Rooker-Feldman Bars Federal Constitutional Attacks Seeking to Undo State Foreclosure and Eviction Judgments

I. Introduction

In Surface v. Home Mortgage Alliance, LLC (10th Cir. Mar. 27, 2026) (unpublished Order and Judgment), the Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a pro se federal lawsuit arising from a completed Colorado state foreclosure and subsequent eviction. Plaintiff Raymond Todd Surface sued a lender, a loan servicer, the foreclosing law firm, the public trustee, and two state judges. He alleged violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, along with accusations of extortion and racketeering, and sought damages, declaratory relief (including that the deed of trust was unconstitutional), and—critically—an order returning his home.

The central issue was jurisdictional: whether the federal district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because the suit, in substance, invited federal review and rejection of state-court foreclosure and eviction judgments entered before the federal case began.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. Applying its settled Rooker-Feldman framework, the court held that Mr. Surface’s claimed injuries were caused by state-court judgments (foreclosure and eviction), those judgments preceded the federal filing, and the requested relief—return of the property and declarations undermining the mortgage instruments and foreclosure mechanism—necessarily required reviewing and rejecting the state-court decisions. Recasting the dispute in constitutional terms did not avoid the doctrine.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1 983) and Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923)

    These foundational cases supply the core principle: lower federal courts are not appellate tribunals for state-court judgments. The Tenth Circuit invoked them (via the district court’s reference) to situate the doctrine’s constitutional and statutory logic—only the U.S. Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments.

  • Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)

    Exxon Mobil provides the modern, cabined articulation of Rooker-Feldman, emphasizing that it is a “narrow” doctrine limited to cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments and inviting federal review and rejection. The panel quoted this formulation (through its own circuit precedent) and used it as the governing test: the focus is causation (injury “caused by” the state judgment) and remedy (an invitation to reject that judgment).

  • Bruce v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 57 F.4th 738, 746 (10th Cir. 2023)

    Bruce served as the opinion’s primary doctrinal vehicle. The panel drew from Bruce both the standard of review (de novo) and the four-factor Rooker-Feldman framework: (1) plaintiff lost in state court; (2) state-court judgment caused the injuries; (3) judgment predated the federal action; and (4) plaintiff asks the federal court to review and reject the judgment. The court then mapped Mr. Surface’s allegations onto each factor.

  • Graff v. Aberdeen Enterprizes, II, Inc., 65 F.4th 500, 515 (10th Cir. 2023)

    The panel cited Graff to underscore that Rooker-Feldman is “a narrow jurisdictional limitation.” Although the doctrine is often invoked broadly in foreclosure-related litigation, the court signaled that its application here was not expansive; rather, the suit fell within the doctrine’s narrow core because it sought to undo state judgments.

  • Campbell v. City of Spencer, 682 F.3d 1278, 1283 (10th Cir. 2012)

    Campbell supplied the key operational test: barred claims are those complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments, meaning “an element of the claim must be that the state court wrongfully entered its judgment.” The panel treated this as dispositive when evaluating Mr. Surface’s “constitutional” framing. If the federal claim requires concluding that the state court judgment was wrongful, the federal court lacks jurisdiction.

  • Behr v. Campbell, 8 F.4th 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2021)

    Mr. Surface relied on Behr for the proposition that Rooker-Feldman applies only when a plaintiff seeks to “modify or overturn” an injurious state-court judgment. The Tenth Circuit distinguished Behr on its facts: in Behr, the plaintiffs did not challenge the underlying custody judgment and sought damages for collateral misconduct (e.g., denial of access to courts, discriminatory acts, unauthorized home entry). Here, by contrast, Mr. Surface directly attacked the foreclosure and eviction and sought the ultimate undoing of those state outcomes—the return of the home—making federal review of state judgments unavoidable.

  • Van Deelen v. Johnson, 497 F.3d 1151, 1153 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007) and Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005)

    These cases established how the court treats pro se litigants: filings are construed solicitously, but the court does not act as counsel and pro se parties must follow procedural rules. This framing matters because many foreclosure-related federal suits are pro se; the court signaled that generous construction does not extend to creating jurisdiction where none exists.

B. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning was methodical and jurisdiction-first. It emphasized that Rooker-Feldman is not about whether the plaintiff alleges constitutional violations in the abstract; it is about whether the federal court is being asked to functionally overturn state-court judgments.

  1. State-court loss and timing were undisputed.

    The foreclosure and eviction judgments were entered in 2023, and the federal suit was filed in 2025—satisfying the “prior state judgment” requirement. Mr. Surface was the state-court loser.

  2. Causation: the injuries flowed from the judgments.

    Mr. Surface’s alleged injuries—loss of title, sale of the home, and eviction—were not merely associated with the litigation; they were the direct legal effects of state-court judgments and proceedings.

  3. Requested relief required rejecting the state judgments.

    The requested return of the home was decisive. Ordering the property restored to Mr. Surface would require a federal determination that the foreclosure and eviction were invalid. Likewise, his declaratory requests (e.g., declaring the deed of trust unconstitutional or the public trustee system a “ruse”) were not freestanding policy questions; they were aimed at negating the legal basis on which the state courts acted.

  4. “Constitutional labels” did not change the jurisdictional substance.

    The court treated Mr. Surface’s due process and related allegations as an invitation to find that the state court “tricked” him, that the note was “counterfeit,” and that the foreclosing parties lacked authority—all of which are functionally arguments that the state courts should not have entered foreclosure and eviction judgments. Under Campbell v. City of Spencer, that makes the supposed federal claims jurisdictionally barred.

  5. Distinguishing “independent misconduct” claims from “judgment reversal” claims.

    The opinion’s engagement with Behr v. Campbell clarifies the line: damages claims for independent wrongs that do not require rejecting a state judgment may proceed, but claims whose success depends on the invalidity of the state judgment cannot. The court held Mr. Surface’s claims fell in the latter category.

C. Impact

Although designated as nonprecedential, the decision consolidates and illustrates the Tenth Circuit’s practical approach to foreclosure-related federal filings:

  • Foreclosure and eviction challenges framed as constitutional claims remain prime Rooker-Feldman candidates when the requested remedy would undo the state result (especially return of property).
  • Declaratory relief does not immunize a complaint if the declaration’s function is to negate the state-court judgment’s legal foundation.
  • Out-of-circuit narrowing cases (like Behr v. Campbell) will not help where the plaintiff directly targets the state outcome rather than alleging truly collateral misconduct.
  • Litigation strategy signal: plaintiffs seeking federal relief after foreclosure must carefully separate any potentially “independent” federal claims (e.g., post-judgment collection misconduct) from claims that require re-litigating note validity, standing to foreclose, or eviction legality—because the latter will usually be jurisdictionally barred in federal district court.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Rooker-Feldman doctrine
A rule that federal trial courts (district courts) generally cannot review or overturn state-court judgments. If you lost in state court, the usual route to challenge that result is through the state appellate system and, ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court—not a new federal district court lawsuit.
“Injury caused by a state-court judgment”
The doctrine turns on what caused the harm. If the harm is the legal effect of the state judgment (e.g., the house was sold because a foreclosure judgment authorized sale), then the claim is likely barred.
“Review and reject”
Even if a complaint does not explicitly ask a federal court to “reverse” a state judgment, it can still be barred if the requested relief would only be possible by declaring the state judgment wrong or invalid.
Dismissal “without prejudice” for lack of jurisdiction
The federal court is not deciding who is right on the merits; it is saying it has no power to decide the dispute. “Without prejudice” typically means the claim is not adjudicated on the merits (though other barriers—like preclusion, immunity, or statutes of limitation—may still apply elsewhere).
De novo review
On appeal, the court reviews the jurisdictional dismissal from scratch, without deferring to the district court’s conclusions.

V. Conclusion

Surface v. Home Mortgage Alliance, LLC reinforces a straightforward jurisdictional rule in the Tenth Circuit: when a federal plaintiff’s alleged harms stem from state foreclosure and eviction judgments, and the requested relief would require a federal court to invalidate or undo those judgments (including restoring title or possession), the suit is barred by Rooker-Feldman—even if styled as a constitutional challenge or a request for declaratory relief. The decision also clarifies that out-of-circuit authority emphasizing Rooker-Feldman’s narrow scope does not assist plaintiffs whose claims are, in substance, a collateral appeal of state-court outcomes.