RICO § 1965(b) “Ends of Justice” Requires More Than Convenience: Sixth Circuit Narrows Nationwide Service Over Non-Contact Defendants

1. Introduction

In Aaron Hall v. Trivest Partners, L.P. (6th Cir. June 16, 2026), Michigan consumers sued a founder of a solar-sales company and multiple Trivest-related entities under civil RICO and the Michigan Consumer Protection Act. The litigation posture mattered: the case reached the Sixth Circuit at the pleadings stage, where the court accepted the amended complaint’s allegations as true under Norfolk Cnty. Ret. Sys. v. Cmty. Health Sys., 877 F.3d 687 (6th Cir. 2017).

The central question was not the merits of the alleged fraud, but whether a federal district court in Michigan could exercise personal jurisdiction over nine Florida Trivest entities that had no Michigan contacts, relying on RICO’s nationwide service provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b). The district court held that it could, reasoning that keeping the case in Michigan was comparably convenient and efficient. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding those reasons were legally insufficient under § 1965(b).

2. Summary of the Opinion

Judge Kethledge (joined by Judge Bush) held that § 1965(b)’s “ends of justice require” standard demands more than considerations of convenience (case age, already-retained local counsel, or relative convenience between Michigan and Florida). Because the Trivest defendants lacked minimum contacts with Michigan and the plaintiffs failed to identify reasons that require litigating in Michigan, the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over them under § 1965(b). The Sixth Circuit reversed the order denying the motion to dismiss and remanded.

As a consequence of the lack of personal jurisdiction, the Sixth Circuit also vacated the district court’s later order denying the Trivest defendants’ motions to compel arbitration, reasoning that without jurisdiction the court lacked power to decide those motions.

Judge Clay dissented, arguing § 1965(b) is a flexible, discretionary standard permitting jurisdiction when “suitable or appropriate” to serve the ends of justice, and warning the majority created an ill-defined “necessity” test with limited guidance.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

(a) Threshold framing: jurisdiction as a prerequisite to adjudication

  • Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803): Quoted for the proposition that courts decide “the rights of individuals,” but implicitly within the limits of judicial power—used here to underscore that personal jurisdiction is a basic precondition to binding a party.
  • Fuld v. PLO, 606 U.S. 1 (2025): Cited for the modern articulation that a court’s power in a particular case extends only to parties over whom it has personal jurisdiction. The majority also used Fuld to emphasize fairness to defendants as a core jurisdictional value.
  • United States v. Haynes, 55 F.4th 1075 (6th Cir. 2022): Provided the de novo standard of review for the district court’s statutory interpretation of § 1965(b).

(b) Mechanics of service and the structure of RICO’s § 1965

  • Butcher's Union Local No. 498 v. SDC Investment, Inc., 788 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1986): Used for two distinct points: (1) personal jurisdiction is tied to the ability to serve process; and (2) § 1965(b) exists to allow plaintiffs to bring nationwide conspirators before one court. But the majority did not adopt the Ninth Circuit’s strict “no other district” condition as an absolute rule.
  • Peters Broad. Eng'g v. 24 Capital, 40 F.4th 432 (6th Cir. 2022): This is the Sixth Circuit’s key internal anchor. It characterizes § 1965(a) as a venue provision and explains the two-step structure: at least one defendant must be subject to minimum-contacts jurisdiction in the forum under § 1965(a), after which § 1965(b) may permit service on additional defendants if the “ends of justice require.”
  • PT United Can Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 138 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1998): Quoted for the idea that Congress expressed a preference to avoid hauling defendants into “far flung fora,” and for skepticism that the “ends of justice” require resort to § 1965(b) when all defendants are subject to suit in a single district.

