Pennsylvania F3 Robbery Is Not Generic Robbery: Mere Snatching Cannot Support the Guidelines Enhancement

Case: United States v. Mashaq White, No. 22-2197, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

Opinion author: Circuit Judge Freeman, joined by Circuit Judges Krause and Roth.

1. Introduction

The Third Circuit held that Pennsylvania third-degree felony robbery under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3701(a)(1)(v) does not qualify as the enumerated offense of “robbery” under the 2021 Sentencing Guidelines. The distinction turns on a deceptively simple question: does taking property with the slightest physical contact necessarily amount to generic robbery?

The court answered no. Generic robbery requires force sufficient to overcome a victim’s resistance. Pennsylvania’s statute reaches further because it also criminalizes sudden snatchings involving no resistance and no more force than necessary to separate the victim from the property. Consequently, Pennsylvania F3 robbery cannot categorically qualify as generic robbery.

The appellant, Mashaq White, challenged an enhanced sentence for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. The United States defended the enhancement on the ground that White’s prior Pennsylvania robbery conviction supplied a necessary second qualifying conviction. Because that conviction did not qualify, the court vacated White’s sentence and remanded for resentencing without the enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(1).

2. Background and Summary of the Opinion

The federal offense and sentencing dispute

In June 2020, Philadelphia police responded to a reported burglary at a Rite Aid store. Officers encountered White running down an aisle with a gun. An officer tackled him, arrested him, and recovered a semiautomatic pistol. White subsequently pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Section 2K2.1(a)(1) provides an increased base offense level when the firearm offense involves a semiautomatic firearm capable of accepting a large-capacity magazine and follows at least two felony convictions for crimes of violence or controlled substance offenses. The parties agreed that the firearm requirement was satisfied and that White had one qualifying crime-of-violence conviction. Whether he had the necessary second conviction depended on Pennsylvania F3 robbery.

The District Court concluded that the robbery conviction qualified. Applying the enhancement increased White’s calculated advisory range from 100–125 months to 140–175 months. Because the statutory maximum applicable to his offense was then 120 months, the enhanced advisory sentence became 120 months. After considering White’s troubled background, the District Court varied downward and imposed 110 months.

The appellate decision

The Third Circuit reviewed the classification question de novo and reached four principal conclusions:

  1. Existing circuit precedent already established that Pennsylvania F3 robbery does not satisfy the Guidelines’ elements clause.
  2. Generic robbery under the applicable enumerated-offenses clause requires force sufficient to overcome a victim’s resistance.
  3. Pennsylvania F3 robbery permits conviction for mere snatching without overcoming resistance and therefore covers conduct outside generic robbery.
  4. Without that conviction as a qualifying predicate, White lacked the two qualifying convictions necessary for the enhancement.

The court accordingly vacated the sentence and remanded. White’s guilty plea and federal conviction remained intact.

A separate procedural issue did not affect the appeal. Although the government had not timely objected to the presentence report’s conclusion that Pennsylvania F3 robbery was not a crime of violence, White did not pursue his Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 objection on appeal. The court therefore resolved the substantive classification issue rather than deciding that procedural dispute.

3. Legal Reasoning

A. Two distinct routes to a “crime of violence”

The 2021 version of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) supplied two potentially relevant routes to classification:

  • The elements clause: an offense must have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another person.
  • The enumerated-offenses clause: an offense must correspond to one of the listed crimes, including robbery.

Failure under the elements clause does not, by itself, establish failure under the enumerated-offenses clause. Each clause requires its own analysis. White’s appeal concerned the second route because earlier decisions had already foreclosed the first.

B. The categorical approach examines legal elements, not White’s conduct

The court compared the elements of Pennsylvania F3 robbery with those of generic robbery. The question was not whether White’s particular prior robbery involved substantial violence. It was whether the Pennsylvania offense necessarily required everything generic robbery requires.

If a state statute permits conviction on a broader basis than the generic offense, the conviction cannot serve as the relevant enumerated predicate. Even a factually violent instance of that state offense cannot eliminate the mismatch between the two legal definitions.

Here, the court did not need to imagine an unlikely prosecution at the statute’s margins. Pennsylvania appellate decisions actually sustained robbery convictions for the kinds of snatching that generic robbery excludes.

C. Pennsylvania requires awareness, but not resistance

Pennsylvania F3 robbery occurs when a person, while committing a theft, “physically takes or removes property from the person of another by force however slight.” Pennsylvania’s highest court has interpreted that language to include force sufficient merely to separate the victim from property on or about the victim’s body.

