Prior Professional Acquaintance Alone Does Not Require Recusal; Rule 60(b)(6) Cannot Repackage Earlier-Available Arguments in Hague Return Cases

1. Introduction

This appeal arises out of an international child-abduction return action brought under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The underlying “Hague proceedings” culminated in a 2021 district-court judgment ordering the child’s return to Romania after the court found Romania to be the child’s habitual residence and concluded the father’s retention violated the mother’s custody rights under Romanian law. The Tenth Circuit previously affirmed that judgment in Dumitrascu v. Dumitrascu, No. 21-1341, 2022 WL 1529624, *1 (10th Cir. May 16, 2022) (“Hague proceedings”).

Years later, the father, Alin Dumitrascu (pro se), returned to district court seeking to reopen the case under Rule 60(b)(6) and to disqualify the presiding judge, Chief Judge Philip Brimmer, alleging (among other things) bias reflected in conduct during the pandemic-era virtual hearing and an asserted prior relationship with the mother’s counsel, Habib Nasrullah. The district court denied recusal and denied Rule 60(b) relief. Alin appealed.

The key issues on appeal were: (i) whether certain new theories were waived because they were not raised below; (ii) whether the recusal denial was an abuse of discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a); and (iii) whether denial of Rule 60(b)(6) relief was an abuse of discretion, particularly where the movant largely re-argued matters available earlier or alleged generalized misconduct without specificity.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit affirmed. It held:

• Waiver: Arguments not presented to the district court—and not accompanied by a plain-error argument on appeal—were deemed waived and not reviewed.
• Recusal: No abuse of discretion occurred in denying recusal. A reasonable, fully informed person would not question the judge’s impartiality based on a virtual hearing conducted due to COVID-19, adverse rulings, or a decade-plus-old professional connection to counsel absent specific facts suggesting partiality.
• Rule 60(b)(6): No abuse of discretion occurred in denying extraordinary post-judgment relief. Rule 60(b)(6) cannot be used to revisit issues previously addressed or to advance arguments and facts that were available earlier; and generalized allegations without specificity do not establish “exceptional circumstances.”

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

• Dumitrascu v. Dumitrascu, No. 21-1341, 2022 WL 1529624, *1 (10th Cir. May 16, 2022) ("Hague proceedings")
  The prior appeal framed the background: the district court’s role was limited to determining habitual residence and ordering return—not awarding custody. This contextual limit was central to rejecting the appellant’s claim that the judge improperly “ruled on custody.”
• Barnett v. Hall, Estill, Hardwick, Gable, Golden & Nelson, P.C., 956 F.3d 1228, 1239 (10th Cir. 2020)
  Provided both the standard of review (abuse of discretion for disqualification rulings) and the operative objective test for § 455(a): whether a reasonable person, fully informed of the relevant facts, would question impartiality. The panel applied this lens to each asserted basis for recusal (virtual hearing logistics; adverse outcome; professional familiarity with counsel).
• Johnson v. Spencer, 950 F.3d 680, 701 (10th Cir. 2020)
  Supplied the abuse-of-discretion standard for Rule 60(b)(6) and the stringent appellate posture: reversal only when there is a “complete absence of a reasonable basis” and the reviewing court is “certain that the decision is wrong.” This deference strongly shaped the affirmance.
• Luo v. Wang, 71 F.4th 1289, 1291 n.1 (10th Cir. 2023) and Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005)
  These cases set the pro se framework: filings are construed liberally, but courts do not act as an advocate, and pro se litigants must follow procedural rules. This mattered to how the panel treated the appellant’s preservation failures and his attempt to relitigate rather than present properly supported grounds.
• United States v. Leffler, 942 F.3d 1192, 1196 (10th Cir. 2019)
  Controlled the waiver analysis. The court applied Leffler to deem certain theories waived where the appellant neither raised them below nor pursued a plain-error framework on appeal. This foreclosed review of (among other things) the appellant’s Rule 60(b)(4) theory and certain due process and UCCJEA contentions.
• Bixler v. Foster, 596 F.3d 751, 762 (10th Cir. 2010)
  Supported the proposition that “adverse rulings alone do not demonstrate judicial bias.” This directly rebutted the appellant’s inference of bias from the judge’s Hague determinations.
• Bond v. Sheriff of Ottawa Cnty., 173 F.4th 1265, 1310 (10th Cir. 2026)
  Emphasized that Rule 60(b) relief is “extraordinary” and reserved for “exceptional circumstances.” The panel used this to frame the high bar the appellant did not clear.
• Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir. 1991)
  Provided a key limiting principle: Rule 60(b) is not a vehicle for “revisit[ing] the issues already addressed” or “advanc[ing] new arguments or supporting facts” that were available earlier. This was the backbone of the court’s reasoning that many of the appellant’s asserted errors and misconduct allegations came too late.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Issue preservation and waiver

The panel first narrowed the appeal. Applying United States v. Leffler, it refused to review newly raised theories (including a Rule 60(b)(4) void-judgment claim, certain due process arguments, and an asserted failure to apply a “home state rule” from the UCCJEA) because they were not raised below and were not presented on appeal through a plain-error lens. This reflects a strong institutional interest in finality and orderly litigation, especially in post-judgment contexts.

2) Recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)

Under § 455(a), the question is not the litigant’s subjective belief but whether an informed, reasonable observer would question impartiality. Using Barnett, the panel concluded no reasonable observer would.

• Virtual hearing procedures: The court accepted the district court’s explanation that pandemic conditions necessitated a virtual hearing, the parties participated equally, and transcripts existed—undercutting any claim of differential treatment or structural unfairness tied to the judge.
• “Ruling on custody” vs. Hague return determination: The panel reiterated that Hague proceedings are not custody adjudications; they determine habitual residence and whether return is required. Thus, the adverse outcome did not evidence bias, and Bixler foreclosed the idea that adverse rulings alone prove partiality.
• Prior professional relationship with counsel: The panel treated a judge’s past professional association with an attorney—standing alone—as insufficient for recusal absent specific facts indicating favoritism. The opinion also rejected an attempted factual wedge: even if the judge presided over a 2013 case involving counsel, that did not transform an attenuated professional history into reasonable grounds to question impartiality.

3) Rule 60(b)(6) and the boundary between extraordinary relief and relitigation

The panel reaffirmed the narrowness of Rule 60(b)(6). Citing Bond v. Sheriff of Ottawa Cnty., it treated relief as extraordinary, and under Johnson v. Spencer it afforded substantial deference to the district court’s denial.

Substantively, the court relied on Van Skiver v. United States to reject attempts to repackage earlier-available claims as “exceptional circumstances.” The panel endorsed the district court’s conclusions that:

• Allegations of legal error and purported misconduct that could have been raised during the Hague proceedings (or on the earlier direct appeal) generally do not justify reopening years later.
• Post-judgment conduct allegations—at least as presented—were treated as “new claims for relief,” not grounds that undermine the integrity of the original judgment as required for Rule 60(b)(6) reopening.
• The asserted “bias” premise failed because recusal was properly denied; therefore, it could not bootstrap extraordinary reopening.
• Generalized accusations lacking specificity do not meet Rule 60(b)(6)’s exceptional-circumstances threshold.

Finally, the panel rejected a challenge to the adequacy of the district court’s explanation, noting the order did, in fact, address the filings with legal citations and reasoning.

C. Impact

• Finality in Hague Convention return proceedings: Although nonprecedential, the decision is a practical reminder that Hague return orders—already designed to be expeditious—are not easily reopened long after the fact. Parties must bring legal-error and evidentiary challenges promptly (trial, direct appeal), not through years-later Rule 60 motions.
• Recusal standards in an era of remote proceedings: The opinion signals that virtual-hearing logistics arising from COVID-19, without concrete prejudice or disparate treatment, will not ordinarily support § 455(a) disqualification.
• Professional familiarity with counsel: The decision reinforces a demanding evidentiary burden for recusal when the alleged conflict is a prior professional association. The mere fact of having worked together long ago, or the judge having presided over counsel’s earlier cases, is not enough without specific indicia of favoritism.
• Appellate discipline on preservation: The waiver analysis underscores that even pro se appellants must preserve issues and properly frame appellate review (including plain error where applicable), or risk losing review entirely.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Hague Convention “return” vs. “custody”: A Hague case typically decides where custody should be litigated (the child’s habitual residence) and whether the child must be returned there. It does not decide which parent should have custody.
• “Habitual residence”: A fact-intensive concept identifying the child’s ordinary home base before the alleged wrongful removal/retention.
• 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) recusal standard: A judge must step aside when an objective, reasonable observer would doubt impartiality—not merely because a party is unhappy with rulings or suspects bias.
• Rule 60(b)(6): A limited “safety valve” allowing reopening for extraordinary reasons not covered by Rule 60(b)(1)-(5). It is not a substitute for appeal and cannot be used to re-argue points that could have been made earlier.
• Waiver vs. forfeiture (as applied here): The court treated unpreserved issues as waived where the appellant also failed to argue plain error on appeal, resulting in no review “at all.”

5. Conclusion

Dumitrascu v. Dumitrascu affirms two interlocking principles in the post-judgment setting: (1) judicial recusal under § 455(a) requires concrete, objectively meaningful facts—neither adverse rulings nor an attenuated, historical professional relationship with counsel suffices; and (2) Rule 60(b)(6) relief is extraordinary and cannot be used to relitigate earlier-available arguments or to raise new theories long after a final Hague Convention return judgment. In doing so, the decision strengthens the practical finality of Hague return determinations and clarifies the high thresholds for both recusal and late-stage reopening in federal court.