Date: Jul 9, 2026

Extracurricular Costs Are Not Child-Support “Add-Ons” Absent an Articulated Deviation; Insurance Proceeds from a Totaled Marital Vehicle Must Be Equitably Distributed

1. Introduction

Sawas v Elzanaty, 2026 NY Slip Op 04336 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t July 8, 2026), is a matrimonial appeal arising from a Nassau County divorce judgment entered after a nonjury trial. The plaintiff (husband) appealed provisions addressing (i) equitable distribution, including characterization of certain assets as separate property and treatment of dissipation, (ii) pendente lite maintenance through entry of judgment, (iii) child support and add-on expenses, (iv) counsel fees awarded to the defendant (wife), and (v) allocation of the attorney for the child’s fees.

The Second Department largely affirmed the trial court’s exercise of discretion, but made two targeted corrections: it removed extracurricular activities as a child-support add-on (because no deviation was articulated), and it awarded the plaintiff a credit for half of insurance proceeds received by the defendant after a marital Land Rover was totaled.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Equitable distribution: Affirmed a 50/50 distribution of marital assets and upheld findings of the plaintiff’s wasteful dissipation/transfers in contemplation of divorce; the dissipated sums were properly included in the marital estate for distribution.
Separate property: Affirmed that funds in the defendant’s Uniform Transfers to Minors Account (from her father prior to marriage) and certain Egyptian real property (acquired through the defendant’s father’s government land allocation, without marital contribution) were separate property.
Vehicles/insurance proceeds: Although the trial court could allow each party to keep their respective vehicles, it erred by failing to distribute insurance proceeds from the loss of a marital Land Rover. The appellate court awarded the plaintiff a credit of 50% of the net proceeds received by the defendant.
Maintenance: Affirmed temporary maintenance calculated under the statutory formula and ending upon entry of judgment, and upheld requiring the plaintiff to maintain medical insurance pendente lite.
Child support: Affirmed the basic award and medical insurance treatment, but modified by deleting the provision requiring the plaintiff to pay 83% of extracurricular activities because extracurriculars are not statutory add-ons and the court did not articulate a basis for deviation.
Counsel fees: Affirmed a $65,000 counsel-fee award to the less-monied spouse; also affirmed requiring the plaintiff to pay 100% of the attorney for the child’s fees.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Appellate deference in equitable distribution and credibility findings

Ambrose v Ambrose, 176 AD3d 1148: Cited for the principle that trial courts have “broad discretion” in equitable distribution and appellate courts will not disturb the result absent an improvident exercise. The Sawas court used this as the framework for reviewing the 50/50 split and related distribution rulings.
Morille-Hinds v Hinds, 169 AD3d 896: Quoted (via Ambrose) reinforcing the deferential standard of review applied to equitable distribution determinations.
Osuagwu v Osuagwu, 229 AD3d 802: Used to emphasize that, after a nonjury trial, the trial court’s credibility assessments receive “great weight.” This deference mattered in upholding findings that the plaintiff’s explanations for transfers and withdrawals were not credible.

B. The “economic partnership” premise of equitable distribution

Davis v O'Brien, 79 AD3d 695: Cited for the core doctrine that marriage is an “economic partnership” with contributions in varied forms (wage earner, homemaker, parent). This supported the court’s rejection of the plaintiff’s argument that a 50/50 distribution was unwarranted in a relatively short marriage.
Potvin v Potvin, 193 AD3d 995 and Iwanow v Iwanow, 39 AD3d 471: Both were used to confirm that the record can show an economic partnership even where spouses have different roles, supporting equal sharing of marital assets.

C. Wasteful dissipation and transfers “in contemplation of a matrimonial action”

Kirshner v Kirshner, 228 AD3d 923 (quoting Silvers v Silvers, 197 AD3d 1195): Cited for the burden of proof—wasteful dissipation must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence.
Epstein v Messner, 73 AD3d 843: Cited for the preponderance standard in evaluating the proof.
Kaufman v Kaufman, 189 AD3d 31 and Sotnik v Zavilyansky, 101 AD3d 1102: Used to support the remedy employed—amounts dissipated or improperly transferred may be included when calculating equitable distribution, ensuring the non-offending spouse receives an equitable share notwithstanding the depletion.

