Analysis
1. Standards of Review and Proof
Relying on Inquiry Concerning Judge Peterson, Inquiry Concerning Judge Coomer (“Coomer II”), and Inquiry Concerning Judge Coomer (“Coomer I”), the Court applied three distinct standards:
- Factual findings: reviewed for clear error, with deference to the Hearing Panel’s credibility determinations.
- CJC violations: required clear and convincing proof.
- Legal conclusions: reviewed de novo.
Williams principally argued that the Panel should have credited contrary evidence. The Court rejected that argument because conflicting evidence does not make a finding clearly erroneous. Where the record supports either view, the Hearing Panel may choose which witnesses to believe.
2. Preliminary Challenge to the JQC Proceedings
Williams moved to quash the charges based on alleged undisclosed political and personal connections involving two judges who had served on the JQC investigative panel. She argued that the judicial-disqualification standard in CJC Rule 2.11 applied.
The Court disagreed. A judge serving on a JQC investigative panel is performing prosecutorial and administrative functions rather than presiding over a case. Recusal was therefore governed by JQC Rule 3(F)(2), which applies standards governing prosecutors, not by the judicial-recusal provisions of CJC Rule 2.11.
The Court also rejected Williams’s due-process claim. Under Hood v. Carsten and Inquiry Concerning Judge Coomer (“Coomer I”), due process fundamentally requires notice and an opportunity to be heard, with procedures adapted to the circumstances. Williams received a hearing on her motion, and additional discovery would not have changed the controlling legal standard.
3. Ex Parte Communications in a Pending Divorce Case
Williams telephoned Brandy Alexander, a litigant whose case was assigned to her. Alexander had previously served as a guardian ad litem before Williams, and the two had discussed membership in the same sorority. Despite a staff warning that the communication would be ex parte, Williams discussed the pending case, stated that she would retain it, and indicated that she would take procedural steps favorable to Alexander.
The Hearing Panel credited testimony that Williams said she “had [Alexander’s] back” because of their sorority connection. Williams later failed to disclose the communication when opposing counsel questioned the unusual handling of the case.
The Court held that this conduct violated:
- CJC Rule 1.2(A): failure to promote public confidence in judicial independence, integrity, and impartiality;
- CJC Rule 2.4(B): allowing a social relationship to influence judicial conduct; and
- CJC Rule 2.9(A): engaging in prohibited ex parte communications.
Inquiry Concerning Judge Peterson and Inquiry Concerning Anderson supported the conclusion that undisclosed communications with one side concerning a pending matter violate the prohibition against ex parte contacts.
The Court classified the conduct as willful misconduct in office. Under Inquiry Concerning Judge Peterson and Inquiry Concerning Judge Coomer (“Coomer II”), that constitutional ground requires action in a judicial capacity, in bad faith, involving a known breach of duty motivated by self-interest or ill will. Williams knowingly disregarded the prohibition, sought to benefit a favored litigant, and later attempted to obscure what had occurred.
4. Use of Judicial Prestige to Assist a Family Member
Williams contacted a junior attorney representing the opposing party in litigation against Williams’s uncle. She identified herself as “Judge Williams,” discussed the merits, requested an extension, and stated that she would have dismissed the case had it come before her. The Panel also found that she drafted a legally sophisticated email for her uncle.
The conduct violated:
- CJC Rule 1.2(B): the obligation to preserve the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary; and
- CJC Rule 1.3: the prohibition against using the prestige of judicial office to advance private interests.
Inquiry Concerning Judge Anthony Peters supported the rule that a judge may not use judicial office to benefit a family member.
Although Williams acted outside her formal judicial capacity, discipline remained constitutionally permissible because she acted in bad faith. Under Inquiry Concerning Judge Coomer (“Coomer II”), private conduct by a judge constitutes conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice when it is undertaken in bad faith. The Panel reasonably found that Williams deliberately approached the least experienced attorney, after hours, because that attorney would be easier to influence.
5. Unlawful Detention of a Witness
During a contentious divorce proceeding, Williams ordered that witness Molly Dennis be handcuffed and taken to a holding cell. Dennis had not been charged with contempt or any other offense and received neither notice of a charge nor an opportunity to be heard.
Williams characterized the detention as an attempt to teach Dennis a lesson rather than an arrest. The Court held that this distinction did not cure the lack of legal authority. Under In re Williams, even summary contempt requires reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard.
The incident violated:
- CJC Rule 1.1: the duty to respect and comply with the law;
- CJC Rule 1.2(A): the duty to promote confidence in the judiciary; and
- CJC Rule 2.8(B): the duty to remain patient, dignified, and courteous toward witnesses and others.