(c) Due process analogies: minimum contacts and fairness versus convenience

  • Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945): Invoked for “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” to emphasize how far the district court’s approach departed from typical jurisdictional constraints, given the Trivest defendants’ “zero contacts” with Michigan.
  • Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958): Cited alongside Fuld to reinforce fairness-to-defendants as a jurisdictional baseline in personal-jurisdiction doctrine.
  • Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007): Cited for the proposition that forum non conveniens (a convenience-based doctrine) is discretionary—supporting the majority’s view that convenience cannot be elevated into a statutory “requirement” for jurisdictional reach.
  • LAK, Inc. v. Deer Creek Enterprises, 885 F.2d 1293 (6th Cir. 1989): Used to highlight purposeful availment as the “sine qua non” of in personam jurisdiction—again by analogy to underscore that convenience considerations are not a substitute for jurisdictional predicates.

(d) The dissent’s interpretive counterweights

  • Hall v. Trivest Partners, L.P., 2023 WL 5941729 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 12, 2023): The dissent relied on the district court’s factor-weighing approach (efficiency, delay, hardships) as a proper “ends of justice” evaluation.
  • Cory v. Aztec Steel Bldg., Inc., 468 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 2006): Cited for the view that “ends of justice” is “flexible” and tailored to facts, and for the notion that § 1965(b) gives RICO “nationwide jurisdictional reach.”
  • Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963): Quoted for the caution that an “ends of justice” test “cannot be too finely particularized.”
  • Stanifer v. Brannan, 564 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2009): Offered by the dissent to show that similarly worded “interest of justice” standards confer broad district-court discretion.
  • Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911): Used to argue that analogous antitrust “ends of justice” language historically supported broad joinder of nonresident defendants once jurisdiction existed over at least one.
  • K.B. by & through Qassis v. Methodist Healthcare - Memphis Hosps., 929 F.3d 795 (6th Cir. 2019): Cited for the plaintiff’s general prerogative to choose where and how to sue.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) The statutory architecture: § 1965(a) first, § 1965(b) second

The majority adhered closely to the two-step scheme described in Peters Broad. Eng'g v. 24 Capital. First, venue under § 1965(a) requires that the action be instituted in a district where at least one defendant “resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs,” which in practice requires minimum-contacts jurisdiction over at least one defendant. Second, § 1965(b) can extend service to additional out-of-district defendants only if “it is shown that the ends of justice require” bringing them before that court.

(b) Interpreting “ends of justice require”: “require” connotes necessity, not mere advantage

The decisive interpretive move is the majority’s emphasis on the word “require.” While acknowledging that RICO conspiracies can be nationwide, the court rejected a reading that would allow plaintiffs to sue any distant defendant in any district so long as one anchor defendant supports venue. In the majority’s view, § 1965(b) demands necessity: litigation in the chosen forum must be required—not simply facilitated—by the ends of justice.

The court explicitly declined to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s strict formulation from Butcher's Union Local No. 498 v. SDC Investment, Inc. (that plaintiffs must show “there is no other district” with jurisdiction over all defendants). But it still required some identified, case-specific reason that makes the chosen forum effectively necessary—something more than comparative convenience.

(c) Why convenience and case-management considerations are insufficient

The district court’s justifications were: (1) the case had been pending for ten months, (2) defendants had already retained Michigan counsel, and (3) Michigan was as convenient for defendants as Florida would be for plaintiffs. The Sixth Circuit held these are “insignificant” compared to the fairness principle underpinning personal-jurisdiction doctrine.

To reach that result, the majority reasoned by analogy to the Supreme Court’s personal-jurisdiction framework. It acknowledged the doctrinal distinction: typical minimum-contacts limits arise under the Fourteenth Amendment for state courts, and Fuld v. PLO noted the Supreme Court has “not identified any limits, under the Fifth Amendment,” on federal courts’ personal jurisdiction for domestic cases. Even so, the Sixth Circuit treated convenience as, at most, a discretionary policy consideration (as in Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp.), and contrasted that with the non-discretionary character of purposeful availment in ordinary doctrine (as in LAK, Inc. v. Deer Creek Enterprises).

