Pending State-Court Docket Orders: Younger Abstention and Immunity for Judicial Acts

Mary Joanna Comer v. Daniel Joseph Tolan (Seventh Circuit, September 22, 2026) is a nonprecedential disposition. It applies established abstention and immunity rules; it does not announce a new binding rule.

Introduction

Mary Joanna Comer sued Judge Daniel Tolan and court clerk Sharon Jorgenson under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 while a Wisconsin criminal prosecution against her was pending. Judge Tolan had ordered papers associated with Comer’s son, Thomas Edward Humphrey—whom she called her “constitutional counsel of choice,” but who was not a licensed attorney—to be stricken and barred future filings by nonparties and unlicensed representatives. Jorgenson docketed the papers as stricken pursuant to that order.

Comer sought damages, a declaration that the order was unconstitutional, restoration of the papers, and an injunction that would include dismissal of her criminal charges. The appeal asked whether a federal court could intervene in the state prosecution over those filing restrictions and whether the judge and clerk could be sued for damages.

Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the complaint at screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Under Younger abstention, the federal court would not grant declaratory or injunctive relief interfering with the pending criminal case. Comer had not shown an extraordinary circumstance depriving her of a state-court remedy: she or licensed counsel could submit papers and challenge the order in state court. Her damages claims also could not proceed. Striking filings was a judicial act protected by Judge Tolan’s absolute immunity, and Jorgenson was immune for implementing his express direction.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • Younger v. Harris supplies the governing restraint on federal injunctions against pending state criminal proceedings. The court found no extraordinary circumstance warranting intervention here. Samuels v. Mackell extends that restraint to a declaratory judgment that would have the same practical effect.
  • FreeEats.com, Inc. v. Indiana informs the exception to abstention: an asserted constitutional injury must leave the defendant without an adequate state remedy before early federal intervention is justified. Comer could raise her objections in the state system.
  • Kowalski v. Boliker, quoting Dellenbach v. Letsinger, and State v. Lee support the court’s description of docket control as an ordinary judicial function. Lawline v. Am. Bar Ass'n supports the state’s authority to regulate who practices law in its courts. Together, these authorities undermined the claim that the filing order was an extraordinary intrusion into Comer’s defense.
  • SKS & Assocs., Inc. v. Dart reinforces that the possibility of losing a constitutional argument in state court does not itself justify turning to federal court. Courthouse News Serv. v. Brown recognizes state courts’ substantial interest in administering their clerks’ offices and filing procedures; it supported declining to order restoration of the papers before the state courts addressed that issue.
  • State v. Haws, involving an attorney’s attempt to obtain a federal injunction permitting representation in a state case, and Nowicki v. Ullsvik, involving a nonlawyer’s challenge to practice restrictions, provided further support for leaving representation disputes to the state process rather than intervening in an ongoing case.
  • Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co. matters to the distinction between remedies: abstention alone may justify staying damages claims, rather than dismissing them. The court therefore separately examined immunity. Stump v. Sparkman establishes absolute damages immunity for judges’ judicial acts; Dellenbach v. Letsinger supported treating record management as such an act. Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc. helped reject Comer’s proposed distinction between striking a submission and otherwise disposing of it.
  • Snyder v. Nolen establishes that immunity can extend to a nonjudicial official acting at a judge’s explicit direction. The court applied that principle to Jorgenson’s implementation of Judge Tolan’s order.

Legal Reasoning

The court treated Comer’s requested remedies separately. Dismissing the charges, restoring filings to the state docket, or declaring the filing order unconstitutional would invite federal interference with an ongoing state prosecution. The order did not foreclose Comer’s defense: it permitted submissions by Comer herself or licensed counsel. Whether particular papers were wrongly stricken, and whether the restriction violated state or federal law, were questions she could present through the state courts, including appellate review at the appropriate time. The opinion did not decide the ultimate merits of her constitutional objections or whether each stricken submission should have been accepted.

Damages required a different analysis because abstention alone was not a reason simply to dismiss those claims. Judge Tolan’s decision about which papers could be filed was judicial in nature, whether expressed as striking the papers or disposing of them another way. Absolute judicial immunity therefore barred damages against him. Jorgenson’s docketing of the papers as stricken implemented his express order, bringing that conduct within the immunity described in Snyder v. Nolen. Although Comer pointed to the six-day interval between receipt of the papers and docketing, the court held that the delay did not remove immunity for implementing the judge’s subsequent direction; it did not announce a general rule immunizing every independent act or delay by a clerk.

Impact

As a nonprecedential disposition, the order is not a new binding precedent. It nevertheless illustrates how existing doctrines operate together. A defendant generally must contest filing and representation restrictions in the pending state criminal case, rather than seek immediate federal equitable relief. At the same time, courts must distinguish such relief from damages claims and assess any asserted immunity independently. The decision does not establish that every filing restriction is lawful; it identifies the proper forum and timing for contesting this one.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Younger abstention: Federal courts ordinarily do not interrupt an ongoing state criminal case when the defendant can raise federal-rights objections through the state process.
  • Equitable relief: A declaration or injunction directing what officials must do, as distinct from an award of money damages.
  • Absolute judicial immunity: Protection against damages liability for acts performed as a judge, even when a litigant alleges the judicial decision was wrong.
  • Proceeding pro se: Representing oneself. The order distinguished papers submitted by Comer from those submitted on her behalf by an unlicensed third party.
  • Striking a filing: Removing a submission from consideration by court order; here, the papers were docketed under a description reflecting that they had been stricken.

Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit held that Comer must pursue her objections to the docket order through the state courts, not through federal intervention in her pending prosecution. Damages were separately barred by immunity for the judge’s judicial act and the clerk’s compliance with his explicit order. The opinion’s significance lies in its careful separation of abstention, the availability of state remedies, and immunity—not in the creation of a new binding rule.