Revocation Sentencing After Esteras: A Passing Reference to “Respect for the Law” Does Not Require Vacatur Absent Plain, Prejudicial Error

1. Introduction

In United States v. Cody Stevenson (4th Cir. June 17, 2026) (unpublished, per curiam), the Fourth Circuit affirmed a district court judgment revoking Cody Zane Stevenson’s supervised release and imposing nine months’ imprisonment followed by 12 months of supervised release. Stevenson admitted to eight violations of his supervision conditions. His counsel filed an Anders brief challenging only the sentence’s reasonableness; Stevenson also filed a pro se brief arguing (i) the revocation proceedings should have been dismissed, (ii) the revocation sentence was substantively unreasonable, and (iii) his original release date was miscalculated such that he allegedly should not have been on supervised release when he violated.

The opinion primarily reinforces the Fourth Circuit’s deferential revocation-sentencing framework and addresses how Esteras v. United States applies when a district court makes a single reference to an arguably impermissible revocation-sentencing factor (promoting respect for the law).

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • Revocation decision affirmed: The district court did not err by revoking supervised release, given Stevenson’s admission to eight violations and the court’s authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).
  • Sentence affirmed as not plainly unreasonable: The nine-month prison term fell within the 6–12 month advisory Chapter Seven policy range and was supported by appropriate revocation rationales (sanctioning breach of trust; deterrence).
  • Esteras issue rejected: Although the district court mentioned “respect for the law,” the Fourth Circuit found no reversible error; even assuming error, it did not affect substantial rights given the single reference and multiple valid justifications.
  • Release-date/credit argument rejected: The record did not support the claim that the original release date was miscalculated; and even “excess prison time” would not automatically reduce supervised release under United States v. Johnson.
  • Collateral custody-level complaint noted but not remedied: An alleged presentence report error affecting Bureau of Prisons classification was not developed below; designation decisions rest with the BOP under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b).

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967)

The case reached the Fourth Circuit via an Anders posture: defense counsel represented that there were no meritorious appellate issues while flagging the potential reasonableness question. The court performed its independent record review and found no nonfrivolous issues—an important procedural context explaining why the opinion is issue-conservative and focused on obvious error.

United States v. George, 95 F.4th 200 (4th Cir. 2024)

Cited for the standard of review of the revocation decision. The Fourth Circuit used this authority to underscore that, once violations are established (here, admitted), the revocation decision is unlikely to be reversed absent clear error or legal misapplication.

United States v. Patterson, 957 F.3d 426 (4th Cir. 2020)

Patterson supplies the headline rule that revocation sentences are affirmed if within the statutory maximum and not plainly unreasonable, emphasizing the district court’s “broad discretion” in the revocation setting.

United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370 (4th Cir. 2015)

Padgett provides two essential pillars of the court’s analysis:

  • Appellate courts apply the same basic procedural/substantive framework used for original sentences, but with a more deferential posture on revocation.
  • A revocation sentence within the policy-statement range is presumed reasonable, a presumption Stevenson failed to rebut.

United States v. Coston, 964 F.3d 289 (4th Cir. 2020)

Coston structures the court’s “reasonableness” inquiry:

  • Procedural reasonableness: adequate explanation after considering Chapter Seven policy statements and applicable § 3553(a) factors through § 3583(e).
  • Substantive reasonableness: an appropriate basis for the chosen sentence in light of the totality of the circumstances.

United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202 (4th Cir. 2017)

Slappy supplies the second step: only if a sentence is unreasonable does the court ask whether it is plainly unreasonable—“plain” meaning clear or obvious, borrowing from plain-error doctrine. This framing helps explain why marginal or ambiguous misstatements by the district court often do not yield reversal.

Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185 (2025)

This is the opinion’s most consequential cited authority. Esteras holds that at revocation sentencing a district court may not consider the § 3553(a)(2)(A) retributive factors (including “promoting respect for the law”), because § 3583(e) omits them. Yet Esteras also emphasizes the importance of preservation: when there is no objection, plain-error review governs.

The Fourth Circuit applied Esteras in a restrained way:

  • It interpreted the district court’s reference to “respect for the law” as tied to Stevenson’s violations and supervision conduct, not “retribution for the defendant’s underlying crime.”
  • It held that, even if the remark crossed the Esteras line, the single reference amid valid revocation rationales did not affect substantial rights.

United States v. Wooten, 167 F.4th 490 (8th Cir. 2026) and United States v. Hernandez, 603 F.3d 267 (4th Cir. 2010)

Although Wooten is an Eighth Circuit case, the Fourth Circuit used it for a practical proposition consistent with plain-error analysis: a single reference to an impermissible factor may be insufficient to show prejudice where the record supplies other valid grounds for the sentence. Hernandez is cited for the “substantial rights” inquiry in the sentencing context, reinforcing that defendants must show a reasonable probability of a different outcome absent the alleged error.

