the Commonwealth and the judge in his official capacity. Those dismissals therefore had to be without prejudice.
The state-law claims against the former attorneys likewise remained undecided on their merits after the District Court declined supplemental jurisdiction. They too required dismissal without prejudice. Separately, lack of personal jurisdiction over the witness necessarily required a without-prejudice dismissal.
These corrections preserve the distinction between rejecting a claim’s substance and declining or lacking authority to decide it. They do not establish that refiling elsewhere would succeed or overcome other defenses.
4. Analysis: Precedents Cited
A. Review standards, pro se litigation, and appellate preservation
- Doe v. Princeton Univ., 30 F.4th 335, 341 (3d Cir. 2022)
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This case supplied de novo review for dismissal on a motion to dismiss. It framed the appellate court’s independent examination of whether Roberts’s allegations stated legally sufficient claims.
- Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 91, 93 (3d Cir. 2019)
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This precedent served two functions: it established abuse-of-discretion review for a Rule 8 dismissal and explained that a pleading cannot be so vague or ambiguous that a defendant cannot reasonably respond. Its second principle directly supported dismissal of the inadequately described claim against Perkins.
- Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021)
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The court relied on this decision to reconcile liberal construction with factual sufficiency. Roberts’s self-represented status justified a generous reading, but not exemption from the obligation to allege facts supporting relief.
- Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam)
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This authority permits affirmance on any ground supported by the record. It explains why the appellate court could uphold the judgment through immunity and alternative pleading grounds without depending exclusively on the District Court’s reasoning.
- M.S. ex rel. Hall v. Susquehanna Twp. Sch. Dist., 969 F.3d 120, 124 n.2 (3d Cir. 2020)
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This decision supplied the opening-brief forfeiture rule. It limited substantive appellate consideration to claims Roberts meaningfully challenged, preventing the opinion from becoming a comprehensive merits review of every defendant and theory.
- Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013)
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This case established that pro se litigants must follow the procedural rules applicable to other litigants. It reinforced the application of appellate forfeiture despite Roberts’s lack of counsel.
- Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)
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The court invoked the less stringent treatment afforded to pleadings drafted without lawyers. Its placement in the Perkins discussion shows that the court considered that protection before concluding that the complaint remained insufficient.
- Doeblers' Pa. Hybrids, Inc. v. Doebler, 442 F.3d 812, 820 n.8 (3d Cir. 2006)
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The court used this decision’s warning against judicial searches for material buried in the record. Applied here, the principle meant that attaching voluminous criminal records did not oblige the District Court to construct an otherwise unarticulated claim.
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009)
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This decision supplied the plausibility framework. The accusation that Perkins knowingly lied required factual support; conclusory characterizations of fraud, perjury, or intentional falsification were insufficient even if extracted from the attachments.
B. State action and amendment
- Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981)
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This Supreme Court decision established that a defense attorney performing traditional criminal-defense functions does not act under color of state law. It supplied the starting point for rejecting the challenged § 1983 claim against Roberts’s former attorney.
- Abbott v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141, 147–48 (3d Cir. 1998)
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This case supplied both the conspiracy qualification and its pleading limit. A private participant in a willful conspiracy with state officials may be a state actor, but conclusory allegations of concerted conduct do not establish actual joint action. Roberts’s allegations failed at that factual threshold.
- Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 106, 108 (3d Cir. 2002)
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The court relied on this precedent when affirming the futility determinations concerning the former attorney and Perkins. It provided the framework for deciding whether amendment could cure the identified defects, rather than treating the initial pleading’s inadequacy alone as dispositive.
C. Prosecutorial immunity
- Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976)
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This Supreme Court precedent supplied the foundational protection of absolute prosecutorial immunity. It supported dismissal of the damages claims directed at protected prosecutorial advocacy.
- Yarris v. Cnty. of Delaware, 465 F.3d 129, 136 (3d Cir. 2006)
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This decision articulated the functional inquiry: immunity applies when the prosecutor acts as the state’s advocate in performing the challenged conduct. The relevant consideration was therefore the nature of the activity, not merely the defendant’s prosecutorial title.
- Roberts v. Lau, 90 F.4th 618, 625 (3d Cir. 2024)
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This precedent distinguished investigative work aimed at generating evidence from advocacy-related witness preparation for trial. It identified a possible boundary to immunity, but Roberts did not adequately explain how amendment would place his claims outside that boundary.
D. Jurisdiction and the form of dismissal
- Merritts v. Richards, 62 F.4th 764, 772 (3d Cir. 2023)
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This authority supported the requirement that jurisdictional dismissals be without prejudice. It contributed to the modification of the judgment rather than reinstatement of the claims.