The key state decision, Commonwealth v. Brown, treated a purse snatching as robbery despite the absence of evidence that the victim resisted. The victim’s awareness mattered: a conscious taking could provoke a reflexive response and thereby create a risk of injury. Pennsylvania thus distinguished this offense from undetected pickpocketing.

But awareness and resistance are different requirements. A victim may realize that a wallet has been snatched without opposing the taking. Pennsylvania’s concern about the possibility of a defensive reaction does not establish that the offender actually overcame resistance.

D. Generic robbery requires overcoming resistance

The applicable Guidelines did not expressly define robbery. The court therefore used its generic meaning: taking property from another person or the person’s immediate presence by force or intimidation.

Earlier circuit precedent described the force requirement as de minimis. This opinion clarifies that description: the required force may be slight, but it must overcome some resistance. The decisive consideration is not simply the quantity of physical energy involved, but what that force accomplishes.

Using Stokeling v. United States, the court explained the contrast:

  • Snatching money from a victim’s hand and running away does not, without more, establish the required force.
  • Peeling back a victim’s fingers to take money does overcome resistance and can satisfy the requirement.

No prolonged struggle, serious injury, or substantial resistance is necessary. Nevertheless, for a taking relying on physical force rather than intimidation, merely removing the property is insufficient.

E. The mismatch defeats the enhancement

The comparison was therefore straightforward:

Offense Relevant force requirement
Pennsylvania F3 robbery Force however slight, including mere snatching accompanied by the victim’s awareness.
Generic robbery Force sufficient to overcome a victim’s resistance, however slight that resistance.

Because the Pennsylvania offense encompasses the first category without necessarily satisfying the second, it is overbroad. The court’s analysis concerned robbery’s force requirement; it did not eliminate intimidation as an alternative means of committing generic robbery.

4. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

A. Review standards and the categorical framework

  • United States v. Quinnones, 16 F.4th 414 (3d Cir. 2021): Established that whether an offense qualifies as a Guidelines crime of violence is a legal question subject to plenary review. The Third Circuit therefore independently examined the District Court’s classification.
  • United States v. Ramos, 892 F.3d 599 (3d Cir. 2018): Supplied the distinction between the “elements clause” and the “enumerated offenses clause,” organizing the two possible routes to qualification.
  • United States v. Brown, 765 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 2014), and Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013): Supplied the categorical method of comparing statutory elements with the generic offense. These decisions directed attention away from the facts of White’s prior conduct.
  • United States v. Brasby, 61 F.4th 127 (3d Cir. 2023): Explained that an offense qualifies when its elements match or are narrower than the generic definition. It also supported consulting the approach taken by a majority of states when identifying a generic offense.
  • United States v. Marrero, 743 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 2014): Supported using a generic definition where the Guidelines list an offense without defining it. The opinion acknowledged that this decision was abrogated on other grounds by Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015); that qualification did not undermine the particular proposition relied upon.
  • United States v. Scott, 14 F.4th 190 (3d Cir. 2021): Supplied the governing general definition of generic robbery: taking property from another person or the person’s immediate presence by force or intimidation.

B. Pennsylvania decisions establishing the statute’s breadth

Commonwealth v. Brown, 484 A.2d 738 (Pa. 1984), was the central state-law authority. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld a conviction arising from a purse grabbed from the victim’s arm. It explained that the amount of force was immaterial if sufficient to separate the victim from the property, and it emphasized the victim’s awareness. The Third Circuit treated that authoritative construction—not an abstract reading of “force however slight”—as establishing the offense’s reach.

The opinion also referred to Justice Zappala’s dissent in that case, which criticized the majority for effectively treating a taking from the person as force per se. That dissent illuminated the breadth of the majority’s rule; it was not itself the source of governing Pennsylvania law.

