Potential-to-Facilitate Rule for U.S.S.G. §2K2.1(b)(6)(B) During Vehicular Flight; No Impermissible Double Counting with §3C1.2

1. Introduction

United States v. Taris Devoe Hollomon concerns a felon-in-possession prosecution arising from a high-speed chase in rural Georgia. After a trooper clocked the defendant speeding, Hollomon attempted to flee, drove recklessly, was stopped by a PIT maneuver, and ran into woods with a backpack containing a stolen revolver. Hollomon pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), 924(a)(8).

The appeal focused on sentencing. The district court applied: (1) a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for possessing a firearm “in connection with” another felony (Georgia’s fleeing/eluding statute, O.G.C.A. § 40-6-395(a)); and (2) a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 for recklessly creating a substantial risk while fleeing. Hollomon argued procedural error (misapplication of § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) and impermissible double counting) and substantive unreasonableness (insufficient consideration of youth, substance abuse, and PTSD).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the 60-month sentence (within the advisory range of 57–71 months). It held that § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) was properly applied because the enhancement turns on the firearm’s potential to facilitate the other felony, and Hollomon had the opportunity and ability to use the gun during flight. The court also rejected the double-counting claim, concluding that § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) and § 3C1.2 target different harms (firearm-linked felony conduct vs. reckless endangerment during flight). Finally, it found the sentence substantively reasonable given the district court’s consideration of § 3553(a) factors and Hollomon’s repeated firearm-related conduct.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Standards of review and sentencing framework

• United States v. Martinez, 964 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2020): Provided the baseline for reviewing guideline interpretation and application (de novo for interpretation/application; clear error for fact findings), and reaffirmed that the “in connection with” determination is a factual finding reviewed for clear error.
• United States v. Bishop, 940 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2019): Quoted via Martinez for the standard of review on “in connection with.”
• Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): Anchored abuse-of-discretion review for substantive reasonableness and totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.

B. Meaning of “in connection with” under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)

• United States v. James, 135 F.4th 1329 (11th Cir. 2025): The opinion’s principal interpretive authority. It supplies (i) a broad reading of “in connection with,” (ii) the “touchstone” that the firearm must have potential to facilitate, and (iii) the “emboldening” concept.
• Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993): Cited (through James) for the minimum requirement that a firearm have some purpose or effect with respect to the other crime and facilitate or have the potential of facilitating it.
• United States v. Carillo-Ayala, 713 F.3d 82 (11th Cir. 2013): Quoted (through James) for the “emboldens an actor” principle when the defendant has the opportunity or ability to display/discharge to protect himself or intimidate.
• United States v. Brooks, 112 F.4th 937 (11th Cir. 2024): Reinforced that, in certain circumstances, mere possession can suffice for § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), and recognized a presumption about contemplated use when illegal activity is threatened.
• United States v. Matos-Rodriguez, 188 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 1999): Used as an analogy: firearm in a car during flight can establish the requisite nexus because the gun could protect the criminal activity—even if later discarded while fleeing.
• United States v. Rhind, 289 F.3d 690 (11th Cir. 2002): Supported the “availability and appearance” rationale—firearms’ presence can promote or protect criminal conduct even if unloaded or disassembled.

C. Double counting doctrine (and when enhancements may stack)

• United States v. Matos-Rodriguez, 188 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 1999): Also cited for de novo review of double counting claims.
• United States v. Flanders, 752 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2014): Emphasized the presumption that the Sentencing Commission intended cumulative application absent express direction otherwise; described the difficulty of prevailing on double counting.
• United States v. Webb, 665 F.3d 1380 (11th Cir. 2012): Quoted (via Flanders) for the cumulative-intent presumption.
• United States v. Suarez, 893 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2018): Articulated the definition of impermissible double counting—punishment increased for a harm already fully accounted for.
• United States v. Dudley, 463 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2006): Quoted (via Suarez) for the double counting standard.
• United States v. Asante, 782 F.3d 639 (11th Cir. 2015): Provided the “different harms” test; if enhancements address different harms, stacking is permissible.

D. Guideline commentary after the Eleventh Circuit’s ambiguity rule

• United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc): Controlled whether the panel would consult U.S.S.G. commentary. The opinion applied Dupree to decline reliance on § 3C1.2’s commentary because Hollomon did not argue the guideline text was “genuinely ambiguous.”

E. Substantive reasonableness and § 3553(a) explanations

• United States v. Goldman, 953 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2020): Totality-of-circumstances and § 3553(a) purpose-based inquiry.
• United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2015): Described the “holistic” nature of § 3553(a) factor weighing.
• United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349 (11th Cir. 2022): Confirmed discretion over the weight accorded to each § 3553(a) factor.
• United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234 (11th Cir. 2021), and United States v. Taylor, 997 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2021): District courts need not address each factor or every piece of mitigation; acknowledgment of consideration is generally sufficient.
• United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc): Defined abuse-of-discretion circumstances in sentencing.
• United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2008): “Definite and firm conviction” standard for reversing as substantively unreasonable.
• United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2008): A sentence well below the statutory maximum indicates reasonableness.
• United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739 (11th Cir. 2008): Within-guideline sentences are generally expected to be reasonable.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. “In connection with” focuses on potential facilitation, not actual use

The panel’s central move was to frame § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) as a capability-and-opportunity inquiry rather than an actual-use inquiry. Using United States v. James as its interpretive lens, the court rejected Hollomon’s argument that the enhancement fails unless the defendant reaches for the gun or attempts to use it during the other felony. Instead, the court treated the presence of the firearm during flight—coupled with the defendant’s access to it and continued flight while carrying the bag—as sufficient to show a contextual/logical relationship and the gun’s potential to facilitate the eluding offense.