- In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., Inc., 335 F.3d 243, 249 (3d Cir. 2003)
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This case explained that Eleventh Amendment immunity, where applicable, deprives the federal court of subject-matter jurisdiction. It supplied the jurisdictional basis for correcting the dismissals of the Commonwealth and the judge in his official capacity.
- Figueroa v. Buccaneer Hotel Inc., 188 F.3d 172, 182 (3d Cir. 1999)
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This precedent supported without-prejudice treatment of the state-law claims after the District Court declined supplemental jurisdiction. Those claims had not received a merits adjudication.
- Lauderdale-El v. Ind. Parole Bd., 35 F.4th 572, 576–77 (7th Cir. 2022)
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The court cited this Seventh Circuit decision for the proposition that dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction is necessarily without prejudice. It clarified the effect of the witness’s dismissal even though the District Court had not expressly specified prejudice.
E. The underlying criminal decision
Commonwealth v. Roberts, No. 1588 MDA 2024, 2025 WL 1380813 (Pa. Super. Ct. May 13, 2025), appeal denied, No. 321 MAL 2025, 2025 WL 3652141 (Pa. Dec. 17, 2025) (per curiam), supplied procedural and factual background. It documented the firearm-charge developments and the affirmance of Roberts’s conviction and sentence. The Third Circuit did not use it to establish a new civil-rights rule.
5. Potential Impact and Limits
- Practical pleading guidance: A complaint should identify each defendant’s conduct and connect it to the asserted violation. Extensive attachments are not a substitute for that explanation.
- Conspiracy claims require factual substance: Dissatisfaction with defense counsel, even coupled with accusations of cooperation with prosecutors, does not itself establish state action.
- Immunity remains function-specific: Future litigants seeking damages from prosecutors must address whether the challenged activity was advocacy or another function. Alleged bad intent alone does not defeat absolute immunity.
- Appellate briefing matters: Self-represented appellants must meaningfully develop their challenges in the opening brief. An appeal does not automatically reopen every district-court ruling.
- Dismissal language has substantive consequences: Courts must distinguish an adjudication rejecting a claim from a dismissal based on jurisdiction or the decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
The opinion does not establish whether the mixed outcomes of Roberts’s criminal charges satisfied any favorable-termination requirement for malicious prosecution. Nor does it determine whether particular warrant statements were actually false. Its disposition rests on the procedural, pleading, state-action, and immunity grounds discussed above.
Because the opinion is nonprecedential, these points offer persuasive and practical guidance rather than a new binding framework for future cases.
6. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Section 1983
- A federal vehicle for seeking relief when someone acting under color of state law violates federal rights. It is not a general remedy for every wrong committed during a criminal case.
- Under color of state law
- Conduct fairly connected to governmental authority. A defense lawyer ordinarily does not become a state actor merely by representing someone in state court.
- Absolute prosecutorial immunity
- Protection from damages liability for prosecutorial advocacy. It concerns whether a lawsuit may proceed, not whether the alleged conduct was acceptable.
- Official versus individual capacity
- An official-capacity claim generally concerns the governmental entity represented by the official; an individual-capacity claim seeks personal liability. Different immunity rules may apply.
- Plausibility
- The complaint must provide facts reasonably supporting the alleged violation, not simply labels such as “conspiracy” or “fraud.” It need not prove the case at the pleading stage.
- Futility of amendment
- A conclusion that revising the complaint would not cure the relevant defect. Here, that conclusion depended on the claims and record presented.
- Subject-matter and personal jurisdiction
- Subject-matter jurisdiction concerns authority to hear the kind of dispute presented. Personal jurisdiction concerns authority over a particular defendant.
- Supplemental jurisdiction
- Authority to hear related state-law claims alongside federal claims. A federal court may decline to exercise it without deciding the state claims’ merits.
- Without prejudice
- The dismissal itself does not finally resolve the claim’s merits. It does not guarantee that another court can hear the claim or that other defenses are unavailable.
- Forfeiture
- Loss of appellate consideration because an argument was not properly presented, here through meaningful development in the opening brief.
7. Conclusion
The Third Circuit left the dismissal of Roberts’s action intact while correcting the judgment’s treatment of jurisdictional and unadjudicated state-law claims. The opinion illustrates three established principles: pro se complaints still require coherent factual allegations; state-action requirements and function-based immunity limit § 1983 damages claims; and dismissals without a merits adjudication must be properly designated.
Its broader value is practical rather than precedential: it shows how those doctrines operate together while preserving the important distinction between an unsuccessful claim and one the court lacks authority, or declines, to decide.