The court’s holding is crisp: for § 1965(b), “interests of convenience cannot ‘require’” haling a defendant into a district where it lacks minimum contacts.

(d) Remedial consequence: no jurisdiction, no power to decide arbitration motions

Having found no personal jurisdiction over the Trivest defendants, the Sixth Circuit concluded the district court lacked authority to rule on their motions to compel arbitration, and therefore vacated the order denying those motions. This underscores a procedural priority rule: jurisdictional defects can nullify subsequent merits-adjacent rulings directed at the non-jurisdictionally present defendants.

3.3. Impact

(a) A tighter gate for nationwide service in civil RICO cases in the Sixth Circuit

The principal precedential effect is a stricter interpretation of § 1965(b) within the Sixth Circuit: plaintiffs cannot rely on litigation efficiency, elapsed time, retained counsel, or rough convenience parity as the “ends of justice” basis to assert jurisdiction over non-contact defendants. Practically, this pushes civil RICO plaintiffs toward filing in:

  • a forum where the principal out-of-state defendants have minimum contacts; or
  • a forum that can be shown, with more concrete necessity-based facts, to be required to litigate the entire controversy.

(b) Strategic implications for pleading and early motion practice

The decision incentivizes early, defendant-focused jurisdictional challenges in multi-entity RICO suits—especially where private equity structures and affiliate entities are added after filing. Plaintiffs, meanwhile, will need to develop an evidentiary and procedural record early (even at the pleadings stage) explaining why their chosen forum is not merely preferable, but required under § 1965(b).

(c) Doctrinal tension with more flexible “ends of justice” readings

The dissent’s reliance on Cory v. Aztec Steel Bldg., Inc. and other “flexible concept” authorities highlights an inter-circuit and intra-statute interpretive tension: whether § 1965(b) is principally (i) a broad remedial tool allowing consolidation when fair and efficient, or (ii) a narrow exception triggered only by necessity-like conditions. The majority’s approach aligns more closely with PT United Can Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co.’s caution against far-flung fora, and less with the dissent’s analogy to “interest of justice” discretion.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Personal jurisdiction: A court’s power to bind a defendant with its orders and judgment. Without it, the court cannot adjudicate claims against that defendant.
  • Minimum contacts / purposeful availment: Traditional doctrine (from Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington and its progeny) asking whether a defendant created meaningful connections with the forum such that it is fair to require the defendant to litigate there.
  • RICO § 1965(a) vs. § 1965(b):
    • § 1965(a) determines where a civil RICO action may be instituted (venue tied to defendant presence/affairs).
    • § 1965(b) may allow additional, out-of-district parties to be summoned—but only if the “ends of justice require.”
  • “Ends of justice require”: The key phrase governing when a court may extend nationwide service to out-of-district defendants under § 1965(b). Here, the majority reads “require” as demanding something closer to necessity than convenience; the dissent reads it as flexible and discretionary.
  • Forum non conveniens: A discretionary doctrine allowing dismissal in favor of a more appropriate forum. The majority cited Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp. to show convenience doctrines are typically discretionary—unlike the jurisdictional showing the district court used to justify § 1965(b).

5. Conclusion

Aaron Hall v. Trivest Partners, L.P. establishes (or, at minimum, sharply clarifies) a Sixth Circuit rule: under 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b), the “ends of justice” are not satisfied by general convenience, litigation momentum, or parity of burdens; those considerations cannot “require” hauling defendants into a forum where they have no minimum contacts. The decision re-centers defendant fairness as the dominant value in the § 1965(b) analysis (even if only by analogy to Fourteenth Amendment doctrine) and constrains plaintiffs’ ability to consolidate multi-state RICO defendants in a chosen forum absent a stronger necessity-based justification. The dissent underscores that future cases will test the boundary between “necessity” and “flexibility,” but the controlling majority opinion makes clear that efficiency alone will not open § 1965(b)’s nationwide service door in the Sixth Circuit.