D. Separate property determinations

Embury v Embury, 49 AD3d 802: Cited in connection with the classification of foreign real property as separate property where it was acquired through a family allocation and there was no marital contribution to acquisition or improvement. The case supported the court’s willingness to treat non-U.S. assets under the same Domestic Relations Law classification principles.

E. Vehicles, marital classification, and insurance proceeds

D'Amico v D'Amico, 66 AD3d 951: Cited for the straightforward rule that an automobile purchased during the marriage and before commencement of the action is marital property.
Nerayoff v Rokhsar, 168 AD3d 1071 and Mistretta v Mistretta, 138 AD3d 1075: Both supported the appellate correction that insurance proceeds replacing a marital asset should be equitably distributed; the Second Department relied on these authorities to award the plaintiff a 50% credit.

F. Pendente lite maintenance adjustments and discretion in maintenance awards

Johnson v Chapin, 12 NY3d 461: Cited for the principle that if a pendente lite maintenance award is later deemed excessive or inequitable, the court can adjust equitable distribution to account for it. In Sawas, the reference framed the court’s discussion but did not lead to modification because the pendente lite maintenance was upheld.
Diliberto v Diliberto, 230 AD3d 637 (quoting Silvers v Silvers, 197 AD3d 1195): Used to reinforce that maintenance is highly discretionary and fact-specific.

G. Child support cap application and add-ons/deviations

Varnit v Varnit, 233 AD3d 917: Cited to support the trial court’s discretion in applying the Child Support Standards Act percentages to income up to a portion of the statutory cap (here, up to $225,000), based on relevant factors.
Tuchman v Tuchman, 201 AD3d 986 and Sinnott v Sinnott, 194 AD3d 868: Central to the modification. These cases stand for the proposition that extracurricular activities are generally encompassed in the basic child support award and should not be treated as add-ons absent an articulated deviation.
Davydova v Sasonov, 109 AD3d 955: Cited for the requirement that the court must articulate a basis for deviation; silence is reversible error when imposing non-statutory add-ons.

H. Counsel fees and attorney for the child

Fredericks v Fredericks, 85 AD3d 1107: Cited for the notion that counsel fees are generally warranted where there is a significant financial disparity.
Weidman v Weidman, 162 AD3d 720: Cited in applying the rebuttable presumption under Domestic Relations Law § 237(a) favoring the less-monied spouse.
Kaufman v Kaufman, 189 AD3d 31: Also used here for the “unnecessary litigation/delay” factor in evaluating counsel fees.
22 NYCRR 130-1.1: Referenced in confirming that neither party engaged in frivolous conduct warranting sanctions-style fee shifting.
Plotkin v Esposito-Plotkin, 216 AD3d 676: Cited to support affirmance of the amount and discretionary nature of the counsel-fee award.
Matter of Young v Young, 161 AD3d 1182 and Matter of Plovnick v Klinger, 10 AD3d 84: Cited to support allocating the attorney for the child’s fees to the wealthier parent, consistent with the “strongly preferred practice” of appointing counsel for the child in contested custody matters.
Ambrose v Ambrose, 176 AD3d 1151: Also cited for the “strongly preferred practice” language regarding attorneys for children.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Standard of review: discretion plus credibility deference

The decision is anchored in two appellate review principles: (1) equitable distribution, maintenance, child support add-ons, and counsel fees are predominantly discretionary calls, and (2) credibility findings after a bench trial are rarely disturbed. These principles explain why most challenges failed: the plaintiff largely sought to relitigate factual determinations (e.g., explanations for large transfers) that the trial court rejected.

B. Equitable distribution: partnership premise and dissipation remedy

The Second Department treated the marriage as an economic partnership under Domestic Relations Law § 236(B), rejecting the plaintiff’s attempt to narrow the marital enterprise. It then applied the statutory factors addressing “wasteful dissipation of assets” and transfers “in contemplation of a matrimonial action” (Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][5][d][12] and [13]). The remedial logic is restorative: a spouse should not improve their distributive outcome by depleting or moving marital funds; instead, the dissipated/transferred sums are effectively brought back into the distribution calculus.