United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669 (4th Cir. 2011)

Jeffery is cited to underscore the district court’s “extremely broad discretion” in weighing sentencing considerations. Here, that discretion supported rejecting Stevenson’s mitigation arguments (rehabilitation and nonviolent violations) in favor of sanctioning repeated breaches of trust.

United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53 (2000)

Johnson forecloses a common misconception raised by Stevenson: even if a defendant served “excess prison time” on the original sentence, that does not automatically reduce or eliminate the supervised release term. The Fourth Circuit relied on this to reject Stevenson’s attempt to convert an alleged crediting issue into a defense to revocation.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) No basis to dismiss revocation proceedings

Stevenson claimed all parties moved to dismiss. The Fourth Circuit corrected the record: only defense counsel moved; the district court denied the motion. The appellate court then emphasized the decisive fact—Stevenson’s admissions to eight violations—making revocation well within statutory authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).

(b) Procedural reasonableness

The court found the sentencing process procedurally sound:

  • The district court properly calculated the advisory Chapter Seven range (6–12 months) based on Grade B violations and criminal history category II (citing the Guidelines policy statement provision as quoted in the opinion).
  • It heard counsel’s arguments, permitted allocution, and explained the sentence with reference to permissible revocation purposes—especially sanctioning breach of trust and deterrence.
  • It addressed mitigation arguments rather than ignoring them.

(c) Substantive reasonableness

Because the nine-month sentence sat within the policy-statement range, it carried a presumption of reasonableness. Stevenson’s rebuttal attempts failed because the district court reasonably could conclude that multiple violations warranted custody despite evidence of rehabilitation and despite the nonviolent character of the violations.

(d) Handling the “respect for the law” remark after Esteras

The opinion’s key doctrinal move is contextualization. The court treated the district judge’s comment as directed to Stevenson’s demonstrated disregard for supervision conditions, not as impermissible retribution for the original offense. Even if the comment were deemed an Esteras violation, the court held there was no reversible plain error because:

  • the reference was single and not the decision’s driving rationale; and
  • the court gave multiple valid reasons consistent with § 3583(e)’s permissible aims.

(e) Release-date miscalculation and sentence credits

The Fourth Circuit rejected the claim on two levels:

  • Factual/record failure: “Nothing in the record” supported the credits assertion or established an alternative commencement date for supervised release.
  • Legal barrier: even if excess time were served, United States v. Johnson prevents automatic reduction of supervised release.

3.3. Impact

Practical implications for revocation litigation post-Esteras

  • Objections matter: The opinion operationalizes Esteras by showing that unpreserved complaints about impermissible considerations are likely to be reviewed only for plain error, a difficult standard to satisfy.
  • Context matters: A passing “respect for the law” reference will not necessarily trigger reversal if it can be read as describing the defendant’s supervision conduct rather than retribution for the underlying offense.
  • Record-building is crucial: Claims about sentence credits, supervised release start dates, and Bureau of Prisons classification issues will fail on appeal without record support and proper presentation below.

Doctrinal stability rather than doctrinal expansion

Because this is an unpublished opinion, it is “not binding precedent in this circuit.” Its significance is therefore mostly persuasive and predictive: it illustrates how the Fourth Circuit is likely to apply Esteras in close cases and how it uses the “plainly unreasonable” framework to uphold within-range revocation sentences.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Supervised release: A period of court-ordered monitoring after prison. Violations can lead to additional imprisonment and another term of supervision.
  • Revocation: The court’s decision to terminate supervised release early due to violations and impose a sanction (often prison).
  • Chapter Seven policy statements: Advisory (nonbinding) guideline recommendations specifically for revocation sentences; courts must consider them but are not required to follow them.
  • Grade B violations: A guideline classification generally reflecting more serious violations (often involving new criminal conduct) and leading to higher recommended ranges.
  • Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness: Procedural focuses on method (correct range, consideration of factors, explanation). Substantive focuses on the outcome’s justification (whether the sentence makes sense given the facts and purposes).
  • “Plainly unreasonable” review: A highly deferential appellate standard for revocation sentences: the defendant must show not only unreasonableness but clear/obvious error to obtain reversal.
  • Plain error / substantial rights: When no objection is made, the defendant typically must show a clear error that likely changed the sentence outcome.
  • Why “respect for the law” is sensitive at revocation: After Esteras, revocation sentencing cannot be driven by retribution for the original offense; it must focus on the supervision breach and permissible statutory aims.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Cody Stevenson reaffirms the Fourth Circuit’s deferential approach to revocation sentences within the Chapter Seven range and illustrates a cautious, context-driven application of Esteras v. United States. The court signaled that a district judge’s isolated mention of “respect for the law” at revocation will not automatically require reversal—particularly where the record shows permissible reasons (breach of trust, deterrence) and the defendant did not preserve the issue. The decision also reiterates that alleged sentence-credit errors generally cannot be leveraged to erase supervised release and that even “excess prison time” does not automatically reduce supervision under United States v. Johnson.