People v. Bender: Depraved Indifference in Erratic Multi-Collision Driving and Strict Enforcement of CPL 250.10 Psychiatric-Notice Requirements

1. Introduction

In People v Bender (2026 NY Slip Op 01444), the New York Court of Appeals addressed two recurring and often fact-intensive criminal-law questions: (1) when dangerous driving supports a finding of depraved indifference—the heightened mens rea required for reckless endangerment in the first degree (Penal Law § 120.25); and (2) when a trial court may preclude psychiatric evidence for failure to comply with the notice requirement of CPL 250.10.

The defendant, Donald Bender, was convicted of first-degree reckless endangerment based on a short but extreme course of driving that involved repeated collisions, pushing other vehicles, leaving crash scenes, and ultimately striking a house occupied by two people. On appeal, he argued the trial evidence did not establish depraved indifference and that County Court improperly barred psychiatric testimony related to bipolar disorder because notice under CPL 250.10 was served only days before trial.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court of Appeals affirmed. It held:

  • The evidence was legally sufficient for a rational jury to find that defendant acted “under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life,” given witness testimony about his demeanor, repeated impacts, failure to brake, and the escalating sequence of dangerous acts.
  • County Court did not abuse its discretion in precluding psychiatric evidence tied to bipolar disorder where defendant failed to timely serve CPL 250.10 notice, showed no adequate “good cause,” and the People demonstrated prejudice (including lost opportunity for an independent exam and full record review).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

People v Suarez, 6 NY3d 202 (2005)

The Court relied on People v Suarez for the modern framing of depraved indifference as a culpable mental state reflecting “utter disregard for the value of human life”—a willingness to act without caring whether grievous harm results. In Bender, this definition anchored the inquiry away from mere dangerousness and toward whether the defendant’s conduct and circumstances permitted an inference of a “don’t care” attitude toward life-threatening risk.

People v Heidgen, 22 NY3d 259 (2013)

People v Heidgen provided the Court’s central analytic tools for depraved indifference in reckless driving contexts: the inquiry is “highly fact-specific” and focuses on whether the defendant consciously disregarded a serious risk of death while continuing reckless conduct “with an appreciation of the grave risks involved.”

Importantly, Bender uses Heidgen to reject a rigid feature-matching approach. Even if certain facts present in other cases (e.g., wrong-way driving) are absent here, the question remains whether the proved circumstances allow a rational inference of continued, grave-risk behavior plus complete disregard for human life.

People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 (2007)

For legal sufficiency review, the Court applied People v Danielson: whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, there exists a “valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences” supporting guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard shaped the Court’s treatment of defendant’s actions and demeanor as jury-issues, not appellate reweighing.

People v Sidbury, 42 NY3d 497 (2024)

People v Sidbury served as the Court’s principal guide for applying CPL 250.10 and for balancing enforcement of statutory notice rules against the constitutional right to present a defense. The Court reiterated that CPL 250.10’s animating principle is “procedural fairness and orderliness” and eliminating surprise to the prosecution. Sidbury also supplied the framework that preclusion may be appropriate especially where delay amounts to “willful misconduct” and a lesser sanction would perpetuate prejudice.

People v Almonor, 93 NY2d 571 (1999)

Quoted through Sidbury, People v Almonor reinforced the policy objective behind CPL 250.10: avoiding surprise and enabling the People to prepare—particularly by obtaining an independent psychiatric evaluation and relevant records when psychiatric evidence is proposed.

Michigan v Lucas, 500 US 145 (1991)

Cited via Sidbury, Michigan v Lucas supports the broader constitutional proposition that notice requirements can be enforced by exclusion in appropriate circumstances. Bender deploys Lucas to underscore that preclusion can be a legitimate sanction when late disclosure undermines the adversary process and causes prejudice that lesser remedies would not cure.

People v Berk, 88 NY2d 257 (1996)

The Court invoked People v Berk for the constitutional dimension: excluding relevant defense testimony as a sanction implicates the defendant’s right to present witnesses. But Berk also sets the balancing requirement—trial courts must weigh that right against prejudice to the People from belated notice. Bender treats the trial court’s decision as a proper exercise of that balancing.

Appellate Division reference: 236 AD3d 1184 (3d Dept 2025)

While not a Court of Appeals precedent, the opinion aligns with the Appellate Division majority’s observation that there is no “checklist” for depraved indifference in driving cases. The Court of Appeals adopted that framing to emphasize totality-of-circumstances analysis over categorical comparisons.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Depraved indifference and extreme driving: totality, escalation, and conscious continuation

The Court’s sufficiency holding rests on how the pattern of conduct supported an inference not just of recklessness, but of depraved indifference. The key proof emphasized by the Court included:

  • Duration and repeated opportunities to stop: over approximately three-tenths of a mile, defendant engaged in multiple discrete dangerous acts rather than a single instantaneous lapse.
  • Multiple collisions and “pushing” behavior: testimony described defendant repeatedly striking and pushing a van “again and again and again,” suggesting persistence in dangerous conduct after impacts occurred.
  • Escalation and flight: after major crashes (including a rollover where a hydrant pierced the roof near the driver’s head), defendant “took off,” continued onto sidewalk/parking areas, and then struck an occupied house.
  • Demeanor evidence: witnesses described defendant as eyes open with a “look of rage,” supporting an inference of awareness rather than unconsciousness or inadvertence.
  • Objective crash data: the brakes were not applied in the eight seconds prior to impact with the house, bolstering the inference of continued, unmitigated risk-taking at the endpoint of the episode.