Inquiry Concerning Baker supported the conclusion that failure to comply with governing law violates Rules 1.1 and 1.2(A).
The Court classified the detention as conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. Even accepting that Williams intended to be constructive rather than malicious, a judge may be disciplined for good-faith judicial conduct that appears unjudicial and damages public esteem for the judiciary. The Court emphasized that a judge is “the servant of the law and not its embodiment.”
6. Failures to Rule Promptly
Numerous charges alleged that Williams failed to decide motions within the 90-day period required by OCGA § 15-6-21(b). She admitted most of those allegations and later filed amended admissions covering all delayed-ruling counts.
The Hearing Panel found violations of CJC Rules 1.1 and 2.2. Although the opinion broadly accepted the Panel’s findings concerning the 28 proven counts, the Court stated that it did not need independently to resolve whether the delayed rulings supplied additional grounds for removal because the other proven violations were already sufficient.
7. Why the Misconduct Would Have Required Removal
The Court viewed the events collectively rather than as isolated mistakes. They demonstrated favoritism, misuse of office, disregard of basic procedural rights, and repeated dishonesty or evasiveness during the investigation.
Several precedents supported removal for such a pattern:
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Inquiry Concerning Judge Peterson approved removal where a pattern of violations was aggravated by lack of candor.
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Inquiry Concerning Fowler approved removal for a consistent pattern of willful misconduct and conduct bringing judicial office into disrepute.
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In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge approved removal where a judge repeatedly failed to understand or protect litigants’ basic rights and demonstrated a troubling pattern of ineptitude and misconduct.
The Court therefore agreed that removal would have been appropriate had Williams remained in office.
8. Effect of Resignation
The controlling disposition rests on a practical and constitutional limit: a person cannot be removed from an office she no longer holds. The Court did not impose a reprimand, permanent judicial disqualification, or another alternative sanction. Nor did it definitively hold that no inherent authority over former judges could ever exist. Instead, it declined to assert any such authority in this case.
Following Inquiry Concerning Judge Gerald Johnson, the Court dismissed without prejudice and authorized reinstatement if Williams again seeks or obtains judicial office. Importantly, reinstatement would not require relitigation of the misconduct. The matter would return solely for consideration of discipline.
Precedents Concerning the Court’s Inherent Authority
The separate opinions extensively examined whether the judicial power includes authority to discipline former judges.
Chief Justice Peterson’s Concurrence
Chief Justice Peterson concluded that the Constitution’s express judicial-discipline provisions concern only sitting judges. He reasoned that the term “judge” ordinarily means a person presently holding judicial office.
Drawing on Beall v. Beall, Lovett v. Sandersville R. Co., Wallace v. Wallace, Grimsley v. Twiggs County, State v. McMillan, Matter of Oliver, and Sacandy v. Walther, he explained that courts possess inherent powers genuinely necessary to discharge their constitutional duties. Those powers must nevertheless be used cautiously.
Matter of Inquiry Concerning a Judge No. 591, Judicial Qualification Comm’n v. Lowenstein, and In re Judicial Qualifications Comm’n Formal Advisory Opinion No. 239 recognized inherent judicial authority over judicial conduct. But none decided whether that authority extends to former judges.
Cases including Fulton County v. State, DeKalb County v. Adams, In re DeKalb County Courthouse Fire Sprinkler System, and McCorkle v. Judges of Superior Court of Chatham illustrated the need for restraint when invoking inherent power.
Because Williams had resigned, the Court had publicly established her misconduct, and proceedings could be revived if she returned to judicial life, Chief Justice Peterson concluded that additional discipline was not sufficiently necessary to justify a novel exercise of inherent authority.
Justice LaGrua’s Concurrence
Justice LaGrua agreed that the Court possesses inherent authority to discipline a former judge for misconduct committed in office. She nevertheless declined to exercise it because Williams had not received clear prior notice that such authority would be used after resignation. She indicated that the opinions in this case may provide sufficient notice for a future case.
Justice Bethel’s Dissent
Justice Bethel, joined by Justice Land, argued that the Court’s duty to preserve the judiciary necessarily includes authority to discipline former judges for official misconduct. He relied on Forston v. Weeks, Judicial Council of Ga. v. Brown & Gallo, LLC, In re DeKalb Cty. Courthouse Fire Sprinkler Sys., Grimsley v. Twiggs County, and Wallace v. Wallace.
In the dissent’s view, publication of findings creates visibility but not accountability. Allowing resignation to terminate the disciplinary process risks encouraging judges to leave office strategically before sanctions are imposed.
The dissent suggested that the General Assembly consider making resignation during a pending JQC matter relevant to future eligibility for judicial office. It also observed that the State Bar remains free to investigate professional-conduct violations by former judges who remain licensed attorneys.