  • Commonwealth v. Bedell, 954 A.2d 1209 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008): Upheld a conviction where the defendant took a wallet from the victim’s hand and fled, emphasizing that the victim was fully aware. This furnished a concrete example of conduct Pennsylvania punishes as robbery even though it need not involve overcoming resistance.
  • Commonwealth v. Williams, 550 A.2d 579 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988): Reversed a conviction where an unconscious victim was rolled over so his wallet could be removed. Although physical movement occurred, the victim was unaware of it. The case demonstrated that awareness, rather than resistance alone, distinguishes Pennsylvania’s offense.
  • Commonwealth v. Jones, 771 A.2d 796 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001): Explained that purse snatching can constitute robbery because the victim is aware of the force, even without force directed at the victim. It reinforced the distinction between Pennsylvania’s rule and the generic requirement.
  • Commonwealth v. Moore, 494 A.2d 447 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985): Described purse snatching as the most common crime intended to fall within the subsection. That characterization showed that the overbreadth concerned ordinary applications of the statute, not exceptional hypotheticals.
  • New Jersey v. Sein, 590 A.2d 665 (N.J. 1991): Recognized Pennsylvania’s departure from the predominant rule that sudden snatching, without an opportunity for resistance, is insufficient for robbery. It helped place Pennsylvania’s interpretation in comparative perspective.

The court also cited LaFave’s Substantive Criminal Law, Ohlin’s Wharton’s Criminal Law, and American Jurisprudence. These secondary sources supported the conclusion that most jurisdictions distinguish mere snatching from robbery requiring additional force.

C. Existing decisions excluding Pennsylvania F3 robbery from the elements clause

United States v. Peppers, 899 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2018), held that Pennsylvania F3 robbery does not satisfy the Armed Career Criminal Act’s elements clause because the offense reaches “the merest touching.” The ACCA clause is identical to the relevant Guidelines clause. United States v. Henderson, 80 F.4th 207 (3d Cir. 2023), confirmed the corresponding consequence under the Guidelines.

Peppers relied on Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010), which defined ACCA physical force as force capable of causing physical pain or injury and distinguished it from mere touching. The present opinion used those authorities in two ways: to treat the elements-clause issue as settled and to identify the low minimum force Pennsylvania permits.

The court nevertheless conducted a separate generic-robbery analysis. It did not assume that failure under one clause automatically establishes failure under the other.

D. The central influence of Stokeling

Stokeling v. United States, 586 U.S. 73 (2019), supplied the decisive explanation of force sufficient to overcome resistance. It held that Florida robbery satisfied ACCA’s elements clause because Florida required the offender to overcome the victim’s resistance, however slight.

Although Stokeling v. United States did not directly decide the generic Guidelines definition, the Third Circuit found its common-law analysis applicable. The Supreme Court had explained that a significant majority of states used the resistance-based requirement. Both parties agreed that generic robbery shared that requirement.

Robinson v. State, 692 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1997), supplied the authoritative Florida distinction underlying that analysis: robbery requires resistance overcome by the offender’s force; mere snatching does not suffice. That distinction made Florida robbery materially different from Pennsylvania F3 robbery.

The opinion also cited Delligatti v. United States, 604 U.S. 423 (2025), specifically Justice Gorsuch’s dissent, for its description of the exclusion of mere touching and simple snatching. This was corroborative discussion, not a majority holding independently controlling White’s appeal.

E. Other circuits supporting the generic-force requirement

  • United States v. Parham, 129 F.4th 280 (4th Cir. 2025): Described generic robbery as requiring enough force to overcome resistance or more force than merely removing an item from the victim’s grasp.
  • United States v. Smith, 928 F.3d 714 (8th Cir. 2019): Recognized, following Stokeling v. United States, that overcoming resistance supplies the relevant force level for generic robbery.
  • United States v. Lockley, 632 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2011): Treated Florida robbery’s resistance-based elements as equivalent to generic robbery, offering additional support for the same formulation.
  • United States v. Rabb, 942 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2019): Specifically concluded that generic robbery does not encompass sudden purse snatching. It closely supported the application of the resistance distinction to Pennsylvania’s statute.
  • United States v. Love, 7 F.4th 674 (7th Cir. 2021): Illustrated the boundary between mere snatching and peeling back a victim’s fingers to take money. Its practical example helped explain why slight force may qualify without reducing robbery to every physical taking.

F. Reconciling Graves and North Carolina robbery

The government principally relied on United States v. Graves, 877 F.3d 494 (3d Cir. 2017), which held that North Carolina common-law robbery categorically matched generic robbery and described the necessary force as de minimis. The government argued that Pennsylvania’s slight-force requirement should produce the same result.