C. Separate property: source-of-funds and non-marital acquisition

The court affirmed classification of the UTMA funds as separate property because they were acquired from the defendant’s father prior to marriage (Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][1][d][1]). Likewise, the Egyptian real property was treated as separate where the evidence showed a government allocation to the defendant’s father and no marital contribution to acquisition or improvements—consistent with source-and-contribution analysis commonly used in classification disputes.

D. Insurance proceeds as marital replacement property

The notable equitable distribution correction concerns the Land Rover: while the trial court could allow each party to keep their own vehicles for convenience, the Land Rover’s destruction converted a tangible marital asset into cash proceeds. The appellate court treated those insurance proceeds as the economic substitute for the marital car and held they must be equitably distributed; failure to do so created an asymmetry inconsistent with the 50/50 distribution framework.

E. Child support: extracurricular activities require a deviation finding

The decision draws a bright operational line under Domestic Relations Law § 240(1-b): “Add-ons” are limited to those enumerated by statute, and extracurricular activities are not among them. If a court nonetheless wants to allocate extracurricular costs separately—often for reasons tied to the child’s prior standard of living or the parents’ means—it must treat that choice as a deviation and explain the basis. Because the trial court did not articulate such a basis, the add-on allocation was stricken.

F. Counsel fees and attorney for the child: disparity-based allocations

Applying Domestic Relations Law § 237(a), the Second Department affirmed the fee award to the defendant as the less-monied spouse (plaintiff earning >$300,000/year; defendant out of workforce, imputed earning capacity around $100,000/year). The court also upheld making the plaintiff fully responsible for the attorney for the child, relying on the policy preference for such appointments and the parties’ financial circumstances.

3.3 Impact

Child support practice point: Trial courts in the Second Department must be explicit if they intend to allocate extracurricular expenses outside the basic child support award. The absence of an articulated deviation invites modification on appeal.
Equitable distribution accounting: The case reinforces that “replacement” funds (like insurance proceeds) should be traced and distributed as marital property when they stand in for a destroyed marital asset.
Dissipation deterrence: By approving inclusion of dissipated/transferred sums in the marital calculus, the decision continues a deterrent approach: pre-action depletion does not shield assets from equitable distribution.
Fee shifting predictability: The decision confirms the continuing strength of the less-monied spouse presumption under Domestic Relations Law § 237(a), and that attorney-for-the-child fees may be fully allocated to the higher earner where justified by circumstances.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Equitable distribution: Division of marital property in a way the court finds fair (not always equal), based on statutory factors and the parties’ circumstances.
Marital property vs. separate property: Marital property generally includes property acquired during the marriage before the action begins; separate property includes certain categories like pre-marriage gifts/inheritances or assets acquired before marriage. Classification often turns on the source of the asset and whether the marriage contributed to its acquisition or increase in value.
Wasteful dissipation / transfers in contemplation of divorce: Spending, moving, or hiding marital money to reduce what can be divided in the divorce. Courts can “add back” those amounts when calculating distribution so one spouse cannot benefit from the depletion.
Pendente lite: Temporary orders (maintenance/support/fees) that apply while the divorce case is pending.
Child support “add-ons”: Expenses the statute allows to be paid in addition to basic child support (for example, certain childcare and medical costs). Extracurricular activities are usually treated as included within the basic award unless the court explains a deviation.
Deviation: A court’s decision to depart from the standard statutory formula or structure; it must explain the reasons and factors supporting the departure.
Less-monied spouse presumption (counsel fees): A statutory presumption that the spouse with fewer financial resources should receive help paying legal fees so both parties can litigate on more equal footing.
Attorney for the child: A lawyer appointed to represent the child’s interests in custody/access disputes; courts often allocate those fees based on the parents’ relative ability to pay.

5. Conclusion

Sawas v Elzanaty is a predominantly deferential affirmance that nonetheless delivers two practical directives. First, extracurricular activities cannot be imposed as a child-support add-on without an articulated deviation rationale, even where one parent earns substantially more. Second, insurance proceeds replacing a marital vehicle are subject to equitable distribution, and a court must account for such proceeds to maintain distributional parity. Beyond those corrections, the decision reinforces familiar Second Department themes: strong deference to credibility findings, robust remedies for dissipation, faithful application of statutory maintenance and child-support frameworks, and predictable fee shifting toward the less-monied spouse, including attorney-for-the-child allocations.