From these facts, the Court concluded a rational jury could find defendant appreciated the grave risk of death to others yet continued regardless—satisfying the depraved indifference mental-state requirement described in Suarez and Heidgen.

A particularly important doctrinal point is the Court’s insistence that depraved indifference is not proven by checking off specific “signature” driving facts (red lights, oncoming lanes). Instead, the question is whether the defendant’s conduct, viewed as a whole, permits the inference of complete disregard for whether others live or die.

B. CPL 250.10: “good cause,” prejudice, and why pandemic delay did not carry the day

On the psychiatric-evidence issue, the Court treated CPL 250.10 as a system designed to prevent surprise and ensure the People can meaningfully test psychiatric claims. The statute requires written notice of intent to offer psychiatric evidence, generally within 30 days of a not-guilty plea and before trial, but allows late filing “in the interest of justice and for good cause shown.”

The Court approved County Court’s reasoning on two linked findings:

  • No adequate good cause: the pandemic did not explain why notice could not be filed by email or other means; and, more importantly, once defense counsel learned of the bipolar-related theory (April 18, 2021), the court found “absolutely no good cause” for waiting until May 18—six days before trial.
  • Concrete prejudice to the People: the late shift toward bipolar/mania evidence deprived the People of the opportunity for an independent examination and full review of mental health records—precisely the kind of prejudice CPL 250.10 aims to avoid per Sidbury and Almonor.

The Court also noted that County Court did not foreclose the defense entirely: it allowed medical evidence about sleep disorder while excluding the unnoticed psychiatric theory tied to bipolar disorder. That tailoring supported the conclusion that the trial court meaningfully balanced the right to present a defense against prejudice and trial orderliness, consistent with Berk and Sidbury.

3.3 Impact

Driving-based depraved indifference

People v Bender reinforces that depraved indifference in vehicular cases can be supported by a combination of (i) repeated, escalating dangerous acts, (ii) evidence suggesting awareness (demeanor, eyes open, continued conduct after impacts), and (iii) objective proof consistent with non-mitigation (e.g., no braking). The decision is likely to be cited for the proposition that:

  • No “checklist” controls: absence of commonly cited features (red-light running; oncoming traffic) does not defeat depraved indifference if the overall proof supports the required mens rea.
  • Persistence matters: multiple impacts and continued driving can powerfully evidence conscious disregard rather than momentary misjudgment.

CPL 250.10 enforcement and late psychiatric theories

On psychiatric evidence, Bender strengthens trial courts’ willingness to impose preclusion where:

  • the defense theory shifts close to trial toward a psychiatric explanation,
  • notice is delayed without a persuasive, specific justification, and
  • the People show practical prejudice in their ability to prepare (especially independent examination and records review).

The opinion is also a warning that generalized references to health or “mental health” in disclosures are not a substitute for timely CPL 250.10 notice, and that pandemic-era disruption, without more, may not establish “good cause” where filing mechanisms exist.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Depraved indifference (mens rea): not an intent to kill, but a state of mind showing the defendant simply does not care whether their conduct kills someone—“utter disregard for the value of human life.”
  • Recklessness vs. depraved indifference: recklessness is conscious disregard of a substantial risk; depraved indifference adds an extreme level of callousness toward life-threatening consequences, inferred from the circumstances and continuation of conduct.
  • Legal sufficiency review: an appellate court asks whether any rational jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt when viewing evidence in the People’s favor—not whether the appellate judges themselves are convinced.
  • CPL 250.10 notice: a procedural requirement that defendants must give written notice if they plan to use psychiatric evidence, so the prosecution can investigate and prepare.
  • Preclusion: excluding evidence from trial as a sanction for noncompliance. Courts must balance fairness to the defense against prejudice and surprise to the prosecution.
  • Good cause: a legitimate, specific reason justifying late compliance; not merely delay, inconvenience, or generalized disruption.

5. Conclusion

People v Bender is a two-part reaffirmation with practical bite. First, it underscores that depraved indifference in dangerous-driving prosecutions is a totality-of-circumstances inquiry with no rigid checklist; repeated collisions, continued escalation, demeanor evidence, and failure to mitigate risk can together support the “utter disregard” inference required by Penal Law § 120.25. Second, it confirms that CPL 250.10’s psychiatric-notice requirement will be strictly enforced where late disclosure lacks good cause and materially prejudices the People’s ability to respond—without violating the constitutional right to present a defense when courts appropriately weigh that right against the harm caused by surprise and delay.