The court rejected that argument without overruling the earlier decision. “De minimis” did not mean that any contact or property-removing force would suffice. North Carolina still required force overcoming resistance, as the following authorities demonstrated:

  • North Carolina v. Chance, 662 S.E.2d 405, 2008 WL 2415981 (N.C. Ct. App. June 17, 2008) (unpublished): Involved pushing the victim’s hands off a cigarette box. That act overcame the victim’s physical control rather than merely removing unattended or unresisting property.
  • United States v. Dinkins, 928 F.3d 349 (4th Cir. 2019): Explained that North Carolina common-law robbery requires force sufficient to overcome resistance and interpreted the conduct in North Carolina v. Chance accordingly.
  • North Carolina v. Robertson, 531 S.E.2d 490 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000): Found insufficient force where the defendant used only enough force to remove a purse from the victim’s shoulder. This directly distinguished North Carolina’s law from Pennsylvania’s treatment of comparable snatching.
  • United States v. Gattis, 877 F.3d 150 (4th Cir. 2017): Confirmed that North Carolina robbery requires more than a sudden snatching and more than the minimum force necessary to remove property from a victim’s grasp.

The resulting clarification is important: verbal similarity between “de minimis force” and “force however slight” does not establish equivalence. Courts must examine what the respective jurisdictions actually require.

5. Impact and Limits

Immediate sentencing consequences

White must be resentenced without the § 2K2.1(a)(1) enhancement at issue. The decision does not prescribe his new sentence, invalidate his federal conviction, or eliminate the District Court’s ordinary sentencing discretion.

The fact that his original 110-month sentence fell below the enhanced advisory sentence did not prevent vacatur. A downward variance did not cure the erroneous legal premise used to calculate the Guidelines benchmark.

A clearer meaning of “de minimis force”

The opinion’s principal doctrinal contribution is to clarify the Third Circuit’s earlier terminology. Minimal force can satisfy generic robbery when it defeats resistance. Force that merely accomplishes a sudden taking cannot qualify simply because some physical energy was involved.

This distinction should guide future categorical comparisons involving purse snatching, wallet grabbing, and similarly low-force theft offenses. It also discourages courts from relying on statutory labels instead of authoritative state interpretations.

Relationship to the 2023 Guidelines amendment

Amendment 822, effective in November 2023, added an express robbery definition to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(e)(3), including the requirement of force sufficient to overcome a victim’s resistance. The Sentencing Commission explained that this language came from Stokeling v. United States.

The court used the amendment to reinforce its interpretation of generic robbery under the 2021 Guidelines. It did not retroactively apply the amendment to White. For cases governed by the later Guidelines, analysis begins with the express definition; this opinion’s treatment of Pennsylvania’s force requirement remains highly relevant.

Boundaries of the holding

  • The decision concerns § 3701(a)(1)(v), not every Pennsylvania robbery subsection.
  • It does not imply that every offense called “snatching” necessarily falls outside generic robbery; force overcoming resistance remains decisive.
  • It does not mean conduct underlying a Pennsylvania F3 conviction is never violent. It means the statutory elements do not invariably require the necessary force.
  • It does not independently resolve the treatment of the conviction under every other federal statute or every subsequent Guidelines provision.
  • It does not establish automatic reopening or relief for all previously sentenced defendants; any such claim would require its own procedural and substantive analysis.

6. Complex Concepts Simplified

Categorical approach
Compare the legal requirements of the offenses, not the defendant’s particular behavior. If the state offense can be committed without satisfying the generic requirements, it does not categorically match.
Generic robbery
The generally accepted legal definition used when the relevant federal provision names robbery without supplying its own definition. A state’s choice to label an offense “robbery” is not conclusive.
Predicate conviction
A prior conviction that legally qualifies to trigger a sentencing consequence. White’s Pennsylvania robbery conviction remained valid but could not serve as the necessary predicate here.
De minimis force
Very slight force. In this setting, slight force still must overcome resistance; “minimal” does not mean that every touching qualifies.
Awareness versus resistance
Awareness means noticing the taking. Resistance means physically opposing it, even slightly. Pennsylvania’s offense can be satisfied by the former without requiring the latter.
Plenary review
The appellate court decides the legal issue independently rather than deferring to the District Court’s interpretation.
Vacatur and remand
The appellate court sets aside the sentence and returns the case to the District Court for a new sentencing proceeding consistent with its ruling.

7. Conclusion

United States v. Mashaq White establishes that Pennsylvania F3 robbery is broader than generic robbery under the 2021 Sentencing Guidelines because it encompasses mere snatching without overcoming a victim’s resistance. Together with existing elements-clause precedent, that conclusion prevents the conviction from supplying the crime-of-violence predicate needed for White’s enhancement.

The broader lesson is methodological: statutory names and descriptions such as “slight force” cannot replace a close comparison of legal elements. For generic robbery, even minimal resistance matters—and mere awareness of a taking is not its equivalent.