The opinion further invoked a presumption (drawn from United States v. Brooks) that a defendant aware of a weapon’s presence will think of using it if illegal activity is threatened—making the enhancement easier to satisfy where the firearm is accessible during a confrontation risk such as a traffic stop or pursuit.

B. Double counting: different enhancements, different harms

Applying the Eleventh Circuit’s double counting framework (United States v. Suarez; United States v. Asante), the panel held that § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) and § 3C1.2 do not overlap in the way required for impermissible double counting. Even if both enhancements arise from the same episode (flight), the court viewed them as punishing distinct “kinds of harm”:

• § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B): the added danger and criminality of firearm possession that is connected to another felony (here, felony eluding under state law), regardless of whether the driving itself was reckless.
• § 3C1.2: the increased risk to others created by reckless endangerment during flight, regardless of whether the flight is chargeable as a felony or involves a firearm.

C. Commentary use constrained by “genuine ambiguity” (Dupree)

Hollomon attempted to leverage U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 cmt. 1, which says § 3C1.2 should not apply when a Chapter Two guideline already yields an equivalent/greater increase “solely on the basis of the same conduct.” The panel refused to engage the commentary because, under United States v. Dupree, commentary is consulted only if the guideline text is “genuinely ambiguous,” and Hollomon disclaimed any ambiguity argument.

The court also added an alternative holding: even if commentary were consulted, the enhancements were not imposed “solely” on the same conduct because each required proof of a different feature—firearm-linked felony connection versus reckless endangerment.

D. Substantive reasonableness: acknowledgment suffices; recidivist firearm conduct matters

The panel found no abuse of discretion where the district court expressly referenced § 3553(a), recognized the mitigation (youth, substance abuse, PTSD from being shot), but emphasized Hollomon’s repeated firearm-related appearances before the court and the need to deter and promote respect for the law. Relying on United States v. Tinker and United States v. Taylor, the panel underscored that district courts need not address every factor or every mitigating point in detail. The sentence’s position within the guideline range and well below the 15-year maximum supported reasonableness (citing United States v. Hunt and United States v. Gonzalez).

3.3 Impact

Because the opinion is “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” it is not binding precedent, but it may be cited as persuasive authority under applicable rules and is practically important as a clear application of existing Eleventh Circuit doctrine.

• Broader reach of § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) in flight scenarios: The decision reinforces that firearm accessibility during vehicular eluding can support the enhancement even absent brandishing or attempted use, particularly where the defendant continues flight with the firearm in a bag on his person.
• Routine stacking of § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) with § 3C1.2: The “different harms” framing makes it difficult for defendants to characterize these enhancements as duplicative when both are triggered by the same episode.
• Post-Dupree narrowing of commentary arguments: The opinion highlights a strategic and doctrinal point for litigants: a commentary-based limitation is unlikely to be reached unless the party first establishes genuine ambiguity in the guideline text under United States v. Dupree.
• Guideline amendment awareness without doctrinal change: The court noted the 2025 move of the enhancement from § 2K2.1(b)(6) to § 2K2.1(b)(7), signaling continuity of substance despite renumbering.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness: Procedural challenges ask whether the court calculated the guideline range correctly and followed required steps; substantive challenges ask whether the final sentence is reasonable in light of § 3553(a).
• “In connection with” (§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)): The firearm need not be fired or displayed; it is enough that it could have helped the other felony (for example, by emboldening the defendant or providing protection during a confrontation).
• Impermissible double counting: Using two enhancements is allowed unless they punish the same harm twice. If each enhancement targets a different risk or wrongdoing, both may apply.
• Guideline “commentary” after Dupree: Commentary is not treated as automatically controlling. Courts in the Eleventh Circuit generally consult it only if the guideline’s text is genuinely ambiguous.
• Standards of review: “De novo” means the appellate court decides the legal issue fresh; “clear error” is highly deferential to the district court’s factual findings; “abuse of discretion” is deferential to the district court’s sentencing judgment under § 3553(a).

5. Conclusion

United States v. Taris Devoe Hollomon applies and consolidates core Eleventh Circuit sentencing principles in a common fact pattern: a high-speed flight with a readily accessible firearm. The court reaffirmed that § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) turns on the firearm’s potential to facilitate the other felony, not on actual attempted use; that stacking § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) and § 3C1.2 is generally permissible because they address different harms; and that, after Dupree, commentary-based limitations will not be reached absent genuine textual ambiguity. Even in an unpublished disposition, the opinion offers a practical roadmap for how the Eleventh Circuit is likely to analyze firearm-and-flight enhancements and related mitigation arguments under § 3553(a).